Crystal Wall Pty Ltd v Pham

Case [2005] NSWCA 449


NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      Crystal Wall Pty Limited v Pham [2005]  NSWCA 449

FILE NUMBER(S):
40211/05

HEARING DATE(S):               4 November 2005

JUDGMENT DATE: 15/12/2005

PARTIES:
Crystal Wall Pty Limited (Appellant)
Van Chanh Pham (Respondent)

JUDGMENT OF:       Handley JA Santow JA McColl JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          DC 11645/01

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Acting Judge Murray QC

COUNSEL:
M J Neil QC/ R B Page (Appellant)
B R Ferrari (Respondent)

SOLICITORS:
Moroney-Betts (Appellant)
John D Hancock (Respondent)

CATCHWORDS:
NEGLIGENCE – Employee injured whilst engaging in lifting activities – inconsistent accounts of how employee injured – whether finding that employer breached its duty of care open on the evidence – HELD - open to primary judge to find for the respondent if, on the whole of the evidence, he could reasonably infer the accident was due to the employer’s negligence - DAMAGES – employee suffered muscular ligamentous strains and aggravation of pre-existing degenerative changes in low back – Workers Compensation Act 1987 – modified common law damages – whether employee’s injuries constituted 30% of a most extreme case – HELD – assessment of 30% so unreasonable as to warrant appellant intervention – assessment of 20% substituted (D)

LEGISLATION CITED:
Workers Compensation Act 1987
Workers Compensation Legislation Amendment Act 2001
Suitors’ Fund Act 1951

DECISION:
(1) Appeal allowed.
(2) Judgment in favour of the respondent insofar as it ordered the appellant to pay the respondent $233,391.00 set aside and in lieu thereof order the appellant to pay the respondent $23,000.00.
(3) Respondent to pay 50% of the appellant’s costs of the appeal and to have a certificate under the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 if qualified.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA         40211/05
DC         11645/01

HANDLEY JA
SANTOW JA
McCOLL JA

Thursday, 15 December 2005

CRYSTAL WALL PTY LIMITED v Van Chanh PHAM

Judgment

  1. HANDLEY JA:     I agree with McColl JA.

  2. SANTOW JA:      I agree with McColl JA both as to liability and, regrettably, as to damages.  Her judgment explains with clarity why those consequences must follow.  I would wish however to add this. 

  3. This appeal illustrates an anomaly in the changes introduced by the modified common law regime in Part 5 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (“the Act”). It is one which leads to harsh and probably unanticipated results in cases like this.

  4. The Act here renders a 10% difference (between 20% of a most extreme case and 30%) the cause of an enormous reduction in damages from $233,391 to $23,000.  It does so to a plaintiff who, by reason of lack of English and a bad stutter is now essentially unemployable.  Such a person would be most unlikely ever to find light duties given those disabilities.  And heavy duties are now impossible, by reason of his work injury. 

  5. Thus, though suffering a significant back injury he cannot recover at all for economic loss from that injury; that is the effect of the modified regime.  There…

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AGLC
Crystal Wall Pty Ltd v Pham [2005] NSWCA 449
Case
[2005] NSWCA 449
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Crystal Wall Pty Ltd appealed a judgment in favour of its former employee, Mr. Pham, who had sustained injuries while engaged in lifting activities. The primary judge had found that Crystal Wall Pty Ltd breached its duty of care to Mr. Pham, awarding him damages for muscular ligamentous strains and aggravation of pre-existing degenerative changes in his low back. The appeal concerned whether the primary judge's finding of negligence was open on the evidence and, alternatively, the quantum of damages awarded under the *Workers Compensation Act 1987*.

The court was required to determine two principal issues. Firstly, whether it was open to the primary judge to reasonably infer, on the whole of the evidence, that Mr. Pham's accident was due to Crystal Wall Pty Ltd's negligence, notwithstanding any inconsistencies in Mr. Pham's account of the incident. Secondly, if negligence was established, whether the primary judge's assessment of Mr. Pham's injuries as constituting 30% of a most extreme case for the purposes of calculating modified common law damages was so unreasonable as to warrant appellate intervention.

The Full Court held that it was open to the primary judge to find for Mr. Pham if, on the whole of the evidence, he could reasonably infer that the accident was due to the employer's negligence. This principle, derived from cases such as *Doonan v Beacham* and *Mummery v Irvings Pty Ltd*, allows a plaintiff to succeed if the proven facts lead to the conclusion that the injuries resulted from a breach of duty, even if the specific mechanism of injury is not definitively established or if there are alternative breaches of the same duty. However, the Court found that the primary judge's assessment of 30% of a most extreme case was unreasonable.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed. The judgment in favour of Mr. Pham for $233,391.00 was set aside, and an order was substituted for Crystal Wall Pty Ltd to pay Mr. Pham $23,000.00. Mr. Pham was also ordered to pay 50% of the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Appeal allowed.

(2) Judgment in favour of the respondent insofar as it ordered the appellant to pay the respondent $233,391.00 set aside and in lieu thereof order the appellant to pay the respondent $23,000.00.

(3) Respondent to pay 50% of the appellant’s costs of the appeal and to have a certificate under the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 if qualified.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Ferrari submitted that the respondent’s essential account was that he was injured when lifting a panel of glass and that the evidence disclosed the panels of glass were too heavy in the circumstances. He argued that it was open to the primary judge to find lifting a panel of glass caused the respondent’s injury, even if he rejected his account that the injury was suffered on the first lift.Consideration It was open to the primary judge to find for the respondent if, on the whole of the evidence, his Honour could reasonably infer that the accident was due to the appellant’s negligence. In Doonan v Beacham [1953] HCA 38; (1953) 87 CLR 346 the plaintiff’s evidence failed to establish that the accident in which she was injured was due to any of the causes particularised. The defendant called no evidence, and submitted that there was no case to go to the jury. The trial judge directed the jury to find for the defendant. Williams ACJ, with whose reasons all other members of the High Court agreed, said (at 351): “In my opinion the jury are entitled to consider the evidence as a whole and if, on the whole of the evidence, the jury can reasonably infer that the accident was due to the negligence of the defendant, then they can find for the plaintiff. When I say the whole of the evidence I mean the whole of the evidence which is admissible within the scope of the particulars.” Dixon CJ, Webb, Fullagar and Taylor JJ developed this proposition in Mummery v Irvings Pty Ltd [1956] HCA 45; (1956) 96 CLR 99, explaining (at 110):“In an action conveniently described as a negligence action the particular duty, a breach of which is relied upon to establish negligence on the part of the defendant, may be alleged to have been transgressed in a variety of ways and if the plaintiff particularises the transgression or transgressions relied upon the defendant may, subject to the discretion of the court, hold him to the issue or issues of fact so raised. But the action is still for a breach of the duty specified and the defendant will not defeat the plaintiff's claim either by establishing that the plaintiff's injuries resulted from or were consistent with some other breach of the same duty. If the facts, as proved in the case, lead to the conclusion that the injuries resulted either from one or the other the plaintiff will succeed. This view is implicit in the decision in Doonan v Beacham …” Doonan v Beacham and Mummery v Irvings Pty Ltd were applied in Valeriani v Gibson [1963] NSWR 1430 (at 1435) where Herron ACJ, who delivered the judgment of the Full Court said “[e]ven where particulars have been supplied, the issue of negligence involves a consideration of the evidence as a whole.” Accordingly the Full Court held the trial judge erred in ruling the plaintiff could not rely upon an issue of excessive speed, of which there was evidence in both the plaintiff and the defendant’s cases, but on which the plaintiff’s counsel had not opened to the jury.