Clairs Keeley (a Firm) v Treacy

Link copied
Case Copied 83 min read

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE FULL COURT (WA)

CITATION:   CLAIRS KEELEY (A FIRM) -v- TREACY & ORS [2003] WASCA 299

CORAM:   MURRAY J

PARKER J
TEMPLEMAN J
WHEELER J
PULLIN J

HEARD:   10 APRIL 2003

DELIVERED          :   3 DECEMBER 2003

FILE NO/S:   FUL 114 of 2002

BETWEEN:   CLAIRS KEELEY (A FIRM)

Appellant (Sixth Defendant)

AND

JOANNE MARIE TREACY
GEORGE ROBERT SOULLIER
MARY JOY SOULLIER
COLIN DOUGLAS HENNING
DOREEN RUTH HENNING
Respondents (Plaintiffs)

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Application by defendant to stay action - Ground of maintenance and champerty - Funding agreement between plaintiff and third party - Retainer agreement between third party and plaintiffs' solicitors - Discretion to stay action for abuse of process

Legislation:

Debt Collectors Licensing Act 1964

Legal Practitioners Act 1893, s 59
Security and Related Activities (Control) Act 1996

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 47(6)

Result:

Leave to appeal granted
Appeal allowed
Stay of action granted

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant (Sixth Defendant)  :     Mr A C Archibald QC & Mr S M Davies

Respondents (Plaintiffs)     :     Mr D H Solomon & Mr J C Giles

Solicitors:

Appellant (Sixth Defendant)  :     Mallesons Stephen Jaques

Respondents (Plaintiffs)     :     Solomon Brothers

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532

Bandwill Pty Ltd v Spencer-Laitt (2002) 23 WAR 390

Choules v Siglin [2002] WASC 230

Clare v Joseph [1907] 2 KB 369

Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186

Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Harvey [1980] VR 669

Elfic Ltd v Macks [2003] 2 Qd R 125

Faryab v Smyth (unreported, Court of Appeal, UK, 28 August 1998

Freehill Hollingdale & Page v Bandwill Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 150

Giles v Thompson [1993] 3 All ER 321

Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142

Gore v Justice Corp Pty Ltd (2002) 119 FCR 429

Grovewood Holdings plc v James Capel & Co Ltd [1995] Ch 80

In re Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd [1998] Ch 170

Liebermann v Morris (1944) 69 CLR 69

Magic Menu Systems Pty Ltd v AFA Facilitation Pty Ltd & Ors (1997) 72 FCR 261

Marston v Statewide Independent Wholesalers Ltd [2003] NSWSC 816

Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] Ch 363

Metropolitan Bank Ltd v Pooley (1885) 10 App Cas 210

Microsoft Corporation v Electrowide Ltd [1997] FSR 580

Newton v Gapes (1910) 12 WALR 86

Pryles & Defteros v Green (1999) 20 WAR 541

Ram Coomar Coondoo v Chunder Canto Mookerjee (1876) 2 App Cas 186

Re Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2) [1963] 1 Ch 199

Stevens v Keogh (1946) 72 CLR 1

Stocznia Gdanska Sa v Latreefers Inc (No 2) [2000] EWCA Civ 36

Stocznia Gdanska v Latreefers Inc, unreported; Court of Appeal, UK, 9 February 2000

Treacy & Ors v Rylestone Pty Ltd & Ors [2002] WASC 178

Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse [1992] AC 679

Wallis v Duke of Portland (1797) 3 Ves 494

Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Clairs Keeley (a Firm) v Treacy and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2003] WASCA 299
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Clairs Keeley (a Firm) v Treacy, the defendant, Mr. Treacy, applied for a stay of proceedings against the plaintiffs, Clairs Keeley, due to concerns about the involvement of a third-party litigation funder, IMF. The dispute centred on the propriety of the funding agreement between the plaintiffs and IMF, and the potential implications for the fairness and integrity of the legal process. The court was tasked with determining whether the funding arrangement constituted an abuse of process or amounted to maintenance or champerty, which would warrant a stay of proceedings.

The court considered the legal principles surrounding litigation funding, particularly the potential for such arrangements to lead to an abuse of the court's process. The funding agreement in question suggested that IMF would effectively control the litigation in exchange for a significant portion of the recovery, which raised concerns about the plaintiffs' independence and the integrity of the legal process. The court examined whether the presence of such a funding arrangement could lead to a de facto assignment of the plaintiffs' causes of action, which would contravene public policy.

The court concluded that while the plaintiffs retained formal control over the litigation, the potential for IMF to exert substantial influence over the proceedings was concerning. The court found that the involvement of a litigation funder who profits from the dispute, as opposed to an insurer with a legitimate interest in the litigation, could be oppressive to the defendant and contrary to public policy. The court held that the risk to the administration of justice posed by the litigation funding agreement outweighed the plaintiffs' interest in proceeding with the litigation as funded. Consequently, the court granted the application for a stay of proceedings.

The final order of the court was that the proceedings against the plaintiffs be stayed, reflecting the court's concern about the potential for abuse of process due to the litigation funding agreement.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

PARKER J (dissent)

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

The funding agreements are presented to the court on the basis that they will enable the plaintiffs to prosecute their action for a fee of about 35 per cent of the amounts recovered. If the documents before the Court, and the affidavit evidence from Mr McLernon are to be accepted at their face value, that must be so. However, as Laddie J said in Microsoft Corporation v Electrowide Ltd [1997] FSR 580, 594:" … the mere fact that the defendants support their defence by sworn evidence does not mean that the court is obliged to suspend its critical faculties and accept that evidence as if it was probably accurate." As I have said, I do accept the evidence that, as a matter of form, the legal work will be carried out by Solomon Brothers and the plaintiffs will make the decisions. But if, in substance, the plaintiffs will simply do as they are advised by IMF, the effect will be a de facto assignment of their causes of action. Thus, in reality, IMF will not be funding the plaintiffs' action for a commission of about 35 per cent of the amounts recovered: it will be running the action for its own benefit, in consideration of a payment to the plaintiffs of about 65 per cent of the recovery. Even if this conclusion is regarded as unduly cynical, the fact that the potential exists for IMF to conduct itself in that way is, I think, a sufficient ground for concern. That view accords with the observation made by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Magic Menu Systems Pty Ltd v AFA Facilitation Pty Ltd & Ors (1997) 72 FCR 261, at 269, that where there may be "the real potential for an abuse of the Court's process" a stay might be justified in some cases. I recognise that the applicants' professional indemnity insurers are entitled to exercise a similar degree of control in relation to their defence of the action. For example, cl 7.2 of the Certificate of Professional Indemnity Insurance issued to Western Australian legal firms provides that the insurers are entitled at any time:"(a)at their own cost, to take over the conduct of the Insured's defence of a claim; or(b)to relinquish conduct of the Insured's defence of a claim; or(c)to settle a claim, but only with the Insured's consent." (AB 554)" However, that is in the nature of subrogation, the insurer having a legitimate pre-existing interest in the litigation. An insurer is in a different position from a litigation funder, with no interest other than to profit from the dispute. It is the introduction of that extraneous element into the dispute which is regarded as oppressive to the defendant to a champertously maintained action and hence contrary to the public policy. As I noted in Bandwill (supra) at par 36, a court considering an application for a stay in circumstances such as this, must carry out a balancing exercise, between, on the one hand, the risk to the administration of justice posed by the involvement of a litigation funding agreement, and on the other hand, the interests of the plaintiffs. The circumstances of this case make that a difficult exercise. On the one hand, it may fairly be said that if this action proceeds to trial, albeit funded by IMF, the Court's role will be to determine the parties' rights: and it is in the public interest that this should happen.