State of Queensland v Stephenson

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ

STATE OF QUEENSLAND  APPELLANT

AND

PETER ROBERT STEPHENSON  RESPONDENT

State of Queensland v Stephenson
[2006] HCA 20
17 May 2006
B59/2005

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland

Representation:

D O J North SC with D J Campbell SC for the appellant (instructed by Crown Solicitor for the State of Queensland)

D B Fraser QC with G R Mullins for the respondent (instructed by Gilshenan & Luton Lawyers

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ

SCOTT WILLIAM REEMAN  APPELLANT

AND

STATE OF QUEENSLAND  RESPONDENT

Reeman v State of Queensland
B60/2005

ORDER

1.        Appeal allowed with costs.

2.Set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland made on 17 December 2004 and, in lieu thereof, order that:

(a) the appeal to that Court be allowed;

(b)the orders made by Holmes J on 9 September 2004 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, it be ordered that the period of limitation for the action commenced by the appellant on 22 July 2002 be extended so that it expired on 22 July 2002; and

(c)the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the applications before Holmes J and of the appeal.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland

Representation:

D B Fraser QC  with G R Mullins for the appellant (instructed by Gilshenan & Luton Lawyers)

D O J North SC with D J Campbell SC for the respondent (instructed by Crown Solicitor for the State of Queensland)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ

STATE OF QUEENSLAND   APPLICANT

AND

TIMOTHY JAMES WRIGHTSON  RESPONDENT

State of Queensland v Wrightson
B91/2005

ORDER

Application for special leave to appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland

Representation:

D O J North SC with J B Rolls for the applicant (instructed by Crown Solicitor for the State of Queensland)

D B Fraser QC with G R Mullins for the respondent (instructed by Gilshenan & Luton Lawyers)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ.   These appeals[1] and application for special leave[2] are brought from the Queensland Court of Appeal and involve common issues. These turn upon a close consideration of the text and structure of Pt 3 (ss 29‑40) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Q) ("the Limitation Act"). Of the British ancestor of Pt 3[3], Lord Reid observed that it had a strong claim to the distinction of being the worst drafted Act on the statute book[4].  The three cases now before this Court in turn…

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Details
Case
[2006] HCA 20
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered appeals from the Queensland Court of Appeal concerning applications to extend limitation periods under the *Limitation of Actions Act 1974* (Qld). The appellants, the State of Queensland, appealed decisions that allowed former police officers, Peter Robert Stephenson, Scott Walter Reeman, and Timothy James Wrightson, to extend the limitation period for their negligence claims. Each plaintiff had sued the State for damages for personal injury arising from psychiatric conditions developed after performing undercover duties, with their actions instituted more than three years after their causes of action accrued.

The central legal issue before the High Court was the interpretation of section 31(2)(a) of the *Limitation of Actions Act 1974* (Qld). Specifically, the court had to determine whether this provision was satisfied when a material fact of a decisive character relating to a right of action only attained that decisive character after the "relevant date," which was the commencement of the year preceding the expiration of the limitation period, even if the fact itself was within the applicant's means of knowledge before that date. The court also considered the application of a purposive approach to statutory interpretation for remedial legislation.

The High Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the orders of the Court of Appeal. The majority reasoned that the "beneficial" or "liberal" approach to remedial legislation, consistent with the statutory language, favoured an interpretation where a fact could become of a "decisive character" after the relevant date, even if known earlier. This interpretation aligned with the purpose of section 31 to prevent unjust outcomes caused by earlier limitations law. The court found that the Court of Appeal's interpretation was more consistent with this approach. Consequently, the High Court ordered that the plaintiffs' applications and actions be dismissed, with judgment entered for the defendant, the State of Queensland, in each case.

Orders

Orders of the court

State of Queensland v Stephenson (B59 of 2005)

1. The appeal be allowed with costs.

2. The orders of the Court of Appeal be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs.

Reeman v State of Queensland (B60 of 2005).

That the appeal be dismissed with costs.

State of Queensland v Wrightson (B91 of 2005).

1. That special leave be granted to the applicant to appeal from the whole of the judgment and order of the Court of Appeal.

2. That the appeal be allowed with costs.

3. That the orders of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeal be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a) the plaintiff's application and action be dismissed and that there be judgment for the defendant in the action;

(b) the plaintiff pay the defendant's costs of the action and of the appeal to the Court of Appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

This judgment concerns two appeals and one application for special leave to appeal which was argued as an appeal. The three appeals, as they are henceforth described, were heard together. They are attended by a degree of factual, legal and procedural complexity which may be explained as follows.Factual background The plaintiff in the first proceeding is Peter Robert Stephenson. The plaintiff in the second proceeding is Scott Walter Reeman. The plaintiff in the third proceeding is Timothy James Wrightson. There is evidence that each plaintiff is a former police officer who had carried out undercover or covert duties investigating drug dealing; each had experienced traumatic and life threatening events, and was exposed to peril; after returning to ordinary duties, each developed a psychiatric condition; each sought medical treatment; and each attempted to persevere with his police career, but unsuccessfully. Following the termination of his employment in the Queensland Police Service ("QPS"), each sued his employer, the State of Queensland, in negligence for damages for personal injury. Each of the proceedings was instituted more than three years after the cause of action accrued.The legislation Section 11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Q) ("the Act") provides that "an action for damages for negligence ... in which damages claimed by the plaintiff consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury ... shall not be brought after the expiration of 3 years from the date on which the cause of action arose." It followed that the claims were statute-barred. However, the Act permits this limitation period to be extended, and each plaintiff applied for it to be extended. Section 31(2) provides:"(2)Where on application to a court by a person claiming to have a right of action to which this section applies, it appears to the court –(a)that a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within the means of knowledge of the applicant until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action; and(b)that there is evidence to establish the right of action apart from a defence founded on the expiration of a period of limitation;the court may order that the period of limitation for the action be extended so that it expires at the end of 1 year after that date and thereupon, for the purposes of the action brought by the applicant in that court, the period of limitation is extended accordingly." Various key expressions in s 31(2) are defined in s 30(1), which provides:"(1)For the purposes of this section and sections 31, 32, 33 and 34 –(a)the material facts relating to a right of action include the following –(i)the fact of the occurrence of negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty on which the right of action is founded;(ii)the identity of the person against whom the right of action lies;(iii)the fact that the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty causes personal injury; (iv)the nature and extent of the personal injury so caused;(v)the extent to which the personal injury is caused by the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty;(b)material facts relating to a right of action are of a decisive character if but only if a reasonable person knowing those facts and having taken the appropriate advice on those facts, would regard those facts as showing –(i)that an action on the right of action would (apart from the effect of the expiration of a period of limitation) have a reasonable prospect of success and of resulting in an award of damages sufficient to justify the bringing of an action on the right of action; and(ii)that the person whose means of knowledge is in question ought in the person's own interests and taking the person's circumstances into account to bring an action on the right of action;(c)a fact is not within the means of knowledge of a person at a particular time if, but only if –(i)the person does not know the fact at that time; and(ii)as far as the fact is able to be found out by the person – the person has taken all reasonable steps to find out the fact before that time."

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ (dissent) KIRBY J HEYDON J
Similar differences have arisen in England over the meaning and application of like limitation extension provisions[45]. It cannot be denied that competing considerations of legal policy inform the approach that judges take to the meaning and application of provisions such as s 31(2) of the Limitations Act. It is important to be alert to such considerations. However, it does not assist their accurate resolution to deny that the general purpose of the contested provisions was beneficial for plaintiffs (otherwise out of time) and remedial (of the unjust outcomes that earlier limitations law had produced).[45]See, eg, Adams v Bracknell Forest BC [2005] 1 AC 76 at 100 per Baroness Hale of Richmond.Conclusions: the preferable construction When, therefore, there are alternative interpretations that may be adopted, as demonstrated in this case, it is more consistent with the reformatory purposes of s 31 in the Limitations Act to adopt the "beneficial" or "liberal" approach, to the full extent that doing so is consistent with the statutory language. The interpretation favoured by Davies JA in the Court of Appeal is more consistent with that approach. This conclusion does not mean that an applicant will necessarily secure an order for extension of the period of limitation for the action. The making of such an order is still dependent on the applicant's demonstrating that the justice of the case requires that the discretion be exercised favourably[46]. That is the point at which the concerns voiced by McHugh J in Taylor may be given weight to the extent that the discretion allows that to happen[47]. However, the considerations of statutory language and interpretative approach support the analysis of the contested provision favoured by Davies JA and preferred by the joint reasons.[46]Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 544 per Dawson J, 550 per Toohey and Gummow JJ, 556 per McHugh J, 567 my own reasons.[47]See above these reasons at [50].Orders I therefore agree in the orders proposed by the joint reasons. This judgment concerns two appeals and one application for special leave to appeal which was argued as an appeal. The three appeals, as they are henceforth described, were heard together. They are attended by a degree of factual, legal and procedural complexity which may be explained as follows.Factual background The plaintiff in the first proceeding is Peter Robert Stephenson. The plaintiff in the second proceeding is Scott Walter Reeman. The plaintiff in the third proceeding is Timothy James Wrightson. There is evidence that each plaintiff is a former police officer who had carried out undercover or covert duties investigating drug dealing; each had experienced traumatic and life threatening events, and was exposed to peril; after returning to ordinary duties, each developed a psychiatric condition; each sought medical treatment; and each attempted to persevere with his police career, but unsuccessfully. Following the termination of his employment in the Queensland Police Service ("QPS"), each sued his employer, the State of Queensland, in negligence for damages for personal injury. Each of the proceedings was instituted more than three years after the cause of action accrued.The legislation

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIRBY J, HEYDON J

Full text does not contain this section.