McArdle v State of Queensland

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

McArdle v State of Queensland [2016] QSC 165

PARTIES:

SEAN PATRICK JUDE McARDLE

(applicant/plaintiff)

v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND

(respondent/defendant)

FILE NO/S:

BS No 6805 of 2015

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

1 August 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

2 June, 21 July 2016

JUDGE:

Martin J

ORDER:

Application dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS – EXTENSION OF TIME IN PERSONAL INJURIES MATTERS – KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL FACTS OF DECISIVE CHARACTER – GENERALLY – where the applicant was employed as an officer of the Queensland Police Service (QPS) – where the applicant brought an action against the QPS in negligence and breach of contract in relation to a permanent psychiatric injury that resulted in his being dismissed from his employment on medical grounds effective 3 August 2013 – where the QPS pleaded that the applicant was out of time with respect to part of his cause of action – where the applicant applies for an order extending the limitation period to 3 August 2014 – where the applicant was advised by the QPS of its intention to medically retire him prior to 3 August 2013 – whether the applicant was aware, prior to 3 August 2013, that he would be retired or dismissed from his employment and that he would have no means of appealing or otherwise affecting this decision – whether the applicant had thus acquired knowledge of material facts of a decisive character within the meaning of s 30 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 prior to 3 August 2013

Limitation of Actions Act 1974 s 30, s 31

Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 s 275, s 276, s 278, s 302

Castillon v P&O Ports Ltd [2008] 2 Qd R 219, considered
Charlton v WorkCover Qld & Ors [2006] QCA 498, cited
Moriarty v Sunbeam Corporation Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 325, cited
State of Queensland v RAF [2012] 2 Qd R 375, cited
State of Queensland v Stephenson (2006) 226 CLR 197, applied

Sugden v Crawford [1989] 1 Qd R 683, cited

COUNSEL:

M Horvath for the plaintiff

B Charrington for the defendant

SOLICITORS:

Hall Payne for the plaintiff

Dibbs Barker for the defendant

  1. This application seeks to engage those provisions of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974, which allow for the extension of a limitation period.

  2. The applicant (Mr McArdle) was a member of the Queensland Police Service (QPS). On 13 July 2015 the applicant filed a Claim and Statement of Claim against the State of Queensland seeking damages for negligence and breach of contract. The defendant pleads that part of his cause of action is out of time.

  3. In his Statement of Claim Mr McArdle alleges that he has suffered a post-traumatic stress disorder and a major depressive disorder as a result of breaches of duty by his employer. He identifies various matters which he says give rise to the liability…

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Details
Case
[2016] QSC 165
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of McArdle v State of Queensland, the applicant sought an extension of the limitation period for bringing a claim against the Queensland Police Service (QPS) for negligence and breach of contract in relation to a permanent psychiatric injury that resulted in his dismissal from employment. The QPS argued that the applicant was out of time with respect to part of his cause of action, and the applicant applied for an order extending the limitation period.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the applicant had acquired knowledge of material facts of a decisive character prior to 3 August 2013, which would have triggered the commencement of the limitation period under section 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974. The court had to determine whether the applicant's knowledge of the impending retirement or dismissal and the lack of appeal options constituted such material facts.

The court concluded that the applicant was aware of the material facts of a decisive character prior to 3 August 2013. The applicant received correspondence from the QPS indicating his impending retirement or dismissal, and the court found that a reasonable person would have regarded these facts as showing the features described in section 30(1)(b) of the Limitation of Actions Act. Consequently, the application for an extension of the limitation period was dismissed.

ORDERS:
The application for an extension of the limitation period is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Charrington (who appeared for the respondent) submitted that Mr McArdle, if properly advised, had the critical mass of information required to ground a worthwhile cause of action before his employment ended.Conclusions The evidence demonstrates that Mr McArdle, by the letter of 5 March 2013, was “warned” that he was going to be medically retired from the QPS. That letter also contained the references to the expert opinion that he could not continue in employment with QPS but could be employed elsewhere in the public service. In the letter of 6 June 2013 he was told that the QPS was satisfied that he was “permanently unfit” and incapable of performing any duties within the QPS. His employer told him that he should not continue to perform his duties and he was offered the option of retirement. That option was not taken up. In the letter of 27 June 2013 he was dismissed with effect from 2 August 2013. This is not a case where Mr McArdle could possibly have been confused about QPS’ intentions – they were spelled out with clarity in the letters referred to above. His evidence about his understanding of the process was that of a person who was unwilling to accept the inevitable. His contention that he did not believe he would be retired against his will was unsupported by any rational reading of the correspondence. In his evidence he said that he thought that if an independent person examined the evidence that it would be found that he had been put under pressure that was “questionable”. That may be so, but it does not prevent material facts of a decisive character coming within his knowledge before the time at which his employment came to an end. Mr McArdle knew on 29 June 2013, when he received the letter of 27 June 2013, that his employment was over. It was only a matter of time for the formality of termination to take effect. It follows, then, that that was when “a reasonable person, knowing those facts and having taken the appropriate advice on those facts” would regard those facts as showing the features described in s 30(1)(b) of the Limitation of Actions Act. The application is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 302 of the WCR Act allows for an extension of time within which to commence proceedings:“302 Alteration of period of limitation(1) A claimant may bring a proceeding for damages for personal injury after the end of the period of limitation allowed for bringing a proceeding for damages for personal injury under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 only if—(a)before the end of the period of limitation—(i)the claimant gives, or is taken to have given, a complying notice of claim; or(ii)the claimant gives a notice of claim for which the insurer waives compliance with the requirements of section 275 with or without conditions; or(iii)a court makes a declaration under section 297; or(iv)a court gives leave under section 298; and(b)the claimant complies with section 295.(2) However, the proceeding must be brought within 60 days after a compulsory conference for the claim is held.” The “period of limitation” referred to in s 302(1) includes any extension of the limitation period granted under s 31(2) Limitation of Actions Act. See Charlton v WorkCover Qld & Ors.[2] [2] [2006] QCA 498. A fresh notice of claim was served on 28 August 2014. It included events over a longer period: from 1 January 1996 to 3 August 2013. Both parties have proceeded on the basis that the effect of the notice was to “prevent” the limitation period from running. There is, it appears, some confusion in the parties’ minds about the effect of s 302 of the WCR Act but that need not be resolved now. The issue, no matter what the proper construction of s 302 may be, is: when did the material fact of a decisive character come within the means of knowledge of the applicant?What is the relevant test to apply? Section 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act allows the court to extend the limitation period in certain circumstances: “Ordinary actions(1)This section applies to actions for damages for negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or a provision made by or under a statute or independently of a contract or such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury to any person or damages in respect of injury resulting from the death of any person.(2)Where on application to a court by a person claiming to have a right of action to which this section applies, it appears to the court—(a) that a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within the means of knowledge of the applicant until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action; and(b) that there is evidence to establish the right of action apart from a defence founded on the expiration of a period of limitation;the court may order that the period of limitation for the action be extended so that it expires at the end of 1 year after that date and thereupon, for the purposes of the action brought by the applicant in that court, the period of limitation is extended accordingly.(3)This section applies to an action whether or not the period of limitation for the action has expired—(a) before the commencement of this Act; or(b) before an application is made under this section in respect of the right of action.” (emphasis added)