PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Steendyk v Brisbane City Council & Ors (No. 2) [2016] QPEC 51
PARTIES:
BRIAN STEENDYK
Applicant
v
BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
First Respondent
&
ELLEN AND KEVIN CALDER-POTTS
Second Respondents
FILE NO/S:
3982/15
DIVISION:
Planning and Environment Court
PROCEEDING:
Applications for costs of the proceeding
DELIVERED ON:
18 October 2016
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
On the papers, following judgment delivered on 16 September 2016.
JUDGE:
Bowskill QC DCJ
ORDER:
The applicant pay the second respondents 75% of their costs of the proceeding (excluding the costs of the day of the hearing on 1 July 2016), to be assessed on the standard basis, if not agreed
CATCHWORDS:
PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT – Costs
COUNSEL:
K Wylie for the Applicant (direct brief)
N Kefford for the First Respondent
R Laidely for the Second Respondents
SOLICITORS:
Brisbane City Legal Practice for the First Respondent
McCarthy Durie Lawyers for the Second Respondents
On 16 September 2016 I delivered my reasons for refusing the originating application brought by Mr Steendyk: Steendyk v Brisbane City Council & Ors [2016] QPEC 47.
Mr and Mrs Calder-Potts have applied for an order that Mr Steendyk pay their costs of the proceeding, on the indemnity basis, fixed in the amount of $53,000.
Mr Steendyk has applied for an order that the Calder-Potts pay his costs thrown away as a result of the adjournment of the hearing on 1 July 2016, and of the summary judgment application heard on 8 August 2016, on the standard basis.
The Council seeks no order for costs.
The power of the court to make an order for costs is conferred by s 457(1) of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 which provides that:
“Costs of a proceeding or part of a proceeding, including an application in a proceeding, are in the discretion of the court.”
The discretion is a broad one, to be exercised judicially, but without any presumption that costs ought to follow the event, or otherwise, on the basis that there is some qualified protection against an adverse costs order.
Some of the matters the court may have regard to in exercising the discretion under s 457(1) are set out in s 457(2).
One of those matters is the relative success of the parties (s 457(2)(a)). The Calder-Potts have been wholly successful in opposing the relief that Mr Steendyk sought by his application. While the success of a party is not a determinative factor it is clearly a relevant and, in some cases, significant consideration.[1]
[1]YFG Shopping Centres Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council (No 2) [2015] QPELR 8 at [17]; Altitude Corporation Pty Ltd v Isaac Regional Council (No 2) [2015] QPELR 139 at [4].
I regard it as of particular significance in this case, because both Mr Steendyk and Mr and Mrs Calder-Potts are private citizens, and the subject matter of the proceeding concerned the agitation by Mr Steendyk of what he perceived to be the impact on his right(s) of development approvals,…
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- Case
- [2016] QPEC 51
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were twofold: firstly, whether the costs incurred due to the adjournment of the hearing on 1 July 2016 should be borne by the respondents; and secondly, the appropriate allocation of costs relating to the summary judgment application. The court had to consider whether the adjournment was necessary and if the summary judgment application was an appropriate procedural step. Furthermore, the court examined whether these procedural steps artificially constrained the scope of discretionary considerations and potentially increased the overall costs of the proceedings.
The court, after a detailed analysis of the proceedings, decided that the costs of the adjournment on 1 July 2016 should not be borne by the respondents but should instead be reflected through a reduction in what may be recovered by the respondents. Regarding the summary judgment application, the court found that while it was not an appropriate procedural step, it did not significantly increase the costs due to the comprehensive handling of the entire proceeding. Consequently, the applicant was ordered to pay 75% of the respondents' costs of the proceeding, excluding the costs of the hearing on 1 July 2016, to be assessed on the standard basis if not agreed upon.
The court's final orders mandated that the applicant pay 75% of the respondents' costs of the proceeding, excluding the costs of the hearing on 1 July 2016. These costs were to be assessed on the standard basis unless the parties could agree otherwise. This decision aimed to balance the procedural missteps with the overall efficiency of the litigation process.
Orders
Orders of the court
The applicant pay the second respondents 75% of their costs of the proceeding (excluding the costs of the day of the hearing on 1 July 2016), to be assessed on the standard basis, if not agreed
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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