Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cement Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 453 

File number(s): QUD 295 of 2008
Judge(s): GREENWOOD J
Date of judgment: 29 April 2016
Catchwords: COMPETITION – consideration of the principles governing the assessment of a pecuniary penalty under s 76 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) now the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) – consideration of the implications of the decision of the High Court in Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2015) 326 ALR 476 in determining a penalty under s 76 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – consideration of approaches to assessing benefit derived by participants to contravening conduct and market harm caused by contravening conduct – consideration of approaches to determining the “but for” price which would have prevailed in a contestable market had the relevant participants not engaged in the contravening conduct – consideration of the utility of such an exercise
Legislation: Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss 45(2)(a)(ii), 45(2)(b)(ii), 76(1)
Cases cited:

AB v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 111

Attorney‑General v Tichy (1982) 30 SASR 84

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v George Weston Foods Ltd [2000] ATPR 41‑763

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Rural Press Ltd [2001] ATPR 41‑833

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v ABB Transmission and Distribution Ltd (No 2) (2002) 190 ALR 169

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Visy Paper Pty Ltd (No 2) (2004) 212 ALR 564

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Humax Pty Ltd [2005] ATPR 42‑072

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 3) (2005) 215 ALR 301

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Liquorland (Australia) Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1799

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Safeway Stores Pty Ltd [2006] ATPR 42‑101

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Qantas Airways Ltd (2008) 253 ALR 89

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v PRK Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 715

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 929

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v NW Frozen FoodsPty Ltd [1996] ATPR 41‑515

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Limited [1996] ATPR 41‑457

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Foamlite (Australia) Pty Ltd [1998] ATPR 41‑615

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v J McPhee & Son (Australia) Pty Ltd [1998] ATPR 41‑628

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Tyco Australia Pty Ltd [2000] ATPR 41‑740

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Tubemakers Australia Pty Ltd [2000] ATPR 41‑745

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Roche Vitamins Australia Pty Ltd [2001] ATPR 41‑809

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v ABB Transmission and Distribution Limited [2001] ATPR 41‑815; [2001] FCA 383

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Ithaca Ice Works Pty Ltd [2002] ATPR 41‑851

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Kokos International Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] ATPR 42‑212

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cement Australia Pty Ltd (2013) 310 ALR 165; [2013] FCA 909

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 453
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involves a proceeding brought by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) against several respondents for contraventions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (the Act). The respondents are accused of engaging in anti-competitive practices by entering into contracts that substantially lessened competition in the market for the supply of certain flyash products. The court was required to determine the appropriate pecuniary penalties for the respondents based on the nature and extent of their contraventions, as well as the market harm and benefits derived from the conduct. The court considered the principles governing the assessment of pecuniary penalties, including the implications of the High Court decision in Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2015) 326 ALR 476. The court also examined various approaches to assessing market harm and benefits, as well as the utility of determining a "but for" price in a contestable market. The court ultimately decided to impose pecuniary penalties on the respondents based on the specific conduct and contracts in question. The penalties ranged from $20,000 to $5.5 million, depending on the severity of the contraventions and the level of market harm caused. The court also considered the opinions of the respondents' senior managers and directors regarding the potential impact of competition on prices and earnings, and took these opinions into account in determining the appropriate penalties. The final orders of the court include declarations of liability, pecuniary penalties, and costs orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant submit to the Court proposed final orders to be made having regard to the reasons for judgment and the matters set out in the following orders which have regard to the orders sought by Annexure A to the principal submissions of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (“ACCC”).

2. As to those draft orders, the Court expresses this position:

(a) as to draft Order 1, the Court declines to make the declaration sought;

(b) as to draft Order 2, the Court will make the declaration sought by the applicant;

(c) as to draft Order 3, the Court declines to make the declaration sought;

(d) as to the matters set out at paras 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the draft, the Court will make orders in those terms.

3. As to the Original Millmerran Contract, a pecuniary penalty is to be paid to the Commonwealth of Australia (the “Commonwealth”) by the fourth respondent jointly and severally with the third respondent in respect of the making of the contract by the fourth respondent and the third respondent having been knowingly concerned in the making of the contract, of $3.5 million (Declarations 6 and 7).

4. As to the Original Millmerran Contract, a pecuniary penalty is to be paid to the Commonwealth by the fourth respondent jointly and severally with the third respondent in respect of giving effect to the relevant provisions of the contract, of $500,000 (Declarations 8 and 9).

5. No pecuniary penalty is to be ordered in respect of the fifth respondent having acted as a guarantor of the contract (Declaration 10).

6. As to the Tarong Contract, a pecuniary penalty is to be paid to the Commonwealth by the fourth respondent jointly and severally with the third respondent in respect of the making of the contract by the fourth respondent and the third respondent having been knowingly concerned in the making of the contract, of $5.5 million (Declarations 16 and 17).

7. As to the Tarong Contract, a pecuniary penalty is to be paid to the Commonwealth by the fourth respondent jointly and severally with the third respondent in respect of giving effect to the relevant provisions of the contract, of $5.5 million (Declarations 18 and 20).

8. No pecuniary penalty is to be ordered in respect of the third respondent having given effect to the Tarong Contract in the period March, April and May 2003 (Declaration 19).

9. As to the Amended Millmerran Contract, a pecuniary penalty is to be paid to the Commonwealth by the fourth respondent jointly and severally with the first respondent in respect of the making of the Amended Millmerran Contract by the fourth respondent and the first respondent having been knowingly concerned in the making of the contract, of $850,000 (Declarations 12 and 13).

10. No pecuniary penalty is to be ordered in respect of the matters at Declarations 14 and 15.

11. As to the Swanbank Contract in the period up to 31 December 2004, a pecuniary penalty is to be paid to the Commonwealth by the fourth respondent in respect of the making of the extension of the contract to 31 December 2004 by the fourth respondent, of $1.5 million (Declaration 21).

12. As to the Swanbank Contract in the period from 1 January 2005 to 30 June 2005, a pecuniary penalty is to be paid to the Commonwealth by the fourth respondent jointly and severally with the first respondent in respect of the making of the extension of the contract from 1 January 2005 to 30 June 2005 by the fourth respondent and the giving effect to the extension until 30 June 2005 by the first respondent, of $200,000 (Declarations 22, 24 and 26).

13. As to the Swanbank Contract in the period up to 31 December 2004, a pecuniary penalty is to be paid to the Commonwealth by the fourth respondent jointly and severally with the third respondent in respect of their having given effect to the contract to 31 December 2004, of $1 million (Declarations 21, 23 and 25).

14. As to the Swanbank Contract in the period 1 January 2005 to 30 June 2005, a pecuniary penalty is to be paid to the Commonwealth by the fourth respondent jointly and severally with the first respondent in respect of their having given effect to the contract to 30 June 2005, of $50,000 (Declarations 22 and 26).

15. The seventh respondent pay a pecuniary penalty to the Commonwealth in respect of the conduct set out at Declarations 27 and 28 in an amount of $20,000.

16. The first to fifth respondents pay 65% of the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding up to 10 September 2013 and 100% of the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding on and after 10 September 2013, on a party and party basis to be taxed if not agreed.

17. The applicant and the first to fifth respondents are to submit a schedule to the Court within 14 days setting out a list of the paragraphs containing data said to be confidential which ought to be removed from the reasons for judgment so as to preserve the confidentiality of the information and in the event that the applicant, on the one hand, and the first to fifth respondents on the other, are not able to agree a schedule, a schedule ought to be submitted by each of the parties setting out their views of the data to be removed from the judgment.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is important therefore to have regard to some aspects of the observations of their Honours going to these matters of principle and apart from anything else, the observations of their Honours have, in this matter, directly led to the participants making changes to their submissions having considered the Fair Work decision. PART 2: THE FAIR WORK DECISION; THE RELEVANT PRINCIPLES TO BE APPLIED IN EXERCISING THE DISCRETION UNDER SECTION 76 OF THE ACTThe Fair Work decision In Barbaro, French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ held that where a Court is called upon to pass sentence on an offender in criminal proceedings, the “prosecution’s statement of what are the bounds of the available range of sentences is a statement of opinion” which a sentencing judge may not “take into account in finding the relevant facts, deciding the applicable principles of law or applying those principles to the facts to yield the sentence to be imposed”: Barbaro at 66, [7]. That follows because, apart from the “conceptually indeterminate boundaries” of the available range of sentences (and “systemic problems” which would likely result from a criminal sentencing judge being seen to be influenced by the Crown’s opinion as to the available range of sentences), the Crown’s opinion would, in all probability, be informed by an assessment of the facts and relative weighting of the relevant sentencing considerations “different from the judge’s assessment”: Fair Work, the plurality at 491 [56]. Having regard to that consideration, the plurality at [56] also said this: “That is why it was held in Barbaro that it is inconsistent with the nature of criminal sentencing proceedings for a sentencing judge to receive a submission from the Crown as to the appropriate sentence or even as to the available range of sentences”. However, what was said in Barbaro “applies only to criminal proceedings”: Fair Work, the plurality at [50]. That follows because there are “basic differences” between a criminal prosecution and civil penalty proceedings and it is those basic differences that provide the “principled basis” for excluding the application of Barbaro from civil penalty proceedings. Those basic differences between a criminal prosecution and a civil penalty proceeding include these considerations: a criminal prosecution is an accusatorial proceeding governed by the fundamental principle that the burden lies in all things upon the Crown to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil penalty proceedings are “civil” and therefore adversarial with issues and the scope of relief framed by the parties as they choose; and, a criminal prosecution is aimed at securing a criminal conviction whereas a civil penalty proceeding is “precisely calculated” to “avoid the notion of criminality as such”: see Fair Work, the plurality at [53]‑[54]. No less important, however, is the consideration that the imposition of criminal penalties is conditioned by notions of “retribution” and “rehabilitation” as well as general and specific deterrence, whereas the “purpose” of a civil penalty is primarily, if not wholly, “protective” in promoting the public interest in compliance with the law: Fair Work, the plurality at [55]. Civil penalties, like most other civil remedies, are “essentially deterrent or compensatory” and therefore “protective”: Fair Work, the plurality at [59]. Moreover, neither retribution nor rehabilitation “have any part to play in economic regulation of the kind contemplated by Pt IV [of the Trade Practices Act]”, and the principal, and probably the only, “object” of the penalties imposed by s 76, is to attempt to “put a price on contravention that is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravener and by others who might be tempted to contravene the Act”: Fair Work, the plurality at [55] adopting the observations of French J in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1991] ATPR 41‑076 at 52,152 (“TPC v CSR”).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I have taken into account the nature of the market harm by reason of the provisions of the Swanbank Contract, in a qualitative sense. I have also had regard to the provisions of the principal liability judgment concerning the Swanbank Contract and all matters relevant to the contraventions. I have examined at [818], the quantitative aspects urged by the ACCC in relation to benefit and market harm which engaged questions in relation to Swanbank and the sale of Swanbank cgf. Having regard to all of these factors relevant to the assessment of penalty, it seems to me that in respect of the contravening conduct in the period up to 31 December 2004, an appropriate penalty in relation to the making of that contract with the identified provisions is $1.5 million. As indicated in the principal liability judgment, substitutable ash from Swanbank would have had a significant and meaningful effect upon rivalry, prices, revenue and margins. Prior to deterioration in the quality of the ash towards the end of the contravening period, Swanbank ash was regarded by the respondents as substitutable for Tarong ash. In respect of the making of the six month extension to 30 June 2005 by Mr White, an appropriate penalty is $200,000. The extension was for a short period. In relation to the contract up to the period 31 December 2004, Pozzolanic gave day‑to‑day effect to that contract as did QCL by selling cgf produced from Swanbank ash. It seems to me, having regard to all of the relevant factors, that an appropriate penalty in respect of that conduct is $1 million. Like the Tarong Contract, there are two classes of separate conduct in relation to the contraventions concerning Swanbank as an analysis of conduct overall. In respect of the giving effect to the provisions in the period 1 January 2005 to 30 June 2005, the appropriate penalty is $50,000. Cement Australia was also knowingly concerned in the extension of the contract to 30 June 2005. The conduct of Mr White for Cement Australia of making the extension and Cement Australia being knowingly concerned in the contravention is a single course of conduct and no additional penalty ought to be imposed in respect of Cement Australia being knowingly concerned in the extension conduct. A consideration of the factors of benefit and market harm quantitatively In relation to the various approaches to determining market harm caused by the conduct or benefit derived by the respondents, I have formed these views. (1)An attempt to measure, quantify or estimate the prices that would have prevailed in a market but for the contravening conduct is an extremely difficult and precise task. Although the ACCC in its further submissions disavows the notion that it is seeking to establish a but for price, the substance of the submissions are really directed to that task. The task is undertaken in this case by the ACCC to try and demonstrate or estimate the difference between the prices charged for cgf by QCL and later, Cement Australia, in the period 2002 to 2006 and prices that would likely have prevailed in that period had not the respondents entered into and given effect to provisions of the contracts adopted for the purpose and having the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition by foreclosing access to third parties to ash from Tarong, Tarong North and Swanbank (and Millmerran at least for a time, as to effects).(2)That raises the question of the counterfactual. I will not repeat what I said at [477] to [489] of these reasons.(3)The point of undertaking this analysis of the but for price is to try and identify the extent to which the respondents were better off by securing a price, a volume of sales and revenue and a level of EBIT they would not have enjoyed had the provisions not been adopted constraining third party access and new entrant competition in the SEQ cgf market. The ACCC also seeks to identify the market harm brought about by the conduct. The application of the with and without test has already made clear qualitatively that the process of competition in a future world with the provisions was substantially lessened as compared with a future world without the provisions. Now, the ACCC seeks to bolster the serious qualitative assessment already made in the principal liability judgment without an actual measure of the difference between the actual position as to prices, volume, revenue and EBIT as it was from 2002 to 2006 with those things as they would have been but for the contravening conduct. (4)As mentioned, the ACCC says in its further submissions that it is not trying to “quantify” the but for price and consequential but for volumes, revenues and EBIT but rather it seeks to identify an estimate of those things and also the forward‑looking estimates of the consequences of new entrant competition identified by the respondents themselves in their own documents. This approach is later described by the respondents as the “hybrid” approach between qualitative assessments and best informed estimates of likely differentials. (5)One of the methods of gaining a sense of how much higher cgf prices were in the period 2002 to 2006, by reason of the contravening conduct, than they would have been is the extent to which the prices of cement and cgf “de‑coupled” in the years 2011 and 2012. I accept the submissions of the respondents that the two invoices identified at [353] of these reasons provides no basis for a conclusion that but for the contravening conduct cgf prices in 2002 to 2006 would have been a particular proportion or ratio of the GP cement price [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE] and thus prices would have been a lesser ratio than it was (50% to 60%) in the period 2002 to 2006 with the result that, analytically, one can say that cgf prices would have been lower in the period 2002 to 2006 than they were. (6)At [333] to [349] of these reasons, I describe another measure proposed by the ACCC of the likely price differences that would have prevailed in the period 2002 to 2006 but for the contravening conduct. That measure involves an analysis of pricing differentials between Cement Australia’s delivered prices and the delivered prices for cgf of Sunstate and IFB in the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, Sunstate having entered the SEQ cgf market in April 2007 (with ground Tarong North run‑of‑station ash) and IFB having entered in 2008 (with Millmerran ash). The margin difference for each year is set out at [349] of these reasons as it relates to Nucon. It is not an insignificant margin. Another example is given for purchases by Rocla, Gailes. The “study” years 2011, 2012 and 2013 are 5, 6 and 7 years after the end of the contravening period 2002 to 2006. I have great difficulty with this measure for a number of reasons. First, the study years for the transactions are quite a long time after the period of the contraventions which began on 30 September 2002. The contravening period under examination in the principal liability judgment ends on 31 December 2006. Second, although that which is supplied is flyash, the source of the ash in the case of Cement Australia is Tarong and Gladstone ash each of which has its own particular properties. The source of the Sunstate ash is Tarong North as mentioned, ground in Sunstate’s mill, until it reaches the cgf particulate standard. The source of IFB’s ash is Millmerran and some of the other comparative ash is Bayswater ash. It is not clear to me, on the present evidence, what role in pricing in 2011, 2012 and 2013 differential sources of ash played, if any, or what the impact of any comparative cement equivalence may have been or its role in pricing. Third, more would need to be known about the transactions to draw the conclusion sought to be established which is that the significant pricing differentials are only attributable to alternative pricing made possible by entry by Sunstate and IFB and had they entered the SEQ cgf market from 2002 to 2006 (which they did not, it is said, by reason of the contravening conduct), the pricing differentials now apparent in these later years of 2011, 2012 and 2013 would have been seen in Sunstate or IFB’s pricing (or other third party pricing). The ACCC says that Sunstate’s “ex‑works” price was [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE] than Cement Australia’s “average delivered price” in 2013, and the transport costs of delivering Sunstate ash to the buyers batching plants (on this comparative basis) does not account for the difference, as the tables reveal at [333] to [349] of these reasons. However, I am not satisfied that this measure of pricing differentials for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 tells me anything ultimately probative of prices which would have prevailed in the period 2002 to 2006 but for the contravening conduct. (7)Another measure said to reveal an analogue of prices that would have prevailed in the period 2002 to 2006 but for the contravening conduct is a comparison of SEQ prices with prevailing prices in NSW. The supply of cgf in NSW was contestable in the relevant years. Prices were a function of that contestability at least in part. The ex‑works prices at Mt Piper, Eraring and Bayswater are set out at [322] of these reasons for the period 2001 to 1 December 2006. A delivered pricing comparison between the prevailing prices for delivered cgf into NSW from NSW power stations and prevailing prices for cgf delivered from Tarong and Swanbank to the batching plants of buyers in SEQ is set out for the years 2003, 2005 and 2006 at [323] of these reasons. The differences, plainly enough, are significant: see [329] of these reasons. The difference postulated for the years 2002 to 2006 are set out at [330] of these reasons. (8)The difference per tonne for each year is said to be: 2002 - $26.50/t; 2003 - $33.81/t; 2004 - $26.46/t; 2005 - $29.92/t; 2006 [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE]. The additional revenue for the period 2002 to 2006 based on the volume sold having regard to these price differentials is [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE]. The point emphasised by the ACCC is that NSW is a geographic catchment that represents a proper analogue of the SEQ market. The ACCC says that what follows is that had the contravening conduct not occurred, new entrant rivalry in SEQ would have brought about a level of delivered prices on the part of Cement Australia very similar to those prevailing in NSW. Thus, this method demonstrates, it is said, a measure of the margin by which prices were higher in SEQ in 2002 to 2006 than they would have been but for entry and contestability which was foreclosed by the provisions of, particularly, the Tarong and Swanbank Contracts. In NSW, FAA was competing with Hyrock. The ACCC says that FAA had agitated for entry into the SEQ cgf market through access to both Tarong and Millmerran ash and there is no reason to believe that had the contracts at Millmerran and Tarong/Tarong North (but particularly Tarong/Tarong North) not contained the identified provisions, FAA would not have sought to secure access to that ash. The merger of May 2003 resulted in Cement Australia having a 50% interest in FAA (and therefore ultimately Holcim, Rinker and Hanson, the beneficial owners of that interest). (9)Dr Williams accepts that one possible explanation for the marked differences in prices between the two regions is that the effective monopoly of Cement Australia in SEQ meant that it could charge uncompetitive prices. Dr Williams said that another possible explanation is that the ash sources are not homogenous. The product differentiation in the ashes would require extensive empirical work which Dr Williams had not undertaken. Dr Williams thought that another possible explanation was that transfer pricing might be a cause of the differences. The similarity in prices between Eraring, Mt Piper and Bayswater ash suggested to Dr Williams that those ashes were reasonable substitutes for each other. As to aspects of the pricing, Dr Williams seemed to be confused about the 2006 prices. However, he accepted that the SEQ average delivered price for 2006 was [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE] and the highest NSW price for 2006 was $54.11/t. Thus, there plainly were differentials. (10)Apart from these possible explanations, Dr Williams criticises the method of simply applying the price difference between the two regions each year across all tonnes sold in SEQ to produce an aggregated price difference of [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE] because the price difference, by doing so, is applied to all “tied sales” across each of the five years. The second criticism is that no proper controls were applied to isolate the causal influence of transport costs; whether prices charged were at arms‑length; and tied sales were not excluded. (11)Again, I have difficulty with this method as a measure of the price that would have prevailed but for the contravening conduct. Dr Williams accepts that reference to a truly analogical market is one method recognised by economists for testing a but for price. Dr Williams also accepts that the price differentials are significant and that they need to be explained. Apart from the criticisms already mentioned, Dr Williams says that no conclusion can be reached about “average prices” unless all of the invoices for the period under inquiry are examined. The prices could just be point in time prices. It is not clear whether the prices set out in the tables are properly representative or not in the absence of a complete analysis of all of the invoices. (12)It seems to me that these questions of whether the ash is homogenous; the lack of control for other causative factors; and the need for an examination of all the invoices over the period under examination, does not enable a conclusion to be reached that, on this measure, prices in SEQ in the period 2002 to 2006 were higher than they would have been but for the contravening conduct, by the order suggested. (13)This measure is put forward as a measure of market harm of [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE]. That number depends upon the integrity of the pricing data to determine the differential per tonne. In principle, however, Dr Williams accepts that direct market harm can be quantified by multiplying the tonnage by the difference in price per tonne between the price actually charged and the price that would have been charged but for the conduct ([679] of these reasons) provided that those tonnes were sold to external parties: that is, not tied sales to shareholder owners. As a method of measuring market harm, therefore, Dr Williams accepts the principle of the method subject, of course, to the elimination of tied sales in the calculation and the integrity of the data. (14)Although I have expressed difficulty with the determination of the differential per tonne each year in the table at [330] of these reasons, as earlier mentioned based in part upon aspects of the evidence of Dr Williams, the differences on the face of the data are significant and they do require an explanation. The ultimate difficulty is that the evidence does not demonstrate a truly probative basis for a causative finding that the contravening conduct is the source of the differential in that measure. (15)The question of tied sales raises a much more general point of principle. Dr Williams says that tied sales should be excluded because an examination of market harm is about identifying harm caused by the contravening conduct to others: see [669] to [673] of these reasons where Dr Williams identifies the principled foundation for that view based upon his expert opinion and his understanding of the economic orthodoxy applied to determining market harm in the context of deterrence. As to the circumstances of Holcim, Rinker and Hanson and their relationship with Cement Australia, Dr Williams accepted that if Hanson, as a shareholder concrete producer buying flyash, was charged $4/t more than a rivalrous price due to contravening conduct and $1/t came back to it (due to its 25% shareholding interest) and the same result occurred for Hanson, then 50% of the higher price would go in a circle and 50% would not. If Hanson and Rinker each pay $4/t more than the “but for” price as a measure of the market harm, Cement Australia then has $8/t (and leaving aside costs for the moment) $2/t would be returned to each of Rinker and Hanson and $4/t would be returned to Holcim, a non‑concrete producer. It seems then that if 60% of the sales are tied, only 50% of that 60% should be excluded. If that is so, and the market harm is said to be [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE], 60% of that amount is [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE] and 50% of that number is [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE]. The market harm excluding tied sales would then be [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE] assuming the integrity of the pricing differentials which, of course, for the reasons mentioned, cannot be assumed. (16)I have examined the literature and the cases to try and identify judicial authorities for the proposition that tied sales ought to be excluded in measuring market harm consistent with the principle articulated by Dr Williams. I can find no authority on the point. As a matter of foundation principle, it seems to me to be correct to say that if a Court is seeking to identify the market harm caused by contravening conduct, the focus of the inquiry ought to be upon the market harm caused to parties other than entities associated with the companies engaging in the conduct. (17)Accordingly, I accept the proposition that in determining market harm, the proper course is to exclude harm inflicted upon shareholder entities who are engaging in tied acquisitions. (18)Apart from market harm, the ACCC has conducted an analysis of benefit derived by the respondents from maintaining a higher market share than would have been the case but for the contravening conduct. I accept, in substance, the accuracy of the data contained in the tables at [267] and [268] of these reasons as it relates to the full five years in those tables. The Tarong EBIT calculation for those years is at [408] of these reasons [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE] and the combined Tarong and Swanbank EBIT calculation is at [361] of these reasons [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE. After excluding the additional Millmerran costs, the five year EBIT calculation is [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE]. These financial statistics represent the value of the SEQ flyash business of and to the respondents. The EBIT of [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE] as a proportion of total revenues is an EBIT of 43.7% for the full five calendar years set out in those tables. It represents an EBIT of [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE] over 1,777,514 tonnes averaged over the five years. (19)The ACCC says that this position reflected in these statistics can be usefully and relevantly contrasted with the position the respondents would have been in across the period at least 2003 to 2006 had they lost the Tarong Contract but won the OMC. They would have earned $0.14/t or $6,429 and this difference between the two positions represents “one straightforward indicator of the potential financial benefit the [respondents] earned by preventing competition”: [367] of these reasons. In other words, the ACCC sees the entire flyash undertaking of the respondents, largely derived from the sale of Tarong ash (see [408] of these reasons) as a benefit derived from the contravening conduct which should be stripped away as a function of deterrence. Plainly, that is not correct. (20)The true analytical position is that discussed at [477] to [489] of these reasons. (21)The whole of the revenues and EBIT of the flyash business from the date of the Tarong Contract (in particular) forward cannot be attributed to the adoption of the impugned provisions and thus the contravening conduct in that causal sense. Pozzolanic/QCL might have entered into the Tarong Contract with none of the impugned provisions and yet it might have sustained at least a proportion of its revenues and EBIT in the face of responding to competition notwithstanding that absent the provisions, new entrants would likely have entered with access to Tarong ash (perhaps FAA or Transpacific but also others) and brought about a significant impact on earnings through contestability with Pozzolanic/QCL and later Cement Australia. The competition impact of the provisions is significant but if the benefit brought about by reason of the contravening provisions is to be assessed, quantified or estimated, then it is necessary to approach the matter on the footing of the method identified at [477] to [489] of these reasons. (22)Another measure of the benefit said to have been derived from the contravening conduct is that once contestability occurred (foreclosed by operation of the provisions) through Sunstate and IFB, the contravening grip of the respondents on non‑tied sales would have been lost and the ACCC says that the data shows that these sales collapsed from 40% of sales in 2005 to merely [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE] in 2010. The ACCC says that had Sunstate or IFB entered the market in 2005 and had that event resulted in a reduction in sales to sales of cgf by Cement Australia to only [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE] of the non‑tied customers, Cement Australia would have lost [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE] of its 2005 EBIT earnings: see [371] to [372] of these reasons. This is said to give an indication of the measure of the benefit Cement Australia derive from adopting the impugned provisions. (23)Generally, the non‑tied sales represented 40% of the SEQ cgf sales of the respondents from 2005 to 2007. Those sales declined throughout 2008 to 2010. In the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, Cement Australia’s percentage of sales volume in SEQ declined from [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE] in 2012 and then [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE] in 2013. The volume of sales won by competitors, Sunstate, Hyrock and IFB in that period, correspondingly amounted to [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE]. (24)As described, one significant benefit derived by the respondents from the contravening conduct is said to be the retention for each year from 2002 to 2006 of sales of cgf to non‑tied customers represented 40% of the sales revenue. The ACCC then postulates the impact the respondents would have suffered had the impugned provisions not been adopted. The ACCC says that instead of deriving an EBIT across those five years of [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE], the EBIT would have been [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE], a difference (or postulated benefit) of [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE]. However, if an assumption is also made that prices were $14/t higher than they would have been but for the contravening conduct, further adjustments for that price difference on the 60% of the remaining sales results in a contended potential EBIT loss of [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE]. The respondents are said to have benefited to that quantifiable extent by reason of the contravening conduct: [375] of these reasons. That amount is then adjusted by the ACCC to [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE]: [376] of these reasons. (25)A further measure along this line of thinking is that if the respondents had suffered a loss of 40% of sales for each of the five years 2002 to 2006 and prices on the remaining 60% of sales had occurred at the prevailing NSW cgf delivered price, the potential EBIT loss is then said to be [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE]. That amount is said to be a measure of the benefit the respondents derived over the five years 2002 to 2006 and as a matter of principle, that benefit ought to be removed from the respondents in the interests of serving the objective of deterrence. (26)This calculation of benefit is, in many respects, quite problematic. It assumes that there would have been a loss of non‑tied sales but for the contravening conduct in the way described. The position in relation to tied sales would have been different in the period from 26 February 2003 to the end of May 2003. From 1 June 2003, the sales to the shareholder concrete producers were retained by Cement Australia not because of the contravening conduct but by reason of the shareholder equity interest those buyers held in the supplier of the product. As to the non‑tied sales, plainly there would have been a significant impact upon those sales as Professor Hay suggested. What is not clear is whether responsive rivalry from QCL and later Cement Australia would have resulted in a proportion of those sales being held by QCL/Cement Australia. QCL and Cement Australia might well have been reluctant to supply Tarong cgf to non‑tied buyers operating batching plants within a relevant catchment of a batching plant of a shareholder concrete producer for fear that the MFN provisions of the contracts would have required QCL/Cement Australia to provide the same price to those buyers as the non‑tied buyers notwithstanding that the tied shareholder buyers enjoyed the benefit of the “50% goes around in a circle principle”. (27)There is no doubt that QCL/Cement Australia derived a benefit by reason of the contravening conduct in retaining a certain level of non‑tied sales during the period 2002 to 2006, a significant proportion of which would have been lost to a third party entrant. The difficulty I have with the formulations as described, in the necessary detail required of the analysis as set out in these reasons, is that as a true measure of the benefit, it is not clear to me what proportion of the non‑tied sales would have been lost in the period 2002 to 2006. The other calculations are then dependent upon an assumption that the entire 40% of the sales would have been lost and, on top of that, the price in any event was $14/t higher than it would have been with the result that recalculations must be made on the balance 60% of sales to reflect the deterioration in revenue and EBIT (apart from the further table factoring in the NSW delivered price as a further calculation). (28)I am not satisfied that these calculations provide the Court with a probative analysis of a but for benefit. As I have said, I entirely accept that QCL and Cement Australia garnered to itself a real and meaningful benefit by adopting the provisions. My difficulty is that in attempting to either quantify the measure of that benefit or, as the ACCC later says, estimate that benefit on an informed basis, I cannot attribute a quantification or estimate of the kind sought to be asserted by the ACCC based on these calculations. (29)Apart from these matters, a number of other propositions need to be addressed. (30)I accept that sales to shareholder customers, in the way I have described it, ought to be removed from the calculation if the exercise is one of seeking to calculate market harm. (31)I accept that in calculating the benefit derived from the contravening conduct, the starting point is to isolate the revenue derived during the period of the contravening conduct and, in that regard, I accept that the relevantly adjusted revenue is about [REMOVED TO THE CONFIDENTIAL SCHEDULE] according to the matters described at [490] of these reasons. (32)Although I accept that the calculation of market harm ought to exclude harm, in effect, inflicted upon itself or its related corporations in the form of the shareholder concrete producers, it is not entirely clear to me that in seeking to identify a benefit derived by QCL/Cement Australia in supplying cgf at a price higher than the but for price, the returns to the equity owners who are shareholder concrete producers ought to be taken into account in off‑setting the market measure of the benefit derived by the supplier. However, if the analysis involves accepting that any profit extracted from a shareholder buyer due to a higher price, is returned to the concrete producer equity owners as to 50%, the better view is that the measure of the so‑called “benefit” derived through the higher but for price ought to be discounted to reflect a 50% return to the concrete producer equity owners. (33)As to the EBIT earnings, there is much controversy about the true measure of the EBIT. For the purposes of seeking to examine the EBIT earnings, it seems to me that a measure of about 37% is an average benchmark EBIT to test the calculations. (34)As to the off‑setting of the Millmerran costs, Pozzolanic/QCL incurred an ongoing royalty obligation in entering into the contract. It may have been a price QCL was willing to pay to secure the contract for ash supply from the Millmerran power station without provisions which had the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. In fact, Pozzolanic/QCL entered into an obligation to pay royalties under a contract which contained provisions adopted for the purpose and having the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. That was a price Pozzolanic/QCL was willing to bear and an obligation Cement Australia assumed as it gave effect to the contract. To the extent that an attempt is made to quantify or estimate the benefit derived from the contravening conduct, it seems to me that costs related to the acquisition of flyash under a contract containing provisions prohibited by the Act ought not to be taken into account in reducing the measure of the contended benefit. Those costs simply lie where they fall. (35)As to the calculation of the costs to be taken into account, the respondents say that there are many other costs allocated to the MIC segment which ought to have been allocated to the flyash business. The respondents historically calculated EBIT and EBITDA on a particular basis and I can see no basis on which costs that have never been regarded by the respondents as part of the flyash business should now be treated as costs of the flyash business for the purpose of seeking to calculate the measure of the profit. (36)As to the tax, I accept that there is some evidence about earnings and the relationship between earnings and the tax liability of the respondents. However, the respondents could have put on focused, succinct material about that question directed expressly to the tax position. They chose not to do so and it is not clear to me what the tax position of the respondents is or has been and whether any non‑deductible benefit ought to be reduced by the tax burden that theoretically falls upon the profit margin elevated by reason of the non‑deductibility of a pecuniary penalty. (37)I accept that leaving aside the tax question but taking into account the adjustments already indicated (but not the Millmerran costs) the EBIT derived by the respondents in the precise period of the contraventions (rather than the total period 2002 to 31 December 2006) is probably an amount between $13,500 to possibly $20,000. (38)I also accept that it does not necessarily follow that all of this EBIT would have been lost in the face of rivalry and that all of it represents a true “benefit”. Contestability would have resulted in QCL/Cement Australia retaining some proportion of its EBIT earnings. What the measure of that retention might have been or the measure of the actual lost EBIT is not really clear to me notwithstanding an intensive consideration of all of the data. (39)The last matter on this topic is the emphasis the ACCC attributes to the internal analysis by the respondents of the forward‑looking position should a competitor enter the SEQ cgf market. Dr Williams says that it is not inappropriate to examine the thinking within the respondent group but that whatever the thinking of the relevant individuals might have been, it rises no higher than the expression of an opinion and does not reflect hard analysis of a but for price upon which economists would rely. In short, economists would want to test the opinions by reference to hard data to get the answer to the question of what the but for price might have been and that analysis might or might not align with the expressions of opinion. I accept entirely that as a true analytical exercise, the opinions expressed by individuals within the respondent group would need to be tested to determine whether their assessments of the forward‑looking price were likely to be correct. It is important to remember that the opinions were forward‑looking projections of the price that would, in their view, prevail in the face of competition. They were based on certain assumptions some of which proved to be untrue. Notwithstanding all of those qualifications, I do not accept that the Court ought to simply put to one side the expressions of opinion of experienced managers charged with the conduct of the business and experienced directors charged with the governance of the companies. As already indicated, those individuals are probably in the best position to make a market assessment of likely future events notwithstanding that future events might prove their judgements to be wrong. It is clear that Mr Arto and Mr Maycock thought that the assessments by Mr Wilson and Mr Ridoutt were exaggerated, strong expressions of view and perhaps a postulation of the worst possible case. It is also true that Mr Maycock did not accept those assessments as a likely result once QCL began to engage in the competitive process. (40)Nevertheless, Mr Ridoutt and Mr Wilson thought that there would be a significant price reduction should new entrant competition emerge and it would be likely to be in the order of a $10/t reduction in the price of cgf. Mr Arto seemed willing to act on that view. He certainly had his own views about the benchmark margin QCL should seek to preserve. Later, Ms Collins had very similar views about the likely price reduction should Cement Australia find itself in the very unfortunate and undesirable position of having to compete with a rival for the sale of flyash in SEQ. Revenues and EBIT earnings would be under pressure. She spoke about a $10/t price reduction. She pressed the proposition with Mr Clarke. (41)I accept that these postulations by Mr Ridoutt and Mr Wilson and later by Mr Clarke and the emerging reality which Mr White confronted are, at the end of the day, simply expressions of opinion. They remain, however, informed opinions. They cannot be in any sense determinative or probative of a price which would have emerged in the period 2002 to 2006 but for the contravening conduct and the postulations of a price reduction cannot simply be projected across the entire period of the contraventions. That is simply not a rational approach. However, these expressions of opinion make it very plain that the most informed market participant fully expected there to be a significant impact upon the price should a new entrant emerge with contestable ash and seek to compete away the margin and price enjoyed by the monopoly incumbent. Ultimately, it is not possible to put a number in any credible way on the measure of that benefit because it simply depends upon too many factors and assumptions and is ultimately not supported by hard data establishing a but for price. The entire exercise of trying to postulate, by reference to hard data and sound economic analysis, a but for price, is a very complex exercise. I have undertaken with economists such a detailed exercise in seeking to determine the but for price for electricity transformers which would have prevailed had participants in that industry not engaged in cartel conduct. The opinions of the senior managers cannot operate as a proxy for the but for conduct. However, those opinions ought not to be discounted because they tend to suggest a consistent theme accepted by Mr Maycock that in the face of competition QCL, and later Cement Australia, would not have been able to sustain the margins they enjoyed. The immediate difficulty is trying to quantify or estimate the measure of that difference. (42)In the result, it seems to me, that the trend in the opinions within the respondents’ own documents ought to be taken into account in recognising that those individuals believed that QCL and Cement Australia would suffer degradation in the price and earnings should new entrant competition emerge armed with substitutable ash. The pecuniary penalty ought to take into account not the postulated measure of the price reduction projected over five years as a uniform measure but rather recognise that the internal officers believed that new entrant competition would represent a serious threat to price, earnings and margin. It cannot be put any higher than that. Ultimately, the entire matter comes back to a qualitative assessment of the conduct in the sense that the pecuniary penalty should take account and recognise that the respondents derived benefit from the conduct but the true measure of the benefit in the absence of proper economic analysis cannot be quantified in any hard way.