DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Roseneder v Roseneder & Anor [2014] QDC 268
PARTIES:
WADE ROSENEDER
(applicant/plaintiff)
v
DEON ROSENEDER
(first respondent/defendant)
and
AAI LIMITED (ABN 48 005 297 807)
(second respondent/defendant)
FILE NO/S:
3258/13
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Trial
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court, Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
2 December 2014
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
7-8 October 2014 (inclusive)
JUDGE:
Ryrie DCJ
ORDER:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the defendant’s costs of this application on a standard basis unless the parties otherwise agree.
CATCHWORDS:
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – PERSONAL INJURIES OCCASIONED BY MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT – where the limitation period for an action for damages for personal injuries to the plaintiff allegedly caused by the 1st respondent’s negligence in a motor vehicle accident has expired– whether there was a material fact of a decisive character – whether the material fact of a decisive character was within the plaintiff’s means of knowledge – whether the period of limitation for the action should be extended
Limitations of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) ss 30, 31
State of Queensland v Stephenson (2006) 226 CLR 197 – applied
NF v State of Queensland [2005] QCA 110 – applied
Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd v Norris [2012] QCA 101 – applied
Tregelles-Fox v Workcover Queensland [2010] QSC 288 – applied
Baillie v Creber & Anor [2010] QSC 52 – applied
Healy v Femdale Pty Ltd [1993] QCA 210 – applied; distinguishedCOUNSEL:
K. Holyoak (for the applicant)
T. Matthews QC (for the 2nd respondent)
SOLICITORS:
Shine Lawyers (for the applicant)
Quinlan Miller & Treston Lawyers (for the 2nd respondent)
Introduction
This is an application pursuant to s 31 of the Limitations of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) (‘LAA’) for the period of limitation in relation to a personal injuries action to be extended in respect of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 15th August 2008. The applicant accepts that before an order can be made pursuant to s 31, it must be shown that a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within the means of knowledge of the applicant until after 15th August 2010,[1] and no earlier than 18 September 2012.[2] The 2nd respondent opposes the application.
[1]LAA s31(2)(a).
[2] (Order of Kingham DCJ, Document 5 of Proceeding 3258/13; insofar as it relates to 3880/13).
The relevant Law
Section 31(2) of the LAA provides:
“(2)Where on application to a court by a person claiming to have a right of action to which this section applies, it appears to the court—
(a)that a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within the means of knowledge of the applicant until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action; and
(b) that there is evidence to establish the right of action apart from a defence founded on the…
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- AGLC
- Roseneder v Roseneder [2014] QDC 268
- Case
- [2014] QDC 268
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the applicable law and principles governing limitation periods, including the distinction between factual and legal causation. The court found that the applicant’s argument regarding the material fact of a decisive character was based on a misunderstanding of the relevant legal principles. The court held that the material fact of a decisive character must be a fact that, if known, would have led a reasonable person in the applicant’s position to commence proceedings within the limitation period. The court found that the applicant had failed to establish that the material fact of a decisive character was not within their means of knowledge at the relevant time.
The court dismissed the application, holding that the applicant had not satisfied the necessary criteria for extending the limitation period. The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated that the material fact of a decisive character was not within their means of knowledge at the time the cause of action accrued, and that the application was therefore without merit. The court ordered that the applicant pay the 1st respondent’s costs of the application on a standard basis, unless the parties otherwise agreed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the defendant’s costs of this application on a standard basis unless the parties otherwise agree.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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