Walker v State of Queensland (No. 2)

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Walker v State of Queensland (No. 2) [2023] QDC 1

PARTIES:

RICHARD SCOTT WALKER

(plaintiff)

v

STATE OF QUEENSLAND

(defendant)

FILE NO:

1135/18

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Costs Hearing

ORIGINATING COURT:

Brisbane District Court

DELIVERED ON:

19 January 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

Written submissions received 29 August 2022, 13 September 2022, 29 September 2022, 5 December 2022, 9 December 2022 and 12 December 2022.

JUDGE:

Byrne KC DCJ

ORDER:

1.   The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs, on the standard basis, up to and including 9 April 2019, with such costs to be assessed by reference to the District Court scale.

2.   Subject to Order 3, the plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs, on the standard basis, from 10 April 2019, with such costs to be assessed by reference to the District Court scale.

3.   There be no order for the costs of the assessment hearing heard 12-14 April 2022.

CATCHWORDS:

COSTS – ASSESSMENT OF COSTS – TORTS – FALSE IMPRISONMENT – where a jury in the District Court found for the defendant in claims of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment – where the Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff’s appeal on the false imprisonment claim only, remitted matter to the District Court for an assessment of damages and reserved the costs of the first trial – where the plaintiff was awarded damages totalling $30,000, plus interest at the assessment hearing for false imprisonment – where the plaintiff was served with an offer to settle on 9 April 2019 which included terms that could not be the subject of a court order – where rule 361 UCPR is engaged - where the defendant submits it should pay the plaintiff’s costs on the Magistrates Court scale to 9 April 2019 – where the defendant further submits that the plaintiff should pay the defendant’s costs on the standard basis and assessed on the District Court scale after 9 April 2019 – whether the plaintiff obtained an order that is more favourable to him than the offer – whether another order for costs is appropriate under r. 361(2) UCPR.

LEGISLATION:

Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld)

District Court Practice Direction

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld)

CASES:

Balnaves v Smith [2012] QSC 408

Built Qld Pty Ltd v Pro-Invest Australian Hospitality Opportunity (ST) Pty Ltd (No. 3) [2022] QSC 62

Bulsey and State of Queensland [2016] QCA 158

Fairfield Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Leggett (2020) 5 QR 50

McKay v Armstrong & Anor [2020] QDC 127

Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Weatherup [2017] QCA 70

Norfolk Estates Pty Ltd v Cardno(Qld) Pty Ltd (No. 3) [2013] QDC 308

Timms v Clift [1998] 2 Qd R 100

Virgtel Limited v Zabusky (No. 2) [2009] 2 Qd.R. 293

Walker v State of Queensland [2022] QDC 168

Walker v State of Queensland [2020] QCA 137

Waltz Construction Co Pty Ltd v ASP SHI Capital Management (A Firm) [2002] QCA 155

COUNSEL:

Mr M. de Waard for the plaintiff.

Mr. D.…

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Details
Case
[2023] QDC 1
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Walker v State of Queensland (No. 2), the plaintiff, Mr. Walker, sued the defendant, the State of Queensland, claiming damages for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The District Court found in favour of the defendant. However, the Court of Appeal allowed Mr. Walker's appeal on the false imprisonment claim only, remitted the matter to the District Court for an assessment of damages, and reserved the costs of the first trial. Mr. Walker was awarded damages of $30,000, plus interest at the assessment hearing for false imprisonment. The defendant had previously served an offer to settle the whole of the proceedings on 9 April 2019, which included terms that could not be the subject of a court order. The court was required to determine whether the plaintiff obtained an order more favourable than the offer and whether another order for costs was appropriate under rule 361(2) of the UCPR. The court found that the offer was not more favourable to the plaintiff than the eventual outcome because the offer required acceptance of the restrictive clauses. The court also found that the defendant was willing and able to carry out what was proposed in the offer. Therefore, the court ordered that the defendant pay the plaintiff's costs on the standard basis up to and including 9 April 2019, with such costs to be assessed by reference to the District Court scale. The plaintiff would pay the defendant's costs on the standard basis from 10 April 2019, with such costs to be assessed by reference to the District Court scale. There would be no order for the costs of the assessment hearing heard 12-14 April 2022.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs, on the standard basis, up to and including 9 April 2019, with such costs to be assessed by reference to the District Court scale.

2. Subject to Order 3, the plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs, on the standard basis, from 10 April 2019, with such costs to be assessed by reference to the District Court scale.

3. There be no order for the costs of the assessment hearing heard 12-14 April 2022.

Background

Background to the litigation

These reasons should be read together with the earlier published reasons in the litigation.Further facts The claims were commenced on 28 March 2018 seeking damages totalling $248,470.00, comprising $128,470.00 for the malicious prosecution claim and the balance for the false imprisonment claim. Following an unsuccessful mediation, the defendant made a formal offer to settle the whole of the proceedings on the basis that:1.The defendant would pay the plaintiff $57,000.00, including interest.2.The defendant would pay the plaintiff’s costs on the standard basis.3.The parties enter into a Deed of Settlement, which contained a confidentiality clause, a clause allowing the Deed to be pleaded as a bar in any further proceedings arising out of the facts and circumstances the subject of the claims and a clause specifically recognising the non-admission of liability by each party. The offer was made under Chapter 9, Part 5 of the UCPR and lapsed about four months prior to the first trial, namely on 23 April 2019. On 7 September 2022 the orders in the earlier judgment were amended by consent in the following terms:1.With respect to paragraph 2 of the orders made on 5 August 2022, the interest, from 10 September 2014 up to and inclusive of 5 August 2022, is calculated in accordance with paragraph 3 of the District Court Practice Direction 6 of 2013, the amount being $12,485.62. 2.The defendant is to pay interest pursuant to s 59 of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011, in the sum of $5.63 per day (calculated in accordance with paragraph 4 of the District Court Practice Direction 6 of 2013) from 6 August 2022 until payment of the damages awarded. The result is a total award of $42,485.62, including interest, with a small continuing accrual until the time of payment. There is no suggestion that the damages and interest have been paid to date.The parties’ submissions The plaintiff initially submitted that he should receive his costs of the proceeding on the standard basis assessed on the District Court scale. The defendant’s submissions were broadly to the effect that the failure to accept a more advantageous offer than was the end result means that r 361(2) of the UCPR should be applied, with the result that costs are “split” from the date of service of the offer. It is submitted there is no reason to otherwise order, as contemplated by r 361(2). Further, it is argued that because the damages awarded were substantially below the monetary limit of the Magistrates Court, r 697(2) of the UCPR should be applied so that the plaintiff should receive his costs on the Magistrates Court scale. The consequence of the defendant’s submissions is that the defendant should pay the plaintiff’s costs to 9 April 2019 on the standard basis and assessed on the Magistrates Court scale, and that the plaintiff should pay the defendant’s costs thereafter on the standard basis and assessed on the District Court scale. In reply, the plaintiff submitted that the defendant’s offer was not more favourable than the eventual outcome because the offer required acceptance of the earlier outlined restrictive clauses.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 21 November 2022 I invited further written submissions from the parties as to whether another order was appropriate under r 361(2) of the UCPR, based on a specific factual scenario. A number of the plaintiff’s submissions in response to that invitation were framed in a manner that sought to make them broadly responsive to the scenario raised, but in reality were an effort to make further submissions, and different to those earlier made, on the issue of why another order was appropriate under that rule. The plaintiff had earlier been given the opportunity to make whatever submissions he saw fit on the topic, and had made those submissions. The latterly received submissions contain assertions about the effect of the amendment of pleadings prior to the first trial that are not obviously supported by evidence, nor are they necessarily obvious on the state of the filed material. In so far as they were not responsive to the specific issue about which further submissions were invited, they are ignored, consistent with long standing convention.[4][4]See for example the observations in Virgtel Limited v Zabusky (No. 2) [2009] 2 Qd.R. 293, [17]-[19].Consideration The applicability of r. 361(1) requires satisfaction as to two matters, namely that the plaintiff has not obtained an order more favourable than the offer and that the defendant was willing and able to carry out what was proposed in the offer. As to the latter aspect, the defendant’s solicitor has deposed to matters which allow satisfaction of that matter. Issue has not been joined on this, and I am satisfied this has been established. As for the first aspect, the defendant’s offer was to settle the proceedings in the terms earlier mentioned. It did not attribute certain monetary amounts or other conditions to the separate claims of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, and neither did it need to in order to qualify as an offer under the rules.[5] Insofar as the current consideration requires comparison of the monetary component of the offer with the judgment amount, it is a comparison with the whole of the monetary offer and not some proportion of it.[5]Built Qld Pty Ltd v Pro-Invest Australian Hospitality Opportunity (ST) Pty Ltd (No. 3) [2022] QSC 62. Although an aspect of the judgment was successfully appealed, the stated principle was not put in doubt. This Court is entitled to consider the effect of terms in the offer which could not be the subject of a judgment, including, for present purposes, the effect of the confidentiality clause and the clause effecting a non-attribution of liability.[6] When matters of this nature fall for consideration, “it is a matter for the court’s judgment”[7] whether the offer is more favourable to the plaintiff or not. It requires a qualitative assessment of the comparative positions.[6]Timms v Clift [1998] 2 Qd R 100; Balnaves v Smith [2012] QSC 408, [34]-[36]; McKay v Armstrong & Anor, ibid.[7]Timms v Clift, supra at 107. I accept that the plaintiff wanted a public apology and recognition of wrongdoing by the police officers involved. The former has never eventuated, but both would have been frustrated by entering into the proposed Deed of Settlement. However, the value in the recognition of wrongdoing is limited, for these purposes, to the commission of the false imprisonment for just over one hour and not to the commission of the asserted malicious prosecution which, in my view, would have been the more serious of the two claims had it been proven.