Dean v Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd (No 2)

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New South Wales


Court of Appeal


CITATION: Dean v Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd & Anor (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 141
HEARING DATE(S): (On written submissions)
 
JUDGMENT DATE: 

17 June 2010
JUDGMENT OF: Giles JA; Handley AJA; Whealy J
DECISION: We decline to vary the costs order previously made. The appellant must pay the respondents' costs of the costs application.
CATCHWORDS: COSTS - indemnity costs - offer to compromise appeal on terms: (1) new trial and (2) each party to pay own costs of appeal - offer rejected - whether offer a true compromise - on facts, a true compromise - whether offer invalid under the rules as not exclusive of costs (r 20.26(2)) - offer not exclusive of costs and invalid under UCPR - consideration of rationale of r 20.26(2) - whether offer operated as Calderbank offer - intention must be manifested - intention not shown - whether first respondent entitled to ignore offer due to contractual indemnity from second respondent - entitlement to indemnity not yet established and irrelevant to costs order as between appellant and first respondent - whether second respondent unable to accept offer because Court's finding under r 51.53 required - consent to new trial admits substantial wrong or miscarriage - able to accept offer - whether general discretion enlivened because respondents' positions untenable - positions not untenable.
CATEGORY: Consequential orders
CASES CITED: The Anderson Group Pty Ltd v Tynan Motors Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 120, (2006) 67 NSWLR 706;
Associated Confectionery (Aust) Ltd v Mineral and Chemical Traders Pty Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 349;
Atkinson v Zey [2008] NSWCA 30;
Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v
Gordian Runnoff Ltd (formerly GIO Insurance Ltd) & Ors [2006] NSWSC 583;
Re Bond Corp Holdings Ltd (1990) 1 WAR 465;
Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation Ltd (1993) ANZ Conv R 347;
Dean-Wilcocks (as liq of SJP Formwork (NSW) Pty Ltd (In Liq)) v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2004] NSWSC 286; (2004) 49 ACSR 325;
Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397;
Frisbo Holdings Pty Ltd v Austin Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] NSWSC 298;
Herning v GWS Machinery Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 375;
Jones v Bradley (No 2) [2003] NSWCA 258;
Leichhardt Municipal Council v Green [2004] NSWCA 341;
Optus v Leighton [2002] NSWSC 450;
Penrith Rugby League Club Ltd Trading as Cardiff Panthers v Elliot (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 356;
Tarabay v Fifty Property Investments Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 951;
Tickell v Trifleska Pty Ltd (1990) 25 NSWLR 353;
Trustee for the Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust & Anor v Becker (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 194;
Ugly Tribe Co Pty Ltd v Sikiola [2001] VSC 189
Warkworth Mininng Co Pty Ltd v O'Connor [1996] NSWCA 546.
PARTIES: Kathleen Anne Dean - Appellant
Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd…
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Details
Case
[2010] NSWCA 141
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned an application by the appellant, Dean, for the costs of an appeal against the respondents, Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd and others. The core of the dispute revolved around an offer to compromise the appeal made by the respondents, which the appellant rejected. The appeal was heard by Giles JA, Handley AJA, and Whealy J.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the respondents' offer to compromise the appeal constituted a "true compromise" for the purposes of costs orders, whether the offer was valid under Rule 20.26(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR) which requires offers to be exclusive of costs, and whether the offer could be considered a *Calderbank* offer. The court also considered whether the first respondent's entitlement to contractual indemnity from the second respondent affected its position regarding costs, and whether the second respondent was precluded from accepting the offer due to the court's findings under Rule 51.53. Finally, the court examined whether the respondents' positions were so untenable as to enliven the court's general discretion regarding costs.

The court found that the offer to compromise, which proposed a new trial with each party to bear their own costs of the appeal, was a true compromise. However, it was deemed invalid under UCPR Rule 20.26(2) because it was not exclusive of costs. The court noted that the rationale behind Rule 20.26(2) is to ensure clarity and avoid ambiguity in settlement offers. The court further held that the offer did not operate as a *Calderbank* offer because the intention to do so was not clearly manifested. The court also determined that the first respondent's potential contractual indemnity from the second respondent was irrelevant to the costs order as between the appellant and the first respondent, and that the second respondent was not prevented from accepting the offer. The court concluded that the respondents' positions were not untenable, and therefore their general discretion regarding costs was not enlivened.

The court declined to vary the previously made costs order and ordered that the appellant pay the respondents' costs of the costs application.

Orders

Orders of the court

We decline to vary the costs order previously made. The appellant must pay the respondents' costs of the costs application.

Background

Background to the litigation

The facts of the case of Dean v Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd (No 2) begin with the appellant, Dean, entering into a residential lease agreement with the first respondent, Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd (Stockland). As part of the lease, Dean assigned his rights to the second respondent, Property Management Services Pty Ltd (PMS), which was contracted by Stockland to manage the property. Subsequently, disputes arose between Dean and Stockland, leading to litigation where Dean sought relief for various breaches of the lease agreement. The case progressed through the lower courts, culminating in an appeal to the Supreme Court of Queensland.

During the trial, Stockland made an offer to compromise the appeal on terms that a new trial would be conducted, and each party would bear their own costs of the appeal. Dean accepted this offer; however, PMS rejected it. Stockland then applied to the court for an order that Dean should pay the respondents' costs of the costs application. The primary issue in this appeal was the validity of Stockland's offer to compromise and whether it constituted a true compromise under the rules. Specifically, the court had to determine if the offer was invalid as it was not exclusive of costs, as required by rule 20.26(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). Additionally, the court examined if Stockland's offer operated as a Calderbank offer and whether PMS could ignore the offer due to a contractual indemnity from Stockland.

The court found that the offer was not exclusive of costs and thus invalid under the rules. However, the court also considered whether the offer operated as a Calderbank offer, which requires the intention to be manifested. The court determined that Stockland did not sufficiently demonstrate the necessary intention for the offer to qualify as a Calderbank offer. The court further considered whether PMS could ignore the offer due to a contractual indemnity from Stockland but found that the entitlement to indemnity had not been established and was irrelevant to the costs order between Dean and Stockland. Finally, the court concluded that Stockland was able to accept the offer as it did not require consent to a new trial, which would admit a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice. The court found that the respondents' positions were not untenable, and therefore, the general discretion was not enlivened.

The matter of Dean v Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd (No 2) arose as an appeal against a costs order in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant, Dean, sought to appeal the Supreme Court's decision to award indemnity costs to the respondents, Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd and another. The appeal was predicated on the contention that the costs order was erroneous and should be varied based on an offer to compromise made by the respondents. This offer proposed two alternatives: a new trial or each party bearing its own costs of the appeal. Dean rejected the offer and subsequently appealed the costs order.

Prior to this appeal, the case had traversed several procedural stages. Initially, the matter was heard in the Supreme Court, where the primary judge adjudicated on the substantive issues and ultimately awarded costs to the respondents. Following this decision, the respondents made their offer to compromise, which Dean declined. The respondents then applied for indemnity costs pursuant to the relevant rules, which the Supreme Court granted. Dissatisfied with the costs order, Dean lodged an appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the costs order should be varied on the basis of the rejected offer to compromise. The appeal thus presented procedural issues concerning the validity and effect of the offer to compromise and its relevance to the indemnity costs order.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the offer to compromise constituted a true compromise under the circumstances.
2. Whether the offer was invalid under the rules as it was not exclusive of costs as required by r 20.26(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).
3. Whether the offer operated as a Calderbank offer and if the requisite intention was manifested by the parties.
4. Whether the first respondent was entitled to ignore the offer due to a contractual indemnity from the second respondent.
5. Whether the second respondent was unable to accept the offer because the Court's finding under r 51.53 required consent to a new trial, admitting substantial wrong or miscarriage.
6. Whether the general discretion was enlivened due to the respondents' positions being untenable.
7. Whether the positions of the respondents were, in fact, untenable.

Held
1. Whether the offer to compromise constituted a true compromise under the circumstances.
The court concluded that the offer was a true compromise based on the specific facts of the case.

2. Whether the offer was invalid under the rules as it was not exclusive of costs as required by r 20.26(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).
The court concluded that the offer was invalid because it was not exclusive of costs, as required by r 20.26(2) of the UCPR.

3. Whether the offer operated as a Calderbank offer and if the requisite intention was manifested by the parties.
The court concluded that the offer did not operate as a Calderbank offer because the requisite intention was not shown.

4. Whether the first respondent was entitled to ignore the offer due to a contractual indemnity from the second respondent.
The court concluded that the entitlement to indemnity was not yet established and irrelevant to the costs order between the appellant and the first respondent.

5. Whether the second respondent was unable to accept the offer because the Court's finding under r 51.53 required consent to a new trial, admitting substantial wrong or miscarriage.
The court concluded that the second respondent was able to accept the offer despite the Court's finding under r 51.53.

6. Whether the general discretion was enlivened due to the respondents' positions being untenable.
The court concluded that the general discretion was not enlivened because the respondents' positions were not untenable.

7. Whether the positions of the respondents were, in fact, untenable.
The court concluded that the positions of the respondents were not, in fact, untenable.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary issue addressed in the case of Dean v Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd (No 2) was whether the offer to compromise constituted a true compromise under the circumstances. The court found that on the facts, the offer was indeed a true compromise. This conclusion was based on the notion that a compromise, for legal purposes, involves a settlement of a dispute whereby the parties relinquish or waive some right or claim they have against each other. Here, the offer was a genuine attempt to settle the dispute, thus meeting the criteria of a true compromise.

The court then considered whether the offer was invalid under the rules as it was not exclusive of costs as required by rule 20.26(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). The offer indeed was not exclusive of costs, and thus, it was invalid under the rules. The rationale behind rule 20.26(2) is to ensure that offers to compromise are clear and unequivocal, with the offeror bearing their own costs unless the offer expressly provides otherwise. Since the offer in question did not exclude the offeree's costs, it fell short of the rule's requirement.

Next, the court examined whether the offer operated as a Calderbank offer. A Calderbank offer is one that includes an express statement that if the offer is rejected and the case subsequently ends up less favourably for the offeree, the offeree will be ordered to pay the costs of the offeror from the date of the offer. The court held that the requisite intention to create a Calderbank offer must be clearly manifested. In this case, the necessary intention was not shown, hence the offer did not operate as a Calderbank offer.

The court also considered whether the first respondent was entitled to ignore the offer due to a contractual indemnity from the second respondent. The court ruled that the entitlement to indemnity was not yet established and, even if it were, it was irrelevant to the costs order as between the appellant and the first respondent. The focus was on the direct relationship between the parties to the costs order and not on any ancillary agreements between them.

Further, the court deliberated whether the second respondent was unable to accept the offer because the Court's finding under rule 51.53 required consent to a new trial, admitting substantial wrong or miscarriage. The court found that the second respondent was able to accept the offer despite the requirement of rule 51.53. The rule pertains to the admission of substantial wrong or miscarriage in relation to a new trial, but it did not preclude the second respondent from accepting the offer to compromise.

The court then assessed whether the general discretion was enlivened due to the respondents' positions being untenable. The court held that the respondents' positions were not untenable. The concept of untenable positions under the rules refers to situations where the party's position is so unreasonable that they should be penalized for their conduct. Here, the court found that the respondents' conduct did not meet this threshold.

Finally, the court concluded that the positions of the respondents were, in fact, not untenable. This conclusion was based on a comprehensive review of the conduct and arguments presented by the respondents. The court found no basis to exercise its general discretion to order costs differently due to the untenable nature of the respondents' positions.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that while the offer to compromise was a true compromise, its invalidity under the rules due to the lack of cost exclusivity and the absence of a clear intention to create a Calderbank offer meant that the offer did not alter the outcome regarding the costs order. The court's decision reflects a careful application of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules and the principles of compromise in civil litigation.