Birla Nifty Pty Ltd v International Mining Industry Underwriters Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   BIRLA NIFTY PTY LTD -v- INTERNATIONAL MINING INDUSTRY UNDERWRITERS LTD [2014] WASCA 180

CORAM:   McLURE P

BUSS JA
NEWNES JA

HEARD:   5 AUGUST 2014

DELIVERED          :   8 OCTOBER 2014

FILE NO/S:   CACV 124 of 2013

BETWEEN:   BIRLA NIFTY PTY LTD

Appellant

AND

INTERNATIONAL MINING INDUSTRY UNDERWRITERS LTD
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :HALL J

Citation  :BIRLA NIFTY PTY LTD -v- INTERNATIONAL MINING INDUSTRY UNDERWRITERS LTD [2013] WASC 386

File No  :CIV 3302 of 2011

Catchwords:

Contract - Claim for business interruption insurance - Construction of excess clause

Evidence - Admissibility of expert evidence - Expert acted for and on behalf of the respondent in entering into the relevant contracts

Estoppel - Estoppel by convention - Estoppel by representation - The requirement of detriment - Mere entry into a contract - Disconnect between representation or common assumption and the reliance and detriment - Estoppel concerned with avoidance of detriment not prevention of benefit

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Appeal dismissed
Respondent's first contention upheld
Respondent's second and third contentions dismissed

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr S K Dharmananda SC & Mr T J Palmer

Respondent:     Mr G G McArthur QC & Mr P D Herzfeld

Solicitors:

Appellant:     DLA Piper Australia

Respondent:     Wotton & Kearney

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner [2008] HCA 57; (2008) 238 CLR 570

Alpha Wealth Financial Services Pty Ltd v Frankland River Olive Company Ltd [2008] WASCA 119

Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd [1973] HCA 36; (1973) 129 CLR 99

Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd [2014] HCA 14

Australian Goldfields NL (in liq) v North Australian Diamonds NL [2009] WASCA 98; (2009) 40 WAR 191

Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253

Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales [1982] HCA 24; (1982) 149 CLR 337

Electricity Generation Corporation (t/as Verve Energy) v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7

Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd [1937] HCA 58; (1937) 59 CLR 641

HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 161

Jacobs v Platt Nominees Pty Ltd [1990] VR 146

Linter Group Ltd (in liq) v Goldberg (1992) 7 ACSR 580

Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705

Marchesano v The Queen [2000] WASCA 225; (2000) 116 A Crim R 237

Marinovich v The Queen (1990) 46 A Crim R 282

MK & JA Roche Pty Ltd v Metro Edgley Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 39

Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370

Rosenberg v Percival [2001] HCA 18; (2001) 205 CLR 434

The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corpororation [No 9] [2008] WASC 239; (2008) 39 WAR 1

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Details
Case
[2014] WASCA 180
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Birla Nifty Pty Ltd, the appellant, brought an action against International Mining Industry Underwriters Ltd, the respondent, seeking a declaration regarding the interpretation of an excess clause in a business interruption insurance policy. The dispute arose after the parties disagreed on the proper construction of the clause. The case was initially heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, and the appeal was heard in the Court of Appeal of Western Australia. The central legal issue in the case was the proper construction of the excess clause in the insurance policy and whether the respondent could rely on estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention to enforce the clause.

The Court of Appeal considered the evidence provided by the parties and the expert witnesses. The primary judge had focused on whether a decision not to pursue a claim could be taken as a concession of the respondent's interpretation of the excess clause. The Court of Appeal disagreed, stating that the evidence showed that the appellant accepted the respondent's interpretation until after the acceptance of the 2009/10 policy. The Court also found that the primary judge had erred in not accepting the evidence of Mr Plaisted, who stated that the respondent would not have entered into the 2009/10 policy but for the belief that the appellant accepted the interpretation of the excess clause.

The Court of Appeal found in favour of the respondent, stating that the appellant's reliance on the respondent's interpretation of the excess clause constituted an estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention. The Court also found that the requirement of detriment was met, as the respondent would not have entered into the 2009/10 policy without the belief that the appellant accepted the interpretation of the excess clause.

As a result of the Court of Appeal's decision, the costs order made by the primary judge was set aside, and new orders were made in lieu. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the first instance proceedings, including any reserved costs, and the costs of the respondent's application in respect of costs. Interest was to run on costs taxed from the date of judgment on the substantive issues in the action. The appellant was also ordered to pay the costs of the non-party insurers under the policy, and the taxing officer was directed to make various allowances in preparing the matter for hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: These reasons concern the costs in connection with the judgment in Birla Nifty Pty Ltd v International Mining Industry Underwriters Ltd [2014] WASCA 180. Although the parties had been provided with an advance copy of the reasons, they had not put themselves in a position to make submissions on costs when judgment was delivered on 8 October 2014. On that date the court ordered that the appeal be dismissed. The respondent's first contention was upheld and its second and third contentions dismissed. The court also ordered the parties to make written submissions on costs. They have done so. The primary judge ordered that the parties bear their own costs. The respondent, who was successful in the appeal, seeks orders in the following terms:1.The order of the Honourable Justice Hall made on 20 December 2013 as to costs be and is hereby set aside, and the following orders be made in lieu thereof:a.the appellant pay the respondent and the other insurers of the policy the subject of the appeal (who for the remainder of these orders are referred to collectively as the respondent) its costs of the first instance proceedings numbered CIV 3302 of 2011 (which for the remainder of these orders are referred to as the first instance proceedings), including any reserved costs.b.the taxation of the costs referred to at paragraph 1(a) of these orders be performed on the basis that:i.the limit on Item 11 of the Scale be removed;ii.obtaining a running transcript was justified;iii.the taxing officer be directed to make allowance for the fees of senior counsel and counsel at trial;iv.allowance be made for conferences and consultations and other items not allowed for in the Scale; andv.the taxing officer be directed to make additional allowances (additional to those otherwise available for the fees of senior counsel, counsel and the lawyers for the respondent) in preparing the matter for hearing on the basis that the matter did not follow the usual procedure for an originating summons;c.the appellant pay the costs of the respondent's application in the first instance proceedings in respect of costs, including submissions, to be taxed as part of the overall bill in respect of the first instance proceedings; andd.interest to run on costs taxed from 23 October 2013, being the date of judgment on the substantive issues in the action. The appellant submits that the costs order made below should not be disturbed; if disturbed, the appellant should pay 50% of the respondent's costs below. The appellant also opposes the claim of costs for the non‑party insurers under the policy, the special costs orders in (b) and the order in (c). The appellant commenced proceedings by way of originating summons pursuant to O 58 r 10 of the Supreme Court Rules 1971 (WA) seeking a declaration as to the proper construction of an excess clause in the policy (the primary proceedings). The respondent opposed the constructions contended for by the appellant and advanced a different construction. The respondent initially opposed the use of the originating summons procedure on the basis that it wished to ventilate an estoppel claim and made an interlocutory application for the originating summons to be dismissed. That application did not proceed as the parties agreed that the respondent's estoppel claim would be determined as part of the primary proceedings. As a result of the inclusion of the estoppel claim, the master ordered the filing of pleadings and discovery of documents.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondent relied on estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention, both of which are common law estoppels. Estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention (and other categories of estoppel) were discussed by Owen J in The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] (2008) 39 WAR 1 [3455] ‑ [3554]. That summary was approved in Australian Goldfields NL (in liq) v North Australian Diamonds NL (2009) 40 WAR 191 [194] and was not doubted by this court on appeal (Westpac Banking Corporation v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) [No 3] (2012) 44 WAR 1). As is frequently so, this dispute relates to the application of the principles to the facts of the case. The representation and common assumption relied on by the respondent for each category of estoppel are the same, namely that the appellant accepted the respondent's interpretation of the excess clause for business interruption insurance. The primary judge focused his attention on whether a decision not to pursue a claim could, without more, be reasonably taken as a concession that the respondent's interpretation was correct. That, in my respectful opinion, misstates the scope and effect of the statements and conduct on which the respondent relies for the representation/common assumption. The evidence set out above establishes, clearly and unequivocally, that the appellant, by its brokers, accepted the respondent's interpretation of the excess clause until after its acceptance of the 2009/10 policy. The context also supports that conclusion. The conduct continued up to and throughout negotiations for a departure from the wording of the existing excess clause for the new 2009/10 policy in which claims history was a factor. It is also important to bear in mind that there is no element of futurity in the representation/assumption. It would be open to the appellant to resile from the representation/assumption in the future (provided the other elements of an estoppel claim had not been satisfied). Further, I accept the respondent's contention that the primary judge erred in not accepting Mr Plaisted's evidence that the respondent would not have entered into the 2009/10 policy but for his belief in the appellant's acceptance of the interpretation. The evidence was uncontradicted and unchallenged. It is not obviously incredible nor is it undermined by the possibility of hindsight bias (as to which, see Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434). That is particularly so when regard is had to the procedures in the London insurance market which underscore the importance given to dealing with knowledgeable and experienced participants in a specialised market. With good faith and parity of knowledge and understanding, there should be little scope for misunderstandings. It is also significant that the conduct of the lead insurer has an influential effect on other syndicates in the market. The primary judge erred in not accepting Mr Plaisted's evidence on the subject. The last matter is the most difficult. Reliance has been established. That is, the respondent would not have entered into the 2009/10 policy but for the representation/common assumption as to the correctness of the respondent's construction of the excess clause. The question mark relates to the requirement of detriment.