Bulsey v State of Queensland

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Bulsey & Anor v State of Queensland [2015] QCA 187

PARTIES:

DAVID JOHN BULSEY

YVETTE FAITH LENOY
(first appellant)
(second appellant)v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 2831 of 2015
SC No 829 of 2007

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Townsville – Unreported, 20 February 2015

DELIVERED ON:

6 October 2015

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

31 August 2015

JUDGES:

Fraser JA and Atkinson and McMeekin JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1.   Allow each appellant’s appeal with costs.

2.   Set aside the orders and judgments in the trial division.

3.   Order that judgment be entered for the first appellant against the respondent in the sum of $165,000 plus interest in an amount to be agreed between the first appellant and the respondent or, in default of agreement, in an amount assessed by the Court.

4.   Order that judgment be entered for the second appellant against the respondent in the sum of $70,000 plus interest in an amount to be agreed between the second appellant and the respondent or, in default of agreement, in an amount assessed by the Court.

5.   The parties have leave to make submissions in writing about orders for the costs in the Trial Division and the amounts of interest, such submissions to be made within 14 days of these orders or within such other time as is directed by a judge of appeal or the registrar.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – PROCEDURE – WARRANTS, ARREST, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND INCIDENTAL POWERS – ARREST AND DETENTION – EFFECTING ARREST – OTHER MATTERS – where the first appellant was present during the Palm Island riot in 2004 – where the first appellant was included on a list of people to be arrested for committing an indictable offence – where s 198(2) of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) requires that where an arrest is effected without a warrant, the relevant police officer hold a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is committing an indictable offence – where the officer who made the decision to arrest the first appellant was in Townsville – where the first appellant was arrested on Palm Island – where the officer who detained the first appellant did not make the decision to arrest the first appellant – where the charges against the first appellant were subsequently dropped – whether the officer who made the arrest held the required suspicion

PROCEDURE – COURTS AND JUDGES GENERALLY – JUDGES – OTHER MATTERS – where the trial was heard over seven days between March and July 2012 – where judgment was not delivered until 20 February 2015 – where the respondent argued the delay did not bear upon the trial judges’ adverse findings – whether the delay ought to be considered when reviewing the trial judges’ findings

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL-GENERAL PRINCIPLES –…

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Details
Case
[2015] QCA 187
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Bulsey v State of Queensland involved a dispute between the appellants, Bulsey and her partner, and the respondent, the State of Queensland. The case arose from events during the Palm Island riot in 2004. The first appellant was present during the riot and was subsequently arrested. The appellants brought a civil action against the State, alleging various torts, including assault, battery, and false imprisonment, as a result of the police actions during the riot and their arrest. The case was heard over seven days between March and July 2012, but judgment was not delivered until 20 February 2015. The respondent argued that the delay did not affect the trial judge’s adverse findings against the appellants. The appellants appealed the trial judge’s findings.

The central legal issues in the case included whether the police officer who arrested the first appellant had the required suspicion that she had committed an indictable offence, as mandated by s 198(2) of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld). Additionally, the court had to consider whether the trial judge should have interfered with the second appellant’s evidence, given that it was corroborated by other evidence. The court also needed to determine whether the appellants' claim for personal injury damages could be distinguished from other damages claimed. The appellants argued that they were entitled to exemplary, punitive, and aggravated damages, while the respondent contended that such damages were prohibited under s 52(1) of the Civil Liability Act. Lastly, the court had to assess whether the damages awarded by the trial judge were adequate.

The court found that the trial judge should have ruled against the respondent on the pleading point and rejected the respondent’s arguments regarding the appellants’ conduct of the trial. The court accepted the first appellant’s evidence and found that the police conduct in detaining and imprisoning her was not authorised or excused by law, making the respondent liable for the alleged torts of assault, battery, and false imprisonment. Regarding the second appellant’s claim, the court found that she had not proved the police assaulted or imprisoned her in the ways she alleged, and thus her claim was rejected. However, the court found that the trial judge’s delay in delivering judgment did not affect the adverse findings against the appellants. The court held that the second appellant’s evidence was reliable and corroborated by other evidence. The court also found that the damages awarded were inadequate and ordered higher amounts, with interest, to be paid to the appellants.

The final orders of the court were to allow each appellant’s appeal with costs, set aside the orders and judgments in the trial division, and enter judgment for the first appellant against the respondent in the sum of $165,000 plus interest, and for the second appellant against the respondent in the sum of $70,000 plus interest. The parties were given leave to make written submissions about the costs and interest amounts within 14 days of the court’s orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Allow each appellant’s appeal with costs.

2. Set aside the orders and judgments in the trial division.

3. Order that judgment be entered for the first appellant against the respondent in the sum of $165,000 plus interest in an amount to be agreed between the first appellant and the respondent or, in default of agreement, in an amount assessed by the Court.

4. Order that judgment be entered for the second appellant against the respondent in the sum of $70,000 plus interest in an amount to be agreed between the second appellant and the respondent or, in default of agreement, in an amount assessed by the Court.

5. The parties have leave to make submissions in writing about orders for the costs in the Trial Division and the amounts of interest, such submissions to be made within 14 days of these orders or within such other time as is directed by a judge of appeal or the registrar.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Bulsey v State of Queensland arose from events that occurred in the aftermath of the Palm Island riot in 2004. The first appellant was present during the riot and was subsequently included on a list of individuals to be arrested for committing an indictable offence. The relevant provision, s 198(2) of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), mandates that an officer must hold a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is committing an indictable offence to effect an arrest without a warrant. The officer who made the decision to arrest the first appellant was in Townsville, but the arrest was carried out on Palm Island by another officer. The charges against the first appellant were later dropped. The second appellant was seven months pregnant when police forced entry into her residence. The police were armed, and she was ordered to show them where everyone was sleeping and to lie on the floor, which she could not do due to her pregnancy. She was subsequently allowed to sit on a couch.

The trial in the matter was held over seven days between March and July 2012. Judgment was delivered on 20 February 2015. The respondent argued that the delay in delivering judgment did not affect the trial judges' adverse findings. The respondents' appeal against the decision was heard in the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal heard submissions from both parties regarding the reliability of the second appellant's evidence, the adequacy of the damages awarded, and other issues raised in the appeal.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is not necessary to further consider that issue or to elaborate upon the parties’ submissions about the effect of the trial judge’s delay in delivering judgment and publishing reasons. That is not to downplay the seriousness of the delay, but for the following reasons the second appellant’s appeal must succeed even without reference to those principles expressed in Expectation Pty Ltd v PRD Realty Pty Ltd which would render the trial judge’s findings more vulnerable to challenge.Reliability of the second appellant’s evidence The respondent argued that the trial judge’s rejection of the second appellant’s evidence was not inconsistent with the respondent’s admissions or the evidence of Inspector McKay and SERT Operative 2, but the respondent did not contradict the appellants’ argument that the admissions and evidence were consistent with the second appellant’s evidence. There were powerful indications in those admissions and evidence that the second appellant’s evidence was reliable. The trial judge did not advert to those matters in this context. A very striking feature of the case is that the second appellant’s evidence about the beginning and the end of the police raid was corroborated in detail by uncontroversial evidence. As to the beginning of the raid, the second appellant’s evidence about Detective Robinson speaking to her, her evidence that he accompanied a group of armed men dressed in black, wearing black helmets and a mask or goggles who entered the house, and her evidence of what occurred during that entry, accorded very closely with what SERT Operative 2 described as the standard operating procedure: the SERT officers were dressed in dark clothing with a balaclava, a helmet, and perhaps a vest, and they carried their rifles in a way which would allow them to be used quickly; typically between six and eight people would go into the house; those officers would approach the front door; Detective Robinson would knock on the door and identify them as police; the officers would wait for a period of time determined by their team leader and then they would enter; they would force entry by breaking the door open if required; and the SERT officers would go in very quickly. It is also telling that even the detail in the second appellant’s evidence that, whilst one group of men entered through the front door, another group of men surrounded the house was supported by the evidence of SERT Operative 2: that it was standard operating procedure that one group of SERT officers would go into the house and another group of SERT officers would surround the house to make sure people could not escape. The second appellant’s evidence that, despite her offer to open the door, the group of men forced entry into her house was also corroborated by other evidence. It accorded with the italicised words in Detective Robinson’s statement quoted in [26] of these reasons. It was also consistent with evidence given in general terms by Inspector McKay that the situation on Palm Island after the riots on 26 November 2004 had been assessed as being high risk, and that what was put in place was a “templated response” which sought to create the situation where the “offender” has “no other option but to comply”. Inspector McKay gave evidence that “sometimes that occurs purely from the presence… [of] an officer dressed in … black garments, with police written across the front, with a helmet, with a long arm … and we’ve [the SERT teams] experienced a great deal of compliance by people simply seeing police in that configuration”.[54][54]It should be noted, however, that the respondent did not contend that there was any evidence that police directed their attention to the possible reaction of the occupants of the appellants’ house and decided that any of them might in fact engage in any course of action which the “templated response” was designed to defeat.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Senior counsel for the respondent did not advert to the pleading point in his closing submissions in reply at the trial. It seems that the respondent was content to take its chances upon a ruling in its favour in the reasons for judgment. The trial judge should have ruled against the respondent. I would reject the respondent’s arguments about the appellants’ pleading and conduct of the trial.The first appellant’s claim: Conclusion The respondent did not prove that the conduct of the police in detaining and imprisoning the first appellant was authorised or excused by law. It follows from the trial judge’s acceptance of the first appellant’s evidence and the respondent’s concessions mentioned in [2] and [4] of these reasons that the first appellant proved the alleged torts of assault, battery, and false imprisonment for which the respondent was liable. That conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the appellants’ challenges in appeal grounds 2 – 4, 6, 7 and 10 – 13 to the trial judge’s finding that Detective Miles reasonably suspected that the first appellant had committed an indictable offence.The second appellant’s claim The trial judge rejected the second appellant’s claim on the ground that she had not proved that the police who forcibly entered the house assaulted or imprisoned her in the ways she had alleged. The second appellant gave evidence that in November 2004 she lived with the first appellant and their six children (aged between three and seven years) in a house on Palm Island. A relative and her two children were staying in the house at the time. The second appellant was then 29 years old and seven months pregnant. Shortly before 6.00 am on 27 November 2004 she heard a noise from outside. The second appellant was the only person awake in the house. She saw people on the verandah in black wearing black helmets and with a mask or goggles covering their eyes. They were carrying rifles. The second appellant was frightened. Some men went around the house and some men came up onto the verandah. The second appellant also saw two police officers who were not dressed in black. Someone shouted to her, “Get away from the door”. She replied, “Wait a minute, I’ll open the door for youse”. Someone told her to move away from the door. As she put her hand on the door knob to open it, the door flew open. She heard a big cracking noise and a lot of shouting. About five armed men dressed in black and two police officers in plain clothes, one of whom she recognised as Darren Robinson, entered the house. The second appellant was upset and screaming. She asked the men what they were doing. The men told her to shut up and asked, “Where’s the suspect?”. Two men ran into the kitchen pointing their guns around. The following exchange occurred in the second appellant’s evidence in chief: “I think you said earlier - I think you used a phrase something like, “They were waving their guns around?”-- Yes, they was.Yes. And can you be - I know it happened quickly but can you be more precise about where the guns were being pointed as they were being waved around?-- As they were walking and they're coming in the house really quick.Yes?-- And like when they were looking around like pointing it around the place.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Bulsey v State of Queensland, the court considered several issues related to the arrest and detention of two appellants following the Palm Island riot in 2004. Firstly, regarding the arrest of the first appellant, the court concluded that the officer who made the arrest did not hold the required suspicion as mandated by s 198(2) of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld). This was because the officer who made the decision to arrest the first appellant was in Townsville, not on Palm Island where the arrest occurred, and the officer who detained the first appellant did not make the decision to arrest. Consequently, the court found that the conduct of the police in detaining and imprisoning the first appellant was not authorised or excused by law.

Secondly, the court held that the delay in delivering judgment should not be considered when reviewing the trial judges' findings. Despite the significant delay, the court determined that the second appellant’s appeal must succeed for reasons independent of the delay. The court found that the trial judge’s rejection of the second appellant’s evidence was not consistent with the respondent’s admissions and other evidence, which actually supported the second appellant’s account.

Thirdly, the court found that it ought to interfere with the trial judge’s findings that rejected the second appellant’s evidence. The second appellant’s evidence was corroborated by other evidence, including detailed accounts of the police raid and the standard operating procedures of the Special Emergency Response Team (SERT). The trial judge failed to consider these corroborating details, leading the court to conclude that the trial judge’s findings were inconsistent with the evidence presented.

Regarding the false imprisonment of the second appellant, the court found that she was indeed falsely imprisoned. The police forced entry into her residence, were armed, and ordered her to show them where everyone was sleeping and to lie on the floor. Given that she was seven months pregnant and unable to comply with the latter order, the court held that the police had falsely imprisoned her.

The court further determined that the appellants’ claim for personal injury damages could not be distinguished from their claim for other consequences of the torts. The appellants did not clearly separate their claims, and the court found that the respondent’s contention that general damages were confined to awards under the Civil Liability Regulation 2003 was not applicable in this context. Consequently, the court held that the appellants were not entitled to aggravated damages because s 52(1) of the Civil Liability Act prohibits such awards in relation to claims for personal injury damages.

Lastly, the court found that the award of damages was inadequate in the circumstances. The first appellant suffered extreme trauma, assault, and humiliating detention, and the court deemed the $80,000 award insufficient. Similarly, for the second appellant, who experienced a very short but extremely traumatic event, the court found that the provisional assessment of $30,000 was inadequate. As a result, the court ordered a higher sum to be awarded to each appellant.