Queensland Local Government Superannuation Board v Allen

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

The Queensland Local Government Superannuation Board v Allen [2016] QCA 325

PARTIES:

THE QUEENSLAND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUPERANNUATION BOARD
(applicant)
v
LYNDA ALLEN
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 10637 of 2015
DC No 4549 of 2014

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)

ORIGINATING COURT:


District Court at Brisbane - [2015] QDC 237; [2015] QDC 251

DELIVERED ON:

6 December 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

30 March 2016

JUDGE:

Margaret McMurdo P and Philippides JA and Burns J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1.   The applicant is granted leave to appeal.

2.   The appeal is allowed.

3.   The orders of the District Court at Brisbane made on 24 September 2015 and 8 October 2015 are set aside and, in lieu thereof, substitute the following orders:

a.   The application filed on 7 September 2015 is dismissed;

b.   The applicant is ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application calculated on the standard basis.

4.   The respondent shall pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal calculated on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – DISCOVERY AND INTERROGATORIES – DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS – PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS – GROUNDS FOR RESISTING PRODUCTION – PRIVILEGE – CLIENT LEGAL PRIVILEGE – WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE – where the applicant is the trustee of a superannuation scheme – where the applicant refused the respondent’s claim for payment of a total and permanent disability benefit – where the respondent commenced a proceeding in the District Court seeking to establish an entitlement to payment of that benefit – where the respondent brought an interlocutory application in that proceeding seeking disclosure of legal advice provided to the applicant – whether legal professional privilege in the legal advice had been impliedly waived by the applicant

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – DISCOVERY AND INTERROGATORIES – DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS – PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS – GROUNDS FOR RESISTING PRODUCTION – PRIVILEGE – CLIENT LEGAL PRIVILEGE – OTHER CASES AND MATTERS – where the applicant is the trustee of a superannuation scheme – where the applicant refused the respondent’s claim for payment of a total and permanent disability benefit – where the respondent commenced a proceeding in the District Court seeking to establish an entitlement to payment of that benefit – where the respondent brought an interlocutory application in that proceeding seeking disclosure of legal advice provided to the applicant – whether the respondent was entitled to disclosure of the advice on the basis that the advice was the subject of joint privilege so that privilege in the advice was shared by the applicant with the respondent

Local Government Act 1993 (Qld), s 1174, s 1177, s 1180, s 1181
Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), s 208, s…

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Details
Case
[2016] QCA 325
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Queensland Local Government Superannuation Board v Allen, the matter before the court was a dispute concerning the refusal by the Queensland Local Government Superannuation Board (the Board) to pay a total and permanent disability benefit to the respondent, Ms Allen. The respondent had initiated proceedings in the District Court to establish her entitlement to the benefit. The Board, in turn, sought to resist the disclosure of legal advice provided to it by its legal representatives, invoking client legal privilege.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Board had waived its right to claim privilege over the legal advice provided to it, or whether the privilege was shared with Ms Allen as a beneficiary of the superannuation scheme. The court needed to determine if Ms Allen was entitled to the disclosure of the advice on the basis that the advice was subject to joint privilege.

The court held that the Board had not waived its right to claim privilege over the legal advice. The court reasoned that legal professional privilege is a substantive rule of law that exists to protect confidential communications between a client and their lawyer for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice. The privilege is intended to foster trust and candour in the lawyer-client relationship and is for the benefit of the client, not the lawyer. The court found that there was no evidence of an implied waiver of privilege by the Board. Furthermore, the court determined that the privilege was not shared with Ms Allen as a beneficiary of the scheme, and therefore, she was not entitled to the disclosure of the advice.

The court granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the District Court and dismissing the respondent's application for disclosure. The court also ordered the respondent to pay the Board's costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant is granted leave to appeal.

2. The appeal is allowed.

3. The orders of the District Court at Brisbane made on 24 September 2015 and 8 October 2015 are set aside and, in lieu thereof, substitute the following orders:

a. The application filed on 7 September 2015 is dismissed;

b. The applicant is ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application calculated on the standard basis.

4. The respondent shall pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal calculated on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I am of the opinion that leave to appeal should be granted and the appeal allowed.BackgroundThe superannuation scheme The Board is the trustee of the Queensland Local Government Superannuation Scheme. The Scheme was established under the Local Government Act 1936 (Qld) and, on the repeal of that statute, continued in existence under later incarnations of that legislation.[13][13]Local Government Act 1993 (Qld), s 1180(1); Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), s 217(1). Under the legislation, the Board is recognised as a body corporate capable of suing or being sued in its corporate name.[14] The Board’s primary responsibility is to act as the trustee of the Scheme[15] and its directors are responsible for the way in which it discharges that obligation.[16] The legislation also requires that rules governing the operation of the Scheme be set out in a trust deed made by the Board and, further, that those rules include provisions that, under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), are required to be contained in the governing rules of superannuation funds regulated under that statute.[17] As to its members, an employee of a local government (other than the Brisbane City Council) is “automatically” a member of the Scheme while his or her employment continues.[18] Otherwise, and among a number of defined categories,[19] any person who was, but no longer is, an “automatic member” and whose benefit under the Scheme has not been fully paid out, withdrawn or transferred from the Scheme is eligible to be a member.[20][14]Local Government Act 1993 (Qld), s 1173(1); Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), s 208(2).[15]Local Government Act 1993 (Qld), s 1174; Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), s 209(1).[16]Local Government Act 1993 (Qld), s 1177(1); Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), s 210(2).[17]Local Government Act 1993 (Qld), s 1180(3); Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), s 217(2).[18]Local Government Act 1993 (Qld), s 1181(1); Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), s 218(1)(a).[19]Local Government Act 1993 (Qld), s 1181(2); Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), s 218(2).[20]Local Government Act 1993 (Qld), s 1181(2)(h); Local Government Act 2009 (Qld), s 218(2)(k). Although the trust deed regulating the Scheme was not in evidence in the court below, its relevant features appear in the pleadings and are not in serious contest.[21] For present purposes it is sufficient to note that, under the rules contained in that deed, the Board is obliged to pay a benefit to a “defined benefit member” who has “ceased employment by reason of total and permanent disablement”.[22] The expression, “total and permanent disablement”, is defined to mean a member who has ceased work through injury or illness for six consecutive months or “such lesser period as [the Board] considers appropriate” and who, in the opinion of the Board, has become incapacitated to such an extent as to render the member “unlikely ever to resume work in any gainful occupation for which the member was or may become reasonably qualified by education, training or experience”.[23] Where a member suffers an injury or illness which, in the opinion of the Board, “permanently incapacitated” the member from carrying out his or her ordinary work for the employer (or any reasonably available and suitable alternative work) but did not constitute “total and permanent disablement”, then such an injury or illness might constitute a “failure of health” for which a different benefit would be payable under the Scheme.[24][21]Statement of Claim filed 21 November 2014 at par 3 (ARB 138); Defence filed 11 March 2015 at par 3 (ARB 149). And see Exhibit 1 in the appeal, being a bundle of correspondence passing between the solicitors for Ms Allen and the Board, in particular the letter from those solicitors dated 26 June 2013 at p 2 (Total and Permanent Disability Definition).[22]Statement of Claim at par 3(a) (ARB 138); Defence at par 3(a) (ARB 149).[23]Statement of Claim at par 3(b) (ARB 138); Defence at par 3(c) (ARB 149); Reply at par 3 (ARB 160-161); Exhibit 1 (letter from Maurice Blackburn to the Board dated 26 June 2013 at p 2).[24]Statement of Claim at par 3(c) (ARB 138); Defence at par 3(c) (ARB 149); Reply at par 3 (ARB at 160-161).Ms Allen’s claims

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In addition to the proposed grounds of appeal, if leave to appeal is granted it is necessary to also consider Ms Allen’s contention, not raised below but addressed by the parties, that privilege in the advice was shared with beneficiaries such as her.Consideration Legal professional privilege is “more than an aspect of civil and criminal procedure and more than a rule of evidence”;[106] it is a rule of substantive law.[107] It may be “availed of by a person to resist the giving of information or the production of documents which would reveal communications between a client and his or her lawyer made for the dominant purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice or the provision of legal services, including representation in legal proceedings”.[108] There is no differentiation in legal effect between the two categories of legal professional privilege[109] and, as such, either may be invoked to resist the disclosure of a document in the course of a proceeding where to do so would reveal a communication falling under either category. The principle underlying legal professional privilege is that “a person should be entitled to seek and obtain legal advice without the apprehension of being prejudiced by subsequent disclosure of confidential communications”.[110] Without the privilege, the administration of justice “would be greatly impeded or even rendered impossible”.[111] It rests not only on the confidence reposed by the client in the legal adviser but the necessity, in the interests of justice, of protecting those communications from disclosure.[112] Although confidential communications between the client and lawyer are protected, the privilege exists for the benefit of the client and not the lawyer.[113] A court may examine documents where there is a disputed claim of privilege, and should not be hesitant to do so.[114] In appropriate cases, a court may also permit cross-examination of a deponent of an affidavit claiming privilege.[115][106]Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 564 per Gummow J.[107]Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 at 490 per Deane J; Mercantile Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd v Village/Nine Network Restaurants & Bars Pty Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 276 at 287-288 per Byrne J; Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543 at [9].[108]Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543 at [9]-[11] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow & Hayne JJ; Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [35], [61]-[62] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron & Gummow JJ, [167] per Callinan J.[109]That is to say, litigation privilege or advice privilege.[110]Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 115-116 per Deane J, and quoted with approval by the plurality in Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 at 11 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ. And see Waterford v The Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 at 62, 64-65.[111]Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 at 480 per Gibbs CJ. And see Mason and Brennan JJ at 487: “The raison d’etre of legal professional privilege is the furtherance of the administration of justice through the fostering of trust and candour in the relationship between lawyer and client”.[112]Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Webb (1996) 39 NSWLR 601 at 607 per Sheller JA citing Russell v Jackson (1851) 9 Hare 387 at 391; 68 ER 558 at 560.[113]Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 at 13 [28] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ.[114]Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 201 CLR 49 at [52].[115]Ibid.