WZASY v Minister for Immigration & Anor
[2017] FCCA 1623
•14 July 2017
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| WZASY v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2017] FCCA 1623 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Extension of time to file judicial review application seeking prerogative relief – factors for consideration. |
| Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s.144 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.1.06(1), 44.05 Immigrants and Emigrants Act 1949 (Sri Lanka) Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Part 7, Division 4, ss.36, 91R, 422B, 425, 474, 476, 477 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1979 (Sri Lanka) |
| Baig v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 855 Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541; (1996) 70 ALJR 866; (1996) 139 ALR 1 Gill v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection & Anor [2014] FCCA 1929 Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang& Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259; (1996) 70 ALJR 568; (1996) 136 ALR 481; (1996) 41 ALD 1 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairsv Yusuf & Anor [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323; (2001) 75 ALJR 1105; (2001) 180 ALR 1; (2001) 62 ALD 225 MZZIV v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2013] FCA 1203 MZZZL v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1309 NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 Re Commonwealth; Ex parte Marks[2000] HCA 67; (2000) 75 ALJR 470; (2000) 177 ALR 491 Re Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor; Ex parte H & Anor [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 75 ALJR 982; (2001) 179 ALR 425 SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs & Anor [2006] FCAFC 62 SZTMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 535 SZTES v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 719 |
| Applicant: | WZASY |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | PEG 178 of 2013 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Antoni Lucev |
| Hearing dates: | 12 August 2014 and 17 July 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 17 July 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Perth |
| Delivered on: | 14 July 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| For the Applicant: | In person |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr A Gerrard |
| For the Second Respondent: | Submitting appearance, save as to costs |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
That the name of the Second Respondent be amended to “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.
That the applicant’s application for an extension of time pursuant to s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in which to file an application pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”) be dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PERTH |
PEG 178 of 2013
| WZASY |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
Under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”) the applicant seeks to apply for judicial review (“Proposed Judicial Review Application”) of a decision of the second respondent, the then Refugee Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal” and “Tribunal Decision” respectively). The Tribunal Decision is at Court Book (“CB”) 159-189. The Tribunal Decision affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“Delegate” and “Delegate’s Decision” respectively), the Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (“Minister”, then the Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship), to refuse to grant a Protection (Class XA) visa (“Protection Visa”) to the applicant.
The applicant also sought an extension of time pursuant to s.477 of the Migration Act within which to file the Proposed Judicial Review Application (“Extension of Time Application”). The Tribunal Decision was made on 15 May 2013, and the Proposed Judicial Review Application was lodged with the Court on 23 July 2013, and was therefore lodged 34 days late, it being required to be lodged by 19 June 2013, that being 35 days after the Tribunal Decision was handed down: Migration Act, s.477(1). If an extension of time is not granted, the Judicial Review Application is incompetent under s.477(2) of the Migration Act.
Factual and procedural background prior to the Tribunal Decision
The factual and procedural background prior to the Tribunal Decision is as follows:
a)the applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived on Christmas Island on 7 March 2012: CB 123, as an offshore entry person and lodged an application for the Protection Visa on 13 June 2012: CB 5-30;
b)the applicant’s claims can be summarised as follows:
i)fear of harm for reasons of his Tamil ethnicity;
ii)fear of harm for reasons of political (actual or imputed) opinion from his family’s association with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”) (including his uncle’s residence in a former LTTE controlled area);
iii)fear of harm for reasons of membership of a particular social group comprised of Tamil fishermen; and
iv)fear of harm for reasons of membership of the particular social group comprised of failed asylum seekers or failed asylum seekers with actual or imputed LTTE sympathies.
CB 147-155 and 162-163 at [20];
c)on 13 September 2012 the Delegate refused the Protection Visa application: CB 84-104;
d)the applicant lodged an application for review by the Tribunal of the Delegate’s Decision on 8 November 2012: CB 106-110; and
e)a Tribunal hearing was held on 19 December 2012, and the Tribunal Decision on 15 May 2013 affirmed the Delegate’s Decision: CB 159-189.
Tribunal Decision
In the Tribunal Decision dated 15 May 2013, the Tribunal:
a)found that the applicant’s claim that his father was abducted by the police and detained in 1995 lacked credibility, was unclear and confused, although it accepted that the applicant’s father may have travelled to the United Kingdom and sought asylum there. Even giving the applicant the benefit of the doubt in this regard, the Tribunal found that the applicant’s subsequent claim of paying the CID money and returning to Sri Lanka was unconvincing and fabricated for the purpose of strengthening his Protection Visa application: CB 183-184 at [105]-[106];
b)accepted the applicant’s claim that he may have been questioned by the CID in respect of his uncle who lived in an LTTE dominant area, but found that following questioning the CID would have left, and found it implausible that the CID would have merely threatened to harm the applicant only to leave and then return at night rather than arrest him at first instance. The Tribunal also rejected as implausible the applicant’s claim that he hid in his aunt’s bunker for four months: CB 184 at [108]-[109];
c)found that the applicant’s claim that he was of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities is undermined by the fact that he was permitted to leave Sri Lanka to travel to India in 2010 and to leave again in February 2012, without being stopped or questioned in any way, which did not point to the applicant being of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities: CB 184 at [110];
d)accepted that the applicant’s brother was abducted by the LTTE and that the CID conducted investigations into his brother. The Tribunal also accepted that the applicant’s brother left Sri Lanka but did not accept it was for a Convention reason: CB 185 at [111];
e)having regard to country information, found that the applicant would not be imputed with a pro-LTTE opinion or an anti-government opinion simply from his family’s connection with a former LTTE controlled area: CB 185 at [112]-[113];
f)considered the applicant’s claims of persecution by virtue of:
i)being a member of the particular social group of Tamil fishermen; and
ii)being a returned failed asylum seeker who had departed illegally,
and found, based on country information, that those groups were not at risk of serious harm in Sri Lanka: CB 185-186 at [116] and CB 187 at [125]; and
g)considered whether the applicant was owed complementary protection, but having regard to all of the circumstances in the case found that it was not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka, he would suffer significant harm for the purposes of s.36(2A) of the Migration Act: CB 188 at [129].
Other parts of the Tribunal Decision are referred to where relevant below in these Reasons for Judgment.
The Extension of Time Application
As outlined at [2] above, the applicant’s Judicial Review Application is 34 days out of time and unless time is extended pursuant to s.477(2) of the Migration Act, the application is incompetent.
The grounds set out in the Extension of Time Application are as follows:
1. I donot understand english
2. I don’t know Court procedure
3. I donot have service of a lawyer
(Copied from the Extension of Time Application without amendment).
An affidavit was filed with the Proposed Judicial Review Application, attaching the Tribunal Decision, but no affidavit was filed in support of the Extension of Time Application. Rule 44.05 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“FCC Rules”) provides as follows:
(1) An application for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the Court's jurisdiction under section 476 of the Migration Act in relation to a migration decision must be made in accordance with the approved form.
(2) An application must be supported by an affidavit including:
(a) a copy of the decision in relation to which the remedy is sought and any statement of reasons for the decision; and
(b) any document or other evidence the applicant seeks to rely on; and
(c) if an extension of time is sought--the evidence explaining the delay and showing why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension.
It is a statutory requirement under r.44.05(2) of the FCC Rules, compliance with which can be waived under r.1.06(1) of the FCC Rules, that the applicant file an affidavit providing an explanation as to, firstly, the delay and, secondly, why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension of time: Sandan v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1166; (2015) 296 FLR 48 at [24] per Judge Lucev.
The applicant has therefore failed to satisfy the prescribed criteria in r.44.05(2) of the FCC Rules for the Court to grant an extension of time, and the Court has not dispensed with the requirement to do so, and there is no apparent basis for doing so. Nor was there any application to dispense with those requirements.
In any event, there is no evidence before the Court which seeks to explain the reason for the delay or why it is in the interests of the administration of justice for time to be extended.
In the circumstances, the Court does not consider that there has been any explanation for the delay, or any reason as to why it would be in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time, put on affidavit in accordance with r.44.05(2) of the FCC Rules, and given the mandatory nature of the requirement to do so, the failure to do so, together with there being no dispensation from the requirement to do so, is sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the Extension of Time Application. In the circumstances, the Extension of Time Application must fail: Islam v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 1687 at [16] per Judge Lucev. Lest that conclusion be incorrect the Court will in any event consider the Extension of Time Application based on the usual factors for consideration of such an application.
Factors for consideration
The factors relevant to whether time should be extended in the present case are:
a)the extent of the delay: Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344; (1984) 58 ALR 305; (1984) 7 ALD 315 (“Hunter Valley Developments”);
b)the explanation for the delay: Baig v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 855;
c)the prejudice to the Minister: Singh v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2013] FCA 813; and
d)the merits of the proposed Judicial Review Application: SZNYE v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] FCA 500.
Extent of delay
In considering the law with respect to delay in making an application, and in particular a judicial review application which seeks prerogative relief of the kind sought under the Migration Act, the Court must have regard to the judgments of the High Court in Re Commonwealth; Ex parte Marks[2000] HCA 67; (2000) 75 ALJR 470; (2000) 177 ALR 491 (“Marks”) and Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541; (1996) 70 ALJR 866; (1996) 139 ALR 1 (“Brisbane South Regional Health Authority”). The relevant passages in those judgments of the High Court can, for present purposes, be summarised as follows:
a)a limitation period is the general rule, and an extension provision is the exception to it: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority CLR at 553 per McHugh J;
b)the limitation period represents Parliament’s judgment as to how the welfare of society is best served by causes of action being litigated within a limitation period: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority CLR at 553 per McHugh J;
c)where a significant period of time has elapsed, and in all but very exceptional cases, the limitation period should be “rigidly applied”: Marks at [16] per McHugh J; and
d)the effect of the limitation period is such that it “may often result in a good cause of action being defeated”: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority at 553 per McHugh J.
The effect of delay in a case concerning prerogative relief from the decision of an administrative decision-maker was commented upon by the High Court in Marks at [16] per McHugh J in the following terms:
Independently of the merits of the case, I find it difficult to see how a person who, with knowledge of the decision, delays 17 months before seeking relief could ever be granted an extension of time to quash such a decision unless some conduct of the respondent or the public body or official had brought about the delay. As the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council said in Ratnam v Cumarasamy, “[t]he rules of court must prima facie be obeyed”. The time for seeking certiorari is six times, and the time for seeking mandamus is twice, the period in which an application for special leave to appeal to this Court can be brought against a judgment or decision. The periods for applying for certiorari and mandamus give a person affected by an adverse decision or judgment ample time in which to commence proceedings in this Court. In all but very exceptional cases, they should be rigidly applied when, as here, more than one year has elapsed between the decision and the commencement of proceedings in this Court.
In this case, the delay is not insignificant. The delay is a day short of double the existing limitation period, and it would extend the period granted to the applicant in which to file the Judicial Review Application to 69 days. In the context of a case seeking prerogative relief from the decision of an administrative decision-maker such as the Tribunal a delay of this length weighs against the Extension of Time Application being granted.
Explanation for delay
The fact that the applicant does not understand English, does not know Court procedure and does not have the services of a lawyer are not matters which, of themselves, explain the delay. A not insignificant proportion of applicants in migration proceedings in this Court are in the same position as the applicant in this case, and the vast majority file their applications on time. So to do those who have the additional difficulty, which this applicant did not have, of being in immigration detention. The Court needs to be cautious in placing too much reliance on matters such as those sought to be relied on by the applicant lest too ready an acceptance of them makes an extension of time the rule and not the exception on prerogative relief applications, contrary to what was said by the High Court in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority, CLR at 553 per McHugh J. Further, upon the expiry of the time for the issue of a writ against a decision of the Tribunal, the Minister has a vested right to retain the benefit of the Tribunal Decision: Marks at [17] per McHugh J.
Ignorance of procedure and time limits, without any further justification, is not generally regarded as a satisfactory explanation for delay: SZSDA v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319; (2012) 135 ALD 17 at [38] per Foster J (“SZSDA”). As the Federal Court observed in SZSDA:
In the present case, there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay. Whilst one may have considerable sympathy for a litigant in person who does not know that he may have a capacity to bring a judicial review application in the Federal Magistrates Court and therefore fails to do so within the stipulated timeframe, ignorance of those requirements (without more) is generally not regarded as a satisfactory explanation for delay…
SZSDA at [38] per Foster J, followed in MZZRO v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 882 at [34] per Judge Jones and MZZQO & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 2646 at [15] per Judge F Turner.
In Marks at [17] per McHugh J the High Court observed as follows:
An applicant's inability to obtain favourable legal advice is not a ground for extending the time for seeking mandamus or the ancillary writ of certiorari. Upon the expiry of the time for the issue of a constitutional writ against a decision or judgment, the respondent has a vested right to retain the judgment or decision.
In SZQRU v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 1234 at [24] per Katzmann J the Federal Court observed that:
Finally, the applicant mentioned his lack of a solicitor. This was a matter raised before the federal magistrate but nothing the federal magistrate said about it reveals appealable error. There is no right to legal representation. Doubtless, the applicant might have had a better chance if he had been legally represented, but in a civil case procedural fairness does not require it: New South Wales v Canellis [1994] HCA 51;(1994) 181 CLR 309 at 329–331; Nguyen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1265; (2000) 101 FCR 20 at [24]; Bodenstein v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 50 at [17] per Perram J. Cf. SZNVW [2010] FCAFC 41; 183 FCR 575 at [30].
See also SZHTI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 702 [3]-[4] per Gyles J.
In MZZZL v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1309 at [11] per Judge Lucev this Court observed that:
… there is no right to legal representation in migration proceedings in this Court. …
It follows therefore that the inability to obtain legal advice or legal representation in relation to the Judicial Review Application does not explain the delay in this case. The Court further notes that the applicant had more than 12 months in which he might have sought such advice and filed an affidavit explaining the delay: see [x] below.
In SZMWH v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2009] FCA 879 (“SZMWH”) the Federal Court observed that the failure to provide an adequate explanation for the delay may, of itself, provide sufficient reason for the Court not to make an order extending time: SZMWH at [7] per Stone J. Even taking all of the matters relied upon by the applicant cumulatively as the reason for the delay does not explain the delay. Without any further evidence there is no context to the applicant’s grounds in the Extension of Time Application. As set out above the applicant was required to file an affidavit as to the delay and as to the interests of the administration of justice with the Extension of Time Application, but did not do so. Further, pursuant to orders made by a Registrar of this Court on 21 August 2013 the applicant was required to file and serve (“shall file and serve”) on or by 16 October 2013 any affidavits to be relied upon at hearing “including any affidavits on the issue of delay and as to why time for the making of the application should be extended”: order 4 of the 21 August 2013 orders. By further order of the Court as presently constituted on 26 May 2014 time for compliance with order 4 of the 21 August 2013 orders was extended to 11 July 2014. The applicant attended that directions hearing in person with the assistance of an interpreter. The applicant did ultimately file affidavits and submissions (as to which, see [29] below) but they do not explain or give reasons for the delay in lodging the Proposed Judicial Review Application. The applicant has had three opportunities (over a period of more than 12 months) to file an affidavit explaining the delay and the reasons for it, but has failed to do so. Thus, there is no explanation as to what steps the applicant took to find out whether or not he had a right to make the Proposed Judicial Review Application, when he did so, and when he found out that there was a time limitation in respect of the lodgement of any the Proposed Judicial Review Application, and if he found out that there was such a time limitation prior to seeking to file the Proposed Judicial Review Application, what, if anything, was done in relation to the Proposed Judicial Review Application which resulted in the delay. Likewise, there is no explanation as to what, if any, steps were taken to obtain the services of a lawyer, including accessing the various free and pro bono legal services which are available.
In the above circumstances, the Court is not persuaded that there is an acceptable explanation for the delay in filing the Proposed Judicial Review Application and considers that this factor weighs quite significantly against the Extension of Time Application being granted.
Prejudice
Although the Minister does not contend that he would be prejudiced by reason of the delay, the mere absence of prejudice to the Minister cannot of itself justify the exercise of the discretion to extend time: Gill v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection & Anor [2014] FCCA 1929; Hunter Valley Developments FCR at 349 per Wilcox J. Moreover, there is some prejudice because the Minister had a vested right to retain the benefit of the Tribunal Decision on the expiry of the time limitation under s.477(1) of the Migration Act. Ultimately, however, the Court considers that the issue of prejudice weighs neither for nor against the Extension of Time Application being granted.
Merits
In determining whether the merits of the Proposed Judicial Review Application are arguable or have reasonable prospects of success, it is not necessary for the applicant to positively establish that the application will succeed at final hearing: SZTES v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 719 at [48] and [102] per Wigney J (“SZTES”) (from which an appeal was dismissed: SZTES v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 158), but it will rarely be in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time to file an application which has little or no prospect of success: MZZIV v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2013] FCA 1203 at [6] per Mortimer J. Determining whether the grounds of review are arguable, reasonably arguable, or have reasonable prospects of success only requires the Court to deal with the grounds of review, and to examine them, in a reasonably impressionistic manner, and without the full consideration of all of the arguments which would be necessary upon a consideration of the merit of each of the grounds of review, the issue being not whether the applicant would be successful in the ultimate outcome, but whether an extension of time ought to be granted because an impressionistic, and necessarily preliminary examination of the grounds of review, reveal that the grounds of review, or any of them, might be arguable, reasonably arguable, or have a reasonable prospect of success, if fully examined as to their or its merit: SZTES at [48] per Wigney J; Mladenov v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2014] FCA 12 at [25] per Mortimer J. In an extension of time context, an assessment of the merit of the case is therefore relatively broad. It is nevertheless, these being proceedings seeking prerogative relief, necessary to bear in mind the effect of a limitation period such as that under s.477(1) of the Migration Act is such that it may often result in a good cause of action being defeated: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority at 553 per McHugh J.
At hearing before this Court the matter was, in any event, fully argued on the merit of the Proposed Judicial Review Application.
Proposed Judicial Review Application – grounds and further matters raised at hearing
The Proposed Judicial Review Application sets out the following grounds of review in relation to the AAT Decision:
1. Judicial error
2. The Tribunal did not follow the Law of natural Justice
3. The Tribunal was biased in its decision
The reasons stated above will be submitted in due course on the basis of documents which will be filed in Court.
(Copied from the Proposed Judicial Review Application without amendment.)
The grounds of the Proposed Judicial Review Application were amplified by the applicant in the following three documents:
a)the applicant’s affidavit affirmed 20 July 2014 (“Applicant’s July 2014 Affidavit”);
b)the applicant’s 12 August 2014 submissions (which were marked as Exhibit A) (“Applicant’s August 2014 Submissions”); and
c)the applicant’s 17 July 2015 submissions (in the form of a letter to the Court which was tendered at hearing and which was marked as Exhibit B) (“Applicant’s July 2015 Submissions”),
from which relevant factual material and submissions are set out below.
Consideration of merits of Proposed Judicial Review Application
Jurisdictional error required
The Tribunal Decision is only reviewable by this Court if it is affected by jurisdictional error: Migration Act, ss.474 and 476; Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476; (2003) 77 ALJR 454; (2003) 195 ALR 24; (2003) 72 ALD 1 at [76] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ. The Tribunal only makes a jurisdictional error if it:
a)identifies a wrong issue;
b)asks the wrong question;
c)ignores relevant material; or
d)relies on irrelevant material,
in such a way that the Tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected resulting in a decision exceeding or failing to exercise the authority or powers given under the relevant statute: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf& Anor [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323; (2001) 75 ALJR 1105; (2001) 180 ALR 1; (2001) 62 ALD 225 at [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ.
Ground 1
Applicant’s submissions
The Applicant’s July 2014 Affidavit provides:
…
II.The Second Respondent failed to exercise his proper jurisdiction by not examining the implications of my treatment and detention by the security forces in Sri Lanka as stated in paragraphs 20, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 40 of the RRT Report.
III.The Second Respondent did not examine the real situation of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and the plight of asylum seekers returning to Sri Lanka. Reliance was only placed on the reports submitted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the government of Australia. No attention was paid to independent reports of the situation in Sri Lanka by human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Reference is made in this regard to paragraph 25 of the RRT Report in this regard.
IV.The Second Respondent failed to examine the contents and the implications of Sri Lanka’s Prevention of Terrorism Act. This Act was mainly enacted to oppress the Sri Lankan Tamil revolt and if I am forcibly returned to Sri Lanka the provisions of this Act will be applicable to me.
…
(Transcribed from the Applicant’s July 2014 Affidavit without amendment)
The Applicant’s August 2014 Submissions relevantly provided that:
…
IV.The Second Respondent did not access the real situation of the ongoing human right abuses in Sri Lanka. Document marked B issued by Amnesty International on the 26th of June 2014 indicates the situation in Sri Lanka at present and at the time the Second Respondent heard my case …
V.The Second Respondent relied mainly on the report of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in assessing the situation of human right abuses in Sri Lanka.
VI.I submit that Sri Lanka is a terror state and that I will be subject to the provisions of both the Immigration and Emigration Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act if I am forcibly returned to Sri Lanka.
(Transcribed from the Applicant’s August 2014 submissions without amendment).
The Applicant’s July 2015 Submissions alleged that the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s claim for complementary protection, and reiterated the applicant’s claim with respect to the significant harm he will face if forced to return to Sri Lanka as a returned failed asylum seeker pursuant to the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1979 (Sri Lanka) (“POT Act”) and the Immigrants and Emigrants Act 1949 (Sri Lanka) (“I&E Act”).
Minister’s submissions
With respect to the applicant’s submission that the Tribunal failed to consider the implications of the applicant’s treatment and detention by security forces in Sri Lanka the Minister submitted that:
a)that complaint was misconceived as the applicant never claimed to have been detained himself, but rather that:
i)his father had been detained for three years in 1995; and
ii)his brother has been abducted;
b)in any event, the Tribunal considered all the applicant’s claims relating to his supposed treatment by the Criminal Investigation Department (“CID”). The Tribunal accepted the applicant may have been questioned by the CID about his uncle but that after that questioning they left, and the Tribunal found it implausible that the authorities would question the applicant only to leave and then return again at night, and that if the applicant was of interest to the CID he would have been arrested at that questioning. The Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claim that five CID officers arrived in a white van at his house and he hid in a bunker at his aunt’s house: CB 183-185 at [104]-[113];
c)even taking the claim of “the implications of my treatment in detention” as broadly as possible, and including the treatment of his father, brother and uncle, the Tribunal also made findings with respect to the treatment of the applicant’s father: CB 183-184 at [105]-[106]; and
d)ultimately the Tribunal found that the applicant is not a person who is of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities for any reason: CB 185 at [113];
With respect to the applicant’s submission that the Tribunal failed to examine the real situation of Tamil’s in Sri Lanka and the plight of returning asylum seekers, and the allegation that the Tribunal only considered Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (“DFAT”) reports and failed to consider independent reports such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch the Minister submitted that:
a)the Tribunal clearly examined the situation of Tamils in Sri Lanka and the position of failed asylum seekers: CB 185-187 [114]-[126];
b)whilst the Tribunal did place reliance on the DFAT report it is incorrect to state that the Tribunal only relied on that report. The Tribunal clearly had regard to a wide range of country information, including reports from both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch: CB 168-180 at [54]-[89];
c)the Tribunal specifically referred to country information regarding returned failed asylum seekers: CB 172-173 and 177 at [69] and [80]-[83];
With respect to the applicant’s submission that the Tribunal failed to examine the implications of the POT Act and I&E Act, the Minister submitted that :
a)although the issue was raised by the applicant’s representative and the Tribunal considered the activities of the relevant Sri Lankan authorities and use of the POT Act: CB 172 at [67]-[68], the Tribunal found that the applicant was not, and had never been, of any interest to the Sri Lankan authorities, and in particular had never been arrested or detained on any suspicion of involvement with the LTTE. Consequently, there was no basis upon which the POT Act would apply to the applicant;
b)in Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v WZAPN [2015] HCA 22; (2015) 89 ALJR 639; (2015) 220 ALR 467; (2015) 146 ALD 480 (“WZAPN – High Court”) the High Court held that:
i)a period of short detention is insufficient to establish serious harm for the purposes of s.91R of the Migration Act; and
ii)the question of whether a risk of loss of liberty constitutes serious harm requires a qualitative evaluation of the nature and gravity of the apprehended loss of liberty,
and in this case, the Tribunal considered relevant country information and undertook the qualitative evaluation of the nature and gravity of the apprehended loss of liberty: CB 186-187 at [120]-[125].
Consideration of ground 1
Essentially, what is put by the applicant in ground 1 is that the Tribunal failed to exercise jurisdiction because it failed to have regard to relevant material or failed to consider claims made by the applicant.
The applicant asserts a failure to properly exercise jurisdiction by the Tribunal by reason of a failure to examine the implications of the applicant’s treatment and detention by security forces in Sri Lanka: CB 162-164 at [20], CB 164-165 at [27]-[31] and CB 166 at [40]. The applicant’s assertion is not made out, and for the reasons below, the Tribunal did consider the applicant’s claims in support of his Protection Visa claim.
The Tribunal found the applicant was “an unreliable witness”, finding that:
a)the claims relating to hiding from the Sri Lankan authorities in a bunker to be vague and confused;
b)the evidence relating to his father’s bank robbery to be rehearsed and fabricated; and
c)other parts of the applicant’s evidence were generally implausible: CB 181 at [95].
The Tribunal was cognisant of the need not to pick over minor discrepancies in an applicant’s account, and had regard to its own guidelines on the assessment of credibility, and was mindful of the views articulated by the Federal Court that a rational examination of credit is not undertaken by picking a story to pieces to uncover little discrepancies: CB 182 at [96], citing Sundararaj v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 76 at [5] per Burchett J (from which an appeal by the applicant was dismissed: Sundararaj v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 692 where the members of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia were critical of Tribunal conclusions reached on the basis of, as Spender J expressed it at [9] “trifling inconsistencies in quite peripheral matters”). In this case, the Tribunal rightly observed that the discrepancies were “not minor but are significant ones that go to the core of the applicant’s claims”: CB 182 at [96].
Credibility findings are essentially a matter for the Tribunal: Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 74 ALJR 405; (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67] per McHugh, but this does not mean credibility findings are not susceptible to judicial review: SZJEH v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCA 1706 at [17] per Jacobson J (“SZJEH”), but the error must be one going to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal: SZJEH at [17] per Jacobson J; SZSHV v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 253 at [27]-[31] per Flick J. No jurisdictional error arises in this case by reason of the manner in which the Tribunal dealt with the applicant’s credibility.
The Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claim of having actual or imputed LTTE sympathies on the following bases:
a)that the applicant had fabricated his father’s alleged detention by the Sri Lankan authorities to support his application for the Protection Visa: CB 183-184 at [105];
b)that it did not accept or reject the claim relating to the father’s bank robbery but found it did not found any Convention related persecution: CB 184 at [106];
c)that it accepted that the applicant may have been questioned by the Sri Lankan authorities, but rejected the claim that they would threaten him and then return that night to arrest to him rather than arresting him on the spot if they genuinely suspected him of having an LTTE association, and, therefore, that the applicant did not hide out in his aunt’s bunker as claimed. Further, that the bunker claim was implausible because his father would have been followed when delivering food and supplies to him: CB 184 at [108]-[109];
d)that his claim to be of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities if he returns to Sri Lanka is undermined by the fact he was permitted to go to India and return in 2010, and to leave in 2012, without being detained by Sri Lankan security officials: CB 184 at [110];
e)its acceptance of the allegation that the fact the LTTE had abducted the applicant’s brother, and that his brother had subsequently been investigated by the CID, but it rejected the claims that his brother was forced to leave Sri Lanka for a Convention based reason: CB 185 at [111]; and
f)its rejection of the applicant’s claim that because he came from an area previously controlled by the LTTE he would face persecution: CB 185 at [112].
The Tribunal also rejected the applicant’s claim that he would face persecution on the basis of being:
a)a Tamil fisherman, because of country information which indicated that the applicant did not face a real chance of serious harm by reason of his membership of this particular social group, placing significant weight on a November 2012 DFAT advice indicating that it was not aware of any reports that Sri Lankan Tamils were mistreated if caught illegally fishing, or of any reports indicating that Sinhalese fisherman have attacked, or been targeted for harm, by their Sinhalese rivals, or by the Sri Lankan authorities: CB 185-186 at [116]; and
b)a returned failed asylum seeker, and considered the implications thereof: CB 186 at [117]-[126], and in particular, the Tribunal concluded that though the applicant may face a short period of detention upon arrival in Sri Lanka for leaving the country illegally, and is likely to have to pay a fine, such treatment does not constitute serious harm for the purposes of determining whether an applicant is entitled to a Protection Visa: CB 187 at [123]-[126]. The Tribunal set out detailed country information relevant to that claim: CB 173-180 at [71]-[89]. The finding that the treatment of the applicant upon his return to Sri Lanka would not constitute serious harm for the purposes of determining whether he was entitled to a Protection Visa was a finding that was open to the Tribunal on the facts, and the law: WZAPN – High Court at [35], [41] and [45] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ because the Tribunal has made a qualitative judgment in order to determine whether it is satisfied as to the nature and gravity of the alleged serious harm, and it is an evaluation which looks at the likely circumstances of the loss of liberty feared by the applicant: WZAPN – High Court at [52] and [70]-[71] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ, and Gageler J agreeing at [100].
With respect to the applicant’s claim that he would face significant harm by the application of the POT Act to him as failed asylum seeker the matter was raised by his migration agent: CB 149, and the Tribunal made reference to it in the Tribunal Decision: CB 172 at [67]-[68]. In this regard it was a matter considered by the Tribunal, and in respect of which the Tribunal, on the basis of its finding that the applicant did not have actual or perceived links with the LTTE, came to the view that the applicant would be subject to no more than the usual detention on remand and penalty by way of fine upon his return to Sri Lanka. It was unnecessary for the Tribunal to have regard to the POT Act in circumstances where the clear inference from the facts found is that upon return to Sri Lanka the applicant would not, and would not be considered to be, a terrorist under the POT Act, or a person of any interest to the Sri Lankan authorities on account of any real or perceived links with the LTTE: WZATI v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 923 at [36], [45] and [65]-[68] per Barker J (“WZATI Appeal”), dismissing an appeal from a finding by this Court to the same effect as is set out above in this paragraph: WZATI v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 2750 at [45] per Judge Lucev (“WZATI”).
The reference to the I&E Act stands alone. There is no reference to any particular provision of the I&E Act in the Applicant’s July 2015 Submissions. The Tribunal Decision makes it plain that the Tribunal considered what would happen to the applicant upon his return to Sri Lanka, including his treatment by immigration and security officials. Having regard to the country information, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant will be subject to the usual detention on remand and fine by way of penalty, and that having regard to the applicant’s circumstances he was not a person who would be considered to be a person with actual or perceived links to the LTTE. As with the POT Act claims above, claims with respect to the I&E Act identical, or virtually so, in relation to those made in this case were rejected in WZATI Appeal and WZATI as cited above: see [44] above.
Put shortly, the Tribunal was not required to consider the provisions of the POT Act, and to the extent that the applicant might be subject to the I&E Act the Tribunal considered the likely treatment of the applicant upon return to Sri Lanka. On the above basis, any alleged jurisdictional error by reason of a failure to consider the effect of the provisions of the POT Act or the IE Act is not made out.
The applicant’s allegation that his claim was not considered under the complementary protection criterion under s.36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act is also without merit. The Tribunal set out the relevant law as to complementary protection claims in the Tribunal Decision: CB 162 at [16]-[18], and the Tribunal expressly assessed the applicant’s complementary protection claims, applying the complementary protection test to its factual findings “concerning all of the applicant’s circumstances”: CB 187-188 at [127], and rejected the applicant’s claim under the complementary protection criterion: CB 187 at [127]-[129] and SZTMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 535 at [51] per McKerracher J.
The evaluation of the evidence before the Tribunal, including country information, was a matter for the Tribunal: NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 (“NAHI”) at [11] per Gray, Tamberlin and Lander JJ. The findings of fact made, and the Tribunal’s ultimate inability to be satisfied as to the applicant’s claims, were findings open on the evidence before the Tribunal, for the reasons set out in the Tribunal Decision: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang& Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259; (1996) 70 ALJR 568; (1996) 136 ALR 481; (1996) 41 ALD 1; CLR at 272 and 281-282 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ. Further, the Tribunal did, contrary to the assertions made by the applicant, consider country information from both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch: see CB 172-173 at [69] and fn.19 and CB 177 at [80]-[82] and fnn.33-35.
The reliance on the Amnesty International Statement of 26 June 2014 does not assist the applicant. It is a statement which post-dates, by more than thirteen months, the Tribunal Decision, and was therefore not before the Tribunal for consideration. Furthermore, it is, as one might expect of an announcement of its type, very general in its content, and in any event, does not purport to be indicative of the current position in Sri Lanka, which is set out in comprehensive reports, including but not limited to, the 2013 DFAT report and the 2012 UN Eligibility Guidelines, to which the Tribunal had access, and which it considered in the Tribunal Decision. The Court made these same observations in WZATI at [43] per Judge Lucev, and those observations are reinforced by the Federal Court’s findings in WZATI Appeal at [70] per Barker J that “recent materials” cannot be considered.
The Tribunal considered all the applicant’s claims and made findings that were reasonably open to it. Nothing said by the applicant gives rise to a jurisdictional error that the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s claims.
For the purposes of both the Extension of Time Application and the Proposed Judicial Review Application ground 1 has no merit.
Ground 2
Applicant’s submissions
The applicant made no express submissions with respect to a failure by the Tribunal to afford him natural justice or procedural fairness. There was nothing discernible in the applicant’s submissions from which the Court might imply into them an allegation of a want of procedural fairness.
Minister’s submissions
The Minister submitted that:
a)there is nothing in the Tribunal Decision which leads to a concern that the Tribunal failed to afford procedural fairness to the applicant;
b)the Tribunal was aware of, and had regard to all of the applicant’s claims;
c)the Tribunal approached its task correctly and in good faith, and did not fail to take into account a relevant consideration or take into account an irrelevant consideration; and
d)nothing indicates that the Tribunal failed to accord the applicant procedural fairness or failed to carry out a review in accordance with Part 7, Division 4 of the Migration Act.
Consideration of ground 2
As this was a case to which s.422B of the Migration Act applied, the Tribunal was not required to afford the applicant “normal” procedural fairness: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Lat [2006] FCAFC 61; (2006) 151 FCR 214; (2006) 231 ALR 412; SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs & Anor [2006] FCAFC 62. The applicant was entitled only to the rights afforded to him under Part 7, Division 4 of the Migration Act. No breach of those provisions has been identified, nor is any evident on the materials before the Court. Rather, the Tribunal complied with its statutory obligation in s.425 of the Migration Act by validly inviting the applicant to the Tribunal Hearing: SZBEL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152; (2006) 81 ALJR 515; (2006) 231 ALR 592; (2006) 93 ALD 300 which invitation was accepted by the applicant: CB 137-155. The applicant attended the Tribunal Hearing and gave evidence in support of his claims, assisted by an interpreter and with his migration agent in attendance: CB 164 at [23]. The Tribunal Decision shows that the Tribunal put to the applicant matters in respect of which the Tribunal might make an adverse finding, or which were in some way in contention or dispute, including, for example:
a)that his father returning to Sri Lanka after being detained may suggest that his father no longer feared living in Sri Lanka and that it would seem unlikely that he would return to Sri Lanka if he feared he would be seriously harmed: CB 164-165 at [30];
b)that the Tribunal was having difficulty understanding why the applicant would be targeted by the Sri Lankan authorities: CB 165 at [35];
c)that if the Sri Lankan authorities had a genuine interest in the applicant whilst he was hiding out in the bunker they would have followed his father when he was delivering food to the applicant: CB 165 at [37]; and
d)that the applicant’s claims with regards to his fearing harm despite no apparent prior harm were inconsistent with the changes in Sri Lanka since the end of the civil war: CB 166 at [43];
The applicant (through his migration agent) made a post-tribunal hearing submission, which was considered by the Tribunal: CB 166-168 at [46]-[53].
In all of the above circumstances, the Court finds that there was no failure by the Tribunal to afford the applicant the procedural fairness required under the Migration Act, and therefore, for the purposes of both the Extension of Time Application the Proposed Judicial Review Application ground 2 has no merit.
Ground 3
Applicant’s submissions
In the Applicant’s August 2014 Submissions the Applicant asserts that:
II.The Second Respondent was prejudiced by the policy statements issued by the First Respondent against asylum seekers who arrived by boat in Australia, and by the reports by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
III.The document marked A clearly indicates that the first respondent was prejudiced in his attitude to Sri Lankan Tamil asylum seekers and by his policy statements influenced the decisions of the Second Respondent.
(Transcribed from the Applicant’s August 2014 Submissions without amendment).
A document marked “A” attached to the Applicant’s August 2014 Submissions contains the following text which is undated and not ascribed to a particular media outlet:
Scott Morrison attacks critics of Sri Lanka
Dennis Shanahan
Political Editor
CanberraJared Owens
Reporter
Canberra
SCOTT Morrison has lashed out at “increasingly shrill” critics of Sri Lanka, accusing asylum-seeker advocates of using boatpeople to pursue a political agenda of internationally isolating the once war-torn nation.
On his return from Sri Lanka yesterday, the Immigration Minister said that isolating Sri Lanka would only harm economic growth and increase the prospect of more people-smuggler boats coming to Australia
Minister’s submissions
The Minister submitted as follows:
a)an allegation of bias is a serious matter which must be “distinctly made and clearly proved”: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507; (2001) 75 ALJR 679; (2001) 178 ALR 421; (2001) 65 ALD 17 at [69] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J and [127] per Kirby J (“Jia Legeng”);
b)an allegation of actual or ostensible bias should be particularised: SZOTX Minister for Immigration [2011] FMCA 37 at [12] per Driver FM. Ostensible bias must be firmly established: SZOPX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 552 at [9] per Flick J; and
c)the Tribunal Decision does not demonstrate any actual or apprehended bias on the part of the Tribunal.
With respect to the submission that the Tribunal was prejudiced by policy statements issued by the Minister, in this case the Honourable Scott Morrison (“Minister Morrison”), two submissions were made orally at the hearing:
a)that there is nothing in the Tribunal Decision to suggest the policy statements were taken into consideration or influenced the Tribunal; and
b)the policy statement is undated and it is therefore unclear as to whether it was issued before or after the date of the Tribunal Decision and that an inference is open to the Court that the policy statement must have been issued after the Tribunal Decision because it was said to be made by Minister Morrison, who did not become Minister until after the federal election next held after the date of the Tribunal Decision.
Consideration of ground 3
It is well established that an allegation of bias is a serious matter which must be made distinctly and clearly proven: Jia Legeng at [69] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J and [127] per Kirby J. To prove actual bias on the part of the Tribunal requires evidence of a state of mind such that the Tribunal is so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented: Jia Legeng at [72] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J. Similarly, a reasonable apprehension of bias requires a reasonable apprehension of such pre-judgment: Re Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor; Ex parte H & Anor [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 75 ALJR 982; (2001) 179 ALR 425 at [27] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ.
The Tribunal Decision (which is lengthy and thorough) shows that the Tribunal properly raised various concerns about the applicant’s case with the applicant, and, as set out above in relation to procedural fairness: see [54] above, canvassed relevant issues in accordance with its obligations under the Migration Act. The opportunity afforded to the applicant to make submissions both before and after the Tribunal hearing, and the Tribunal’s questioning of the applicant at the Tribunal hearing, demonstrate that the Tribunal gave the applicant the opportunity to persuade the Tribunal to the requisite degree of satisfaction in relation to his claims. In relation to these matters, the Tribunal Decision does not demonstrate pre-judgment on the part of the Tribunal, nor does it give rise to a reasonable apprehension of pre-judgment by the Tribunal.
The applicant alleges bias in relation to comments attributed to Minister Morrison. Assuming that the statement allegedly made by Minister Morrison was made by him, it does not assist the applicant. There is no evidence that the Tribunal was aware of the statement, or that it influenced the Tribunal in any way. The mere assertion of bias by the applicant does not establish bias, and the onus is on the applicant to put before this Court cogent evidence capable of distinctly and clearly proving bias. The applicant has not done so in relation to the comments attributed to Minister Morrison and any affect they may have had on the Tribunal. In those circumstances, the allegation of bias in relation to the Minister Morrison’s alleged comments influencing the Tribunal is not made out.
The Court notes that the date of the Tribunal Decision is 15 May 2013. Proof is not required about knowledge that is not reasonably open to question and is capable of verification by reference to a document the authority of which cannot reasonably be questioned: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s.144(1) (“Evidence Act”). A judge may acquire knowledge of this kind in any way that a judge thinks fit, and a court may take knowledge of that kind into account: Evidence Act, s.144(2) and (3). At the hearing of this matter the applicant was given the opportunity to respond to the Minister’s submissions on this point (thereby fulfilling the requirements under the Evidence Act, s.144(4)) as to whether or not the Tribunal Decision could have been influenced by any statement made by Minister Morrison, given the timing of the federal election in September 2013. Insofar as the applicant asserted bias on the part of Minister Morrison by reason of the comments attributed to Minister Morrison in the document marked “A” the Court, having consulted the Government Notices Gazette, notes that writs were issued on 5 August 2013 to cause a federal election to be held on 7 September 2013: Government Notices Gazette C2013G01199 06/08/2013. Minister Morrison was appointed by the Governor-General as Minister for Immigration and Border Protection on 18 September 2013: Government Notices Gazette C2013G01423 20/09/2013. In the above circumstances, it would not therefore have been possible for Minister Morrison to have influenced the Tribunal in the manner asserted by the applicant as at the time of the Tribunal Decision (15 May 2013) as Minister Morrison had not yet been appointed as the Minister, and therefore could not have made the comments attributed to him in his capacity as a Minister.
The applicant’s assertion that the Tribunal was biased by reason of reference to reports prepared by DFAT is misconceived. The Tribunal is entitled to have regard to country information of its choosing, and to derive factual findings from that country information where, as here, the import of that country information has been put to the applicant for comment: NAHI at [11] per Gray, Tamberlin and Lander JJ. No bias of any kind therefore arises from the Tribunal’s consideration of any DFAT report.
For the purposes of the both the Extension of Time Application and the Proposed Judicial Review Application ground 3 has no merit.
Conclusion
The Court has concluded that there is no basis on which to grant the Extension of Time Application, and even if time were to be extended the Proposed Judicial Review Application has no merit. It follows that the Extension of Time Application must be dismissed. There will be an order accordingly. It is therefore unnecessary to make any order in relation to the purported, but incompetent, Judicial Review Application: BZABK v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship & Anor [2012] FCA 774; (2012) 205 FCR 83 at [43] per Foster J.
The Court will also order that name of the second respondent be changed to “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”: Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth), s.3, Sch.2.
The Court will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding sixty-nine (69) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Antoni Lucev
Associate:
Date: 14 July 2017
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