FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| KLEWER v OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY | [2015] FCCA 196 |
| Catchwords: BANRUPTCY – Injunction – stay of writ of possession – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 |
| Ex parte James; In re Condon (1874) LR 9 Ch App 609 Fode v Stirling Lindsay Horne [2015] FCCA 70 Hypec Electronics Pty Limited (in liq) v Mead & Ors [2003] NSWSCA 934 Young, In the Matter of Macryannis [2011] FCA 1272 |
| Applicant: | LUCY KLEWER |
| Respondent: | OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY |
| File Number: | SYG 186 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Street |
| Hearing date: | 29 January 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 29 January 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 29 January 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | In person via telephone link |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | N/A |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr K Metlej |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Craddock Murray Neumann |
ORDERS
The application be dismissed.
The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT AT SYDNEY |
SYG 186 of 2015
| LUCY KLEWER |
Applicant
And
| OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
In this application, pursuant to this Court’s jurisdiction under s.27 of the Bankruptcy Ac 1966, the applicant sought an order against the respondent, being a trustee in bankruptcy, as follows:
1. A review against the respondent’s decision pursuant to s-178 of the Bankruptcy Act.
2. Any other order the Court deems fit.
An interim order was sought to the effect that the respondent’s writ of possession on the applicant’s Korora home be stayed until further order. It was the step by way of enforcement of the writ that was the subject of the application for review. Section 178 does apply to a discharged bankrupt, Ferella v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2010) FCA 766. The applicant gave sworn evidence by telephone as to the events that had occurred. There was tendered before the Court the writ of possession as exhibit A. It was issued on 18 November 2014 and it makes apparent that the trustee is the registered owner of the relevant property at Korora, New South Wales.
This Court has had opportunity in the decision of Fode v Stirling Lindsay Horne [2015] FCCA 70 at [17] identify the nature of the duties and powers of the trustee, and the importance of those duties and powers, as explained in the decision of Stone J in Young, In the Matter of Macryannis [2011] FCA 1272.
The Court also identified in the Fode, and it’s equally applicable here, the importance of the duties under s.19 that the trustee has in taking steps in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act and the powers that are conferred, including relevantly the power to sell all or any part of the property of the bankrupt under s.134.
The trustee, when the applicant was declared bankrupt, had the relevant property vested in him pursuant to s.58. The trustee has taken steps to have that property registered in his name. The trustee under the Act has a right of priority for under s.109…
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- Case
- [2015] FCCA 196
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether Mr Klewer had demonstrated a "genuine dispute" regarding the existence of the debt. This required the Court to consider whether the grounds raised by Mr Klewer constituted a substantial and not merely a shadowy or ill-founded dispute, and whether those grounds were capable of giving rise to a real question of fact or law.
Judge Street reasoned that the grounds relied upon by Mr Klewer, namely that the judgment debt had been satisfied by a third party and that the judgment itself was obtained by fraud, were not capable of giving rise to a genuine dispute in the context of setting aside a statutory demand. The Court held that a claim of fraud against the judgment itself, or a claim that the debt had been satisfied by a third party, could not be raised as a defence to the statutory demand. Such claims would need to be pursued through separate proceedings to set aside the original judgment. The Court applied the principle that a statutory demand is a summary process and not a forum for litigating the merits of a judgment debt that has not been set aside.
Consequently, the Court dismissed Mr Klewer's application to set aside the statutory demand.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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