FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Archer Capital 4A Pty Ltd as trustee for the Archer Capital Trust 4A v Sage Group plc (No 3) [2013] FCA 1160
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 1160
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that Archer Capital had not engaged in conduct inconsistent with the maintenance of confidentiality over communications with their solicitors. The court noted that Archer Capital's pleadings did not directly reference privileged communications or legal advice, and thus did not constitute an implied waiver of privilege. The court further held that Archer Capital's reliance on their state of mind and assumptions did not necessarily expose any confidential communications to scrutiny. Consequently, the court ruled that Archer Capital had not waived their right to legal professional privilege.
In its decision, the court declined to make further orders for discovery or verification of discovery by Archer Capital, as one of the applicants, Archer Capital 4A Pty Ltd, had been placed into liquidation and had no records or documents related to the case. The court ordered Archer Capital to produce two specific documents for inspection within a week. The court dismissed Sage's application to subpoena UBS, though it indicated a willingness to consider a more defined subpoena. The court concluded by ordering Sage to pay Archer Capital's costs of the interlocutory application.
The final orders of the court included directing Archer Capital to produce two specific documents for inspection, dismissing Sage's subpoena application, and ordering Sage to pay Archer Capital's costs associated with the interlocutory application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicants produce two documents, identified by their barcode numbers (ARC.003.005.9759 and ARC.019.001.0237 and attachment ARC.019.001. 0240), for inspection within one week of the making of this order.
2. The interlocutory application is otherwise dismissed.
3. The respondents pay the applicants costs of, and incidental to, the interlocutory application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In relation to the anticipated evidence of Mr Story, the applicants submit that it is premature to consider whether anticipated evidence gives rise to a waiver because that evidence may not be led or given at trial. Even if Mr Story is called to give evidence, he may not give evidence relating to his state of mind, let alone evidence that raises for scrutiny any confidential communications. Reliance is also placed on the fact that the evidence that Sage points to as raising Mr Story’s state of mind is simply responsive to, or a denial of, Mr Reede’s evidence relating to a conversation.Consideration In my opinion, at this stage of the proceedings the applicants have not engaged in any conduct inconsistent with the maintenance of confidentiality over communications with their solicitors. They have not expressly or impliedly made an assertion, or brought a case, which is either about the contents of an otherwise privileged communication, or which necessarily lays open any confidential communication to scrutiny. In relation to the applicants’ pleaded case, in my opinion the mere fact that the applicants have pleaded a case which involves their reliance upon representations, or their state of mind, or assumptions they claim to have made as a result of the alleged conduct of the respondent, does not give rise to an implied waiver. The fact that the pleadings raise an issue concerning the applicants’ state of mind does not alone give rise to the type of inconsistency necessary to give rise to a waiver of all otherwise privileged communications that might be relevant to that issue. It may be accepted that the applicants’ pleaded case is somewhat out of the ordinary because the pleaded state of mind includes a belief or an assumption about the legal effect of the Final Offer or the legal state of affairs following its acceptance. On that basis, it could perhaps be said to be more likely that confidential communications might be materially relevant to that issue. However, relevance to an issue is not the proper test for implied waiver. More is involved in the assessment of issue or implied waiver than merely putting state of mind in issue, even if that state of mind involves a belief, opinion or assumption concerning the law. The ASOC does not refer in any way to legal advice or any privileged communication, let alone the contents of any such communication. The applicants do not plead in any way that their beliefs, opinions or assumptions were influenced in any way by legal advice. The pleadings make no direct reference to the involvement of the applicants’ lawyers. In these circumstances it is not possible to conclude that by their pleadings alone the applicants have expressly or impliedly made an assertion about a privileged communication, or otherwise necessarily laid open to scrutiny any confidential communication. For the reasons already given, the series of questions posed in Wayne Lawrence and Chen should not be approached as a surrogate for the proper test for implied or issue waiver. Answers to those questions may, in an appropriate case, provide some assistance in answering the proper question, which is whether an expressed or implied assertion has been made about the contents of the privileged communication. In this matter, based on the pleadings alone, the answers to the questions posed in Wayne Lawrence and Chen do not compel a finding that there has been a waiver. In particular, in my opinion it cannot necessarily be concluded from the pleadings alone that it was likely that the applicants received legal advice in relation to the legal effect of the Final Offer and its acceptance. Nor can it necessarily be inferred that any legal advice received would or might raise doubts about the applicants’ beliefs, assumptions or reliance on the Final Offer.