Archer Capital 4A Pty Ltd v Sage Group plc (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Archer Capital 4A Pty Ltd as trustee for the Archer Capital Trust 4A v Sage Group plc (No 3) [2013] FCA 1160

Citation: Archer Capital 4A Pty Ltd as trustee for the Archer Capital Trust 4A v Sage Group plc (No 3) [2013] FCA 1160
Parties: ARCHER CAPITAL 4A PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ARCHER CAPITAL TRUST 4A (ACN 123 463 749) AND OTHERS NAMED IN SCHEDULE 1 v THE SAGE GROUP PLC
File number: NSD 1992 of 2011
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 8 November 2013
Catchwords:

EVIDENCE – legal professional privilege – implied waiver – principles of implied waiver – actions involving client’s state of mind – implied waiver by anticipated evidence

EVIDENCE – discovery – adequacy of discovery – possession, custody or power  

Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Cases cited: Adelaide Steamship Co Limited v Spalvins (1998) 81 FCR 360
Apple v Wily [2002] NSWSC 855
Archer Capital 4A Pty Limited as trustee for theArcher Capital Trust 4A v Sage Group PLC (No 2) [2013] FCA 1098
Austral Dutch Kaolin Pty Ltd v Hanjin P&C Co Ltd [2011] FCA 638
B v B [1979] 1 All ER 801
Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) and (No 10) (2009) 39 WAR 1
Brookfield Multiplex Limited v the International Litigation Funding Partners Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 180 FCR 1
Campaign Master (UK) Limited v Forty Two International Pty Limited(No 4) [2010] FCA 398
Chen v City Convenience Leasing Proprietary Limited [2005] NSWCA 297
Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto Limited (2006) 151 FCR 341
Cooper v Hobbs [2013] NSWCA 70
Council of theNSW Bar Association v Archer (2008) 72 NSWLR 236
DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 127 FCR 499
DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 135 FCR 15
Equuscorp Pty Limited v Kanisha Corp Limited [1999] ATPR 41-697
Esso Australia Resources v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49
Farrow Mortgage Services(In Liq) v Webb (1996) 39 NSWLR 601
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (1979) 143 CLR 499
Ferella v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2010) 188 FCR 68
Hardcastle v Advanced Mining Technologies Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1846
Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1
Mcdougallv OnQ Group Ltd v [2007] VSC 184
SA E.Med Pty Ltd v Calvary Healthcare Adelaide Ltd(No 2) [2011] FCA 835
Sargent v ASL Developments Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 634
Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2006) 227 ALR 704
South Australia v Barrett (1995) 64 SASR 73
Stern v Sekers [2010] NSWSC 59
Tan v St George Bank [2005] WASC 143
Wayne Lawrence Pty Limited v Hunt [1999] NSWSC 1044
Date of hearing: 10, 11 September 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 132
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Williams
Solicitor for the Applicant: Allens
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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 1160
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Archer Capital 4A Pty Ltd v Sage Group plc (No 3) involves Archer Capital, a group of Australian companies, suing Sage Group plc, a British company, over various legal claims. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, which was tasked with addressing issues surrounding legal professional privilege and discovery processes. The key legal issues revolved around whether Archer Capital had waived their right to legal professional privilege through their anticipated evidence and pleadings, and whether they had adequately disclosed documents required for the case.

The court found that Archer Capital had not engaged in conduct inconsistent with the maintenance of confidentiality over communications with their solicitors. The court noted that Archer Capital's pleadings did not directly reference privileged communications or legal advice, and thus did not constitute an implied waiver of privilege. The court further held that Archer Capital's reliance on their state of mind and assumptions did not necessarily expose any confidential communications to scrutiny. Consequently, the court ruled that Archer Capital had not waived their right to legal professional privilege.

In its decision, the court declined to make further orders for discovery or verification of discovery by Archer Capital, as one of the applicants, Archer Capital 4A Pty Ltd, had been placed into liquidation and had no records or documents related to the case. The court ordered Archer Capital to produce two specific documents for inspection within a week. The court dismissed Sage's application to subpoena UBS, though it indicated a willingness to consider a more defined subpoena. The court concluded by ordering Sage to pay Archer Capital's costs of the interlocutory application.

The final orders of the court included directing Archer Capital to produce two specific documents for inspection, dismissing Sage's subpoena application, and ordering Sage to pay Archer Capital's costs associated with the interlocutory application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicants produce two documents, identified by their barcode numbers (ARC.003.005.9759 and ARC.019.001.0237 and attachment ARC.019.001. 0240), for inspection within one week of the making of this order.

2. The interlocutory application is otherwise dismissed.

3. The respondents pay the applicants costs of, and incidental to, the interlocutory application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In this passage, Greenwood J refers to an example of a claim the very nature of which demonstrates inconsistency with the maintenance of confidentiality in respect of otherwise privileged communications. The example given by Greenwood J is a case where a client sues a lawyer for negligence. An action for negligent advice will put in issue the very advice received by the client. Other examples of such actions include some actions raising allegations of undue influence or actions for rectification where the content of a communication between the lawyer and client or the content of advice received by the client is directly raised by the nature of the allegation. The decision in SA E.Med provides an example of such a rectification case. In such cases, by commencing the action the privilege holder puts in issue the content of the very advice received: see Adelaide Steamship at 371-372. However, as the Full Court observed in Rio Tinto, it is dangerous to generalise from other cases of implied waiver unless they arise from the same facts. There is no closed or categorical list of types of actions that by their very nature give rise to implied waiver. Each case will turn on its own facts and circumstances.Evidence and Submissions In support of its case of implied waiver, Sage relies essentially on two matters; first, on those paragraphs of the ASOC that plead the applicants’ state of mind and reliance; and second, on two statements of anticipated evidence of the applicants’ solicitor, Mr Thomas Story. In relation to the pleadings, Sage contends that by pleading a case which puts their state of mind in issue, the applicants have directly or indirectly made assertions about their state of mind in circumstances where confidential communications are likely to have affected that state of mind. The anticipated evidence of Mr Story is relied upon in two ways; first, as establishing the likelihood that Mr Story had provided advice to the applicants that would be relevant to their alleged state of mind; and second, as establishing that the applicants intend to lead evidence of Mr Story’s state of mind to prove their case. The latter conduct is said to amount to conduct inconsistent with the maintenance of confidentiality in relation to communications bearing on both Mr Story’s and the applicants’ state of mind. To the extent that the applicants’ case of implied waiver is based upon the pleadings, it is necessary to consider the applicants’ pleaded case in some more detail. Critical to the applicants’ case is a letter, said to constitute a final offer by Sage to purchase the applicants’ MYOB shares, which was sent by Sage at 7:25 pm on the 15 August 2011. The terms of the letter are critical because the applicants allege, in general terms, that it constituted a contractual offer capable of acceptance (the Final Offer) and also contained a number of representations that provide the basis for the pleaded estoppel and misleading or deceptive conduct causes of action (the Representations).

Decision

Reasons for decision

In relation to the forty-first applicant, there is evidence that a liquidator has been appointed to that company, that the company’s only function was to hold treasury stock which could be issued to the management of MYOB Cayman, and that it no longer holds any such stock. The company has never, and is not currently, holding any records. Nor has it ever created or received documents or correspondence in relation to the matters in dispute between the parties. In these circumstances, I decline to make any further orders in relation to discovery or the verification of discovery by the forty-first applicant. Conclusion and Orders For the reasons I have given:(a)I decline to make any further orders in relation to discovery by the applicants, including any further orders in relation to the verification by affidavit of the lists already served;(b)I will order that the applicants produce two documents, identified by their barcode numbers (ARC.003.005.9759 and ARC.019.001.0237 and attachment ARC.019.001.0240), for inspection within one week of the making of this order;(c)I do not propose to grant leave to Sage to file a subpoena to UBS in the form provided to the Court, though I would be prepared to consider granting leave to issue a subpoena to UBS which includes paragraph 1 and a more defined and confined version of the existing paragraph 2. The interlocutory application should otherwise be dismissed. As the applicants have been the successful party, other than in a very minor respect, it is appropriate that Sage be ordered to pay the costs of the applicants of, and incidental to, the interlocutory application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to the anticipated evidence of Mr Story, the applicants submit that it is premature to consider whether anticipated evidence gives rise to a waiver because that evidence may not be led or given at trial. Even if Mr Story is called to give evidence, he may not give evidence relating to his state of mind, let alone evidence that raises for scrutiny any confidential communications. Reliance is also placed on the fact that the evidence that Sage points to as raising Mr Story’s state of mind is simply responsive to, or a denial of, Mr Reede’s evidence relating to a conversation.Consideration In my opinion, at this stage of the proceedings the applicants have not engaged in any conduct inconsistent with the maintenance of confidentiality over communications with their solicitors. They have not expressly or impliedly made an assertion, or brought a case, which is either about the contents of an otherwise privileged communication, or which necessarily lays open any confidential communication to scrutiny. In relation to the applicants’ pleaded case, in my opinion the mere fact that the applicants have pleaded a case which involves their reliance upon representations, or their state of mind, or assumptions they claim to have made as a result of the alleged conduct of the respondent, does not give rise to an implied waiver. The fact that the pleadings raise an issue concerning the applicants’ state of mind does not alone give rise to the type of inconsistency necessary to give rise to a waiver of all otherwise privileged communications that might be relevant to that issue. It may be accepted that the applicants’ pleaded case is somewhat out of the ordinary because the pleaded state of mind includes a belief or an assumption about the legal effect of the Final Offer or the legal state of affairs following its acceptance. On that basis, it could perhaps be said to be more likely that confidential communications might be materially relevant to that issue. However, relevance to an issue is not the proper test for implied waiver. More is involved in the assessment of issue or implied waiver than merely putting state of mind in issue, even if that state of mind involves a belief, opinion or assumption concerning the law. The ASOC does not refer in any way to legal advice or any privileged communication, let alone the contents of any such communication. The applicants do not plead in any way that their beliefs, opinions or assumptions were influenced in any way by legal advice. The pleadings make no direct reference to the involvement of the applicants’ lawyers. In these circumstances it is not possible to conclude that by their pleadings alone the applicants have expressly or impliedly made an assertion about a privileged communication, or otherwise necessarily laid open to scrutiny any confidential communication. For the reasons already given, the series of questions posed in Wayne Lawrence and Chen should not be approached as a surrogate for the proper test for implied or issue waiver. Answers to those questions may, in an appropriate case, provide some assistance in answering the proper question, which is whether an expressed or implied assertion has been made about the contents of the privileged communication. In this matter, based on the pleadings alone, the answers to the questions posed in Wayne Lawrence and Chen do not compel a finding that there has been a waiver. In particular, in my opinion it cannot necessarily be concluded from the pleadings alone that it was likely that the applicants received legal advice in relation to the legal effect of the Final Offer and its acceptance. Nor can it necessarily be inferred that any legal advice received would or might raise doubts about the applicants’ beliefs, assumptions or reliance on the Final Offer.