Dorajay Pty Ltd v Aristocrat Leisure Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dorajay Pty Limited v Aristocrat Leisure Limited

[2005] FCA 1483

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – stay of proceedings – abuse of the Court’s process – maintenance and champerty – whether litigation funder has control of the proceeding – relationship between the applicant, its solicitors and the litigation funder – distinction between whether an allegedly champertous agreement is enforceable and whether the proceeding is an abuse of the Court’s process

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – representative proceeding under Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether the proceeding ought to continue as a representative proceeding – power to order that the proceeding no longer continue as a representative proceeding under s 33N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether representative proceeding will not provide an efficient and effective means of dealing with the claims – whether it is inappropriate that the claims be pursued by means of a representative proceeding – whether in the interests of justice to make such an order – role of the opt out procedure under Part IVA – comparison between opt out and opt in procedures

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – intervention by a non-party – application by litigation funder to intervene pursuant to O 6 r 17 of the Federal Court Rules – leave to intervene on a limited basis granted

EVIDENCE – admissibility – opinion evidence – whether opinion evidence – whether expert evidence – expert evidence based on experience – evidence ruled admissible pursuant to s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 12BB, 12DA
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 674, 769C, 1041H,
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 76, 79, 80
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 23, 33C, 33D, 33E, 33H, 33J, 33L, 33M, 33N, 33V, 33W, 33X, 33Z, 33ZB, 33ZE, 33ZF, 33ZG, 33ZJ, 43
Federal Court of Australia (Amendment) Act 1991 (Cth)
Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic)
Trade Practices Act (Cth), s 51A, 52

Federal Court Rules, O 6 r 17, O 11 r 16, O 20 r 2, O 21 and O 46 r 7A
Supreme Court Rules (NSW), Pt 8 r 13

Abraham v Thompson [1997] 4 All ER 362 referred to
Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 46 ACSR 504 referred to
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chats House Investments Pty Ltd (1996) 71 FCR 250 cited
BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 211 ALR 523 referred to
Bright v Femcare Ltd (2002) 195 ALR 574 discussed
Clairs Keeley (a Firm) v Treacy (2003) 28 WAR 139 discussed
Clairs Keeley (a Firm) v Treacy [2004] WASCA 277 discussed
Clairs Keeley (a Firm) v Treacy [2005] WASCA 86 discussed
Courtney v Medtel Pty Ltd (2000) 122 FCR 168 referred to
Elfic Ltd v Macks [2003] 2 Qd R 125 referred to
Faryab v Smyth [1998] EWCA Civ 1416 discussed
Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 83 discussed
Giles v…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCA 1483
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Dorajay Pty Ltd initiated a representative proceeding against Aristocrat Leisure Ltd, a company that provides gaming software, systems, and hardware, in the Federal Court of Australia. The proceeding was brought on behalf of those who acquired shares in Aristocrat between 20 September 2002 and 26 May 2003 and suffered loss due to Aristocrat's alleged misleading conduct. The applicant, Dorajay, sought to continue the proceeding as a representative proceeding under Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. Aristocrat contested the proceeding's continuation as a representative proceeding, citing concerns about the definition of the representative group and the funding arrangements. The primary legal issue was whether the proceeding should continue as a representative proceeding, given the limitations in the definition of the representative group and the funding arrangements.

The Court examined whether the proceeding should continue as a representative proceeding under s 33N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. Aristocrat argued that the proceeding should not continue as a representative proceeding due to the restrictive definition of the representative group, which limited membership to those who retained a particular firm of solicitors. The Court also considered Aristocrat's concerns about the funding arrangements, where certain firms were involved in both funding and representing the group members. The Court held that continuing the proceeding as a representative proceeding would subvert the clear legislative intent of improving access to justice and efficient use of court resources. The Court found that the restrictive definition of the representative group and the funding arrangements did not align with the goals of Part IVA of the Act.

The Court concluded that the proceeding could not continue as a representative proceeding while retaining a particular firm of solicitors as a criterion for membership of the representative group. The Court allowed a short period for the parties to consider amending the definition of the representative group to address the concerns raised. The Court's decision emphasized the importance of adhering to the legislative intent behind representative proceedings and ensuring that such proceedings genuinely serve the purpose of improving access to justice and efficient use of court resources.

The Court ordered that the proceeding could not continue as a representative proceeding under the current definition of the representative group. The Court proposed allowing a short period for the parties to consider amending the definition of the representative group to address the concerns raised. The Court's decision highlighted the need for representative proceedings to align with the legislative intent and serve the purpose of improving access to justice and efficient use of court resources.

Background

Background to the litigation

This proceeding, commenced as a group proceeding pursuant to Part 4A of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), was transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court of Victoria made on 3 March 2004. Since then it has continued as a representative proceeding under Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (‘the Act’). BACKGROUND The applicant, the representative party, commenced the proceeding on its own behalf and on behalf of others. The respondent (‘Aristocrat’) is a company that provides gaming software, systems and hardware. It is listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (‘ASX’) and is registered pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘the Corporations Act’). The representative group is defined in clause 2 of the further amended statement of claim which states:‘This proceeding is commenced by the Applicant on its own behalf and on behalf of the other persons for whom the solicitors for the Applicant have instructions to act at any particular time, who at some time during the period between 20 September 2002 and 26 May 2003 inclusive … acquired an interest in shares in Aristocrat and who suffered loss and damage by or resulting from the conduct of Aristocrat referred to below.’ In December 2004, I raised with the parties my concern about the way in which this definition limited the representative group to persons who had retained a certain firm of solicitors and whether, having regard to this aspect of the group definition, the proceeding should continue as a representative proceeding. Aristocrat indicated that, in addition to sharing my concerns, it had additional concerns of its own. Those concerns relate to the arrangements for the funding of the proceeding. With the consent of the parties, I therefore ordered that there be a hearing to determine, pursuant to s 33N of the Act, if the proceeding should continue as a representative proceeding. I also ordered that Aristocrat file and serve a statement of issues in relation to the questions arising under s 33N(1) and the additional concerns it had. Before turning to the issues raised however, it may be helpful if I briefly summarise some aspects of the present proceeding.THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGThe further amended statement of claim In its further amended statement of claim, the applicant alleges that between 20 September 2002 and 27 May 2003 Aristocrat by positive statements and by silence, made a series of representations about its profits for the calendar years 2002 and 2003 and certain aspects of its operations (‘the profitability representations’). The applicant claims that each of the profitability representations was misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive, and Aristocrat thereby engaged in conduct in contravention of s 1041H(1) of the Corporations Act, s 12DA(1) of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (‘the ASIC Act’) or s 52 of the Trade Practices Act (Cth) (‘the TP Act’). To the extent that any of the profitability representations were representations as to future matters the applicant alleges that, pursuant to s 769C(1) of the Corporations Act, s 12BB of the ASIC Act or s 51A of the TP Act, Aristocrat had no reasonable basis for making them.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Mr Walker also stated that he was unaware of any potential group member who had expressed an interest in becoming a member of the group and who did not want to be funded by IMF and/or to instruct MBC. He stated that IMF would not be prepared to provide funding where only some members of the class obtained funding and others obtained the benefit of that funding but did not agree to pay a share of their recoveries to IMF in consideration for the funding. He further stated:‘Neither IMF nor ILF are controlling, nor have they at any stage controlled, the proceeding. Neither IMF nor ILF determine the steps to be taken in the proceeding. IMF and ILF leave it to the applicant and MBC to determine the conduct of the proceeding in the applicant’s interest.’Admissibility of evidence Mr Murphy has considerable experience in representative proceedings and his evidence draws heavily on that experience. Senior counsel for Aristocrat, Mr Bathurst QC, submitted that much of Mr Murphy’s evidence was inadmissible. Both parties were content for the disputed parts of Mr Murphy’s first affidavit to be treated as submissions. This was not so, however, with the second affidavit. Much of that affidavit concerned Mr Murphy’s opinion in relation to the future progress of the proceeding if it continues as a representative proceeding, including an estimate of the likely costs involved. He also canvasses the possible ways in which each of the group members could bring their claims, if at all, if the Court ordered that this proceeding no longer continue as a representative proceeding. This is said to be by way of comparison with the evidence given in respect of his expectations as to the approach if the proceeding did continue in its present form. Mr Bathurst contended first, that Mr Murphy’s expectations of the likely course to be adopted if the proceeding continued as a representative proceeding were irrelevant; secondly, that the opinions expressed in these passages were only admissible on the basis that they were given as expert evidence; and thirdly, that the opinions proffered were not supported by any underlying facts and as such these paragraphs should not be admitted into evidence. Mr Bathurst also objected to Mr Murphy’s evidence as to the options open to group members if the representative proceeding does not continue, on the basis that Mr Murphy clearly states that he would need to take instructions about each group member’s experience: see [9] above. As a result, Mr Bathurst submitted that rather than there being a failure to disclose the basis for the opinions, this evidence demonstrated that there is simply no basis for the opinions. Dr Hanscombe SC, senior counsel for the applicant, submitted that in considering the issues under s 33N of the Act the Court must make a comparison between the costs of a representative proceeding and the costs of comparative proceedings. As such, she argued that this evidence was an attempt to assist the Court in making that comparison. Dr Hanscombe further submitted that this evidence was not expert opinion evidence, but rather the evidence of an experienced solicitor making the best estimates he can in relation to the respective costs of a representative proceeding and other comparative proceedings. I am not sure that I understand this distinction; even if the evidence is accurately described by Dr Hanscombe, I find it difficult to see that it is nonetheless an expression of opinion.

Decision

Reasons for decision

STONE J
While access to justice is an important consideration and there is a public interest in favour of representative proceedings, these are not the sole considerations. See also, in a different context BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 211 ALR 523 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ at [15]. In enacting Part IVA, Parliament clearly was intending to improve access to justice and the efficient use of this Court’s resources and prescribed the manner in which these goals were to be achieved. So much is clear from the representative proceeding provisions of the Act and the related extrinsic material. The goals that Part IVA was intended to achieve must be considered, not in the abstract but in the context of the procedures that Parliament expressly adopted. In my opinion, it would be inappropriate and not in the interests of justice to permit a proceeding to continue under Part IVA in circumstances where the clear legislative intention is subverted in the manner described above.CONCLUSION For the reasons given above I am of the opinion that the proceeding cannot continue as a representative proceeding while retaining a particular firm of solicitors is a criterion of membership of the representative group. It may be that the definition of the representative group can be amended to meet the concerns expressed in these reasons. Obviously this is a matter for the applicant to consider. I therefore propose to allow a short period for the parties to consider, in the light of these orders, what steps should now be taken.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: STONE J

The court considered that the primary goal of Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) was to enhance access to justice and the efficient use of the Court's resources. The legislative intent was clear in prescribing the procedures to achieve these goals. The court noted that while access to justice and public interest in representative proceedings were important, they were not the only considerations. The court was of the opinion that it would be inappropriate and not in the interests of justice to permit a proceeding to continue under Part IVA if the legislative intent was subverted by criteria such as retaining a particular firm of solicitors for membership of the representative group. The court allowed a short period for the parties to consider what steps should now be taken, which might include amending the definition of the representative group to meet the concerns expressed.