Morton v Bolinda Publishing Pty Limited

Link copied
Case Copied 40 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Morton v Bolinda Publishing Pty Limited [2017] FCA 187

File number: NSD 892 of 2016
Judge: BURLEY J
Date of judgment: 2 March 2017
Catchwords: PRIVILEGE – interlocutory application challenging claim for legal professional privilege – whether joint privilege and common interest privilege available – whether privilege waived in context of common and joint privilege – whether privilege waived by putting contents of privileged documents in issue – application dismissed
Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 75, 124
Cases cited:

Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners (No 2) [1972] 2 QB 102

Australian Hospital Care (Pindara) Pty Ltd v Duggan (No 2) [1999] VSC 131

AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) [2006] FCA 1234; (2006) 155 FCR 30

Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto Limited [2006] FCAFC 86; (2006) 151 FCR 341

Commonwealth v Vance [2005] ACTCA 35; (2005) 158 ACTR 47

DSE (Holdings) Pty Limited v Intertan Inc [2003] FCA 384; (2003) 127 FCR 499

Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Webb (1996) 39 NSWLR 601

Ferella v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2010] FCA 766

Grofam Pty Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1993) 45 FCR 445

Hancock v Rinehart (Privilege) [2016] NSWSC 12

Health Insurance Commission v Freeman [1998] FCA 1340; (1998) 88 FCR 544

Lane v Admedus Regen Pty Limited [2016] FCA 864

Macquarie Bank Ltd v Arup Pty Limited [2016] FCAFC 117

Mann v Carnell [1999] HCA 66; (1999) 201 CLR 1

Marshall v Prescott [2013] NSWCA 152

Re McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade [2004] AATA 1365; (2004) ALD 780

Sydney Airports Corporation Ltd v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2005] NSWCA 47

Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v State of Victoria [2013] VSC 302

Tavcol Pty Ltd v Valbeet Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1002

Date of hearing: 3 and 6 February 2017
Date of last submissions: 7 February 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Intellectual Property
Sub-area: Copyright and Industrial Designs
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 91
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms J A Steele with Ms L R Vujcic
Solicitor for the Applicant: Frankel Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P M Wood with Mr T E O’Brien
Solicitor for the Respondent: Arnold Bloch Leibler
Solicitor for Selwa Anthony and Selwa Anthony Pty Limited: Ms M Paton of Maxwell, Meredith & Co

ORDERS

NSD 892 of 2016
BETWEEN:

KATE MORTON

Applicant/Cross-Respondent

AND:

BOLINDA PUBLISHING PTY LIMITED

Respondent/Cross-Claimant

JUDGE:

BURLEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 MARCH 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory application dated 14 December 2016 is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

3.The applicant be granted leave to file written submissions, of not more than two (2) pages, in relation to the costs of Ms Anthony, within fifteen (15) working days from the date of these orders.

4.Ms Anthony be granted leave to file written submissions in answer, of not more than two (2) pages, within…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Morton v Bolinda Publishing Pty Limited and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] FCA 187
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Morton v Bolinda Publishing Pty Limited involved a dispute over the application of legal professional privilege in documents related to publishing agreements between Kate Morton and Bolinda Publishing Pty Limited. Morton sought to assert privilege over several documents exchanged between the parties, including communications with her former literary agent, Selwa Anthony. Bolinda challenged Morton's claim of privilege, arguing that it was not applicable due to various factors, including Morton's termination of her agency agreement with Anthony and the assertion of privilege in the context of a dispute over the withholding of payments.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether Bolinda was entitled to claim legal professional privilege over the documents in question, whether a joint privilege or common interest privilege existed between Bolinda and Anthony, whether there had been a waiver of privilege by Bolinda, and whether Morton had waived the privilege by putting the contents of the privileged documents in issue. The court had to determine the applicability of legal professional privilege in light of the specific circumstances and context of the communications and documents in dispute.

In dismissing the interlocutory application, the court found that Bolinda was entitled to claim legal professional privilege for the documents in question, as the communications were made for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice. The court also held that a joint privilege or common interest privilege existed between Bolinda and Anthony, as they shared a common interest in resolving the dispute over the withholding of payments. However, the court found that there had been no waiver of privilege by Bolinda, as the communications were made in confidence and for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. The court also ruled that Morton had not waived the privilege by putting the contents of the privileged documents in issue.

The court dismissed the interlocutory application and ordered Morton to pay Bolinda's costs. Additionally, the court granted Morton leave to file written submissions regarding the costs incurred by Anthony, with Anthony then granted leave to respond.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application dated 14 December 2016 is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

3. The applicant be granted leave to file written submissions, of not more than two (2) pages, in relation to the costs of Ms Anthony, within fifteen (15) working days from the date of these orders.

4. Ms Anthony be granted leave to file written submissions in answer, of not more than two (2) pages, within ten (10) working days thereafter.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out in more detail below, the interlocutory application is dismissed with costs.2. BACKGROUND2.1 Chronology The first of the publishing agreements between Ms Morton and Bolinda is dated 21 March 2006. It is governed by the laws of the State of Victoria and provides that Bolinda shall make royalty and other payments to the “Proprietor” who is defined as “Kate Morton c/o Selwa Anthony Author Management”. Clause 3.3 provides that “[a]ll monies due under this agreement will be paid to the Proprietor”. The second and third agreements are dated 14 December 2007 and 18 August 2009. The terms of these agreements in relation to payment of royalties are relevantly the same (save that different publications by Ms Morton are identified). The fourth agreement is dated 20 May 2013 and is also relevantly in the same terms, save that clause 3.5 provides that “[p]ayment of royalties must be made according to payment details outlined in the Schedule”. The Schedule provides “Proprietor Details Selwa Anthony Pty Ltd Account Number: [details provided] BSB: [details provided]”. On 15 December 2015, Ms Morton purported to terminate her agency agreement with Ms Anthony. On 8 February 2016, Bolinda received a letter from Ms Morton’s solicitors, Frankel Lawyers (Frankel) which advised Bolinda of the termination, and instructed it to make all payments to an account at Ms Morton’s direction. This letter was described by the respondent as the “first trigger” being the trigger for the first document in respect of which privilege is claimed. Document 1 in the list of documents is a chain of six emails dated from 10 February 2016 to 12 February 2016 from Ms Herrmann to Mr Trevor Choy (Bolinda’s legal advisor), Mr Choy to Ms Herrmann, Ms Herrmann to Ms Anthony, and Ms Anthony to Ms Herrmann. On 12 February 2016, Ms Herrmann, on behalf of Bolinda, wrote to Frankel stating that Bolinda had been made aware by Ms Anthony that an ongoing legal dispute exists between Ms Anthony’s agency and Ms Morton: “[i]n light of this dispute, Bolinda will withhold any payments due under the following audio publishing agreements until this matter has been resolved”. The letter then listed the publishing agreements. On 15 February 2016, Bolinda received a letter from Frankel entitled “Notice of Breach” in which Frankel informed Bolinda that by withholding payments, Bolinda was in fundamental breach of each of the publishing agreements, and notifying Bolinda that unless such breach was rectified within 30 days, the agreements would be terminated. This is said by counsel for Bolinda to be the “second trigger”. Document 2 is a chain of three emails dated 16 and 17 February 2016 variously from Ms Isabella Depiazzi (Bolinda’s Rights and Contracts Executive) to Mr Choy, Mr Choy to Ms Herrmann and Ms Depiazzi, and Ms Herrmann to Mr Choy. Document 3 is a chain of three emails dated 17 February to 24 February 2016 from Ms Herrmann to Mr Choy, Mr Choy to Ms Herrmann, Ms Herrmann to Ms Anthony.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The parties presented a cascading series of options that flow from the claim for privilege which conveniently reflect the issues for determination:(1)Is Bolinda entitled to legal professional privilege in documents 1 to 11?(2)Does a joint privilege or common interest privilege apply to the benefit of Bolinda and Ms Anthony in respect of documents 1 and 3?(3)Has there been a waiver of privilege in documents 1 and 3?(4)Has there been an issue waiver?4. CONSIDERATION 4.1 Relevant legal principles Legal professional privilege protects confidential communications between a legal adviser and a client from disclosure. The public policy behind the privilege is to promote candour. The claim for legal privilege professional privilege is governed by common law principles which have been conveniently summarised by Young J in AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) [2006] FCA 1234; (2006) 155 FCR 30 (AWB) at [44]:(1)The party claiming privilege carries the onus of proving that the communication was undertaken, or the document was brought into existence, for the dominant purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice. The onus might be discharged by evidence as to the circumstances and context in which the communications occurred or the documents were brought into existence, or by evidence as to the purposes of the person who made the communication, or authored the document, or procured its creation. It might also be discharged by reference to the nature of the documents, supported by argument or submissions.(2)The purpose for which a document is brought into existence is a question of fact that must be determined objectively. Evidence of the intention of the document’s maker, or of the person who authorised or procured it, is not necessarily conclusive. It may be necessary to examine the evidence concerning the purpose of other persons involved in the hierarchy of decision-making or consultation that led to the creation of the document and its subsequent communication.(3)The existence of legal professional privilege is not established merely by the use of verbal formula. Nor is a claim of privilege established by mere assertion that privilege applies to particular communications or that communications are undertaken for the purpose of obtaining or giving “legal advice”. If assertions of that kind are received in evidence in support of the privilege claim, their conclusionary nature can leave unclear what advice was really being sought. There will be cases in which a claim of privilege will not be sustainable in the absence of evidence identifying the circumstances in which the relevant communication took place and the topics to which the instructions or advice were directed.(4)Where communications take place between a client and his or her independent legal advisers, or between a client’s in-house lawyers and those legal advisers, it may be appropriate to assume that legitimate legal advice was being sought, absent any contrary indications. In Kennedy v Wallace, Black CJ and Emmett J inclined to the view that in the ordinary case of a client consulting a lawyer about a legal problem in uncontroversial circumstances, proof of those facts alone will provide a sufficient basis for a conclusion that legitimate legal advice is being sought or given.(5)A “dominant purpose” is one that predominates over other purposes; it is the prevailing or paramount purpose.(6)An appropriate starting point when applying the dominant purpose test is to ask what was the intended use or uses of the document which accounted for it being brought into existence.(7)The concept of legal advice is fairly wide. It extends to professional advice as to what a party should prudently or sensibly do in the relevant legal context; but it does not extend to advice that is purely commercial or of a public relations character.(8)Legal professional privilege protects the disclosure of documents that record legal work carried out by the lawyer for the benefit of the client, such as research memoranda, collations and summaries of documents, chronologies and the like, whether or not they are actually provided to the client.(9)Subject to meeting the dominant purpose test, legal professional privilege extends to notes, memoranda or other documents made by officers or employees of the client that relate to information sought by the client’s legal adviser to enable him or her to advise. The privilege extends to drafts, notes and other material brought into existence by the client for the purpose of communication to the lawyer, whether or not they are themselves actually communicated to the lawyer.(10)Legal professional privilege is capable of attaching to communications between a salaried legal adviser and his or her employer, provided that the legal adviser is consulted in a professional capacity in relation to a professional matter and the communications are made in confidence and arise from the relationship of lawyer and client. Some cases have added a requirement that the lawyer who provided the advice must be admitted to practice. However, in Commonwealth v Vance (2005) 158 ACTR 47, the Full Court (Gray, Connolly and Tamberlin JJ) did not regard the possession of a current practising certificate as an essential precondition to the availability of legal professional privilege: at [23]-[35]. ...(11)Legal professional privilege protects communications rather than documents, as the test for privilege is anchored to the purpose for which the document was brought into existence. Consequently, legal professional privilege can attach to copies of non-privileged documents if the purpose of bringing the copy into existence satisfies the dominant purpose test. …(12)The Court has power to examine documents over which legal professional privilege is claimed. Where there is a disputed claim, the High Court has said that the court should not be hesitant to exercise such a power. If the power is exercised, the court will need to recognise that it does not have the benefit of submissions or evidence that might place the document in its proper context. The essential purpose of such an inspection is to determine whether, on its face, the nature and content of the document supports the claim for legal professional privilege. (citations omitted)