Braziron Corporate Services Pty Ltd v Road Rail and Mine Products Pty Ltd [No 4] - [2025] WASC 451

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   BRAZIRON CORPORATE SERVICES PTY LTD -v- ROAD RAIL AND MINE PRODUCTS PTY LTD [No 4] [2025] WASC 451
CORAM:   LUNDBERG J
HEARD:   21 OCTOBER 2025
DELIVERED          :   23 OCTOBER 2025
FILE NO/S:   CIV 1788 of 2020
(Consolidated with CIV 1104 of 2021)

BETWEEN: BRAZIRON CORPORATE SERVICES PTY LTD
First Plaintiff
SAFETY BARRIERS (WA) PTY LTD
Second Plaintiff
AND
ROAD RAIL AND MINE PRODUCTS PTY LTD
First Defendant
CYNDIE WOOLCOCK
Second Defendant
JED PALMER
Third Defendant
WYLIE JAMES WOOLCOCK
Fourth Defendant
LATOYA MARIE PALMER
Fifth Defendant

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Application by the defendants for production of documents discovered by the plaintiffs which are subject to a claim for legal professional privilege - Issue waiver asserted to arise on the pleadings - Whether Court should inspect documents - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 26 r 9, O 26 r 10

Result:

Application dismissed.

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

First Plaintiff	:	Ms R R Joseph
Second Plaintiff	:	Ms R R Joseph
First Defendant	:	Mr P G Donovan
Second Defendant	:	Mr P G Donovan
Third Defendant	:	Mr P G Donovan
Fourth Defendant	:	Mr P G Donovan
Fifth Defendant	:	Mr P G Donovan

Solicitors:

First Plaintiff	:	M6:8 Legal
Second Plaintiff	:	M6:8 Legal
First Defendant	:	MDS Legal
Second Defendant	:	MDS Legal
Third Defendant	:	MDS Legal
Fourth Defendant	:	MDS Legal
Fifth Defendant	:	MDS Legal

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Archer Capital 4A Pty Limited v Sage Group plc (No 3) [2013] FCA 1160; (2013) 306 ALR 414
Braziron Corporate Services Pty Ltd v Road Rail and Mine Products Pty Ltd [No 2] [2025] WASC 44
Braziron Corporate Services Pty Ltd v Road Rail and Mine Products Pty Ltd [No 3] [2025] WASC 432
Ferella & Anor v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2010] FCA 766; (2010) 188 FCR 68
GR Capital Group Pty Ltd v Xinfeng Australia International Investment Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 266
Macquarie Bank Limited v Arup Pty Limited [2016] FCAFC 117
Poland v Hedley [2023] WASCA 69
The Commonwealth of Australia v Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 107
Viterra Malt Pty Ltd v Cargill Australia Ltd [2018] VSCA 118; (2018) 58 VR 333

LUNDBERG J:

These reasons concern an interlocutory application filed by the defendants seeking orders for production of several documents discovered by the plaintiffs, which are subject to claims for legal professional privilege. The documents consist of several email communications between the plaintiffs and their former solicitor, Ms Anderson. The application is, as I apprehend it, brought pursuant to O 26 r 9(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC).
By way of background, I note the plaintiffs' former solicitor was separately sued by the plaintiffs in this court, in proceeding CIV 2395 of 2023. Those proceedings were settled. The defendants to the present action have pursued further discovery from the plaintiffs of various documents touching upon CIV 2395 of 2023 and concerning the settlement between the plaintiffs and their former solicitor. That application has been addressed by Strk J, the case manager of this action, in her Honour's recent decision: Braziron Corporate Services Pty Ltd v Road Rail and Mine Products Pty Ltd [No 3].[1]
[1] Braziron Corporate Services Pty Ltd v Road Rail and Mine Products Pty Ltd [No 3] [2025] WASC 432 (Strk J) (Braziron No 3).
Initially, in the application which has been referred to me, the defendants sought production of 21 documents, but seven were voluntarily produced,[2] leaving 14 contested documents. The contested documents are described in Attachment A to these reasons.[3] The contested documents consist of nine email communications (and the attachments to five of those emails) which passed between a representative for the plaintiffs and the solicitor who was then advising the plaintiffs. The email communications were sent in May 2017, in August/September 2017, and in December 2017.
[2] The seven documents were produced on the basis that the plaintiffs did not concede that production waived privilege in those documents: Affidavit of Mabel Chua sworn 14 October 2025 [4] - [6].
[3] I have proceeded on the basis that the dates ascribed to contested documents 5 and 10 are incorrect, given those documents are attachments to the immediately preceding documents in the list.
The defendants contend that the privilege which would otherwise attach to these documents has been waived by reason of specific pleas in the plaintiffs' statement of claim, being the Further Amended Consolidated Statement of Claim dated 25 November 2024 (FASOC),[4] amounting to an issue waiver.[5] I previously dealt with a similar waiver application in these proceedings, brought on that occasion by the plaintiffs, which is explained in the reasons which were delivered in February 2025: Braziron Corporate Services Pty Ltd v Road Rail and Mine Products Pty Ltd [No 2].[6]
[4] The most recent defence is the Further Amended Defence to the FASOC dated 4 March 2025 (FAD).
[5] DS [5].
[6] Braziron Corporate Services Pty Ltd v Road Rail and Mine Products Pty Ltd [No 2] [2025] WASC 44 (Lundberg J) (Braziron No 2).
The specific pleas relied upon by the defendants are the rectification plea found at [19] - [21] of the FASOC, and the misleading or deceptive conduct plea at [48] - [56] of the FASOC. The defendants submit that, by these pleas, the plaintiffs have put their state of mind in issue in the action. These species of claims fall within the type of cases identified by Wheeler J (as her Honour then was) in The Commonwealth of Australia v Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd[7] as exposing a party's state of mind to scrutiny.
[7] The Commonwealth of Australia v Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 107 [10] (Wheeler J).
The plaintiffs' counsel did not demur from the contention that her clients had indeed put their state of mind in issue.[8] Counsel was right to approach the argument in that manner, in my view. Importantly, counsel submitted that merely putting a party's state of mind in issue is insufficient to ground a conclusion there has been an implied waiver of privilege. That is undoubtedly correct, as explained by Yates J in Ferella & Anor v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy.[9] There are numerous authorities to the same effect, including Archer Capital 4A Pty Limited v Sage Group plc (No 3).[10]
[8] PS [6].
[9] Ferella & Anor v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2010] FCA 766; (2010) 188 FCR 68 [65] (Yates J).
[10] Archer Capital 4A Pty Limited v Sage Group plc (No 3) [2013] FCA 1160; (2013) 306 ALR 414 [16] – [24] (Wigney J).
The proper question is, rather, whether the person has directly or indirectly put the contents of the otherwise privileged communications in issue, or necessarily opened the communications to scrutiny, with the consequence that an inconsistency has arisen between the making of the assertion and the maintenance of privilege: Poland v Hedley.[11]
[11] Poland v Hedley [2023] WASCA 69 [75] (Quinlan CJ, Murphy and Beech JJA).
It is in this important respect that the defendants' application encounters some real difficulty. I say that because the pleadings filed by the plaintiffs do not depend, in any respect, on an examination or understanding of the legal advice which may have been obtained by the plaintiffs at the relevant times. To explain this point, a brief review of the action and the pleaded claims which were emphasised by counsel for the defendants is required.
The plaintiffs' action arises from commercial transactions and instruments, executed in July 2016 and in December 2017, which led to the acquisition of a company known as Safety Barriers (WA) Pty Ltd (SBWA), being the second plaintiff in this action. The first plaintiff, BrazIron Corporate Services Pty Ltd (BrazIron), now owns and controls SBWA, having acquired it through these transactions. The second to fifth defendants were initially equal shareholders in SBWA before its sale to the first plaintiff. Ms Woolcock, the second defendant, was a director of SBWA and was employed as its operations manager and office manager.
The principal instruments are a Share Sale Deed executed on 1 July 2016, a Shareholders' Agreement also executed on 1 July 2016, and the final sale agreement executed on 13 December 2017, described as the 'Agreement for Sale of Shares and Termination'.[12] I will refer to this last instrument as the 2017 Agreement. The 2017 Agreement contains an express restraint provision, in cl 7.1(j), which has not been drafted in the modern, cascading style of such clauses.
[12] FASOC [8], [9] – [11], and [15] – [18].
There were oral and written communications between the parties in the lead up to the execution of the commercial transactions, conducted largely between Ms Woolcock for the defendants and Mr Jamie Morton for BrazIron.
At [21] of the FASOC, the plaintiffs plead that the restraint clause in the 2017 Agreement should be rectified, having regard to the common intention of the parties as pleaded at [19] which, by oversight, did not find voice in the agreement as executed, as pleaded at [20].
The pleaded common intention of the parties is that the term of the 2017 Agreement that each of the second to fifth defendants would not provide services to, or be engaged or employed by, any company the business of which was carried on in Western Australia and which was substantially the same as, and in competition with, the business of SBWA, would be:[13]
(a)binding on the parties;
(b)should apply to the whole of Western Australia; and
(c)for a period that is be legally enforceable such that if the duration of the restraint through until 12 December 2022 is voidable, invalid or unenforceable, it will instead last until 12 December 2021 (and similarly in relation to 2018, 2019 and 2020).
[13] FASOC [19].
The second claim to examine is the misleading and deceptive conduct plea at [48] - [56] of the FASOC. The plaintiffs plead, in substance, that on 12 December 2017, each of the second to fifth defendants made certain representations to BrazIron. The representations were that, in the event that BrazIron executed the draft agreement provided to them (which was attached to an email sent on that date):
(a)the second to fifth defendants would not provide services to, or be engaged or employed by, any other company or entity, the business of which comprised or included as a principal undertaking, the same or substantially the same as that of SBWA for a period of 5 years from completion of the sale of the remaining shares in SBWA;
(b)the second to fifth defendants would ensure that he or she would not act as pleaded in the preceding paragraph for a period of 5 years from completion of the sale of that defendant's shares in SBWA;
(c)the express restraint included in the agreement would, upon execution of the agreement between the parties, be valid and effective; and
(d)each defendant had a reasonable basis for making the representation referred to in the preceding paragraph.
BrazIron pleads that it relied on these representations and was induced thereby to enter into the 2017 Agreement (as pleaded at [50] of the FASOC).
It may be accepted, for the purposes of this application, that the solicitor with whom the plaintiffs were communicating in May 2017, August/September 2017 and December 2017, was indeed acting for both plaintiffs and was providing the plaintiffs with legal advice and assistance in relation to the agreement which was ultimately executed on 13 December 2017, being the 2017 Agreement.
These matters were the subject of some discussion at the hearing and I understood, in the end, that counsel for the plaintiffs accepted these matters, at least for the purposes of the present application. With leave, a further affidavit was filed by the defendants following the hearing to make good these points.[14] That affidavit attached the seven privileged documents which had been voluntarily produced by the plaintiffs.
[14] Affidavit of Mr Radenti sworn 21 October 2025.
In any event, when the available factual material is read together with the pleadings, it would be necessary for the court to speculate in order to draw a connection between the contents of the contested documents and the issues which arise from the rectification and misleading conduct pleas.
It is not enough, in my respectful view, for the defendants to demonstrate that the plaintiffs' then solicitor was communicating with them in proximity to the pleaded events, even if it be accepted that the solicitor was at the time providing them with legal advice as to the instrument being negotiated by the parties. The defendants must demonstrate that the issues of reliance and common intention were, in some manner, informed by or addressed in the legal advice which the plaintiffs received at the time.
This lacuna in the defendants' challenge cannot be overcome by mere inference. The connection which I have mentioned above ought to be demonstrated on the pleadings and by reference to some evidentiary materials.
Even if such an inference were open to be drawn, it would not assist the defendants' application for production of contested documents 1, 2 or 3, in my view. Those communications were exchanged on 15 May 2017, well before the negotiations between the parties commenced on 30 August 2017, as is pleaded at [14] of the FASOC. It is not possible to draw any inference that the contents of the communications in mid-May 2017, including the legal advice which might be found therein, would be relevant to the issues arising in the rectification or misleading conduct claims, which concern matters said to have occurred between the end of August 2017 and the date on which the 2017 Agreement was executed in mid-December 2017.
I accept the remaining contested documents are more proximate in time to the pleaded events. Contested documents 4 to 8 were exchanged between the plaintiffs and their solicitor on or immediately after the day on which the negotiations commenced (on 30 August and 1 September 2017). Further, contested documents 9 to 14 were exchanged on 1, 5 and 6 December 2017, which appears to be in the lead up to the execution of the 2017 Agreement on 13 December 2017. This proximity in time does not bridge the gap I have described, though.
The reality is that the plaintiffs have not specifically put in issue the contents of any legal advice which might be contained in these communications, or the contents of these communications generally, in order to vindicate or justify a pleaded state of mind on their part. I do not read the plaintiffs' pleaded claims as having this effect. And it is only the conduct of the plaintiffs which can constitute the necessary waiver; it is not open to the defendants to structure a case to achieve this objective.
It is plain enough that the contested documents are not referred to within the plaintiffs' pleading. Mere reference to the privileged documents would, of course, be insufficient on its own. Further, mere relevance of the content of a privileged communication to an issue in the proceedings is not enough to demonstrate the inconsistency of position required as a matter of principle. That said, a reference within the pleading and a demonstrated relevance are useful starting points in order to further develop a contention that waiver has occurred.
Ultimately, as noted by Macfarlan JA in GR Capital Group Pty Ltd v Xinfeng Australia International Investment Pty Ltd,[15] 'something more is needed'. Without the additional requirement, there is a real risk that issue waiver would be asserted in each case in which rectification or misleading conduct is pleaded by a litigant who happened to be legally represented at the relevant time.
[15] GR Capital Group Pty Ltd v Xinfeng Australia International Investment Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 266 (Macfarlan JA, McCallum and Simpson AJA agreeing).
The 'something more' may be demonstrated by a pleading on the part of the privilege-holder which 'puts the contents of the legal advice in issue by specifically relying on the contents of the advice (and not merely the fact of the advice) to vindicate its claimed state of satisfaction', for example.[16] A deliberate plea which puts the subject of the advice in issue would be inconsistent with the privilege-holder's ability to maintain the claim for privilege. This inconsistency is central to the question of waiver. Considerations of fairness are not excluded, provided they are examined within this framework, and not merely by reference to general notions of fairness.
[16] Poland v Hedley [75].
I should refer to two intermediate appellate court decisions which help explain the proper approach to the analysis of issue waiver and which were specifically relied on by counsel for the plaintiffs. The first is Macquarie Bank Limited v Arup Pty Limited,[17] a decision of the Full Federal Court.
[17] Macquarie Bank Limited v Arup Pty Limited [2016] FCAFC 117.
The primary judge in that case rejected an argument there had been an implied waiver of privilege having regard to the pleaded case advanced by Arup. The Full Court agreed with that conclusion.
It had been pleaded that misleading representations had been made to Arup concerning the legal effect of a contractual provision. The pleaded case contained no reference to legal advice and no implicit assertion as to whether or not legal advice had been received by Arup, or as to the content of the advice.
Nonetheless, in support of its application for production of the privileged documents, Macquarie emphasised that assertions about a party's state of mind are particularly relevant where the party is also pleading its understand of the legal effect of the instrument in question. Macquarie submitted that the misleading conduct claim put in issue Arup's understanding as to the effect of the relevant agreements. The Full Court accepted this characterisation, as did the primary judge, but the Full Court concluded that:
[35]…it cannot be said that the question of reliance must have been informed by or addressed in the legal advice that Arup received. Arup's descriptions of the basis for its claims for legal professional privilege do not indicate such, which descriptions merely generically refer to 'legal advice in relation to the reliance statement in the [Engagement Agreement]', 'legal advice in relation to third party use of data', and 'legal advice in relation to the draft [NSBT Contract]'. There is no other evidence to indicate the extent of the legal advice; and certainly no evidence that the legal advice was likely or necessarily related to any question of reliance as pleaded in the Cross-Claim. It cannot be said that Arup necessarily 'la[id]… open to scrutiny' the advice that it received in relation to that matter, in the manner contemplated by Allsop J in DSE.
…
[41] This proceeding merely involves the pleading by Arup of reliance and the discovery of privileged documents. Whilst such documents are relevant to the proceeding (and hence discoverable), this is not sufficient to constitute waiver. If it were, then as the primary judge observed, this would 'come perilously close to, if not amount to, a proposition that a mere pleading of reliance would itself be sufficient to constitute a waiver of privilege'...
The second authority is Viterra Malt Pty Ltd v Cargill Australia Ltd,[18] a decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal. In that matter, allegations of misrepresentation had been made arising out of the sale and purchase of a malting business. Cargill alleged misleading and deceptive conduct together with breaches of warranties. In particular, Cargill alleged that the Viterra companies had failed to disclose certain practices of the malting business.
[18] Viterra Malt Pty Ltd v Cargill Australia Ltd [2018] VSCA 118; (2018) 58 VR 333 (Whelan, Kyrou and McLeish JJA).

The Viterra companies sought production of privileged documents, contending those documents recorded or evidenced Cargill's knowledge of the undisclosed matters prior to completion of the purchase (at [32] and [33]). The Viterra companies asserted that Cargill had, on the basis of its pleadings, waived privilege over the documents. The application was brought pursuant to s 122(2) of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic).
The Viterra companies referred to the integral role played by the lawyers within Cargill, through the due diligence process, in reaching its ultimate state of knowledge prior to signing and then completing the agreement in question (at [34]). Cargill maintained there was no waiver and that the case was an example of a 'mere reliance pleading' in which they had simply pleaded a reliance on representations made to them (at [35]).
The Full Court concluded that assistance in understanding and applying the test of inconsistency in the statutory provision could be derived from the common law propositions, but expressed the need for caution in doing so (at [72] – [72]). The Full Court continued (at 73]):
Notwithstanding the need for caution on that account, it can be said that a pleading of reliance, without more, will not usually manifest inconsistency with the maintenance of client legal privilege in communications relevant to that state of mind. It can also be seen that the observation of Allsop J in DSE as to the circumstances in which privilege will be waived, while still a gloss on the statutory language, has commanded wide acceptance as a statement of the general operation of the principle.
Then, at [77], the Full Court addressed the point agitated by the Viterra companies, to the effect that Cargill's lawyers had been 'integrally involved in the due diligence process and in communications leading to the signing of the agreement'. Further, the Full Court accepted the proposition that it could be inferred from the description of discovered documents that 'communications had flowed to and from Cargill and its lawyers as part of these events, contemporaneously with the formation of the state of mind which Cargill had put in issue'.
Nonetheless, the Full Court concluded there would be nothing inconsistent in maintaining privilege in relation to those privileged documents, while also asserting ignorance of the matters which had not been disclosed and pleading reliance. The court stated (at [78]):
This is not a case where the nature of the pleading makes it inconsistent to withhold privileged communications about the transaction, notwithstanding that those communications might reveal something of Cargill's state of mind. It is entirely to be expected that a party pleading a misleading or deceptive conduct case arising from a commercial transaction will have received legal advice regarding the transaction before its consummation. The applicants' argument would suggest that privilege is waived by pleading such a case. The authorities show that something more is required.
The Full Court examined the 'something more' identified by the Viterra companies, which was the assertion that lawyers had been 'integrally involved in the pre-sale processes and that it could be inferred from that fact and from the Cargill parties' discovery that the lawyers had provided advice material to the formation of Cargill's state of mind as to the Undisclosed Matters over the relevant period' (at [79]). The court concluded that it could not draw that inference on the material available, stating that (at [79]):
Unlike in Rio Tinto, it is not pleaded that such legal advice was provided. Nor is it, as in Thomason, to be inferred from the pleading. The Cargill parties' discovery does not provide a basis for the inference either. At the very highest, it may allow for the inference that Cargill's lawyers sent communications to Cargill about one or more of the Undisclosed Matters. Similarly, the judge below was prepared to conclude that 'some, perhaps many, of the confidential communications listed are probably relevant to the issue of what and to which extent Cargill knew about an Undisclosed Matter, namely the practice of supplying out of specification malt'. But such communications have not been shown to extend to legal advice material to the formation of Cargill's state of mind in respect of the Undisclosed Matters. In that respect, the case resembles Macquarie Bank v Arup.
The decisions in both Macquarie Bank Limited v Arup Pty Limited and Viterra Malt Pty Ltd v Cargill Australia Ltd demonstrate that a pleading of reliance, without more, will not be sufficient. Even factual circumstances which demonstrate that the privilege-holder was assisted by lawyers at the relevant time, and also received legal advice at the relevant time, are not sufficient. The communications which are sought to be produced will need to be shown to extend to legal advice which was material to the formation of the state of mind which has been pleaded by the privilege-holder.
It follows from these authorities, that the nature of the rectification and misleading conduct pleas in the present case, which in broad terms are connected to the intended terms and contractual meaning of the restraint aspects of the 2017 Agreement, being matters on which a party might be inferred to have taken advice, are not sufficient to sustain the application for production on the basis of issue waiver.
In the present case, I am not satisfied the defendants have adequately demonstrated that the plaintiffs' pleading has laid the contested documents open to scrutiny, and I cannot be satisfied there has been a waiver on the part of the plaintiffs of the privilege which otherwise exists in those communications.
In these circumstances, it might well be doubted whether it would be appropriate to inspect the contested documents, which were produced to the Court on a confidential basis by the plaintiffs' solicitors, particularly given the lack of strength in the waiver argument and the verified evidence received from the plaintiffs' solicitor as to the substance of the contested documents.[19] It will not be in every application for production of privileged documents that inspection by the court is appropriate.
[19] Affidavit of Mabel Chua sworn 14 October 2025 [8] – [9].
Ultimately, for reasons similar to those I expressed in Braziron No 2 at [89], I concluded it was appropriate in the circumstances of the present application to exercise the inspection power, sourced as it is in either O 26 r 10 RSC or the inherent jurisdiction, to fairly dispose of the application.[20] The inspection of the documents does not cause me to alter the views I have expressed above as to the fate of this application.
[20] The defendants encouraged inspection. The plaintiffs accepted there was power, did not object to its exercise, but submitted it was not necessary to exercise that power in the circumstances: PS [10].
The application should be dismissed. I will hear from counsel as to the costs orders which should now be made.

ATTACHMENT A
Schedule of the Contested Documents

No.	Document	Title	Date	Author	Recipient
1.	BRA.0018.3405	Email from Jamie Morton to Catherine Anderson	15.05.2017	Morton	Anderson
2.	BRA.0018.3406	Attachment to BRA.0018.3405, being SSD BZL 191216.docx	15.05.2017	-	-
3.	BRA.0018.5155	Email from Catherine Anderson to Jamie Morton	15.05.2017	Anderson	Morton
4.	BRA.0018.3462	Email from Jamie Morton to Catherine Anderson	30.08.2017	Morton	Anderson
5.	BRA.0018.3463	Attachment to BRA.0018.3462, being BZL and SBWA Shareholder's Agreement.pdf	01.03.2019	-	-
6.	BRA.0018.5156	Email from Catherine Anderson to Jamie Morton	31.08.2017	Anderson	Morton
7.	BRA.0018.5157	Email from Catherine Anderson to Jamie Morton	01.09.2017	Anderson	Morton
8.	BRA.0018.5159	Attachment to BRA.0018.5157, being SBWA advice Sept 2017.docx	01.09.2017	-	-
9.	BRA.0018.3535	Email from Jamie Morton to Catherine Anderson	01.12.2017	Morton	Anderson
10.	BRA.0018.3536	Attachment to BRA.0018.3535, being BZL and SBWA Share Sale Deed.pdf	01.03.2019	-	-
11.	BRA.0018.5162	Email from Catherine Anderson to Jamie Morton	05.12.2017	Anderson	Morton
12.	BRA.0018.5176	Email from Catherine Anderson to Jamie Morton	06.12.2017	Anderson	Morton
13.	BRA.0018.5163	Email from Catherine Anderson to Jamie Morton	06.12.2017	Anderson	Morton
14.	BRA.0018.5165	Attachment to BRA.0018.5163, being Agreement for Sale of Shares V1.docx	06.12.2017	-	-

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
LM
Associate to the Honourable Justice Lundberg
23 OCTOBER 2025