JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: ARWON FINANCE PTY LTD -v- WILSON [2019] WASC 244
CORAM: KENNETH MARTIN J
HEARD: 29 & 30 APRIL 2019
DELIVERED : 5 JULY 2019
FILE NO/S: CIV 2225 of 2017
BETWEEN: ARWON FINANCE PTY LTD
Plaintiff
AND
FRANK CULLITY WILSON
Defendant
Catchwords:
Loan - Recovery action - Promissory estoppel - Defence - Evaluation of estoppel requirements - Assumption held regarding recovery and recourse to security by foreclosure - Express terms of loan agreement - Insider's corporate knowledge of recovery policy used to found assumption by ex-director and senior administrator - Failure to establish representation or reliance on assumption - No position of detriment established
Legislation:
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Result:
Judgment for the plaintiff
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | Mr S K Dharmananda SC & Mr V N Ghosh |
| Defendant | : | Mr I R Pike SC & Mr T C Russell |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | Allens |
| Defendant | : | McInnes Wilson Lawyers |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Australian Goldfields NL v North Australian Diamonds [2009] WASCA 98; (2009) 40 WAR 191
Bell Group Ltd (in liquidation) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] [2008] WASC 239; 39 WAR 1
Birla Nifty Pty Ltd v International Mining Industry Underwriters Ltd [2014] WASCA 180; (2014) 47 WAR 522
Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd [2016] HCA 26; (2016) 260 CLR 1
Grundt v The Great Boulder Proprietary Gold Mines Ltd [1937] HCA 58; (1937) 59 CLR 641
Hughes v St Barbara Mines Ltd [No 4] [2010] WASC 160
Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406
Merilla Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2015] WASC 309
State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387
Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group (in liq) [No 3] [2012] WASCA 157; (2012) 44 WAR 1
Woodhouse AC Israel Cocoa Ltd SA v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co Ltd [1972] AC 741
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
The Loan
Background to the proceedings
The last defence: promissory estoppel
Personal insights to the defendant - Mr Wilson
Quintis and Arwon
Mr Wilson's 'recoverability assumption'
The pleadings
Promissory estoppel defence - 3FAD plea 2(a)(i)
Promissory estoppel defence – 3FAD pleas 2(a)(ii) and (iii)
Promissory estoppel defence - 3FAD plea 2(b)
Promissory estoppel defence - 3FAD plea 2(c)
Promissory estoppel defence - 3FAD plea 2(d)
Equitable (promissory) estoppel: basic principles
Key facts and materials underlying the present dispute
ATO private taxation ruling sought by Mr Wilson
The Policy of Arwon (codified in 2013)
The terms of Mr Wilson's Loan Agreement with Arwon
Further trial evidence of Mr Wilson
Mr Wilson's evidence-in-chief
Background and the structure of Arwon and Quintis
The Loan
Change in Quintis strategy regarding direct ownership of sandalwood plantations
Implementation of foreclosure strategy
The Arwon Loan Policy document
High net worth individuals and a put option
No distinction between sophisticated and retail borrowers
Enforcement of…
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- Case
- [2019] WASC 244
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the six criteria for promissory estoppel as outlined by Owen J in Bell Group Ltd (in liquidation) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No9]. Wilson argued that Arwon Finance's insider's knowledge of the recovery policy had induced his assumption. However, the court found that Wilson had failed to establish that Arwon Finance had made a representation or that Wilson relied on any assumption to his detriment. Additionally, Wilson could not demonstrate that his position had been detrimentally affected due to the alleged assumption. Consequently, the court ruled that Wilson could not rely on promissory estoppel as a defence to prevent Arwon Finance from enforcing the loan agreement.
The court concluded that Wilson's defence based on promissory estoppel was unsuccessful. The plaintiff, Arwon Finance, was entitled to recover the loan and resort to security by foreclosure. The court did not find any unconscionable conduct by Arwon Finance that would warrant the application of promissory estoppel. The final orders of the court were that Arwon Finance was entitled to recover the loan amount from Wilson and could proceed with foreclosure on the security provided for the loan.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In those reasons, I cited a comprehensive explanation of estoppel principles by Owen J in Bell Group Ltd (in liquidation) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No9] [2008] WASC 239; 39 WAR 1 (Bell [No 9]) and commencing as regards equitable estoppel principles at [3535] (page 474 of the WAR). Owen J's reasons at [3539] in turn summarised what his Honour there referred to as a 'seminal description' of the doctrine of promissory estoppel by Brennan J (as he then was) in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, 428. Addressing Brennan J's well known six criteria, Owen J had paraphrased them as follows:1.The plaintiff has assumed that a particular legal relationship then existed between the plaintiff and the defendant or has expected that a particular relationship would exist between them and, in the latter case, that the defendant would not be free to withdraw from the expected legal relationship.2.The defendant has induced the plaintiff to adopt that assumption or expectation.3.The plaintiff has acted or abstained from acting in reliance on the assumption or expectation.4.The defendant knew or intended him to do so.5.The plaintiff's action or inaction will occasion detriment if the assumption or expectation is not fulfilled.6.The defendant has failed to act to avoid that detriment whether by fulfilling the assumption or expectation or otherwise. Within the same reasons Owen J at [3537], from an historical perspective, explained that the decision in Waltons Stores v Maher had seen the High Court of Australia move a step beyond the position it had earlier recognised in Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, by acknowledging an application of the promissory estoppel doctrine to relationships outside a pre‑existing contract. In State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoor Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170, 193 McHugh JA (then sitting as a Justice of Appeal in the New South Wales Supreme Court) had anticipated the same extension as an aftermath to Legione v Hateley. Referring to the joint reasons of Mason CJ and Wilson J in Waltons Stores v Maher at page 404, Owen J in Bell [No 9] at [3537] observed that the High Court of Australia had:... identified a common thread from previous authority, namely, the principle that equity will come to the relief of a plaintiff who has acted to his detriment. The basis for intervention was that one party to a transaction had a basic assumption in relation to which the other party to the transaction had 'played such a part in the adoption of the assumption that it would be unfair or unjust if he were left to ignore it', citing Dixon J in Grundt at 675. Their Honours explained that equity comes to the relief of such a plaintiff on the ground that it would be unconscionable conduct on the part of the other party to ignore the assumption.Owen J also noted that the joint reasons of Mason CJ and Wilson J in Waltons Stores v Maher at page 408 said:[T]he doctrine of promissory estoppel extends to the enforcement of voluntary promises on the footing that a departure from the basic assumptions underlying the transaction between the parties must be unconscionable. But mere reliance on an executory promise would not necessarily amount to unconscionable conduct. Something more would be required. That 'something' might be the creation or encouragement by the party estopped in the other party of an assumption that a contract will come into existence or a promise will be performed and that the other party relied on that assumption to his detriment to the knowledge of that first party.