Steendyk v Brisbane City Council (No. 2)

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PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Steendyk v Brisbane City Council & Ors (No. 2) [2016] QPEC 51

PARTIES:

BRIAN STEENDYK

Applicant

v

BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL

First Respondent

&

ELLEN AND KEVIN CALDER-POTTS

Second Respondents

FILE NO/S:

3982/15

DIVISION:

Planning and Environment Court

PROCEEDING:

Applications for costs of the proceeding

DELIVERED ON:

18 October 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

On the papers, following judgment delivered on 16 September 2016.

JUDGE:

Bowskill QC DCJ

ORDER:

The applicant pay the second respondents 75% of their costs of the proceeding (excluding the costs of the day of the hearing on 1 July 2016), to be assessed on the standard basis, if not agreed

CATCHWORDS:

PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT – Costs

COUNSEL:

K Wylie for the Applicant (direct brief)

N Kefford for the First Respondent

R Laidely for the Second Respondents

SOLICITORS:

Brisbane City Legal Practice for the First Respondent

McCarthy Durie Lawyers for the Second Respondents

  1. On 16 September 2016 I delivered my reasons for refusing the originating application brought by Mr Steendyk:  Steendyk v Brisbane City Council & Ors [2016] QPEC 47.

  1. Mr and Mrs Calder-Potts have applied for an order that Mr Steendyk pay their costs of the proceeding, on the indemnity basis, fixed in the amount of $53,000.

  1. Mr Steendyk has applied for an order that the Calder-Potts pay his costs thrown away as a result of the adjournment of the hearing on 1 July 2016, and of the summary judgment application heard on 8 August 2016, on the standard basis.

  1. The Council seeks no order for costs.

  1. The power of the court to make an order for costs is conferred by s 457(1) of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 which provides that:

“Costs of a proceeding or part of a proceeding, including an application in a proceeding, are in the discretion of the court.”

  1. The discretion is a broad one, to be exercised judicially, but without any presumption that costs ought to follow the event, or otherwise, on the basis that there is some qualified protection against an adverse costs order.

  1. Some of the matters the court may have regard to in exercising the discretion under s 457(1) are set out in s 457(2).

  1. One of those matters is the relative success of the parties (s 457(2)(a)).  The Calder-Potts have been wholly successful in opposing the relief that Mr Steendyk sought by his application.  While the success of a party is not a determinative factor it is clearly a relevant and, in some cases, significant consideration.[1]

    [1]YFG Shopping Centres Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council (No 2) [2015] QPELR 8 at [17]; Altitude Corporation Pty Ltd v Isaac Regional Council (No 2) [2015] QPELR 139 at [4].

  1. I regard it as of particular significance in this case, because both Mr Steendyk and Mr and Mrs Calder-Potts are private citizens, and the subject matter of the proceeding concerned the agitation by Mr Steendyk of what he perceived to be the impact on his right(s) of  development approvals,…

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Details
Case
[2016] QPEC 51
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Steendyk v Brisbane City Council (No. 2) involved a complex dispute concerning planning and environment law. The applicant, Steendyk, had taken legal action against the Brisbane City Council regarding alleged breaches of planning and development laws. The case was further complicated by an adjournment of the hearing on 1 July 2016 and a subsequent summary judgment application. The court had to determine the costs associated with these proceedings, including the costs "thrown away" by the adjournment and the costs of the summary judgment application.

The legal issues before the court were twofold: firstly, whether the costs incurred due to the adjournment of the hearing on 1 July 2016 should be borne by the respondents; and secondly, the appropriate allocation of costs relating to the summary judgment application. The court had to consider whether the adjournment was necessary and if the summary judgment application was an appropriate procedural step. Furthermore, the court examined whether these procedural steps artificially constrained the scope of discretionary considerations and potentially increased the overall costs of the proceedings.

The court, after a detailed analysis of the proceedings, decided that the costs of the adjournment on 1 July 2016 should not be borne by the respondents but should instead be reflected through a reduction in what may be recovered by the respondents. Regarding the summary judgment application, the court found that while it was not an appropriate procedural step, it did not significantly increase the costs due to the comprehensive handling of the entire proceeding. Consequently, the applicant was ordered to pay 75% of the respondents' costs of the proceeding, excluding the costs of the hearing on 1 July 2016, to be assessed on the standard basis if not agreed upon.

The court's final orders mandated that the applicant pay 75% of the respondents' costs of the proceeding, excluding the costs of the hearing on 1 July 2016. These costs were to be assessed on the standard basis unless the parties could agree otherwise. This decision aimed to balance the procedural missteps with the overall efficiency of the litigation process.

Orders

Orders of the court

The applicant pay the second respondents 75% of their costs of the proceeding (excluding the costs of the day of the hearing on 1 July 2016), to be assessed on the standard basis, if not agreed

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

There are two issues to deal with, in this regard: first, the costs of the adjournment of the hearing on 1 July 2016 and, second, the costs of the summary judgment application itself. Firstly, in terms of what should be done about the costs “thrown away” by the adjournment of the hearing on 1 July 2016. A brief outline of what took place on 1 July 2016 is set out in [121] of the reasons. Reading the transcript of that day, it is not a straightforward matter of concluding that, due to the oral application for summary dismissal, made on behalf of the Calder-Potts, the proceeding was adjourned, in circumstances where otherwise it would have gone ahead and been completed on that day. That ignores the issue first raised by the Judge about whether the matter could be dealt with in one day, and the subsequent discussion about various other issues, including particularisation sought by the Council of the development offence alleged to have been committed, and the question of the utility of the other declarations sought, absent consequential relief – all of which took the parties until just after 12.30pm, at which point it was clear the hearing could not proceed, and even if it did, would not finish that day. Judge Searles described it as an “inflated directions hearing”. His Honour initially proposed there be no costs order, but at the request of counsel for Mr Steendyk, reserved the costs. On balance, in so far as the 1 July 2016 hearing is concerned, I do not propose to order that Mr and Mrs Calder-Potts pay Mr Steendyk’s costs of that day, but do propose to reflect the costs to some extent by a reduction in what may be recovered by the Calder-Potts. Secondly, in relation to the summary judgment application. As I have said, my view is that that was not an appropriate procedure to adopt. It artificially constrained the scope of the discretionary considerations. In light of the conclusions which I reached about some of the discretionary factors relied on in seeking summary judgment, if that application had proceeded to be dealt with in isolation, it may well have been refused; and the parties would have had to return at a later stage to deal with the substantive application. I commend the parties for agreeing, after the hearing on 8 August, to the whole of the matter being dealt with, as this undoubtedly led to a quicker, and less costly outcome, in the end. It is fair to say that the summary judgment application would have increased the costs of the parties to some extent. But in dealing with the whole proceeding, which I ultimately did, the submissions made on 8 August (as to discretionary considerations) were a substantive part of dealing with the whole application; they were not repeated on 18 August, when the focus was on the substantive part of Mr Steendyk’s application. So, taken together, the hearings on 8 and 18 August were all part of dealing with the whole proceeding. Realistically, given the hours the court sat on each of those days (from 10am to 1.20pm on 8 August; and from 9am (starting with the site inspection) until 1.53pm on 18 August), the matter would not have been dealt with in one sitting day (as Judge Searles predicted). It would have gone into a second day. So to this extent, the costs were not unreasonably increased.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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