Brackenridge v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

BRACKENRIDGE v BENDIGO AND ADELAIDE BANK LIMITED

[2021] SASCA 129

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable Justice Lovell, the Honourable Justice Livesey and the Honourable Justice Bleby)

4 November 2021

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL

MORTGAGES - ESTATE, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE - POSSESSION

MORTGAGES - MORTGAGEE'S REMEDIES - POSSESSION - PROCEEDINGS TO OBTAIN

GUARANTEE AND INDEMNITY - ENFORCEMENT OF GUARANTEE AND RELATED MATTERS

The appellant is the registered proprietor of a property on which a “luxury home” was constructed with funds advanced by the bank (the Property). The appellant granted two mortgages (the 2007 Mortgage and the 2010 Mortgage) over the Property which secured his guarantee (the guarantee) covering the indebtedness of Apex Property Solutions Pty Ltd (Apex), of which the appellant was the sole director and shareholder. The guarantee was in the respondent’s favour.

The purpose of the loan facility was to enable the appellant to construct a “luxury home” on the Property. However, even after numerous advances and extensions to the loan facility, the home remained incomplete. The facility expired in December 2017 and the full amount fell immediately due and payable. Nothing repayment was made, and approximately $4 million remained outstanding. In June 2018, the respondent commenced proceedings seeking possession of the property. The appellant opposed the respondent’s action, claiming that neither he nor Apex were liable or otherwise indebted to the respondent, with the effect that the respondent’s mortgages effectively secured nothing.

The trial Judge found against the appellant and the respondent obtained a warrant of possession.  The bank subsequently sought possession on 27 October 2020 and the applicant again applied to prevent the bank taking possession. The applicant obtained an interim stay on the basis that he would file a notice of appeal that day. By 4 November 2020, the notice of appeal had not been filed, so the Master set aside the stay. The bank again sought to take possession of the property and the applicant filed his notice of appeal on 30 November 2020, well over four months out of time. On 2 December 2020, the appellant obtained a partial stay of the warrant of possession to enable him to prosecute his appeal.

Held (by the Court), dismissing the appeal and discharging the partial stay of the warrant of execution:

1.The respondent did not impermissibly depart from the case that it was entitled to possession based on the contentions that the appellant was liable under the guarantee for the indebtedness of Apex and that this was secured by both the 2007 and 2010 mortgages. That was the case as opened, prosecuted and closed during the course of the trial.

2.To the extent that the appellant propounded a new case on appeal which was not put before the trial Judge, whether in relation to his case that the mortgage needed to be read down having regard to the circumstances surrounding entry into the 2007 mortgage, or on any other appeal…

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Details
Case
[2021] SASCA 129
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a dispute between Mr. Brackenridge and Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited regarding possession of a property. The Bank sought possession based on two mortgages granted by Mr. Brackenridge, which secured a guarantee he had provided for the indebtedness of Apex Property Solutions Pty Ltd. Mr. Brackenridge contended that neither he nor Apex owed any debt to the Bank, rendering the mortgages ineffective. The Supreme Court of South Australia was required to determine whether the appeal should be dismissed and a partial stay of a warrant of execution discharged.

The legal issues before the Court included whether the Bank had impermissibly departed from its pleaded case at trial, whether Mr. Brackenridge could advance new arguments on appeal that were not raised at trial, and whether a payment of $200,000 had extinguished the overdraft facility provided to Apex. The Court also considered whether Mr. Brackenridge had been provided with all necessary documentation and whether financial products were supplied without his consent.

The Court reasoned that the Bank had consistently pursued its claim based on Mr. Brackenridge's liability under the guarantee, secured by the mortgages, and had not departed from this case. It rejected Mr. Brackenridge's attempts to introduce new arguments on appeal, finding that these could have been addressed at trial and that he had declined to give evidence. The Court found that the commercial nature of an overdraft facility meant it was not extinguished by a single payment, particularly given Mr. Brackenridge's continued acknowledgments of Apex's liabilities. Furthermore, the Court determined that Mr. Brackenridge had received all requisite documents and had solicited the funding by accepting offers and signing documents. Consequently, the Court found the appeal grounds to be without merit and refused an extension of time to file the notice of appeal.

The Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and the partial stay of the warrant of execution be discharged, allowing the Bank to take possession of the property and deal with it, including by way of sale.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held (by the Court), dismissing the appeal and discharging the partial stay of the warrant of execution:

1. The respondent did not impermissibly depart from the case that it was entitled to possession based on the contentions that the appellant was liable under the guarantee for the indebtedness of Apex and that this was secured by both the 2007 and 2010 mortgages. That was the case as opened, prosecuted and closed during the course of the trial.

2. To the extent that the appellant propounded a new case on appeal which was not put before the trial Judge, whether in relation to his case that the mortgage needed to be read down having regard to the circumstances surrounding entry into the 2007 mortgage, or on any other appeal grounds, that case must be rejected because it could have been addressed by the respondent.

3. The ordinary commercial operation of an overdraft facility is that the facility will, of necessity, move in and out of credit from time to time as the debtor’s trading circumstances demand. The appellant’s contention that the facility was extinguished by the payment of $200,000 is contrary to the commercial purpose of the facility and must be rejected.

4. Whatever the effect of the $200,000 payment, it cannot be said to have extinguished the facility given the surrounding circumstances and where the appellant continued to sign acknowledgments in his various capacities acknowledging Apex’s ongoing liabilities.

5. The appellant was provided with all of the requisite documents at every stage. Those documents were provided in whatever capacity the appellant acted, whether as director and shareholder of the debtor, or as director and shareholder of a corporate guarantor or in his own right as guarantor.

6. No financial services or financial products were supplied until the appellant, in his various capacities, accepted the offers and signed the requisite documents. When that occurred, the appellant solicited the funding or credit that followed.

7. The appellant’s appeal grounds are without merit and there is no utility in granting an extension of time to file his notice of appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Because the appellant issued his notice of appeal out of time, he requires an extension of time in which to press his appeal. He presently has the benefit of a “partial stay”.[3] For the reasons that follow, the appellant has not demonstrated any utility in an extension of time and the appeal should be dismissed.[3] Brackenridge v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd [2020] SASC 235 (Livesey J).Relevant background The appellant is the registered proprietor of the Beaumont property on which a “luxury home” has been constructed with funds advanced by the bank. The case for the bank at trial was that the appellant granted two mortgages over the property (the 2007 mortgage and the 2010 mortgage) which secure a guarantee executed by him in favour of the bank on 20 April 2010. The bank contended that the guarantee covered the indebtedness of Apex Property Solutions Pty Ltd (Apex), of which the appellant was the sole director and shareholder. In finding for the bank, the trial Judge rejected the various defences advanced by the appellant. The appellant contends that neither he nor Apex is liable or otherwise indebted to the bank, with the result that the bank’s mortgages effectively secure nothing. At trial, the appellant did not challenge the bank’s evidence that, if Apex was indebted to the bank, the amount owed approximated $4 million.[4] [4] Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd v Brackenridge [2020] SASC 114, [5], [26], [237] (Doyle J). The appellant represented himself at trial and on appeal. He was described by the trial Judge as “intelligent, capable and determined”.[5] The trial Judge emphasised that, during closing address, he demonstrated a “quite sophisticated understanding” of the matters in issue between the parties.[6][5] Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd v Brackenridge [2020] SASC 114, [15].[6] Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd v Brackenridge [2020] SASC 114, [62]. Before outlining the appellant’s appeal grounds, it is necessary to emphasise that the bank contends that, in a number of respects, the appellant seeks to agitate matters which were neither pleaded nor litigated at trial, in circumstances where the appellant ultimately declined to give evidence at the trial. The bank asserts that this demonstrates the appellant’s propensity to conduct his defence “in a staged and tactical way for the purpose of frustrating” the bank’s claims, contrary to the High Court’s decision in UBS AG v Tyne.[7][7] Respondent’s Written Submissions, [6], citing UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 265 CLR 77. These assertions must be assessed in light of the history of the appellant’s delays. It is not presently necessary to describe these in detail as was done by the trial Judge.[8] For the purposes of this appeal, it is sufficient to provide the following outline. [8] Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd v Brackenridge [2020] SASC 114, [30], [63]. The bank commenced proceedings in June 2018, initially relying upon the summary procedure available under Part XVII of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA). The bank obtained an order for possession on 26 September 2018, after the appellant failed to file evidence in opposition and did not attend the hearing at which the order was made.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It follows from the foregoing that the appellant’s appeal grounds are without merit. There is no utility in granting the appellant an extension of time to file his notice of appeal. In any event, the appellant has failed to satisfactorily explain his delay. An extension of time is refused.Conclusion In these circumstances, the order for possession was rightly made. It is appropriate to make the following orders:1.The appeal is dismissed.2.The order made by way of “partial stay” on 2 December 2020 is discharged. The parties will be heard on the question of costs and any other orders required. The effect of the orders made will be to permit the bank, having taken possession of the property, to deal with it, including by way of sale.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established