FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WZATI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 923
Citation: WZATI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 923 Appeal from: WZATI v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 2750 Parties: WZATI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: WAD 377 of 2014 Judge: BARKER J Date of judgment: 24 August 2015 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for protection (class XA) visa – appellant a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity – alleged well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Sri Lanka – alleged imputed affiliation with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (‘LTTE’) – returned asylum seeker – whether Tribunal failed to consider relevant considerations – whether Tribunal erred in making adverse credibility finding – reliance on recent country information – whether Tribunal decision demonstrated bias or gave rise to reasonable apprehension of bias – no error in Federal Circuit Court decision Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2)(a), s 36(2)(aa), s 36(2A), s 91R(1)(a), s 91R(1)(b)
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Opened for signature 28 July 1951. 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954)
Cases cited: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 73 ALD 321; [2003] HCA 26
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN (2015) 320 ALR 467; [2015] HCA 22
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17.
Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 243 CLR 319; [2010] HCA 4
Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425 at 434; [2001] HCA 28
SZLZM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1263
SZOVB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 125 ALD 38; [2011] FCA 1462
SZTEQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 229 FCR 497; [2015] FCAFC 39
WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 144 ALD 82; [2014] FCA 947Date of hearing: 24 August 2015 Place: Perth Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 81 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P Macliver Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 377 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: WZATI
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BARKER J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 AUGUST 2015
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 377 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: WZATI
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 923
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Federal Circuit Court found no error in the decision of the delegate, who had considered the appellant's evidence and relevant country information. The delegate accepted the appellant's claimed association with the LTTE but found his fear of persecution was not well-founded. The court held that the delegate's findings were supported by the evidence, particularly the country information suggesting that non-voluntary returnees to Sri Lanka with LTTE connections face additional scrutiny but are generally released if no significant involvement with the LTTE is found. The court also found no merit in the appellant's claims that the Tribunal erred in its credibility findings or demonstrated bias.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent. The court concluded that the Tribunal had properly exercised its jurisdiction, followed natural justice, and made no error in its assessment of the appellant's claims. The decision of the Federal Circuit Court was upheld, and the appellant's application for a protection visa was denied.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The appellant's wife and children, who had not made specific claims, were therefore not owed protection obligations. The delegate also considered that the CID had released the appellant from custody after questioning, and the SLA had granted him clearance to leave Jaffna in 2007, suggesting the CID did not consider him a person of interest or someone involved with the LTTE. Furthermore, the appellant had travelled to India on a passport in his own name in 2009, which the delegate believed indicated he would have been apprehended at the airport if he was a person of interest. The delegate found there appeared to be no connection between the LTTE camp on his wife's property and his presence at the protest in Jaffna and his apprehension and mistreatment by the CID in Colombo. The appellant himself stated in his interview with the delegate that nothing happened to him as a result of working at the ice-cream shop.
The delegate also found that while the appellant may come under scrutiny on arrival in Sri Lanka, because he is a Tamil from the north, once it was established he had minimal involvement and contact with the LTTE, he and his family would be released. The delegate said there was only a remote chance they would be further detained, noting the family did not depart Sri Lanka illegally and there was no evidence the appellant and his family had been politically active abroad. The delegate then considered whether the appellant met the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The delegate found the country information did not indicate that extremely widespread conditions of violence and systemic breakdown of law enforcement, which would pose a real risk of significant harm to the appellant, existed in Sri Lanka, even after the end of the civil war. The delegate further found that on return to Sri Lanka, the appellant would be subject to normal re-entry procedures and would not be exposed to significant harm once the authorities established his "extremely minimal LTTE contact, similar to that of many Tamils originating from the north," thus there was not a particular risk to the appellant based on his profile.
The appellant filed an appeal against the delegate's decision to the Refugee Review Tribunal, which was subsequently dismissed. The appellant then appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Federal Circuit Court, which upheld the Tribunal's decision. The appellant then lodged a further appeal to the High Court, which was dismissed. The appellant has now appealed the Federal Circuit Court's decision to this Court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant filed an outline of submissions dated 18 August 2015 in response to the Minister’s submissions, to the following effect:This is in response to the First Respondent’s outline of submissions sent byCounsel for the First Respondent, dated 12 August 2015.I.My appeal is based on:a.Jurisdictional Error – which refers to the fact that the Tribunal committed by exceeding or by failing to exercise proper jurisdiction.b.Bias: A conscious or unconscious prejudice or partiality such asto affect capacity to decide and issue on its merits alone.c.Natural justice: falling to extend the minimum standed of fairness that has to be applied in the adjudication of a dispute.II.Reference is made to the First Respondent’s submission paragraph 14 where reference was made to the fact that the Tribunal found me to be a credible witness. If so, my submission is that my evidence as a whole should have been given credibility.III.Reference is made to the First Respondent’s submission paragraph 15 where the Tribunal had not accepted that the Sri Lankan army came in search of me.IV.Reference is made to the First Respondent’s submission paragraph 16.2 clearly points to the fact that I was arrested by the CID interrogated and mistreated.V.Reference is made to the First Respondent’s submission paragraph 17 clearly pints to the fact that the CID’s treatment of me constituted serious harm.VI.Reference is made to the First Respondent’s submission paragraph 18 which refers to the country information. Its assessment which shows bias and prejudice as it was based mainly on the reports submitted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia and the directions given by the First Respondent in regard to asylum seekers who arrived in Australia by boats.VII.I submit herewith document entitled: Torture of Tamil Detainees in Sri Lanka Has Continued, Says Charity, which is supported by J Julian Borger, Diplomatic Editor, 13th August 2015 issued from the United Kingdom.VIII.I also submit a recording from the ABC 24 programme entitled: The 7.30 Report.My submission is that the Refugee Review Tribunal should have considered all the evidence and acted on the presumption of my personal circumstances in relation to the then existing situation in Sri Lanka before it came to its conclusion in regard to the claims made by me and other members of my immediate family. In contrast is My submission is that the Tribunal acted on conjectures based on bias.I appeal, therefore, that a fresh inquiry be constituted to examine in a proper manner my claims for a Protection Visa to remain in Australia.Consideration This appeal was originally listed for hearing in March this year, however was adjourned pending the High Court’s determination of an appeal from the decision of North J in WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 144 ALD 82; [2014] FCA 947. At [30], North J found that serious harm, for the purposes of s 91R(1)(b) of the Act, was constituted by a threat to life or liberty, without reference to the severity of the consequences to life or liberty. His Honour held the interpretation in s 91R(2)(a) is informed by international human rights standards, finding at [42] that the decision-maker must ask whether the deprivation of liberty was “on grounds and in accordance with procedures established by law, whether the detention was arbitrary, and whether the applicant was treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the person”.