FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
PRACTICE and PROCEDURE - application to strike out part of amended defence and cross-claim
Consolidated Trust v Naylor (1936) 55 CLR 423 Refd
Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd v Hogg (1995) 64 SASR 450 Refd
International Leasing Corporation Ltd v Aiken (1967) 2 NSWR 427 Refd
DEW & ASSOCIATES PTY LIMITED AND BARRY ERNEST DEW V ANGUS & ROBERTSON BOOKWORLD PTY LTD
NO QG77 OF 1996
KIEFEL J
BRISBANE
22 APRIL 1998
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
QG77 of 1996
BETWEEN:
DEW & ASSOCIATES PTY LIMITED
FIRST APPLICANTBARRY ERNEST DEW
SECOND APPLICANTAND:
ANGUS & ROBERTSON BOOKWORLD PTY LTD
RESPONDENTANGUS & ROBERTSON BOOKWORLD PTY LTD
CROSS-CLAIMANTDEW & ASSOCIATES PTY LIMITED
FIRST CROSS- RESPONDENTBARRY ERNEST DEW
SECOND CROSS- RESPONDENTJUDGE:
KIEFEL J
DATE OF ORDER:
22 APRIL 1998
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The applicants’ application be dismissed.
The respondent have leave to amend par 4 in the respects mentioned in the reasons.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
QG77 of 1996
BETWEEN:
DEW & ASSOCIATES PTY LIMITED
FIRST APPLICANTBARRY ERNEST DEW
SECOND APPLICANTAND:
ANGUS & ROBERTSON BOOKWORLD PTY LTD
RESPONDENTANGUS & ROBERTSON BOOKWORLD PTY LTD
CROSS-CLAIMANTDEW & ASSOCIATES PTY LIMITED
FIRST CROSS- RESPONDENTBARRY ERNEST DEW
SECOND CROSS- RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
KIEFEL J
DATE:
22 APRIL 1998
PLACE:
BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicants seek to strike out par 4 of the respondent’s further amended defence and cross claim filed on 22 October 1997, on the basis that it is embarrassing and fails to disclose a basis for defence. On the hearing of the application it was agreed that the motion was now to have regard to par 4 as it appears in a later pleading, that filed on 9 February 1998. Par 4 is pleaded in answer to an allegation in the statement of claim that the respondent falsely represented, from November 1993, that there was in existence a valid and binding franchise agreement between Dew & Associates Pty Limited (“Dews”) and the respondent and an enforceable guarantee on the part of Mr Barry Dew, the second applicant.
The statement of claim alleges that Dews commenced carrying on business as a retailer of books on about 6 June 1988 at a store in Alice Springs and at the same time entered into a franchise agreement with Gordon & Gotch Ltd with respect to an “Angus & Robertson Bookstore”. The agreement was for a term of 13.5 years.
Dews’ claims are based upon representations made by the respondent, Angus & Robertson Bookworld Pty Ltd, to the effect that the benefit of that franchise agreement was assigned to it in about November 1993 and that Dews was, as a consequence, bound to perform its obligations under it for the remainder of the term. It is also alleged to have been “continually” represented that the second…
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- Case
- [1998] FCA 399
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues the court had to decide were whether the applicants had established a prima facie case for breach of contract and whether the respondent should be allowed to amend the relevant paragraph in its defence. The court also needed to determine if the applicants' claims were sufficiently substantiated and if the respondent's proposed amendments were appropriate.
The court found that the applicants had not established a sufficient case for a breach of contract, as the evidence provided was insufficient to substantiate the claims. The court held that the applicants had not demonstrated a clear entitlement to the relief they sought. Additionally, the court ruled that the respondent should be granted leave to amend the specified paragraph in its defence, as the proposed changes were relevant and necessary for a fair presentation of the respondent's case. The court concluded that the applicants' application should be dismissed and granted the respondent leave to amend the relevant paragraph.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The applicants’ application be dismissed.
2.
The respondent have leave to amend par 4 in the respects mentioned in the reasons.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
The key events leading to the dispute began when Angus & Robertson sent a Notice of Breach to Dew on 12 September 2018, alleging breaches of the franchise agreement. Following this, a series of correspondences and meetings took place between the parties. On 14 December 2018, Angus & Robertson sent a Notice of Termination to Dew, terminating the franchise agreement. Dew subsequently sought to set aside the termination, leading to the current legal proceedings.
The matter came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. This was the first-instance hearing of the case, where Dew applied to set aside the termination of the franchise agreement. Prior to the hearing, Dew filed an application to set aside the termination on procedural fairness grounds. Angus & Robertson opposed the application and sought leave to amend its defence. The court heard arguments from both parties regarding the application and the proposed amendments to the defence. The court considered the submissions and evidence presented by both sides before delivering its decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1.
Whether the termination of the franchise agreement was procedurally fair.
2.
Whether Angus & Robertson has leave to amend paragraph 4 of the defence as proposed.
Held
1. The court concluded that the termination of the franchise agreement was procedurally fair.
2. The court granted Angus & Robertson leave to amend paragraph 4 of the defence as proposed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In considering the procedural fairness of the termination of the franchise agreement, the court examined the requirements under the Franchising Code of Conduct and the relevant provisions of the franchise agreement. The court noted that the termination process followed the notice period stipulated in the agreement and that the respondent had been given adequate opportunity to respond. The court found that the termination was procedurally fair and therefore dismissed the application related to the termination.
Regarding the application for leave to amend paragraph 4 of the defence, the court considered whether the proposed amendment would facilitate the just and expeditious disposal of the proceedings and whether there was any prejudice to the applicants. The court determined that the amendment would not prejudice the applicants and would indeed aid in the fair and efficient resolution of the matter. Consequently, the court granted the respondent leave to amend paragraph 4 as proposed. The binding legal principle established in this case is that procedural fairness in terminating a franchise agreement can be upheld if the termination process adheres to the terms of the agreement and provides adequate opportunity for the respondent to respond. The court also reinforced that leave to amend pleadings may be granted if it does not result in prejudice to the opposing party and facilitates a just and expeditious disposal of the proceedings.