Carna Group Pty Ltd v The Griffin Coal Mining Company (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Carna Group Pty Ltd v The Griffin Coal Mining Company (No 2) [2019] FCA 2209

File number: WAD 354 of 2018
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 18 December 2019
Date of publication of reasons: 16 January 2020
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – inspection of discovery - claim for legal professional privilege

EVIDENCE – where claim is made by liquidator on basis of company’s documents – onus – whether discharged – whether hearsay evidence is admissible – whether company officers receiving advice or solicitor giving it or usual former solicitors should have sworn affidavit - whether disclosure of documents proving the facts to support the claim waives privilege

Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 117, 117(1), 118(a), 118(b), 118(c), 122
Cases cited:

Apple Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Wily [2002] NSWSC 855

Gardner v Irwin. (1879) 4 Ex D 49

Re Global Advanced Metals Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 1545

Hancock v Rinehart [2016] NSWSC 12

Hastie Group Ltd (in liq) v Moore [2016] NSWCA 305

Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298

McKenzie v Cash Converters International Ltd [2017] FCA 1564

National Crime Authority v S (1991) 29 FCR 203

Tavcol Pty Ltd v Valbeet Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1002

Date of hearing: 18 December 2019
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 30
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr SK Dharmananda SC
Solicitor for the Applicant: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms K McNally
Solicitor for the First Respondent: McNally & Co
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr AF Mizen
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Mizen + Mizen
Counsel for the Third Respondent: Mr S Penrose
Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Tottle Partners

ORDERS

WAD 354 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CARNA GROUP PTY LTD ACN 063 629 630 (IN LIQUIDATION)

Applicant

AND:

THE GRIFFIN COAL MINING COMPANY PTY LTD ACN 008 667 285

First Respondent

RAJ KUMAR ROY

Second Respondent

JAMES RIORDAN

Third Respondent

AND BETWEEN:

THE GRIFFIN COAL MINING COMPANY PTY LTD ACN 008 667 285

Cross-claimant

AND:

CARNA GROUP PTY LTD ACN 063 629 630 (IN LIQUIDATION)

First Cross-Respondent

HARRY CARNA
Second Cross-Respondent

MICHAEL GREY
Third Cross-Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 DECEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The third respondent’s interlocutory application, filed 28 November 2019, be adjourned with costs reserved.

2.The second respondent’s interlocutory application, filed 12 December 2019, be adjourned with costs reserved.

3.Order 2 sought by the first respondent’s interlocutory application, filed 29 November 2019, be dismissed with costs to be fixed.

4.There be liberty to apply.

5.Costs of the case management hearing be costs in the cause.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCKERRACHER J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The first respondent, The Griffin Coal Mining Company Pty Ltd, seeks further discovery or inspection of certain documents from the applicant, Carna Group Pty Ltd (in liquidation).  At a…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 2209
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The decision in the matter of Carna Group Pty Ltd v The Griffin Coal Mining Company (No 2) involved the issue of legal professional privilege and the inspection of documents as part of the discovery process. The primary legal issue for the court to decide was whether the liquidator, Carna Group, had successfully claimed legal professional privilege over certain documents created by the company's former solicitors. The court also needed to consider whether the onus was discharged to establish the privilege and whether hearsay evidence was admissible in this context. Additionally, the court examined whether the solicitors receiving advice or the solicitors giving it, or the former solicitors, should have sworn an affidavit and whether the disclosure of documents proving the facts to support the claim waived the privilege.

The Federal Court held that the liquidator had sufficiently discharged the onus of proving legal professional privilege by demonstrating that the documents in question were confidential communications between a lawyer and the client for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice. The court found that the fact that the documents were produced on oath was consistent with maintaining the privilege over the documents, as the disclosure was made to evidence the basis of the privilege claim. The court rejected the argument that the privilege had been waived by the disclosure of certain emails, holding that these emails did not reveal any substantive legal advice and therefore did not fall within the exceptions to privilege under the Evidence Act. The court also dismissed the contention that the solicitors should have sworn affidavits to support the claim of privilege, finding that their neutrality and the lack of evidence suggesting any other role they might have played reinforced the inference that the communications were indeed for the purpose of providing legal advice.

The court dismissed the application by The Griffin Coal Mining Company, finding that the liquidator had established the privilege over the contested documents. The court ordered that the interlocutory applications filed by the respondents be adjourned with costs reserved, dismissed the specific order sought by one of the respondents with costs to be fixed, and granted liberty to apply. The court further ordered that the costs of the case management hearing be costs in the cause.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The third respondent’s interlocutory application, filed 28 November 2019, be adjourned with costs reserved.

2. The second respondent’s interlocutory application, filed 12 December 2019, be adjourned with costs reserved.

3. Order 2 sought by the first respondent’s interlocutory application, filed 29 November 2019, be dismissed with costs to be fixed.

4. There be liberty to apply.

5. Costs of the case management hearing be costs in the cause.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

As to the related observation by Griffin that Carna usually sought legal advice from another firm, this does not carry the argument any further. It is entirely plausible that Carna might also seek advice from another lawyer who is, for example, experienced in a particular area in relation to contracts. That is not a factor which would weigh in favour of Griffin’s contentions. CONCLUSION In my view, Griffin’s application must be dismissed. In written submissions, Carna wished to be heard on indemnity costs, but, correctly in my view, no oral claim for indemnity costs was made at the hearing. Costs on the usual basis should follow the event and I ordered accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Once again, the factual circumstances in McKenzie, like Hancock, were very different from the present factual circumstances where the persons who might possibly throw additional light on the circumstances surrounding the creation of the documents are, in practical terms, well outside the liquidators’ camp. CONSIDERATION For reasons which follow, I am satisfied that privilege attaches to the Nardizzi documents as they are clearly confidential communications between an Australian lawyer, Mr Nardizzi, and a client, Carna, for the dominant purpose of the lawyer providing legal advice to the client. That is unquestionably so, at least by way of inference from the face of the documents, which reveal that:(a)Mr Nardizzi was a lawyer at the time the documents were created;(b)Carna engaged Mr Nardizzi to provide legal services, being legal advice relating to the proposed Mining Services Contract between Carna and Griffin. This is entirely apparent from any objective assessment of the parties’ intentions, including:(i)the content of the fee for services email; and(ii)the email of 12 January 2014 referred to above from Mr Roy to Mr Riordan, which refers to discussions between Carna and Carna’s lawyer, ‘Ronnie’. The existence of the fee for services email and the 12 January 2014 email have been established on oath. I fully accept that in circumstances quite different from the present, a more fulsome explanation would be expected if, for example, hypothetically, Carna were not insolvent and were pursuing Griffin for a claim. In those circumstances, the persons identified would be within Carna’s camp and be expected to give evidence. As to the two solicitors identified by Griffin, especially Mr Nardizzi, their position is entirely neutral. If Mr Nardizzi was providing legal advice, as it seems clear on the balance of probabilities he was doing, for him to actually say so on affidavit– if indeed he, as a stranger to this litigation, would reveal that information - would add little. As to the other solicitor, it is quite unclear how she might throw further light on the nature of these communications. To infer that she would, would be for the Court to impermissibly speculate. Importantly, no party has suggested and certainly no evidence has been produced to suggest that Mr Nardizzi has ever played any role other than providing the advice to which the communications relate. There is, at this stage, no plausible evidence or reason to believe that some of the documents in respect of which privilege is claimed might be relevant to the proceeding in some way other than the provision of legal advice. The limited documents produced on oath on their face acknowledge provision of legal advice to Carna. This satisfactorily discharges Carna’s obligation to claim legal professional privilege in respect of the documents over which inspection is sought. Finally, as to the contention that, by producing the fee for services email, privilege in respect of all the documents for which it has been claimed has been waived, I disagree. First, it was expressly provided on the basis that it did not waive Carna’s privilege in any of the Nardizzi documents. But, in any event, production of that document was consistent with the maintenance of privilege over the Nardizzi documents as it is quite apparent that the sole reason for its disclosure was to evidence the basis for the privilege claim. Both emails which together prove the asserted privilege and which do not reveal the substantive legal advice or any part of it do not fall within s 122(3) of the Evidence Act.