BJK15 v Minister for Immigration - [2019] FCCA 347

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BJK15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2019] FCCA 347

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Judicial review – decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – citizen of Sri Lanka – ethnic Tamil – Hindu religion – whether denial of procedural fairness – alleged error of law on the face of the record – ultra vires – whether jurisdictional error.

Legislation:

Immigrants & Emigrants Act 1948 (Sri Lanka)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 46A, 91R, 422B, 425, 474, 476

Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1979 (Sri Lanka)

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593; (2003) 75 ALD 630
Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464
Maroun v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2009] FCA 1284; (2009) 112 ALD 424
Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Pandey & Ors [2014] FCA 640; (2014) 143 ALD 640
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259; (1996) 70 ALJR 568; (1996) 136 ALR 481; (1996) 41 ALD 1
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323; (2001) 75 ALJR 1105; (2001) 180 ALR 1; (2001) 62 ALD 225
MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection & Anor [2015] FCA 1392; (2015) 238 FCR 158
MZXHY v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCA 622
NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476; (2003) 77 ALJR 454; (2003) 195 ALR 24; (2003) 72 ALD 1
Re The Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 74 ALJR 405; (2000) 168 ALR 407; (2000) 58 ALD 609
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152; (2006) 81 ALJR 515; (2006) 231 ALR 592; (2006) 93 ALD 300
SZJBD v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 922; (2008) 102 ALD 622
SZJMG v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 1145
VAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117
WAIJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 74; (2004) 80 ALD 568
WZATI v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 923

Applicant:

BJK15

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent:

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number:

PEG 322 of 2015

Judgment of:

Judge Antoni Lucev

Hearing date:

25 May 2016

Date of Last Submission:

25 May 2016

Delivered at:

Perth

Delivered on:

19 February 2019

REPRESENTATION

For the Applicant:

In person (with the assistance of an interpreter)

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr A Burgess

For the Second Respondent:

Submitting appearance save as to costs

Solicitor for the Respondents:

Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

That the application be dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT PERTH

PEG 322 of 2015

BJK15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

The applicant has filed an application for judicial review (“Judicial Review Application”) pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”) seeking review of a decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal Decision” and “Tribunal” respectively), to affirm a decision of a delegate (“Delegate’s Decision” and “Delegate” respectively) of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (“Minister”), to refuse the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa (“Protection Visa”).
A copy of the Tribunal Decision is at Court Book (“CB”) 336-374.

Background

The background is as follows:
a)the applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity and of the Hindu religion, and arrived in Australia as an irregular maritime arrival on 20 June 2012: CB 36-37;
b)on 7 November 2012 the Minister exercised his power under s.46A(2) of the Migration Act to allow the applicant to apply for the Protection Visa and on 12 December 2012 the applicant applied for the Protection Visa making the following claims:
i)his uncle and cousin “S” went to work in the north of Sri Lanka in 2009 and while they were there fighting between the Sri Lankan Army (“SLA”) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”) broke out. His uncle and S were attempting to run away from the shelling that was occurring and S was unable to escape, and was killed, and his uncle was unable to find S’s body, and many other people were also killed: CB 54;
ii)one month after S’s death, three Criminal Investigation Department (“CID”) officers came to the applicant’s uncle’s house and questioned him about S’s body, and they did not believe his uncle when he said they could not find S’s body because of the shelling so they asked the applicant and his cousin’s brother “K” what had happened: CB 54;
iii)in 2010, the applicant was with his cousins’ family and the CID came again. They interrogated and spoke in a threatening way with the applicant, said that they did not believe what the applicant and his cousins’ family were saying, and that they thought S was helping the LTTE, which the applicant and his cousins’ family denied: CB 54;
iv)while the applicant was in Qatar from 2010 to May 2012 the CID returned to question the applicant’s uncle and K and beat them, and K then fled to Australia: CB 55;
v)on 28 May 2012 four men whom the applicant assumed were from the CID came to his house in a white van and enquired further about S’s whereabouts, saying “if it’s true your cousin died in the shelling, why has your other cousin gone into hiding” and they pointed a gun at the left side of the applicant’s head and told him to tell the truth about K’s whereabouts, and said that the next time they would take the applicant to “the office”, which is where the applicant assumes people get tortured: CB 55;
vi)another one of the applicant’s uncles had been taken by the CID before, and that uncle was never seen again and the applicant is worried that something similar would happen to him: CB 55; and
vii)the Sri Lankan government is unwilling to prevent the persecution the applicant faces because of the applicant’s ethnicity, imputed political opinion of association with the LTTE, as a member of particular social group of young Tamil males in Sri Lanka and as he left Sri Lanka illegally, therefore if he returns to Sri Lanka he is afraid he will be taken by the authorities and tortured, beaten or killed: CB 55;
c)the applicant attended an interview with the Delegate on 15 January 2014: CB 115, and on 13 February 2014 the applicant’s migration agent provided submissions for the Delegate to consider: CB 117-268;
d)on 26 March 2014 the Delegate’s Decision was to refuse to grant the applicant the Protection Visa: CB 274-297;
e)on 31 March 2014 the applicant applied for review of the Delegate’s Decision with the Tribunal: CB 298-299, and on 17 April 2015 the applicant’s migration agent forwarded to the Tribunal submissions: CB 311-324 (“Tribunal Submissions”) and a letter regarding the applicant from the Sri Lankan police (“Police Letter”) which was received by the applicant’s mother: CB 321-322; and
f)accompanied by his migration agent, the applicant attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 22 April 2015 (“Tribunal Hearing”): CB 328-330, and on 22 June 2015 the Tribunal Decision affirmed the Delegate’s Decision not to grant the applicant a Protection Visa: CB 336 and 353 at [93].

Tribunal Decision

In the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal:
a)summarised the applicant’s claims made in the Protection Visa application and the findings made in the Delegate’s Decision, including that the applicant had fabricated his claims: CB 337-338 at [3]-[16];
b)referred to the Tribunal Submissions and the Police Letter and stated that the applicant had asked his mother to provide him with anything she had received, and having pressed the police officers as to why they were looking for the applicant the mother was able to obtain the Police Letter, which read as follows: CB 338-339 at [18]:
Our attempts a few months ago to arrest … [the applicant] of … [place name] in your Police Division, under suspicion of terrorist activities have not been successful. Please investigate and arrest him as soon as possible and inform me.
c)noted from the applicant’s oral evidence that the applicant says that:
i)he cannot return to Sri Lanka because the CID there has threatened him about S;
ii)because S’s body was not identified he was suspected of being a fighter for the LTTE; and
iii)the CID suspects that the applicant knows about S’s activities because the applicant and his cousins’ family are very close: CB 339 at [21];
d)asked the applicant why the police would have questioned him, to which he responded that after K fled to Australia the CID thought his aunt may have told him something, and upon the applicant saying the CID questioned only himself, his aunt and his uncle, the Tribunal put it to the applicant that it appeared somewhat unusual that the police do not appear to have questioned anyone else, to which the applicant responded that their houses are close together: CB 339 at [23];
e)invited the applicant to describe what he claims occurred in March 2009, and the applicant replied that three CID officers questioned his father and asked K if he knew where S was and K told the CID that he was killed. The applicant explained he was questioned while he was outside, and as he was only 15 or 16 at the time he did not understand what was happening, but he had overheard some of the discussion between the CID and his uncle where the CID did not believe his uncle, but when the CID spoke to the applicant they did so cordially and upon responding to their questions the CID officers simply left: CB 340 at [24];
f)asked the applicant what happened next, and noted that the applicant responded that in 2010 his uncle and aunt were again questioned by the CID, as was he, and they confirmed what had been stated in 2009, and while they CID were not as polite as the first time, they again left, the applicant also confirming that the CID never threatened the applicant and only questioned him: CB 340 at [25] and [27];
g)referred to the applicant stating that he had never had any dealings or contact with the LTTE, nor had his family or his cousins’ family, and that he had never made any public comments against the Sri Lankan government: CB 340 at [26];
h)put to the applicant that it might not accept he is a person of interest as he would not have been issued with a passport if he were, to which he told the Tribunal he was not on the radar at the time he applied for his passport. The Tribunal then put an alternative proposition to the applicant that the CID simply accepted the applicant’s statements and therefore left the applicant alone, and allowed the applicant to obtain a passport to travel to Qatar: CB 340-341 at [28];
i)summarised the applicant’s oral evidence that his problems started after he returned from Qatar, and that after returning from Qatar the CID threatened him severely as K had left Sri Lanka and his family did not want to say where he had gone as they feared it may lead to trouble as K had left illegally. The Tribunal then put country information to the applicant that suggested the family of someone who departed Sri Lanka illegally would not be targeted for harm by the Sri Lankan authorities to which the applicant responded that he was already under investigation so it would be different for him: CB 340-341 at [28];
j)put to the applicant that it appeared implausible that the CID would question him about S only a few days after his return from having been away in Qatar for two years and having previously questioned the applicant and been told that he did not have any information about S. The applicant responded to this saying the CID on that occasion asked him whether he had spoken with his aunt, and whether he knew where K was, and they did so in a ferocious manner and one of the officers suggested that the applicant knew where K was and had put a gun to his forehead: CB 340-341 at [28];
k)explained that the applicant had told the Tribunal that since his arrival in Australia, he thinks around 2013, the CID has visited his house and asked his father as to his whereabouts, and after this his father ran away and that neither the applicant nor his mother knows where the father is. When the Tribunal put to the applicant that it might not consider it plausible that his father, who has been married to his mother for 24 years, has been gone for over a year and not made any contact with his family to advise them where he was living, the applicant replied that he just hopes he is safe: CB 341 at [31];
l)asked the applicant whether the Police Letter was issued after the first enquiry about the applicant’s whereabouts with his father which he claims occurred in 2013, and noted the applicant responded it was issued after that, and when the Tribunal pointed out that the Police Letter was dated 16 August 2012 the applicant said the CID went to his house in 2014 and gave the Police Letter to his mother as evidence of their interest in the applicant: CB 341-342 at [32];
m)asked the applicant to confirm the grounds on which he was claiming protection which he did, and also added that there is an arrest warrant against him: CB 342 at [33];
n)advised the applicant that it had some concerns about the credibility of his claims and evidence and put to the applicant a number of matters and invited him to comment, which the applicant did, then put certain country information concerning the Immigrants & Emigrants Act 1948 (Sri Lanka) (“I & E Act”) to the applicant and invited him to comment, to which the applicant responded that he does have money to pay a fine (for breach of the I & E Act) if it were imposed (if he returned to Sri Lanka): CB 342-343 at [34]-[37]; and
o)summarised the submissions made by the applicant’s migration agent at the Tribunal Hearing in respect of the issues and matters that had been put to the applicant and generally as to the applicant’s claims for protection: CB 343-344 at [39]-[42].
In the Tribunal Decision the Tribunal then:
a)having carefully considered the applicant’s claims and noted that some aspects of the applicant’s evidence were plausible and credible, found that important aspects were not credible and therefore were rejected as unreliable, exaggerated, or fabricated for the purposes of strengthening the applicant’s protection claims: CB 345 at [52];
b)gave the applicant the benefit of the doubt and accepted the CID made inquiries about S as the CID considered the applicant might know something about S’s activities, and accepted the applicant’s evidence that he was truthful when he told the CID that he did not know anything other than that S had gone north to fish and that he got caught up, and was killed, in the crossfire of the Sri Lankan civil war: CB 345-346 at [54];
c)found that the CID left the applicant to go about his life, including enabling him to depart for Qatar, and that after the interview in 2010 the CID determined the applicant was no longer of any interest to it for information about his cousin, or anything else: CB 345-346 at [54];
d)given relevant country information indicating the “ruthless efficiency” of the CID, found it “most unlikely” that the CID would have permitted the applicant to obtain a passport had he been of any interest to the CID’s ongoing enquiries, or had he been suspected of having LTTE links: CB 346 at [56];
e)accepted the applicant’s claim that K departed Sri Lanka illegally and that the CID asked the applicant to provide any information as to K’s whereabouts, however, it did not accept the applicant would have been threatened to be taken to “their office” the “next time” if it was considered he had relevant information or suspected links with the LTTE as it would have detained the applicant, rather than merely threatening to do so the next time: CB 347 at [59];
f)considered the Police Letter and the explanation of the circumstances in which it arose and was not satisfied the Police Letter was genuine and placed little weight on it: CB 347 at [61];
g)rejected the claim the applicant’s problems escalated upon his return to Sri Lanka from Qatar on the basis that it did not accept the Police Letter was genuine, and was not satisfied the applicant was wanted or of interest to the police for any knowledge he may have of the whereabouts of K, and considered the fact that the applicant was not detained for further questioning in 2012 indicates there was no continuing interest in him as a person who might have useful information, or relevant links to the LTTE: CB 347-348 at [62]-[63];
h)rejected the applicant’s account that the CID had visited the applicant’s house since his arrival in Australia because:
i)the applicant was unable to give a clear estimate of when this occurred; and
ii)of the applicant’s inability to provide more detailed information, especially given the significance of the alleged incident in causing his father to run away from home: CB 348 at [64];
i)did not accept the applicant’s father disappeared because of anything associated with the applicant’s claims, and found these claims had been fabricated for the purposes of the Protection Visa, and that no enquiries have been made of the applicant because he is not a person of interest: CB 348 at [64];
j)rejected the claim that as S was killed in an LTTE controlled area the applicant is at an elevated risk of harm if returned to Sri Lanka, as the Tribunal considered many people in Sri Lanka will have lost relatives in the civil war in an LTTE controlled area, and that although the Sri Lankan authorities continue to monitor persons in Sri Lanka with the aim of preventing a resurgence of the LTTE and civil war, in all the circumstances the applicant was not a person of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities after 2010 and does not face a real chance of serious or significant harm should he return to Sri Lanka: CB 348 at [65];
k)considered that if the Sri Lankan authorities had an interest in the applicant because of the disappearance of an uncle in 2006, or anyone else’s disappearance, he would have been arrested and detained and questioned about those things, rather than being released and allowed to travel to Qatar: CB 348-349 at [66];
l)addressed the argument that because the applicant could have gone to another country, as he had the financial means to fly out of Sri Lanka, his claims are somewhat more genuine, and found the argument to be unpersuasive as there was no evidence that the applicant had a visa to enter any other country, or that he had an intention to travel to another country, rather he travelled to and entered Australia: CB 349 at [68];
m)having regard to the country information and the applicant’s evidence, the Tribunal found the applicant does not face a real chance of serious harm for reasons of being a Tamil youth now or in the reasonably foreseeable future should he return to Sri Lanka: CB 350 at [72];
n)discussed what the country information indicated would occur to the applicant having breached the I & E Act, and noted that there is nothing in the applicant’s circumstances that would give rise to a real chance he would be detained over and above the usual period of detention, and further noted the applicant himself gave evidence he could pay the fine for the breach of the I & E Act if it were imposed, and was satisfied that the I & E Act was a law of general application, applied in a non-discriminatory manner, and serving a legitimate purpose of dealing with people who depart Sri Lanka unlawfully: CB 350 at [72]-[73];
o)noted that although the conditions of any period the applicant may spend in a remand cell upon return to Sri Lanka would cause the applicant to suffer discomfort and unpleasantness, on the evidence and country information this did not amount to persecution for a Convention reason: CB 350 at [75];
p)having regard to its findings that the applicant is not actually, or otherwise perceived to be, a person of interest by reason of any links to the LTTE or any anti-government activities or opinion, or for any other reason, the Tribunal therefore did not accept that the applicant faces a real chance of any serious harm if any inquiries are made with the authorities in his home area or anywhere else in Sri Lanka in relation to his being a failed asylum seeker: CB 351 at [77]-[79];
q)considered, for the purposes of complementary protection claims, whether the applicant might face significant harm by reason of the detention and questioning he is likely to face upon his return to Sri Lanka under the I & E Act, and found the applicant will be granted bail and subsequently fined, and found that that does not give rise to a real risk of significant harm as the I & E Act is a law of general application which is not applied in a discriminatory way or with the intention to inflict cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment, degrading treatment or punishment through the temporary detention of returnees pending the grant of bail: CB 352-353 at [85]-[88]; and
r)affirmed the Delegate’s Decision not to grant the applicant a Protection Visa: CB 353 at [93] as it was not satisfied the applicant faced a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm as required by s.36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Migration Act: CB 351 at [80] and CB 353 at [89].

Judicial Review Application

There are three grounds of review (Grounds 1, 2 and 3 respectively, collectively “the Grounds”) set out in the Judicial Review Application, as follows:
1. Not following the rules of natural justice.
2. Error of law on the face of the record.
3. Review of delegated legislation on grounds of ultra-virus.
On 30 September 2015 a Registrar of this Court made orders (“Registrar’s Orders”) providing the applicant with an opportunity to file:
a)any amended Judicial Review Application, giving complete particulars of each ground;
b)any further affidavit materials; and
c)a written outline of submissions.
The applicant filed an affidavit affirmed 9 March 2016 (“Applicant’s Affidavit”) comprising four paragraphs and annexed documents, and in relation to which the Court notes that:
a)the Applicant’s Affidavit at [1] simply identifies the applicant;
b)the Applicant’s Affidavit at [2] and [4] contains assertions which the Court will treat as particulars to Grounds 1 and 2 respectively of the Judicial Review Application; and
c)the Applicant’s Affidavit at [3] refers to annexed documents which the Court addresses at [15]-[19] below.
At hearing the applicant sought to tender further documents to the Court in support of the Judicial Review Application. The documents were marked as Exhibit 1, (subject to objections by the Minister), and contained submissions from the applicant (“Applicant’s Submissions”) and three further documents which the Court addresses at [15]-[19] below. The Applicant’s Submissions are as follows:
1. The Second Respondent did not accept my credibility as seen in paragraph 16 of the Tribunal’s Judgement, which was done without examining the situation in Sri Lanka in relation to the connection my village … [applicant’s village named] had with … [another village named], within the Northern Province which witnessed a bitter struggle between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the Tamil rebels, the LTTE.
2. The majority persons within the village of … [applicant’s village named] are fishermen by caste and profession and during the monsoon season relocate to the Northern and Eastern Provinces for the purposes of fishing. This is yet the practice.
3. Both by ethnicity (being a Tamil) and by social grouping (coming from the fishing caste) I am suspect and perceived to be a person who has connection with the LTTE.
4. The fact that my uncle and cousin were perceived to be LTTE supporters, and my relationship to them was a ground for my being questioned was not given due weight by the Second Respondent.
5. The fact that I am forced to return to Sri Lanka has a failed asylum seeker will confirm in the minds of the security forces of Sri Lanka that I had a connection with the LTTE.
6. I submit that my village was used by the LTTE as a point to smuggle arms to the Tamil rebels, and this is why there is yet a naval and military camp in my village.
7. The Second Respondent did not examine the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which is the basis on which all suspected Tamils like me are arrested, detained and harassed without bail or recourse to the courts.
8. The UNHCR has an ongoing inquiry into the human right violations committed by the Sri Lankan armed forces against the Tamils during and after the course of the civil war.
9. This was the situation when the Second Respondent inquired into my claims for a Protection Visa.
10. Therefore documents like the PTA and reports about the current UNHCR inquiry are relevant.
At hearing the Court invited the applicant to make oral submissions in support of his Judicial Review Application. The applicant proceeded to explain to the Court that what he is saying is the truth and that he is in fear and will be in danger if he returns. He stated it was difficult for him to obtain evidence to give to the Tribunal and despite the fact he gave “so many evidences” he did not know if they were considered and pleaded with the Court to give him an opportunity to live safely in Australia.
The Minister objected to the Court considering the documents annexed to the Applicant’s Affidavit and the documents annexed to the Applicant’s Submissions. The Minister’s submissions asserted that there was no jurisdictional error in the Grounds outlined and that the failure to particularise the Grounds warranted their dismissal in any event. It was submitted that the Applicant’s Affidavit and the Applicant’s Submissions simply invited impermissible merits review as the applicant was on notice of the credibility issues dealt with in the Tribunal Decision, and the Tribunal expressly put concerns to the applicant about all of the matters the applicant has taken issue with.

Consideration

Jurisdictional error required

The Tribunal Decision may be set aside by this Court upon judicial review if it is affected by jurisdictional error: Migration Act, ss.474, 476; Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476; (2003) 77 ALJR 454; (2003) 195 ALR 24; (2003) 72 ALD 1. Jurisdictional error may occur where the Tribunal identifies a wrong issue, asks the wrong question, ignores relevant material or relies on irrelevant material, so that the Tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of powers is affected, resulting in a decision exceeding, or a failure to exercise, the authority or powers given to the Tribunal under the Migration Act: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323; (2001) 75 ALJR 1105; (2001) 180 ALR 1; (2001) 62 ALD 225 at [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. In certain circumstances a denial of procedural fairness may also constitute jurisdictional error: SZBEL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152; (2006) 81 ALJR 515; (2006) 231 ALR 592; (2006) 93 ALD 300 (“SZBEL”), so too legal unreasonableness: as to which see the summary in Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Pandey & Ors [2014] FCA 640; (2014) 143 ALD 640 at [41] per Wigney J.
The Court does not have the jurisdiction to review the merits of the Tribunal Decision, or determine claims for protection: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259; (1996) 70 ALJR 568; (1996) 136 ALR 481; (1996) 41 ALD 1 (“Wu Shan Liang”), CLR at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
The applicant bears the onus of establishing jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision: VAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117 at [45] per Hill, Sundberg and Stone JJ; Maroun v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2009] FCA 1284; (2009) 112 ALD 424 at [15] per Jagot J.

Additional materials

The documents annexed to the Applicant’s Affidavit and the Applicant’s Submissions were as follows:
a)Annexure 1 to the Applicant’s Affidavit and the second annexure to the Applicant’s Submissions are identical and are an extract of a number of provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1979 (Sri Lanka) (“POT Act”);
b)Annexure 2 to the Applicant’s Affidavit and the third annexure to the Applicant’s Submissions is a news article from TamilNet dated 15 January 2016 titled “Coerced confessions determine Tamil prisoners’ fate”; and
c)the first annexure to the Applicant’s Submissions is a printout of two articles, seemingly sourced from the internet, the first dated 10 May 2016 titled “UN experts urge Sri Lanka to adopt measures to fight torture and strengthen justice system” and the second dated 7 May 2016 titled “UN official says torture continue in post was Sri Lanka”.
The following are general principles in respect to the Court receiving additional materials or evidence in judicial review applications:
a)an application for judicial review is ordinarily confined to the material that was before the Tribunal: SZJMG v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 1145 at [27] per McKerracher J (“SZJMG”);
b)in most circumstances it is not open or appropriate for the Court to consider materials that post-date the Tribunal Decision: WZATI v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 923 (“WZATI”) at [70] per Barker J;
c)only where material has some bearing on the jurisdictional error the applicant is purporting to establish and is relevant to the grounds of review can the Court consider the evidence: SZJMG at [27] per McKerracher J. An example may be evidence of what occurred at a Tribunal hearing to support a claim of bias or a denial of procedural fairness: SZJBD v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 922; (2008) 102 ALD 622 at [23] per Siopis J; and
d)the admission of fresh evidence simply for the purpose of inviting the Court to disagree with a factual conclusion reached by the Tribunal is inappropriate and is simply an invitation for the Court to undertake impermissible merits review: MZXHY v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCA 622 at [8] per Nicholson J.
In this matter each of the documents referred to at [15(b) and (c)] above post-date the Tribunal Decision, and are therefore materials that were not before the Tribunal at the time of the Tribunal Decision and the Court does not therefore consider it appropriate to consider them: WZATI at [70] per Barker J. Further, the materials concern matters which relate to the merits of the Tribunal Decision and invite the Court to engage in impermissible merits review, contrary to longstanding principle: Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
As to the materials at [15(a)] above, these documents look to be dated sometime in 2014, and to the extent the applicant wished to rely upon them he ought to have provided them to the Tribunal. His migration agent forwarded submissions and made references to country information and if the applicant believed these documents were of assistance to his claims he ought to have provided them to the Tribunal. They are irrelevant for the purposes of judicial review in this Court, and for the reasons explained at [44]-[46] below the Tribunal cannot be said to have not considered the POT Act nor appreciated the extensive powers it provided to the police and Sri Lankan authorities. These materials are therefore no more than part of a further plea for impermissible merits review: Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
For the above reasons the Court therefore finds the additional materials to be inadmissible, and will not consider them in addressing the grounds of the Judicial Review Application.

Ground 1

On the basis of the materials before the Court it is apparent that:
a)the applicant was invited to, and indeed attended, a hearing before the Tribunal pursuant to s.425 of the Migration Act, and at that hearing the applicant was assisted by an interpreter and his migration agent: CB 328;
b)the applicant’s migration agent provided written submissions to the Tribunal and was also given an opportunity to provide oral submissions: CB 311-324 and 343-344 at [38]-[42];
c)in the course of the Tribunal Hearing, which lasted more than four hours: CB 328-330, the applicant provided oral evidence that the Tribunal carefully detailed in the Tribunal Decision, and there is nothing to suggest there was any issue or matter that inhibited the applicant from partaking in, and giving evidence to, and providing arguments at the Tribunal Hearing in support of his Protection Visa application: SZBEL at [44] per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ;
d)the Tribunal put to the applicant, at CB 339-340 at [23], 340-341 at [28], 341 at [31], 342 at [35] and 343 at [36], a number of matters it had concerns with and considered would be a reason or part of the reason it might not accept his evidence, and invited the applicant to comment on that information, which the applicant did, as did his migration agent, at CB 343-344 at [37]-[42]; and
e)the applicant was on notice that his credibility was in issue by virtue of the Delegate’s Decision which found him to not be credible and to have fabricated his claims, and therefore there was no need for the Tribunal to give the applicant notice that aspects of his claims may not be accepted as plausible or credible: SZBEL at [35] per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ, but in any event the Tribunal directly did so and invited the applicant to comment: CB 342 at [34].
Having regard to the matters set out at [20] above, it is evident that the Tribunal has accorded the applicant procedural fairness under s.422B of the Migration Act, and that there has been no denial of procedural fairness (or natural justice) in relation to the process followed by the Tribunal.
In the Applicant’s Submissions at [1] he refers to the Tribunal making a determination on his credibility “ … without examining the situation in Sri Lanka in relation to the connection my … [applicant’s village named] had with … [another village named], within the Northern Province which witnessed a bitter struggle between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the Tamil rebels, the LTTE”.
The Tribunal’s finding with respect to the applicant’s credibility is set out in what are familiar terms at CB 345 at [52], as follows:
The Tribunal carefully considered all of the applicant’s claims and has reached a conclusion that certain aspects of his evidence are plausible and credible, however, it also finds important aspects of his claims are not credible and the Tribunal rejects those parts of the applicant’s evidence as unreliable, exaggerated, or fabricated for the purposes of strengthening his protection claims.
The assertion that the credibility finding was made without examining the situation in relation to the applicant’s home village and the other village necessitates an examination of the Tribunal Decision, which must be read as a whole, and without an overzealous search for error: Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
In the Tribunal Decision the Tribunal:
a)observed that the applicant claimed he left Sri Lanka because his uncle and S went to work in the other village in 2009, because they were only able to work in their home village for six months of the year due to rough sea conditions, and that while they were there because there was fighting between the LTTE and the SLA the entry and exit points in or around the other village were closed, and that S was caught in the shelling and his body was never found: CB 337 at [6];
b)found that the Delegate did not find the applicant’s claims credible, including observing that the Delegate found it to not be credible that the applicant’s uncle and S would travel from their home village, in a relatively safe area experiencing no active fighting during the civil war, to the other village which was still under the control of the LTTE but was being encircled by the SLA, but also considered the alternative, that if they did travel to the other village every year for the purpose of fishing that that would have been an easy matter for the SLA to verify and therefore it was unlikely that the SLA would perceive them to be possible LTTE members: CB 338 at [16];
c)further referred to the Delegate’s Decision considering country information concerning civilian deaths in the civil war, and S’s death in the other village, and whether it would raise the attention of the CID so as to cause the CID to target the applicant: CB 338 at [16];
d)referred to the fact that at the Tribunal Hearing the applicant said that S was killed as a result of fighting in the civil war, his body was not identified, and so S was suspected of being a fighter for the LTTE, and that he was near the other village at the time: CB 339 at [21];
e)referred to the fact that the applicant said he had previously told CID officials that S “had been in a war zone and was caught up in crossfire”: CB 340 at [25];
f)enquired as to whether S, or any member of his family, had any connection with the LTTE: CB 340 at [26];
g)referred to submissions made by the applicant’s migration agent, including the following:
i)that a death certificate had been presented to verify that S had been killed in the other village: CB 343 at [38]; and
ii)that the applicant was a Tamil who had had a relative killed in an LTTE controlled area and that the people of the applicant’s home village were suspected of being LTTE supporters and suspected of smuggling for the LTTE: CB 343 at [39] and 344 at [42];
h)in assessing the applicant’s refugee protection claims the Tribunal dealt with the actual and imputed political opinion of the applicant, and in so doing commenced with the following observations at CB 345-346 at [54]:
The applicant’s claim is that his cousin … [S] was a fisherman who was killed during the civil war. He claims … [S] was killed in crossfire near … [the other village]. He claims the CID suspect that … [S] had been fighting for the LTTE. The Tribunal accepts that country information indicates heavy fighting occurred in … [the other village] and that there was shelling during the civil war and before it ended in 2009. The Tribunal accepts, given the circumstances in which … [S’s] body was found, and the location, the CID may have suspected he was associated with the LTTE. However, having regard to country information such as that found in the UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines, the Tribunal does not accept the mere fact that a person was located in the northern part of Sri Lanka during the civil war gives rise to an inference that the person is linked with, or has sympathies for, the LTIE.
i)considered a claim made by the applicant, as expressed by his migration agent, that because S had been killed in an LTTE controlled area that that elevated the risk that the applicant would be regarded with suspicion and targeted for harm if he returned to Sri Lanka: CB 348 at [65]; and
j)said that it had considered all of the circumstances, including the death of S, and including the fact that the applicant had no relevant links with the LTTE, in determining that the applicant did not face a real chance of serious harm for his imputed or actual political opinion now or in the reasonably foreseeable future if he returned to Sri Lanka: CB 349 at [70].
Findings of credibility are findings of fact: Re The Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 74 ALJR 405; (2000) 168 ALR 407; (2000) 58 ALD 609 at [67] per McHugh J. Credibility findings are not however immune from judicial scrutiny, and may expose jurisdictional error, if the findings or inferences of fact are not grounded upon probative material and logical grounds: WAIJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 74; (2004) 80 ALD 568 (“WAIJ”) at [22] per Lee and Moore JJ.
As is evident from the setting out of the material from the Tribunal Decision at [25] above, there can be no suggestion that the determination on credibility made by the Tribunal was procedurally unfair because it failed to examine the situation in Sri Lanka, and in particular in relation to the connection between the applicant’s village and the other village named within the Northern Province, and the then ongoing civil war between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the LTTE. The Tribunal, as is evident, dealt with those matters at considerable length, setting out the claims, referring to country information and submissions made by the applicant and his migration agent, and having considered those matters reached conclusions, including its ultimate conclusion as to credibility. In the circumstances, the findings or inferences of fact which the Tribunal arrived at are based upon probative material and logical grounds: WAIJ at [22] per Lee and Moore JJ, and for this Court to revisit those issues would entail the Court engaging, not in judicial review, but rather impermissible merits review: Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.

In the Applicant’s Affidavit at [2] the applicant states as follows:
2. I refer to paragraphs 55, 57, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75 and 85 of the Refugee Review Tribunals decision of 18 June 2015 to point to the judicial error and that the said Tribunal had not followed the principles of a fair procedure in arriving at this decision.
As indicated above, the Tribunal has accorded with those procedural fairness obligations exhaustively stated in s.422B of the Migration Act, but nevertheless, the Court specifically addresses hereunder the paragraphs of the Tribunal Decision referred to in the Applicant’s Affidavit at [2].
At CB 346 at [55] and [57] the Tribunal accepted the applicant’s evidence of what occurred when he was questioned in 2009 and found it plausible and credible that the same occurred in 2010 and thereafter the CID did not threaten the applicant. Having regard to all the evidence and country information, it found, however, that after leaving Sri Lanka for Qatar in 2010 the CID concluded that the applicant did not have any information about his uncle or cousin that either linked them, or the applicant, with the LTTE, or that the applicant was withholding any information. It is not possible to find any error or denial of procedural fairness in these paragraphs as the Tribunal based the findings on the applicant’s own evidence that nothing occurred after 2010, and it expressly put to the applicant, at CB 342 at [34], that it did not appear he was of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities after that time.
The Tribunal put to the applicant at CB 339-340 at [23] that it appeared unusual that the police had not interviewed other members of his family about S. At CB 347 at [60] the Tribunal found that if the CID had interviewed other members of his family or his neighbours about S’s whereabouts the applicant would have been aware of that and this suggests no other persons were interviewed about this matter. The Tribunal also rejected the explanation the applicant provided when the matter was put at CB 339-340 at [23], that is that other family members were not interviewed because they live a distance away, and concluded that the other family members were not interviewed as the CID, who would be capable of finding them, did not consider S a person of significant interest. There is nothing to suggest the Tribunal’s reasoning was in error, was unfair or in breach of the procedural fairness obligations under the Migration Act.
At CB 347-348 at [61] and [62] the Tribunal discussed the concerns it had with the Police Letter and stated it was not satisfied the Police Letter was genuine and placed little weight on it, while also finding that the CID did not continue to hold an interest in the applicant as a person who might have useful information, or a person with relevant links to the LTTE. It is well established that the Tribunal is entitled to reject and give such weight to evidence proffered as it thinks appropriate: Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 280-282 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ; Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464 at [27] per French J (“Lee”). The concerns the Tribunal had with the Police Letter were not unfair, and the Tribunal put to the applicant that his oral evidence was inconsistent with the Police Letter at CB 341-342 at [31]-[33]. Again, no error is apparent in the Tribunal’s reasoning.
The findings at CB 348 at [64] concerning the applicant’s claim that his father had disappeared, and the Tribunal not accepting this was put to the applicant at CB 341 at [31]. At CB 348 at [65] the Tribunal found the applicant did not possess the profile of a person considered at risk of serious harm, a matter that was put to him at CB 343 at [36]. At CB 349 at [68] the Tribunal rejected a submission from the applicant’s migration agent on the same basis which the Tribunal had invited the migration agent to comment upon at CB 343 at [39], and further noted the lack of evidence that would have supported this argument in any event. Again, no error is apparent in the Tribunal’s reasoning.
The Tribunal simply considered all of the applicant’s claims cumulatively at CB 349 at [70] and found, for the same reasons expressed at CB 345-349 at [54]-[69], that it was not satisfied the applicant faced a real chance of serious harm. Again, no error is apparent in the Tribunal’s reasoning.
At CB 350 at [73]-[75] the Tribunal considered the chance of harm that the applicant faces in returning to Sri Lanka as an illegal departee. The Tribunal invited the applicant to comment on information surrounding the treatment of those returning to Sri Lanka having departed illegally, including the prospective fine to be imposed which the applicant indicated he would be able to pay: CB 343 at [36]. At CB 352 at [85] the Tribunal considered the possible harm in respect of the complementary protection criterion and referred to the same information concerning a fine and possible remand that was put to the applicant at CB 343 at [36]. Again, no error is apparent in the Tribunal’s reasoning.
Each of the matters referred to in the Applicant’s Affidavit at [2] and the finding made in those paragraphs, were put to the applicant for comment. Further, the Delegate’s Decision came to the same findings in relation to a number of the same matters for the same or similar reasons, and the applicant was therefore on notice that those were matters the Tribunal was likely to consider in the review.
In the Applicant’s Submissions at [4] and [10] the applicant submits the Tribunal did not give sufficient weight to particular claims or to matters he considered were relevant to his circumstances. Again, weight to be afforded to evidence and information are matters for the Tribunal: Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 280-282 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ; Lee at [27] per French J. In any event, the Tribunal asked the applicant if he or his cousins’ family were ever involved with the LTTE and he responded in the negative, and the Tribunal considered in detail the applicant’s questioning by the authorities and came to a reasoned conclusion that neither the applicant, nor his cousins’ family, were of further any interest to the authorities on the basis of links to the LTTE, or otherwise: CB 346 at [56] and [58], 347 at [60], 347-348 at [62] and 348 at [65].
In all of the above circumstances, there is nothing in the Tribunal Decision, and the applicant has otherwise failed to refer to or identify any matter, that constitutes a denial of procedural fairness by the Tribunal. Ground 1 is not made out.

Ground 2

Without particulars it is difficult for the Court to determine what “error of law” the applicant is alleging, and none immediately appears evident on the face of the record, given:
a)the Tribunal referred in detail to the claims the applicant made in his Protection Visa application, the oral evidence he provided to the Tribunal at the Tribunal Hearing, the documents he provided in support of his claims (including S’s death certificate and the Police Letter), and, finally, the further submissions advanced in the written submissions and orally at hearing by the applicant’s migration agent;
b)the Tribunal referred to the principles and authorities from the High Court and the Federal Court in respect of assessing the credibility of a Protection Visa applicant: CB 344-345 at [49]-[51], and on the face of the Tribunal Decision it is clear the Tribunal applied those principles to the applicant’s circumstances: CB 345 at [52] and 345-346 at [54];
c)the Tribunal outlined the various sources and particular extracts from country information it relied upon in assessing the applicant’s claims, including information specific to the situation for Tamils in Sri Lanka, the treatment of those suspected of LTTE links, the I & E Act, and the treatment faced by returnees to Sri Lanka: CB 354-371; and
d)the Tribunal summarised the applicable statutory provisions including ss.36 and 91R of the Migration Act and the applicable legal principles and considerations: CB 372-373 at [131]-[144], and applied those principles in the Tribunal Decision.
As already noted above, matters of weight and credibility are generally matters for the Tribunal to determine: see [26]-[27], [32] and [37] above. There is nothing to indicate illogicality or unreasonableness in the findings the Tribunal made: the materials and evidence before it were sufficiently probative to inform the conclusions it came to.
Insofar as the Applicant’s Submissions at [8] and [9] refer to the ongoing inquiry into human rights violations committed against Tamils during and after the civil war, the Tribunal was required to determine the chance or risk of harm in the reasonably foreseeable future if the applicant was returned to Sri Lanka. While there may be an ongoing inquiry into actions committed previously, various country information was before the Tribunal, including the United Nations High Commission for Refugees “Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka” dated 21 December 2012 (“UNHCR Guidelines”). The Tribunal expressly found the applicant was not a person with a profile identified in the UNHCR Guidelines as being one which might engage Australia’s protection obligations: CB 355-356 at [96]-[97]. In this case the UNHCR Guidelines were the subject of submissions from the applicant prior to the Tribunal Hearing: CB 321 and 349 at [69]. The Tribunal also referred to DFAT country reports, including one from October 2014, which indicated that the monitoring and harassment of Tamils on a day-to-day basis had generally eased since the end of the civil war: CB 360 at [106]. It is well accepted that the Tribunal is entitled to have regard to its choice of particular country information, to weigh that country information, and make reasonable factual findings based on the country information: NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11] per Gray, Tamberlin and Lander JJ.
In the Applicant’s Affidavit at [4] the applicant states that:
4. I, therefore, submit that the Refugee Review Tribunal had not examined the relevant laws, or the likelihood of my being harassed and tortured if I return to Sri Lanka after having sought refuge in Australia.
It is evident from the summary of the Tribunal Decision set out above that the Tribunal did examine what might happen to the applicant if he was returned to Sri Lanka, and specifically, and in the context of the I & E Act, whether or not the applicant was likely to suffer any form of harm: see generally CB 350-353 at [72]-[89], summarised at [5(n)-(r)] above. In those circumstances the alleged error in the Tribunal Decision referred to in the Applicant’s Affidavit at [4] cannot be sustained, subject to what is said at [44]-[46] below.
Otherwise, the Court has inferred, on the basis of the Applicant’s Submissions at [7], that the applicant may be suggesting that the Tribunal failed to consider the POT Act as one of the “relevant laws”. The Court notes that the applicant’s migration agent made a submission on the POT Act being applicable to the applicant’s circumstances: CB 321, as follows:
We submit, that based on COI it would be reasonable to assume that the Sri Lankan police would not need a reason other than suspicion to arrest or target people such as the applicant. Indeed the Prevention of Terrorism Act allows them to hold someone on the grounds of suspicion alone.
The Tribunal had before it country information concerning the POT Act: CB 360 at [106], and it was also clear it turned its mind to the application of the POT Act in the present case where, as noted at CB 342 at [35], it specifically put a question to the applicant about the legislation as follows:
… The Tribunal put it to the applicant that the CID have significant powers of arrest, including arrest under the prevention of terrorism act, and that it does not believe he would have been let go if he was of interest to the authorities. The applicant then told the Tribunal that the CID officials told him that they would arrest him and he does not know why they didn’t arrest him at the time.
The Tribunal ultimately found the applicant was not a person suspected of, or perceived to be linked to, the LTTE: CB 349 at [70], and the country information before the Tribunal similarly indicated that the POT Act was utilised during the civil war largely for the purpose of detaining those with LTTE links, however it appears significantly less persons are detained at present: CB 360 at [106]. Thus, the Tribunal made a finding of greater generality that subsumed the need to specifically address the POT Act: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593; (2003) 75 ALD 630 at [47] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ. And so the premise on which the POT Act was therefore said to apply was rejected as the Tribunal found the applicant did not have, nor was he suspected of having, and nor would he be imputed with, links to the LTTE, and therefore on the applicant’s own evidence and submissions the Tribunal was required to go no further than it has done.
For the above reasons, Ground 2 fails to establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision.

Ground 3

The Applicant’s Submissions and the oral submissions made by the applicant at hearing did not particularise any delegated legislation which was beyond power (that is, ultra vires) or any application of any delegated legislation which went beyond the power given to the Tribunal by any delegated legislation. In the absence of identification of any delegated legislation the subject of Ground 3, or any particularisation of any excess of power in relation to delegated legislation, or in the application of delegated legislation by the Tribunal, Ground 3 is not made out.
No jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision is established by ground 3.

Applicant’s Submissions

Where necessary the Court has addressed above the Applicant’s Submissions as they appear to relate to the grounds of the Judicial Review Application. The remaining paragraphs of the Applicant’s Submissions can be addressed as follows:
a)at no time did the applicant claim to fear harm on the basis of a particular social group of “fishing caste” as referred to in the Applicant’s Submissions at [2] and [3];
b)the Applicant’s Submissions at [5] were addressed by the Tribunal in finding that the applicant returning as a failed asylum seeker did not give rise to a real chance or significant risk of harm: CB 351 at [77]; and
c)the Applicant’s Submission at [6] is plainly a plea for impermissible merits review of the Tribunal Decision: Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
No jurisdictional error is established by the matters referred to in the Applicant’s Submissions.

Oral submissions

The applicant made a brief oral submission that he had submitted lots of materials and he did not think the Tribunal took them into consideration. The Court has examined the materials in the Court Book and notes the documents the applicant appeared to provide the Tribunal were two sets of written submissions from his migration agent, the Police Letter and S’s death certificate. The Tribunal referred to those documents in the Tribunal Decision as follows:
a)at CB 347 at [61] it was not satisfied the Police Letter was genuine and afforded it little weight as a result, something it was entitled to do for the reasons it gave;
b)at CB 343 at [38] it referred to S’s death certificate and did not appear to cavil with the notion that S was dead; and
c)the written submissions were addressed throughout the Tribunal Decision and a number of the sources of country information referred to by the applicant’s migration agent were included or referenced by the Tribunal.
The Court is not satisfied the applicant’s oral submission discloses any jurisdictional error.

Conclusion and order

Because the applicant was self-represented the Court has remained alert to the possibility of error in the Tribunal Decision: MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection & Anor [2015] FCA 1392; (2015) 238 FCR 158 at [112] per Mortimer J. The Court has, however, concluded that there is no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision. The Judicial Review Application must therefore be dismissed. There will be an order accordingly.
The Court will hear the parties as to costs.

I certify that the preceding fifty-five (55) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Antoni Lucev

Associate:

Date: 19 February 2019