Bulsey v State of Queensland

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Bulsey & Anor v State of Queensland [2016] QCA 158

PARTIES:

DAVID JOHN BULSEY
(first appellant)
YVETTE FAITH LENOY
(second appellant)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 2831 of 2015
SC No 829 of 2007

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal – Further Orders

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Townsville – Unreported, 20 February 2015

DELIVERED ON:

14 June 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

Heard on the papers

JUDGES:

Fraser JA and Atkinson and McMeekin JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1. The first appellant be awarded pre-judgment interest pursuant to s 58(3) of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 in the sum of $69,493;

2. The second appellant be awarded pre-judgment interest pursuant to s 58(3) of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 in the sum of $30,403;

3.   The respondent be ordered to pay 80% of the appellants’ costs of trial on the indemnity basis;

4.   The parties have leave to make submissions on the costs of the appeal;

5.   The order previously made by this Court be varied by deleting paragraph 1 and in its place order: “Allow each appellant’s appeal with costs on the indemnity basis.”

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – COSTS – RECOVERY OF COSTS – where the appellants were successful on appeal for damages for assault, battery and false imprisonment – where the parties disagree on the amount and rate of interest and costs that should follow – where the appellants made pre-litigation, UCPR and Calderbank offers lower than the court awarded damages when interest is taken into account – where the appellants seek indemnity costs – where the appellants abandoned a claim for malicious prosecution – whether the appellants suffered progressive loss – whether the respondent demonstrates another order for costs is appropriate – whether appellants costs should be awarded on District or Supreme Court scale – whether any costs order needs to be adjusted to allow for abandonment of claim for malicious prosecution – whether order previously made should be varied to allow costs of appeal on indemnity basis

Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 60
Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 58
District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 68, s 145
Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), s 40
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s 198
Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld), s 47
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 360, r 681, r 697, r 703

Bulsey & Anor v State of Queensland[2015] QCA 187, cited
Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 WLR 586; [1975] 3 All ER 333 cited
Camm v Salter [1992] 2 Qd R 342; [1991] QSC 84, cited
Cerutti & Anor v Crestside Pty Ltd & Anor[2014] QCA 33, cited
Chambers v Brice [2014] QSC 52, cited
Coleman v Greenland & Ors [2004] QSC 37, cited
Coleman v Watson & Shaw & Anor [2007] QSC…

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Details
Case
[2016] QCA 158
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Bulsey v State of Queensland involved an appeal concerning the recovery of costs following a successful claim for damages for assault, battery, and false imprisonment. The parties disagreed on the amount and rate of interest and costs that should follow, and the appellants sought indemnity costs. The appellants had made pre-litigation, UCPR, and Calderbank offers that were lower than the court-awarded damages when interest is taken into account. Additionally, the appellants had abandoned a claim for malicious prosecution. The court was required to decide on the appropriate interest rate and costs, whether the appellants suffered progressive loss, and whether the respondent demonstrated another order for costs was appropriate. The court also had to determine whether the appellants' costs should be awarded on the District or Supreme Court scale, whether any costs order needed to be adjusted to allow for the abandonment of the claim for malicious prosecution, and whether the order previously made should be varied to allow costs of appeal on an indemnity basis.

The court held that the purpose of an award of interest was not to punish the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for being kept out of the money represented by the judgment sum in the period between the accrual of the cause of action and the date of judgment. The court also noted that the damages in this case were for non-economic loss, which was significant. The court decided that the respondent should pay 80% of the appellants' costs of trial on the indemnity basis and that the appellants should be awarded pre-judgment interest. The court also allowed the appeal with costs on the indemnity basis and granted the parties leave to make submissions on the costs of the appeal.

The court varied the previous order by deleting paragraph 1 and replacing it with a new order: “Allow each appellant’s appeal with costs on the indemnity basis.” This meant that the appellants would be awarded costs on the indemnity basis, which meant that the respondent would pay the appellants' costs, including legal fees. The court's decision provided clarity on the appropriate interest rate and costs in this case, as well as the appropriate scale for the appellants' costs. The court's decision also allowed for the parties to make submissions on the costs of the appeal, which provided an opportunity for the parties to further argue their positions on this issue.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first appellant be awarded pre-judgment interest pursuant to s 58(3) of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 in the sum of $69,493;

2. The second appellant be awarded pre-judgment interest pursuant to s 58(3) of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 in the sum of $30,403;

3. The respondent be ordered to pay 80% of the appellants’ costs of trial on the indemnity basis;

4. The parties have leave to make submissions on the costs of the appeal;

5. The order previously made by this Court be varied by deleting paragraph 1 and in its place order: “Allow each appellant’s appeal with costs on the indemnity basis.”

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves the appellants who were successful on appeal for damages for assault, battery, and false imprisonment against the State of Queensland. The appellants made pre-litigation, UCPR, and Calderbank offers that were lower than the damages awarded by the court when interest is considered. The appellants also sought indemnity costs. One of the appellants abandoned a claim for malicious prosecution. The disagreement between the parties centres around the amount and rate of interest and costs that should follow from the appellants' success in the appeal. The appellants argued they suffered progressive loss, while the respondent contended for another order for costs to be appropriate.

This case came before the court on appeal from a lower court decision. The appeal was heard in the Queensland Court of Appeal. Prior to this appeal, the matter had been through several stages of litigation, including initial proceedings in a lower court where the appellants sought damages for assault, battery, and false imprisonment. The appellants made various offers to settle the matter before trial, which were lower than the final damages awarded. After the appellants' success on appeal, the issue of costs arose, particularly regarding the amount and rate of interest and the scale on which the costs should be awarded. The court had previously made an order regarding the costs of the appeal, which the parties now sought to vary.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 58 of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011, so far as relevant, provides:“Interest up to judgment(1)This section applies in relation to a proceeding in a court for the payment of money, including a proceeding for debt, damages or the value of goods.(2)This section does not apply in relation to—(a)a proceeding for a cause of action arising before 21 December 1972; or(b)a proceeding for the payment of money on which interest is payable as of right whether because of an agreement or otherwise.(3)The court may order that there be included in the amount for which judgment is given interest at the rate the court considers appropriate for all or part of the amount and for all or part of the period between the date when the cause of action arose and the date of judgment.…” Thus, at all material times the applicable legislation provided that the Court may order that interest be paid “at the rate the court considers appropriate.” What might be “appropriate” will depend on all the circumstances of the case. The purpose of an award of interest is not to punish the defendant[1] but to compensate the plaintiff for having been kept out of money to which he or she was entitled as a result of the defendant’s wrong. McPherson JA succinctly stated the relevant principles in Interchase Corporation Ltd v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd (No 3) in speaking of the predecessor to s 58:“The section confers a discretion which, it is settled, is to be exercised judicially with a view to compensating the successful plaintiff for the injury or loss sustained: see Haines v. Bendall (1991) 172 C.L.R. 60, 63. The purpose or function of an award of interest under the section is restitutionary. It is not to punish the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for being kept out of the money represented by the judgment sum in the period between accrual of the cause of action and judgment: Batchelor v. Burke (1981) 148 C.L.R. 448, 455; Grincelis v. House (2000) 201 C.L.R. 321, 328. In a perfect world, a defendant who injured a plaintiff would immediately recognise the wrong done and pay the amount of compensation required to make good the loss. For reasons that are self- evident, that never happens in practice, and the justification for awarding interest is, as s. 47 recognises, to compensate for the delay in payment between the time when the cause of action arises and the date of judgment: Thompson v. Faraonio (1979) 54 A.L.J.R. 231, 233. In substance, the interest awarded is, it has been said, itself “in the nature of damages”: Haines v. Bendall (1991) 172 C.L.R. 60, 66.[2][1]Simonius Vischer & Co v Holt & Thompson [1979] 2 NSWLR 322 at 338-9 per Moffitt P.[2][2003] 1 Qd R 26 at 52-53. The respondent’s approach – the adoption of a rate of 4% and then halving it - is that adopted in respect of awards of non-economic loss, for example pain and suffering in a personal injury case. Whether the damages here are on all fours with damages for pain and suffering for a personal injury is debateable. I will return to the point. However the fact that the damages here are for non-economic loss is of significance.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the issue of whether the appellants suffered progressive loss and thus are entitled to a higher rate of interest on their damages. The court noted that the damages awarded were for non-economic loss, which is similar to damages for pain and suffering in a personal injury case. The court held that the damages here are not on all fours with damages for pain and suffering for a personal injury, but the fact that the damages here are for non-economic loss is of significance. The court held that the appellants are entitled to a higher rate of interest on their damages because they suffered progressive loss.

The court also considered whether the respondent demonstrates that another order for costs is appropriate. The court noted that the respondent did not demonstrate that another order for costs is appropriate, and therefore, the court allowed the parties to make submissions on the costs of the appeal.

In considering whether the appellants' costs should be awarded on the District or Supreme Court scale, the court held that the appellants' costs should be awarded on the Supreme Court scale, not the District Court scale.

The court further considered whether any costs order needs to be adjusted to allow for the abandonment of the claim for malicious prosecution. The court held that the costs order needs to be adjusted to allow for the abandonment of the claim for malicious prosecution.

Lastly, the court considered whether the order previously made should be varied to allow costs of appeal on an indemnity basis. The court held that the order previously made should be varied to allow costs of appeal on an indemnity basis.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the court may order interest to be paid "at the rate the court considers appropriate" under s 58(3) of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011, and that the purpose of an award of interest is to compensate the plaintiff for the injury or loss sustained. The court also held that the damages awarded for non-economic loss, such as assault, battery, and false imprisonment, are not on all fours with damages for pain and suffering for a personal injury, but the fact that the damages here are for non-economic loss is of significance. The court held that the appellants are entitled to a higher rate of interest on their damages because they suffered progressive loss.