JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: BIRLA NIFTY PTY LTD -v- INTERNATIONAL MINING INDUSTRY UNDERWRITERS LTD [2014] WASCA 180
CORAM: McLURE P
BUSS JA
NEWNES JA
HEARD: 5 AUGUST 2014
DELIVERED : 8 OCTOBER 2014
FILE NO/S: CACV 124 of 2013
BETWEEN: BIRLA NIFTY PTY LTD
Appellant
AND
INTERNATIONAL MINING INDUSTRY UNDERWRITERS LTD
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :HALL J
Citation :BIRLA NIFTY PTY LTD -v- INTERNATIONAL MINING INDUSTRY UNDERWRITERS LTD [2013] WASC 386
File No :CIV 3302 of 2011
Catchwords:
Contract - Claim for business interruption insurance - Construction of excess clause
Evidence - Admissibility of expert evidence - Expert acted for and on behalf of the respondent in entering into the relevant contracts
Estoppel - Estoppel by convention - Estoppel by representation - The requirement of detriment - Mere entry into a contract - Disconnect between representation or common assumption and the reliance and detriment - Estoppel concerned with avoidance of detriment not prevention of benefit
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Respondent's first contention upheld
Respondent's second and third contentions dismissed
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr S K Dharmananda SC & Mr T J Palmer
Respondent: Mr G G McArthur QC & Mr P D Herzfeld
Solicitors:
Appellant: DLA Piper Australia
Respondent: Wotton & Kearney
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Agricultural and Rural Finance Pty Ltd v Gardiner [2008] HCA 57; (2008) 238 CLR 570
Alpha Wealth Financial Services Pty Ltd v Frankland River Olive Company Ltd [2008] WASCA 119
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd [1973] HCA 36; (1973) 129 CLR 99
Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd [2014] HCA 14
Australian Goldfields NL (in liq) v North Australian Diamonds NL [2009] WASCA 98; (2009) 40 WAR 191
Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26; (2011) 243 CLR 253
Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales [1982] HCA 24; (1982) 149 CLR 337
Electricity Generation Corporation (t/as Verve Energy) v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7
Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd [1937] HCA 58; (1937) 59 CLR 641
HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 161
Jacobs v Platt Nominees Pty Ltd [1990] VR 146
Linter Group Ltd (in liq) v Goldberg (1992) 7 ACSR 580
Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705
Marchesano v The Queen [2000] WASCA 225; (2000) 116 A Crim R 237
Marinovich v The Queen (1990) 46 A Crim R 282
MK & JA Roche Pty Ltd v Metro Edgley Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 39
Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370
Rosenberg v Percival [2001] HCA 18; (2001) 205 CLR 434
The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corpororation [No 9] [2008] WASC 239; (2008) 39 WAR 1
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- Case
- [2014] WASCA 180
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal considered the evidence provided by the parties and the expert witnesses. The primary judge had focused on whether a decision not to pursue a claim could be taken as a concession of the respondent's interpretation of the excess clause. The Court of Appeal disagreed, stating that the evidence showed that the appellant accepted the respondent's interpretation until after the acceptance of the 2009/10 policy. The Court also found that the primary judge had erred in not accepting the evidence of Mr Plaisted, who stated that the respondent would not have entered into the 2009/10 policy but for the belief that the appellant accepted the interpretation of the excess clause.
The Court of Appeal found in favour of the respondent, stating that the appellant's reliance on the respondent's interpretation of the excess clause constituted an estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention. The Court also found that the requirement of detriment was met, as the respondent would not have entered into the 2009/10 policy without the belief that the appellant accepted the interpretation of the excess clause.
As a result of the Court of Appeal's decision, the costs order made by the primary judge was set aside, and new orders were made in lieu. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the first instance proceedings, including any reserved costs, and the costs of the respondent's application in respect of costs. Interest was to run on costs taxed from the date of judgment on the substantive issues in the action. The appellant was also ordered to pay the costs of the non-party insurers under the policy, and the taxing officer was directed to make various allowances in preparing the matter for hearing.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondent relied on estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention, both of which are common law estoppels. Estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention (and other categories of estoppel) were discussed by Owen J in The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] (2008) 39 WAR 1 [3455] ‑ [3554]. That summary was approved in Australian Goldfields NL (in liq) v North Australian Diamonds NL (2009) 40 WAR 191 [194] and was not doubted by this court on appeal (Westpac Banking Corporation v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) [No 3] (2012) 44 WAR 1). As is frequently so, this dispute relates to the application of the principles to the facts of the case. The representation and common assumption relied on by the respondent for each category of estoppel are the same, namely that the appellant accepted the respondent's interpretation of the excess clause for business interruption insurance. The primary judge focused his attention on whether a decision not to pursue a claim could, without more, be reasonably taken as a concession that the respondent's interpretation was correct. That, in my respectful opinion, misstates the scope and effect of the statements and conduct on which the respondent relies for the representation/common assumption. The evidence set out above establishes, clearly and unequivocally, that the appellant, by its brokers, accepted the respondent's interpretation of the excess clause until after its acceptance of the 2009/10 policy. The context also supports that conclusion. The conduct continued up to and throughout negotiations for a departure from the wording of the existing excess clause for the new 2009/10 policy in which claims history was a factor. It is also important to bear in mind that there is no element of futurity in the representation/assumption. It would be open to the appellant to resile from the representation/assumption in the future (provided the other elements of an estoppel claim had not been satisfied). Further, I accept the respondent's contention that the primary judge erred in not accepting Mr Plaisted's evidence that the respondent would not have entered into the 2009/10 policy but for his belief in the appellant's acceptance of the interpretation. The evidence was uncontradicted and unchallenged. It is not obviously incredible nor is it undermined by the possibility of hindsight bias (as to which, see Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434). That is particularly so when regard is had to the procedures in the London insurance market which underscore the importance given to dealing with knowledgeable and experienced participants in a specialised market. With good faith and parity of knowledge and understanding, there should be little scope for misunderstandings. It is also significant that the conduct of the lead insurer has an influential effect on other syndicates in the market. The primary judge erred in not accepting Mr Plaisted's evidence on the subject. The last matter is the most difficult. Reliance has been established. That is, the respondent would not have entered into the 2009/10 policy but for the representation/common assumption as to the correctness of the respondent's construction of the excess clause. The question mark relates to the requirement of detriment.