Macquarie Bank Limited v Arup Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Macquarie Bank Limited v Arup Pty Limited [2016] FCAFC 117

Appeal from: BrisConnections Finance Pty Limited (Receivers and Managers appointed) v Arup Pty Limited [2016] FCA 438
File number: NSD 677 of 2016
Judges: MIDDLETON, ROBERTSON AND GLEESON JJ
Date of judgment: 16 August 2016
Catchwords: EVIDENCE – legal professional privilege – where party’s state of mind put in issue – where common law of legal professional privilege applies – whether implied waiver arising from party’s pleading.
Cases cited:

Archer Capital 4A Pty Limited as trustee for  the Archer Capital Trust 4A v Sage Group plc (No 3) (2013) 306 ALR 414

Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475

Chen v City Convenience Leasing Pty [2005] NSWCA 297

Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto Ltd (2006) 151 FCR 341

Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Archer (2008) 72 NSWLR 236

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 127 FCR 499

Ferella & Anor v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2010) 188 FCR 68

Hancock v Rinehart [2013] NSWSC 1978

Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1

Paragon Finance Plc v Freshfields [1999] 1 WLR 1183

Vic Hotel Pty Ltd v DC Payments Australasia Pty Ltd (2015) 321 ALR 191

Wayne Lawrence Pty Ltd v Hunt [1999] NSWSC 1044

Date of hearing: 16 August 2016
Date of publication of reasons: 2 September 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 42
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr SG Finch SC with Mr IJM Ahmed
Solicitor for the Applicant: Herbert Smith Freehills
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr I Pike SC with Ms AE Munro
Solicitor for the Respondent: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, MolinoCahill Lawyers

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

NSD 677 of 2016
BETWEEN:

MACQUARIE BANK LIMITED (ACN 008 583 542)

Applicant

AND:

ARUP PTY LIMITED (ACN 000 966 165)

Respondent

JUDGES:

MIDDLETON, ROBERTSON AND GLEESON JJ

THE COURT:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This was an application by Macquarie Bank Limited (‘Macquarie’) for leave to appeal from the decision of the primary judge in BrisConnections Finance Pty Limited (Receivers and Managers appointed) v Arup Pty Limited [2016] FCA 438. The issue before the primary judge concerned implied waiver of legal professional privilege said to arise from a party’s pleading.

  2. On 16 August 2016, the Full Court ordered that the application for leave be dismissed with costs.  These are the reasons for the decision of the Full Court. 

  3. The principles relating to the circumstances where the Court will grant leave to appeal need no rehearsing: see, eg, Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397. For the reasons set out below, we consider that the decision of the primary judge was correct, and was accordingly not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant a grant of leave to appeal.

  4. In the application…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 117
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Macquarie Bank Limited sought leave to appeal a decision of the primary judge in the Supreme Court of Queensland, which involved a complex dispute regarding legal professional privilege and the disclosure of privileged documents. The dispute arose out of a larger proceeding where BrisConnections Finance Pty Limited alleged that Arup Pty Limited engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct or was negligent in preparing traffic forecasts for the Airport Link toll road. Arup, in turn, cross-claimed against the Sponsor Group, alleging that they engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct that affected Arup’s liability under the Engagement Agreement. The core issue in the appeal was whether Arup had impliedly waived its legal professional privilege over certain documents by pleading reliance on the Sponsor Group’s alleged conduct.

The court needed to determine if the primary judge erred in not finding a waiver of privilege. Macquarie argued that the primary judge failed to apply the correct legal principles and authorities concerning circumstances where a party puts its understanding of the legal effect of a contract or document in issue, and incorrectly applied considerations of fairness in determining whether an implied waiver of privilege had arisen. The court examined the primary judge’s reasoning and found no such errors. The court held that the pleading of reliance by Arup did not constitute an implied waiver of privilege. The court emphasised that merely pleading reliance on certain conduct does not come perilously close to, or amount to, a waiver of privilege. As the primary judge correctly found, such a pleading alone was not sufficient to constitute a waiver.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, concluding that the primary judge was correct in finding that Arup had not impliedly waived privilege. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the application. This decision reinforced the principle that legal professional privilege is not waived merely by pleading reliance on certain conduct, and that such privilege remains intact unless explicitly waived.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

In the application for leave to appeal, Macquarie contended that the primary judge erred in not finding a waiver of privilege. Macquarie contended that this error arose because the primary judge did not apply the legal principles and authorities that have considered circumstances where a party has put in issue its understanding as to the legal effect of a contract or document, and incorrectly applied considerations of fairness in determining whether an implied waiver of privilege had arisen. We do not consider that the primary judge made either of these errors. BACKGROUNDThe claims in this proceeding The background to this proceeding is set out at [1]-[13] in the reasons of the primary judge (the ‘Reasons’). In summary, the principal claim is brought by BrisConnections Finance Pty Limited (Receivers and Managers appointed) and other related entities (‘BrisConnections’) as applicants, against Arup Pty Limited (‘Arup’) as respondent. BrisConnections allege that Arup engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct, or was negligent, in preparing traffic forecasts on which BrisConnections relied in taking various steps in relation to the Airport Link toll road. Arup then brought a claim against Thiess Pty Ltd, John Holland Pty Ltd and Macquarie (together, the ‘Sponsor Group’), as set out in Arup’s Notice of Cross-Claim. In that Cross-Claim, Arup seeks to pass on to the Sponsor Group any liability it may have to BrisConnections which exceeds $10 million, an amount to which liability was said to be limited. The Cross-Claim is concerned with the Patronage and Forecasting Contract for the Airport Link Project that Arup entered into with the Sponsor Group (‘Engagement Agreement’). BrisConnections were not parties to the Engagement Agreement. Arup alleges that the terms of the Engagement Agreement were based on the provisions of an earlier similar agreement between Arup and the Sponsor Group, called the Patronage Forecasting Contract for the North South Bypass Tunnel (‘NSBT Contract’). The Engagement Agreement required Arup to prepare the traffic forecasts that are at issue in this proceeding. Arup alleges that it also contained two other important features:(1)a reliance statement that set out the terms on which persons, including BrisConnections, could rely on the traffic forecasts prepared by Arup (‘Reliance Statement’); and(2)a contractual term (at clause 17.9) that limited Arup’s liability for the provision of services to $10 million (‘Limitation of Liability’). Relevantly to this application for leave to appeal, Arup alleges in the Cross-Claim that the Sponsor Group engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct. Arup’s claim alleges the following elements:(1)the Sponsor Group represented to Arup that it would take ‘all necessary steps’ to ensure that BrisConnections would be bound by the Limitation of Liability, but did not take such steps (‘Arup’s Representation Case’) ([61] and [63] of the Cross-Claim);(2)the Sponsor Group knew that BrisConnections formed the view that they were not bound by the Limitation of Liability, but did not inform Arup that BrisConnections had formed that view (‘Arup’s Silence Case’) ([65]-[66] of the Cross-Claim);(3)the Sponsor Group’s representation or silence was misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive ([68] of the Cross-Claim);(4)in reliance on the Sponsor Group’s representation or silence, Arup performed various services under the Engagement Agreement ([69] of the Cross-Claim); and(5)Arup suffered loss by reason of the Sponsor Group’s representation or silence ([70] of the Cross-Claim).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In Vic Hotel, DC Payments relied on evidence of Next Payments’ state of mind, acquired by senior managers through communications between them and DC Payments, to prove its case. At the same time, DC Payments denied, by the assertion of legal privilege, the opportunity for Next Payments to prove its lack of the alleged state of mind acquired by the same senior managers in the same way: Vic Hotel at [58]. The allegations made by DC Payments align with the type of inconsistent conduct foreshadowed by the majority in Mann v Carnell. Similar to proceedings for professional negligence against that party's lawyer, DC Payments could not ‘pick and choose, disclosing such incidents of the relationship as strengthen [its] claim for damages and concealing them from forensic scrutiny such incidents as weaken it’: Paragon Finance Plc v Freshfields [1999] 1 WLR 1183, as cited in Vic Hotel at [51].CONCLUSION This proceeding merely involves the pleading by Arup of reliance and the discovery of privileged documents. Whilst such documents are relevant to the proceeding (and hence discoverable), this is not sufficient to constitute waiver. If it were, then as the primary judge observed, this would ‘come perilously close to, if not amount to, a proposition that a mere pleading of reliance would itself be sufficient to constitute a waiver of privilege’: see [39] of the Reasons. For the foregoing reasons, the primary judge was correct in finding that Arup had not impliedly waived privilege. As a consequence, the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed. The applicant should pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established