SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Bulsey & Anor v State of Queensland [2015] QCA 187
PARTIES:
DAVID JOHN BULSEY
YVETTE FAITH LENOY
(first appellant)
(second appellant)v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 2831 of 2015
SC No 829 of 2007DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Townsville – Unreported, 20 February 2015DELIVERED ON:
6 October 2015
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
31 August 2015
JUDGES:
Fraser JA and Atkinson and McMeekin JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders madeORDERS:
1. Allow each appellant’s appeal with costs.
2. Set aside the orders and judgments in the trial division.
3. Order that judgment be entered for the first appellant against the respondent in the sum of $165,000 plus interest in an amount to be agreed between the first appellant and the respondent or, in default of agreement, in an amount assessed by the Court.
4. Order that judgment be entered for the second appellant against the respondent in the sum of $70,000 plus interest in an amount to be agreed between the second appellant and the respondent or, in default of agreement, in an amount assessed by the Court.
5. The parties have leave to make submissions in writing about orders for the costs in the Trial Division and the amounts of interest, such submissions to be made within 14 days of these orders or within such other time as is directed by a judge of appeal or the registrar.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – PROCEDURE – WARRANTS, ARREST, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND INCIDENTAL POWERS – ARREST AND DETENTION – EFFECTING ARREST – OTHER MATTERS – where the first appellant was present during the Palm Island riot in 2004 – where the first appellant was included on a list of people to be arrested for committing an indictable offence – where s 198(2) of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) requires that where an arrest is effected without a warrant, the relevant police officer hold a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is committing an indictable offence – where the officer who made the decision to arrest the first appellant was in Townsville – where the first appellant was arrested on Palm Island – where the officer who detained the first appellant did not make the decision to arrest the first appellant – where the charges against the first appellant were subsequently dropped – whether the officer who made the arrest held the required suspicion
PROCEDURE – COURTS AND JUDGES GENERALLY – JUDGES – OTHER MATTERS – where the trial was heard over seven days between March and July 2012 – where judgment was not delivered until 20 February 2015 – where the respondent argued the delay did not bear upon the trial judges’ adverse findings – whether the delay ought to be considered when reviewing the trial judges’ findings
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL-GENERAL PRINCIPLES –…
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- Case
- [2015] QCA 187
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in the case included whether the police officer who arrested the first appellant had the required suspicion that she had committed an indictable offence, as mandated by s 198(2) of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld). Additionally, the court had to consider whether the trial judge should have interfered with the second appellant’s evidence, given that it was corroborated by other evidence. The court also needed to determine whether the appellants' claim for personal injury damages could be distinguished from other damages claimed. The appellants argued that they were entitled to exemplary, punitive, and aggravated damages, while the respondent contended that such damages were prohibited under s 52(1) of the Civil Liability Act. Lastly, the court had to assess whether the damages awarded by the trial judge were adequate.
The court found that the trial judge should have ruled against the respondent on the pleading point and rejected the respondent’s arguments regarding the appellants’ conduct of the trial. The court accepted the first appellant’s evidence and found that the police conduct in detaining and imprisoning her was not authorised or excused by law, making the respondent liable for the alleged torts of assault, battery, and false imprisonment. Regarding the second appellant’s claim, the court found that she had not proved the police assaulted or imprisoned her in the ways she alleged, and thus her claim was rejected. However, the court found that the trial judge’s delay in delivering judgment did not affect the adverse findings against the appellants. The court held that the second appellant’s evidence was reliable and corroborated by other evidence. The court also found that the damages awarded were inadequate and ordered higher amounts, with interest, to be paid to the appellants.
The final orders of the court were to allow each appellant’s appeal with costs, set aside the orders and judgments in the trial division, and enter judgment for the first appellant against the respondent in the sum of $165,000 plus interest, and for the second appellant against the respondent in the sum of $70,000 plus interest. The parties were given leave to make written submissions about the costs and interest amounts within 14 days of the court’s orders.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Allow each appellant’s appeal with costs.
2. Set aside the orders and judgments in the trial division.
3. Order that judgment be entered for the first appellant against the respondent in the sum of $165,000 plus interest in an amount to be agreed between the first appellant and the respondent or, in default of agreement, in an amount assessed by the Court.
4. Order that judgment be entered for the second appellant against the respondent in the sum of $70,000 plus interest in an amount to be agreed between the second appellant and the respondent or, in default of agreement, in an amount assessed by the Court.
5. The parties have leave to make submissions in writing about orders for the costs in the Trial Division and the amounts of interest, such submissions to be made within 14 days of these orders or within such other time as is directed by a judge of appeal or the registrar.
Background
Background to the litigation
The trial in the matter was held over seven days between March and July 2012. Judgment was delivered on 20 February 2015. The respondent argued that the delay in delivering judgment did not affect the trial judges' adverse findings. The respondents' appeal against the decision was heard in the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal heard submissions from both parties regarding the reliability of the second appellant's evidence, the adequacy of the damages awarded, and other issues raised in the appeal.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Bulsey v State of Queensland, the court considered several issues related to the arrest and detention of two appellants following the Palm Island riot in 2004. Firstly, regarding the arrest of the first appellant, the court concluded that the officer who made the arrest did not hold the required suspicion as mandated by s 198(2) of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld). This was because the officer who made the decision to arrest the first appellant was in Townsville, not on Palm Island where the arrest occurred, and the officer who detained the first appellant did not make the decision to arrest. Consequently, the court found that the conduct of the police in detaining and imprisoning the first appellant was not authorised or excused by law.
Secondly, the court held that the delay in delivering judgment should not be considered when reviewing the trial judges' findings. Despite the significant delay, the court determined that the second appellant’s appeal must succeed for reasons independent of the delay. The court found that the trial judge’s rejection of the second appellant’s evidence was not consistent with the respondent’s admissions and other evidence, which actually supported the second appellant’s account.
Thirdly, the court found that it ought to interfere with the trial judge’s findings that rejected the second appellant’s evidence. The second appellant’s evidence was corroborated by other evidence, including detailed accounts of the police raid and the standard operating procedures of the Special Emergency Response Team (SERT). The trial judge failed to consider these corroborating details, leading the court to conclude that the trial judge’s findings were inconsistent with the evidence presented.
Regarding the false imprisonment of the second appellant, the court found that she was indeed falsely imprisoned. The police forced entry into her residence, were armed, and ordered her to show them where everyone was sleeping and to lie on the floor. Given that she was seven months pregnant and unable to comply with the latter order, the court held that the police had falsely imprisoned her.
The court further determined that the appellants’ claim for personal injury damages could not be distinguished from their claim for other consequences of the torts. The appellants did not clearly separate their claims, and the court found that the respondent’s contention that general damages were confined to awards under the Civil Liability Regulation 2003 was not applicable in this context. Consequently, the court held that the appellants were not entitled to aggravated damages because s 52(1) of the Civil Liability Act prohibits such awards in relation to claims for personal injury damages.
Lastly, the court found that the award of damages was inadequate in the circumstances. The first appellant suffered extreme trauma, assault, and humiliating detention, and the court deemed the $80,000 award insufficient. Similarly, for the second appellant, who experienced a very short but extremely traumatic event, the court found that the provisional assessment of $30,000 was inadequate. As a result, the court ordered a higher sum to be awarded to each appellant.