SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Wiggins Island Coal Export Terminal Pty Limited v Civil Mining & Construction Pty Ltd [2021] QCA 8
PARTIES:
WIGGINS ISLAND COAL EXPORT TERMINAL PTY LIMITED
ABN 20 131 210 038
(appellant)
v
CIVIL MINING & CONSTRUCTION PTY LTD
ABN 18 102 557 175
(respondent)FILE NO:
Appeal No 2221 of 2020
SC No 6050 of 2013DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2020] QSC 1 (Flanagan J)DELIVERED ON:
29 January 2021
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
8 September 2020
JUDGES:
Holmes CJ and Philippides JA and Brown J
ORDERS:
1. The time for the respondent to file and serve its Notice of Contention is extended to 10 August 2020.
2. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
3. The parties are to file any further submissions on reserved costs by 5 pm on 5 February 2021.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – OFFERS OF COMPROMISE, PAYMENTS INTO COURT AND SETTLEMENTS – OFFER OF COMPROMISE OR OFFER TO SETTLE OR CONSENT TO JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULES – GENERALLY – where there was a claim and counterclaim – where the appellant made an “all-up” offer to settle “all claims in the proceeding” which was expressed to be under ch 9 pt 5 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (“the Rules”) – where the offer did not distinguish between the claim and counterclaim – where the trial judge held that rr 360 and 361 of the Rules did not apply to the appellant’s offer to settle because it did not distinguish between the claim and counterclaim – where the trial judge ordered each party to pay the other’s costs in the proceeding in which it was unsuccessful – where the appellant appeals the costs order on the basis that the offer to settle was effective under the Rules – whether rr 360 and 361 of the Rules apply to the appellant’s offer to settle
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – OFFERS OF COMPROMISE, PAYMENTS INTO COURT AND SETTLEMENTS – INFORMAL OFFERS AND CALDERBANK LETTERS – where the appellant’s offer to settle was accompanied by a letter which bore the heading “Without prejudice except as to costs” – where the appellant argues that, if its offer to settle did not engage rr 360 and 361, it should have been treated as an effective Calderbank offer – whether the appellant’s offer to settle should have been taken into account in the exercise of the costs discretion under r 681 of the Rules
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – APPEALS AS TO COSTS – RELEVANT PRINCIPLES – WHERE DISCRETION NOT EXERCISED – ADEQUACY OF REASONS – where the appellant submits that the respondent failed to comply with its obligations under r 5 of the Rules in its approach to other offers to settle made early in the proceedings – where the trial…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Wiggins Island Coal Export Terminal Pty Ltd v Civil Mining &... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2021] QCA 8
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the appellant’s offer to settle did not distinguish between the claim and counterclaim and therefore did not engage rules 360 and 361 of the Rules. However, the court also considered whether the offer should be treated as an effective Calderbank offer, given it was accompanied by a letter marked “Without prejudice except as to costs.” The court concluded that the offer did not constitute an effective Calderbank offer and was not to be taken into account when exercising the costs discretion under rule 681 of the Rules. Additionally, the court found that the trial judge’s approach to the exercise of his discretion in relation to costs was appropriate, and the reasons provided were adequate. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs.
The court further noted that the appellant's submissions regarding the respondent’s approach to earlier offers to settle did not warrant a departure from the general principle that costs follow the event. The time for the respondent to file and serve its Notice of Contention was extended to 10 August 2020. The parties were directed to file any further submissions on reserved costs by 5 pm on 5 February 2021. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The time for the respondent to file and serve its Notice of Contention is extended to 10 August 2020.
2. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
3. The parties are to file any further submissions on reserved costs by 5 pm on 5 February 2021.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter initially came before the trial court where Wiggins brought a claim against CMC for damages for alleged breaches of contract concerning the construction of a coal export terminal on Wiggins Island. CMC filed a counterclaim for outstanding payments. During the litigation, Wiggins made an offer to settle all claims, which included both the original claim and the counterclaim. The offer was made under Chapter 9 Part 5 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (NSW) and was accompanied by a "Without prejudice except as to costs" letter. The trial judge found that rules 360 and 361 did not apply to the offer because it did not differentiate between the claim and counterclaim. Consequently, the trial judge ordered each party to bear its own costs. Dissatisfied with the costs order, Wiggins appealed to a higher court. The appeal was heard and determined by the court, which dismissed Wiggins' appeal with costs.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether rules 360 and 361 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (NSW) apply to Wiggins' offer to settle.
2. Whether Wiggins' offer to settle should have been treated as an effective Calderbank offer.
3. Whether the trial judge gave sufficient weight to the respondent's approach to early offers in the exercise of the costs discretion under rule 681 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (NSW).
4. Whether the trial judge's reasons for the costs order were adequate.
Held
1. The court held that rules 360 and 361 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (NSW) do not apply to Wiggins' offer to settle.
2. The court held that Wiggins' offer to settle should not have been treated as an effective Calderbank offer.
3. The court held that the trial judge gave sufficient weight to the respondent's approach to early offers in the exercise of the costs discretion under rule 681 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (NSW).
4. The court held that the trial judge's reasons for the costs order were adequate.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court addressed the first issue by examining the nature of Wiggins' offer to settle, which was an "all-up" offer covering all claims in the proceeding. The trial judge had found that rules 360 and 361 did not apply because Wiggins' offer did not distinguish between the claim and counterclaim. The court affirmed this finding, emphasising that for the rules to apply, the offer must be specific to the claim or counterclaim, which Wiggins' offer was not. The binding principle here is that the application of rules 360 and 361 is contingent on the specificity of the offer to either the claim or counterclaim.
Regarding the second issue, the court considered whether Wiggins' offer should have been treated as an effective Calderbank offer despite not falling under rules 360 and 361. The court noted that Wiggins' offer was accompanied by a letter marked "without prejudice except as to costs," which is indicative of a Calderbank offer. However, the court reasoned that since the rules did not apply, and the offer did not comply with the rules' requirements, it could not be treated as a Calderbank offer. The court emphasised that a Calderbank offer must be unequivocal and made without a reservation of rights to be considered effective.
The third issue involved the trial judge's consideration of the respondent's approach to early offers in the exercise of the costs discretion. The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to sufficiently weigh this aspect in making the costs order. The court found that the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent's actions did not warrant a departure from the general rule that costs follow the event was appropriate. The court stressed that the trial judge's discretion under rule 681 allows for consideration of various factors, including the conduct of the parties in negotiations.
Finally, the court assessed the adequacy of the trial judge's reasons for the costs order. The appellant contended that the reasons were insufficient. The court concluded that the trial judge provided adequate reasoning by explaining that the respondent's conduct did not justify a costs order different from the usual rule. The court underscored that the reasons must be sufficient to demonstrate the exercise of the court's discretion and the consideration of relevant factors. The ratio decidendi here is that adequate reasons must reflect the application of the court's discretion and consideration of the parties' conduct.