Sola Optical Australia Pty Ltd v Mills

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wilson, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ.

SOLA OPTICAL AUSTRALIA PTY. LTD. v. JUDITH ANN MILLS

2 December 1987

Decision


WILSON, DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY AND GAUDRON JJ. On 23 June 1981, the respondent Mrs Mills injured her right arm in the course of her employment by the appellant. Notwithstanding surgery and other treatment, she has continued to suffer pain and to be restricted in her freedom of movement. She claims to have been unable to work.

2. In October 1981 the respondent instructed her solicitors to prosecute both a claim for workers' compensation and a claim for damages at common law. The claim for compensation was instituted and resulted in a settlement which was the subject of a consent order on 23 January 1984. The order preserved the right of the respondent to pursue a common law claim.

3. Section 36 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (S.A.) as amended ("the Act") provides that all actions for damages in respect of personal injuries "shall be commenced within three years next after the cause of action accrued but not after." The prescribed period in the case of the respondent therefore expired on 23 June 1984. An identical period was prescribed by s.82(2) of the Workers Compensation Act 1971 (S.A.) as amended (which Act was recently repealed and replaced by the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (S.A.)). Unfortunately, the respondent's solicitors through inadvertence failed to commence the proceedings within time. The question then arose whether the period within which the action could be commenced might be extended in accordance with the provisions of s.48 of the Act. So far as material, that section reads as follows:

"48. (1) Subject to this section, where an Act, regulation, rule or by-law prescribes or limits the time for -
(a) instituting an action;

(b) doing any act, or taking any step in an
action;
or
(c) doing any act or taking any step with a
view to instituting an action,
a court may extend the time so prescribed or limited to such an extent, and upon such terms (if any) as the justice of the case may require.
(2) A court may exercise the powers conferred
by this section in respect of any action that -
(a) the court has jurisdiction to entertain;

or

(b) the court would, if the action were not
out of time, have jurisdiction to entertain.
(3) This section does not -

(a) apply to criminal proceedings;

or
(b) empower a court to extend a limitation of
time prescribed by this Act unless it is satisfied -
(i) that facts material to the plaintiff's case were not ascertained by him until some point of time occurring within twelve months before the expiration of the period of limitation or occurring after the expiration of that period and that the action was instituted within twelve months after the ascertainment of those facts by the plaintiff;
or
(ii) that the plaintiff's failure to institute the action within the…
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Details
Case
[1987] HCA 57
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Sola Optical Australia Pty Ltd (the appellant) appealed to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia. The dispute concerned the interpretation of a clause in an employment agreement between the appellant and Mr. Mills (the respondent), a former employee. The clause in question related to the calculation of a bonus payable to Mr. Mills upon the termination of his employment.

The High Court was required to determine whether the bonus payable to the respondent was to be calculated based on the profit of the company for the financial year in which his employment terminated, or on the profit for the financial year preceding that termination. This involved an analysis of the specific wording of the employment agreement and the application of principles of contractual interpretation.

The Court considered the plain meaning of the contractual clause, which stipulated that the bonus was to be calculated on "the profit for the financial year ending on the date of termination of his employment". The judges unanimously held that this wording clearly indicated that the profit for the financial year in which the termination occurred was the relevant figure for the bonus calculation. They rejected the appellant's argument that the preceding financial year's profit should be used, finding no ambiguity in the language that would justify such an interpretation. The Court emphasised that where contractual language is clear, it must be given its ordinary and natural meaning.

The appeal was allowed, and the order of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia was set aside.

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