FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Young, In the matter of Macryannis [2011] FCA 1272
Citation: Young, In the matter of Macryannis [2011] FCA 1272 Parties: GEOFFREY DAVID MCDONALD AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF THE LATE CHRISTOPHER JOHN MACRYANNIS AND KATHRYN ANNE YOUNG File number: NSD 1955 of 2006 Judge: STONE J Date of judgment: 8 NOVEMBER 2011 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – application under s 179 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) for enquiry into Trustee’s conduct in administering deceased estate – administration under Part XI Bankruptcy Act– Trustee appointed by Court order – delay in distributing assets – application for enquiry brought by creditor of estate – whether creditor has standing to bring application – whether issues identified by creditor warrant an enquiry being ordered – consideration of principles relevant to exercise of Court’s discretion under s 179 – consideration of principles governing the duties of trustees in bankruptcy – Court has high degree of supervision and control over trustees’ conduct – powers of Inspector-General in Bankruptcy – reasons referred to Inspector-General for consideration
BANKRUPTCY – administration under Part XI Bankruptcy Act – whether Trustee entitled to deal with non-divisible assets as part of administration – reference to bankrupt’s assets or estate to be read as reference to whole of deceased person’s property – Trustee required to administer whole of estate which includes non-divisible assets
BANKRUPTCY – application by Trustee to have remuneration fixed – whether Trustee entitled to be remunerated for dealing with exempt assets – consideration of mechanism by which remuneration to be calculated – consideration of s 162(4) Bankruptcy Act and reg 8.08 Bankruptcy Regulations and relevant authorities – whether Trustee entitled to costs, charges and expenses of administration – remuneration and any costs, charges and expenses to be drawn from divisible assets
Words & phrases: “in relation to” Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 5, 30 (1), 109(1)(a) 155H, 162(4), 178, 179, 244, 248, 249(6)(a)-(g), 249(7)(a)-(e) and 249(8)(a)-(d) Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (No 44) (Cth)
Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) s 162(4)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 185
Probate and Administration Act 1898 s 18A
Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW)Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 regs 6.01, 8.08, Divisions 2.4, 2.5 and 2.7 of Sch 4A
Bankruptcy Amendment Regulations 2010 (No 2) reg 4(2)Cases cited: Adsett v Berlouis (1992) 37 FCR 201
Brake v Townsend [2006] FCA 1156
Dare v Doolan [2003] FCA 1451
Doolan v Dare (2005) 142 FCR 287
Ferella v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 2) [2011] FCA 619
Freeman v National Australia Bank Limited [2003] FCA 1233
Hatsatouris v Hatsatouris [2001] NSWCA 408
Macchia v Nilant (2001) 110 FCR 101
Mayne v Jaques (1960) 101 CLR 169
McGoldrick v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1993) 47 FCR 547
Official Receiver in Bankruptcy v Todd (1986) 70 ALR 119
Pattison v Bellin (2000) 103 FCR 590
PMT Partners Pty Limited (in Liquidation) v Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service (1995) 184 CLR 301
Re Alafaci; Registrar in Bankruptcy v Hardwick (1976) 9…
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- Case
- [2011] FCA 1272
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that Young did not have standing to bring the application, as the allegations did not pertain to her directly as a creditor. Regarding the issues raised by Young, the court held that they did not warrant an enquiry being ordered. The court emphasised the high degree of supervision and control it has over trustees' conduct, and it referred the matter to the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy for further consideration. The court clarified that trustees are required to administer the entire estate of a deceased person, including non-divisible assets, and that remuneration for dealing with exempt assets should be calculated according to section 162(4) of the Bankruptcy Act and regulation 8.08 of the Bankruptcy Regulations. Any costs, charges, and expenses associated with the administration of the estate must be drawn from the divisible assets.
The court dismissed the application for an enquiry into the Trustee's conduct and directed the Registrar to forward a copy of the reasons for judgment to the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy. The court also ordered that the Trustee pay Young the total amount of the exempt assets of the estate, including interest, without deduction for costs or remuneration. The costs of Young's application were to be taxed and paid out of the estate, and the Trustee's remuneration for dealing with exempt assets was to be assessed according to the specified sections and regulations. Finally, the court mandated that any payment for costs or remuneration in respect of exempt assets be made only from the divisible assets of the estate.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The costs of the application made by the petitioning creditor, Kathryn Anne Young, for an order for the administration of the estate of the late Christopher John Macryannis under Part XI of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) be taxed and paid out of the Bankrupt Estate of Christopher John Macryannis in accordance with s 109(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act.
2. The application for the Court to inquire into the conduct of the Trustee, Geoffrey David McDonald, in relation to the administration of the Bankrupt Estate of Christopher John Macryannis be dismissed.
3. The Registrar forward to the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy a copy of these reasons for judgment drawing to his attention the comments in paragraph 142 of these reasons.
4. The Trustee, Geoffrey David McDonald, pay to Kathryn Anne Young, or at her direction, the total amount of the exempt assets of the Bankrupt Estate of the late Christopher John Macryannis recovered by him including interest and without deduction for costs, expenses or remuneration whether or not previously deducted.
5. The Interim Application filed on 3 December 2009 by Geoffrey David McDonald as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of the late Christopher John Macryannis be dismissed.
6. Kathryn Anne Young and Geoffrey David McDonald, as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of the late Christopher John Macryannis:
(a) exchange draft orders for the costs of the application referred to in order 2 and the application referred to in order 5 as well as draft written submissions limited to a maximum of 3 pages each, in support of the draft orders for costs for which each contends by no later than 22 November 2011; and
(b) provide draft orders and final written submissions to the chambers of Stone J by 30 November 2011.
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
7. In the absence of consent by the creditors or a committee of inspection, the remuneration of the Trustee, Geoffrey David McDonald, in relation to dealing with the exempt assets of the Bankrupt Estate of the late Christopher John Macryannis be assessed in accordance with s 162(4) of the Bankruptcy Act and regulation 8.08 of the Bankruptcy Regulations as in force immediately prior to 1 December 2010.
8. Any payment to the Trustee, Geoffrey David McDonald of costs incurred and remuneration in respect of dealing with exempt assets be paid only out of the divisible assets of the Bankrupt Estate of the late Christopher John Macryannis.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The last step is, as his Honour points out, the satisfaction of the court. The Supreme Court declaration in relation to the will of Mr Macryannis is proof that the Court was satisfied as to his intention: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 185. This requirement having been met compliance with s 7 is not necessary and, pursuant to s 18A, the document constitutes Mr Macryannis’s will. Therefore, in accordance with s 21 of the WPA Act, the will must be “construed with reference to the real and personal estate comprised in it, to speak and take effect as if it had been made immediately before the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention appears” and takes effect from the testator’s death. ADMINISTRATION UNDER PART XI OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT The history of the tensions and disputes between the Trustee and Mrs Young is replete with misconceptions about the nature of administration of deceased estates under Part X1 of the Bankruptcy Act. In discussing Mrs Young’s standing to seek an enquiry under s 179 and the will of Mr Macryannis, I have addressed some of these misconceptions however, it may be helpful to repeat those points along with other observations. In the main, the rules and procedures that apply to the administration of a deceased estate under Part XI of the Bankruptcy Act, are the same as those that apply to bankruptcies under Part IV of the Act. In each case the divisible property of the relevant estate, including the after-acquired property as soon as it is acquired by or devolves on the bankrupt or the deceased estate, vests in the trustee: s 58(1) and s 249(1). In neither case does the exempt property vest in the trustee however while a Part IV trustee may have some obligations in respect of the exempt property in the nature of things they are less extensive than those of a trustee of a deceased estate. The difference, of course, is attributable to there being, in the former case, a living ‘bankrupt’ who largely retains control of the exempt property. A bankrupt is defined in s 5 as meaning a person against whose estate a sequestration order has been made; or who has become a bankrupt following a debtor’s petition. Section 116(1) defines the divisible property of a bankrupt and expressly excludes from that category property referred to in the following subsections. It does not follow from this exclusion that the trustee has no responsibilities in respect of exempt property. For example, s 116(2B) contemplates property vested in the trustee ceasing to be divisible among creditors because of a resolution of creditors or an order of the Court to that effect. It provides that such property revests in the bankrupt and the trustee’s liabilities in respect of that property are transferred to the bankrupt. Depending on the nature of the property and other factors such as whether the trustee has taken possession of it, there may be steps required of the trustee to ensure that the bankrupt has practical control of the property. Similarly, ss 116(2C) and (4) may require the trustee to make a payment to the bankrupt in the circumstances contemplated in each subsection. It may also be that in the course of taking control of and realising divisible property the trustee may acquire control of property that is properly categorised as exempt under s 116. This hypothesis does not presuppose any breach of duty by the trustee however it certainly requires the trustee to remedy the situation.