of Police-Prejudice of member-Libel action by member against Commissioner- Costs-Payment by Association-Powers-Payment challenged by another member Objects and rules of Association- Redress of any grievance to which members may become subject"MaintenanceTrad Union Act 1881-1936 (N.S.W.), April 1-3. 8. 14 (5), 31.

Upon representations made to him by a citizen and certain departmental investigations the Commissioner of Police directed that a charge of indecency laid against the citizen by G., a police constable, be cancelled and G. was suspended from duty. The charge was revived under ministerial direction. In a lengthy statement which appeared in the press prior to the hearing of the charge the Commissioner denounced the conduct of G. in the performance of his duties as a police constable, particularly in relation to the arrest by G. of the citizen and also of many other citizens on charges of indecency. The charge against the citizen was dismissed by a magistrate. A departmental inquiry found G. guilty of concocting charges against citizens but he was

72 CLR 2

exonerated by an Appeal Board constituted under the National Security (Man Power) Regulations, and he resumed duty. G. brought an action for libel againstIth Commissioner and the newspaper, and at G.'s request the Police Association of New South Wales, of which he was a member, paid the costs incurred by G. in the action. The jury returned a verdict in favour of the defendants. In a suit in equity brought against the trustees and officers of the Police Association and the Association itself, S., a member of the Associa- tion, sought a declaration that the payment SO made out of the funds of the Association in respect of G.'s costs was ultra vires and unlawful and an order that the amount SO paid should be repaid by the personal defendants. The objects of the Police Association are, 'by all lawful means," inter alia, " to promote the interest of the police service

; to secure redress for any grievance to which members may become subject financial provision for carrying out any of the

objects." The suit Held, (1) by the whole Court, that the payment of G.'s costs did not, in the circum- stances, infringe the law of maintenance, and by Starke, Dixon, McTiernan and Williams JJ. (Latham C.J. dissenting), that the payment was not ultra vires or beyond the powers of the Police Association and

(2) by Latham C.J., Starke and Williams JJ., that S. was entitled to bring Quare, by the whole Court, (i) whether the Police Association is a trade union within the meaning of those words as defined in S. 31 of the Trade Union Act 1881-1936 (N.S.W.): and (ii) whether a certificate under S. 14 (5) of that Act is conclusive evidence that the organization referred to in the certificate is a trade union within the meaning…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Stevens v Keogh

Details

AGLC: Stevens v Keogh [1946] HCA 16
Case: [1946] HCA 16
Decision Date: 7 June 1946

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant, Percival Thomas Stevens, a member of the Police Association of New South Wales, sought a declaration that payments made from the Association's funds to cover the legal costs of Constable Neville William Grigg in a libel action were ultra vires and unlawful. Stevens also sought an order for the repayment of these funds. The respondents were the trustees and officers of the Police Association, along with the Association itself.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the payment of Constable Grigg's libel action costs by the Police Association was lawful, specifically whether it constituted maintenance at common law and whether it was within the powers granted to the Association by its rules and relevant legislation. The court was required to determine if the Association's rules, particularly those concerning the objects of the Association and the application of its funds, authorised such expenditure, and if the executive's interpretation of these rules was valid.

The majority of the High Court, comprising Starke, Dixon, McTiernan, and Williams JJ., held that the payment of Grigg's costs did not infringe the law of maintenance and was not ultra vires or beyond the powers of the Police Association. Their reasoning focused on the interpretation of the Association's rules, particularly rule 2(c) which allowed for securing redress for grievances to which members might become subject, and rule 2(j) which permitted financial provision for carrying out the Association's objects. The majority found that the circumstances surrounding Grigg's libel action, which arose from his conduct in performing his duties as a police constable and the subsequent public statement by the Commissioner of Police, created a grievance affecting members of the police force generally. Therefore, the financial assistance provided to Grigg was considered a legitimate means of securing redress and promoting the interests of the police service, falling within the authorised objects and purposes of the Association. Latham C.J. dissented, finding that the payment was ultra vires.

By majority decision, the High Court dismissed the appeal. The court also considered, but did not definitively determine, whether the Police Association qualified as a trade union under the relevant New South Wales legislation and the effect of a certificate of registry.

Orders