Ferella v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ferella v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2010] FCA 766

Citation: Ferella v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2010] FCA 766
Parties: ANGELO FERELLA and GUSTAVO FERELLA v OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATES OF ANGELO FERELLA AND GUSTAVO FERELLA
File number: NSD 1284 of 2009
Judge: YATES J
Date of judgment: 22 July 2010
Catchwords:

BANKRUPTCY – whether discharged bankrupt is entitled to bring an action under s 179(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)

Held: Yes.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – legal professional privilege – whether paragraphs of pleading put in issue the contents of privileged communications so as to waive privilege

Held:  No waiver of privilege.

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 5(1), 43(2), 55(8), 178, 179(1)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 37M

Federal Court Rules, O 20 r 2

Cases cited: Alafaci, Re; Registrar in Bankruptcy v Hardwick (1976) 9 ALR 262
Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto Ltd (2006) 151 FCR 341
Cheesman, Re; Cheesman v Waters (1997) 143 ALR 78
Gault, Re; Gault v Law (1981) 57 FLR 165
Macchia v Nilant (2001) 110 FCR 101
Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1
Official Receiver v Todd (1986) 14 FCR 177
Quinn, Re; Ex parte Quinn v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1995) 63 FCR 129
Registrar in Bankruptcy v Bradley (1983) 72 FLR 231
Watson v Healey (1996) 64 FCR 301
Wilson v The Commonwealth of Australia [1999] FCA 219
Zegarac v Rambaldi [2010] FCA 219
Date of hearing: 2 June 2010
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 78
Counsel for the Applicants: D P M Ash
Solicitor for the Applicants: Colin Biggers & Paisley
Counsel for the Respondent: S Golledge
Counsel for the Respondent: Sally Nash & Co

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1284 of 2009

BETWEEN:

ANGELO FERELLA
First Applicant

GUSTAVO FERELLA
Second Applicant

AND:

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATES OF ANGELO FERELLA AND GUSTAVO FERELLA
Respondent

JUDGE:

YATES J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 JULY 2010

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Within seven days the parties are to endeavour to agree on the form of orders giving effect to these reasons.  If agreement cannot be reached in that time, the parties are to re-list the proceeding at the earliest possible time by arrangement with my Associate.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1284 of 2009

BETWEEN:

ANGELO FERELLA
First Applicant

GUSTAVO FERELLA
Second Applicant

AND:

OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATES OF ANGELO FERELLA AND GUSTAVO FERELLA
Respondent

JUDGE:

YATES J

DATE:

22 JULY 2010

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. In this proceeding the applicants have applied for an order…

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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 766
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Ferella v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, the primary issue was whether a discharged bankrupt has standing to bring an action under section 179(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The secondary issue revolved around whether specific paragraphs of the pleadings in the case waived legal professional privilege. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, and both issues were considered by the court.

The first legal issue addressed was whether a discharged bankrupt can bring an action under section 179(1) of the Bankruptcy Act. This section allows the court to inquire into the conduct of a trustee in relation to a bankruptcy and permits the court to remove the trustee from office or make an order it deems proper. The court considered the statutory language and relevant case law, particularly the decision in Official Receiver v Todd, where the Full Court held that a discharged bankrupt could be summoned under section 81 of the Bankruptcy Act. The reasoning in Todd emphasised that the trustee's duties continue after the bankrupt is discharged, and the court's role in supervising the trustee's conduct is ongoing. Based on this reasoning and the authorities, the court concluded that a discharged bankrupt retains standing to bring an action under section 179(1).

The second issue was whether certain paragraphs of the pleadings waived legal professional privilege by putting the contents of privileged communications in issue. The court examined the specific paragraphs in question and found that they did not waive privilege. The court held that there was no sufficient indication in the pleadings that the contents of privileged communications were being relied upon or contested. Therefore, the privilege was not waived.

The court's decision affirmed that a discharged bankrupt can indeed bring an action under section 179(1) of the Bankruptcy Act and that the specific pleadings in this case did not waive legal professional privilege. Consequently, the orders required the parties to endeavour to agree on the form of orders to give effect to these reasons within seven days. If they could not reach an agreement, the proceeding was to be re-listed at the earliest possible time.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Within seven days the parties are to endeavour to agree on the form of orders giving effect to these reasons. If agreement cannot be reached in that time, the parties are to re-list the proceeding at the earliest possible time by arrangement with my Associate.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

The question so framed raised a question of law that could be determined by reference to the pleadings without the need for evidence. If resolved in favour of the respondent, the effect would be to bring an end to the proceeding. The legislative background Division 4 of Pt VIII of the Bankruptcy Act is headed “Control over trustees”. It comprises three sections, as follows: 177 Control of creditors over trustees(1)Subject to this Act, in the administration of the estate of a bankrupt, the trustee shall have regard to any lawful directions given by resolution of the creditors at a meeting of the creditors or by the committee of inspection.178 Appeal to Court against trustee’s decision etc.(1)If the bankrupt, a creditor or any other person is affected by an act, omission or decision of the trustee, he or she may apply to the Court, and the Court may make such order in the matter as it thinks just and equitable.(2)The application must be made not later than 60 days after the day on which the person became aware of the trustee’s act, omission or decision.179 Control of trustees by the Court(1)The Court may, on the application of the Inspector‑General, a creditor or the bankrupt, inquire into the conduct of a trustee in relation to a bankruptcy and may do one or both of the following:(a) remove the trustee from office; and (b) make such order as it thinks proper.(2)The Inspector‑General or a creditor may at any time require a trustee to answer an inquiry in relation to the bankrupt’s estate or affairs. Section 5(1) of the Bankruptcy Act defines the word “bankrupt” as follows: bankrupt means a person:(a)against whose estate a sequestration order has been made; or(b)who has become a bankrupt by virtue of the presentation of a debtor’s petition. It is convenient to note now that that definition is not subject to any temporal constraint: Official Receiver v Todd (1986) 14 FCR 177 at 183; Re Cheesman; Cheesman v Waters (1997) 143 ALR 78 at 89; Macchia v Nilant (2001) 110 FCR 101 at [41]. As Lockhart J observed in Todd (at 183): “The description applies to [the person] as aptly after, as it does before, [the person] is discharged from bankruptcy or [their] bankruptcy is annulled”. It is also important to note that the definition applies “unless the contrary intention appears”. The word “end” is defined, relevantly, in s 5(1) as follows:end means:(a)in relation to a bankruptcy – the discharge of the bankrupt from the bankruptcy or the annulment of the bankruptcy;… Section 43(2), which assumed importance in the respondent’s submissions, provides as follows: Upon the making of a sequestration order against the estate of a debtor, the debtor becomes a bankrupt, and continues to be a bankrupt until: (a) he or she is discharged by force of subsection 149(1); or (b) his or her bankruptcy is annulled by force of subsection 74(5) or 153A(1) or under section 153B. Section 55(8), which relates to bankruptcies through acceptance of a debtor’s petition, is substantially in the same terms. The parties’ submissions

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It follows that the respondent would not be obliged to produce the documents sought by paragraph 2 of the notice to produce, as now confined. As it is common ground that the only documents caught by paragraph 2 as so confined are documents that evidence communications that are otherwise privileged from production, it is appropriate, in light of my ruling, to set aside that paragraph of the notice to produce. ISSUE 3: SHOULD ALL EVIDENCE BE PUT ON NOW?The parties’ submissions This issue arises as a matter of case management. The applicants’ submissions on this issue can be summarised as follows:(a)Section 179(1) contemplates two stages to make out a case for relief, not two hearings and two sets of evidence in relation to that case.(b)As a rule, split proceedings should be avoided. Applying case management principles to the present case, a direction requiring all evidence to be put on now is warranted.(c)By making such a direction, no prejudice will be suffered by the respondent. The application is not one by a patently insolvent person attempting to abuse the Court’s process to disturb, inconvenience or over-burden an officer of the Court performing his or her duty.(d)Having regard to the complete break-down in relationship between the parties, it is desirable that the matter be dealt with as swiftly as possible. In advancing these submissions the applicants also made a number of submissions concerning the merits of their case for relief. It is not necessary for me to detail their submissions in that regard. It is sufficient to note that the applicants submit that their case “on paper” is, at this stage, a strong one. The respondent’s submissions can be summarised as follows:(a) Applications under s 179(1) usually involve a two-stage process: an applicant is required to show that there is sufficient reason for there to be an inquiry before the trustee is obliged to respond substantively, including by leading any evidence if that is what the trustee proposes to do.(b)The rationale behind that approach applies with even greater force in a matter such as the present where the applicants seek an inquiry into eleven separate subjects covering conduct over a number of years and involving reconsideration of a large number of acts and alleged omissions on behalf of the trustee, including the conduct of contested litigation in another court.(c) If required to respond with evidence now on all of those matters, the trustee will be obliged to produce a massive amount of evidence, potentially from a number of officers.(d)The applicants’ complaints are entirely without merit and the trustee should not be put to the trouble and expense of responding to such matters until the Court has been satisfied that it is just that an inquiry be held at all and, if so, on what terms and in respect of what matters.(e)The course proposed by the applicants will produce considerable delay in the resolution of this proceeding and greatly increase its likely cost. Consistently with case management principles and the requirements of s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Federal Court Act), the only direction that should be made now is that the respondent put on any affidavit evidence on which it intends to rely in respect of the question whether there should be an inquiry in respect of any of the eleven matters raised by the applicants.Consideration

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicants’ submissions on this issue can be summarised as follows:(a)The Bankruptcy Act contemplates that it will continue to act on bankrupt estates after the discharge of a bankrupt. For example, s 152 requires a discharged bankrupt, even though discharged, to give assistance as the trustee reasonably requires in the realisation and distribution of property vested in the trustee. Also, although s 153(1) provides that the discharge of a bankrupt operates to release the bankrupt from all debts provable in the bankruptcy, that release is subject to a number of exceptions. These provisions contradict the apparent effect of s 43(2). (b)Given that the Bankruptcy Act imposes both rights and duties on the trustee and the bankrupt, before and after discharge, it would be odd to read into s 179(1) a limitation that restricted standing, in the case of a bankrupt, to a bankrupt whose bankruptcy had not been discharged.(c) Macchia, which held that a discharged bankrupt had standing to apply under s 179(1), should be followed. Consideration In my view the applicants were and are entitled to bring an action under s 179(1) of the Bankruptcy Act even though they were discharged from bankruptcy at the time the action was commenced. The weight of authority supports this conclusion and the submissions made by the respondent do not compel a contrary conclusion. The majority judgments in Todd are the starting point for consideration of the relevant authorities. Todd concerned a person who became bankrupt following the presentation of her own petition. Following her discharge from bankruptcy four summonses were issued pursuant to s 81 of the Bankruptcy Act requiring the attendance of the discharged bankrupt and three others for examination in relation to the bankruptcy. The issue was whether a person could be examined under s 81 after the bankrupt had been discharged from bankruptcy. A majority of the Full Court (Fisher and Lockhart JJ) determined that issue affirmatively. In its then form, s 81 provided as follows: The Court or the Registrar may, on the application of a creditor who has proved his debt and on such terms as to costs as the Court or the Registrar thinks fit to impose, or on the application of the Official Receiver or the trustee, at any time summon - (a)the bankrupt or the spouse of the bankrupt; or (b)a person who is known or suspected to have in his possession any of the property of the bankrupt, or is supposed to be indebted to the bankrupt or to be able to give information concerning the bankrupt or his trade dealings, property or affairs, to attend, on a date and at a time and place fixed in the summons, before the Court or the Registrar or, if the Court or the Registrar thinks fit, before a magistrate, to give evidence concerning, and produce any books (whether or not in existence at the time the bankrupt became a bankrupt) in his custody or power relating to, the bankrupt or his trade dealings, property or affairs. Central to the reasoning of both Fisher J and Lockhart J was the fact that, notwithstanding that a bankrupt has been discharged, the trustee in bankruptcy remains as trustee of the undistributed property of the bankrupt estate and continues to have duties in relation to that estate. As Fisher J (at 178) said: The Act does not link temporally the completion of the administration of the bankrupt’s estate, and in particular the ascertainment of the assets, their respective whereabouts and their realisation and distribution, with the obtaining of a discharge with its consequential change of status and release from debts. Many years may separate the date of discharge of the bankrupt on the one hand and the release of the trustee upon completion of his administration.