Byrne v Wagner Investments Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Byrne v Wagner Investments Pty Ltd & Ors [2020] QSC 76

PARTIES:

Luke Patrick Byrne

(Applicant)

v
Wagner Investments Pty Ltd (ABN 66 011 055 271)

(First Respondent)
And
Wagners Quarries Pty Ltd (ABN 80 092 751 669)
(Second Respondent)
And
Wagners CFT Manufacturing Pty Ltd (ABN 90 099 936 446)
(Third Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS 3168/20

DIVISION:

Trial

PROCEEDING:

Originating Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

14 April 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

30 March 2020

JUDGE:

Lyons SJA

ORDER:

1. Pursuant to s 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) the period of limitation in respect of the applicant’s claim for damages for personal injuries sustained on 26 October 2016 be extended as against the first, second and third respondents to 13 February 2021

2. Pursuant to s 43 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (PIPA) the applicant have leave to commence proceedings against the first, second and third respondents

3. The proceedings be stayed until the applicant complies with Chapter 2, part 1 of PIPA

4.     Costs in the cause

 CATCHWORDS

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS – EXTENSION OF TIME IN PERSONAL INJURIES MATTERS – KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL FACTS OF DECISIVE CHARACTER – WHAT ARE MATERIAL FACTS – where the applicant suffered a chemical burn during the course of his employment as concrete was being poured at a railway platform – where the injury resulted in a rare and serious bone infection which lodged in his spine and resulted in the fusion of two vertebrae – where the applicant has commenced proceedings to recover damages for injuries against his employer and against Wagners EFC as the manufacturer of the concrete – where the applicant’s limitation period expired on 26 October 2019 – where the applicant has applied for an extension of time in which to issue proceedings and leave to commence proceedings against the first, second and third respondents – where the applicant must show that a material fact of a decisive nature relating to the right of action was not within his means of knowledge until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action in accordance with s 31(2)(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) – where the applicant seeks an extension of time against all the respondents to 13 February 2021 or in relation to the first and second respondents, at least until 18 April 2020 – whether a material fact in the context of this application is the identity of the parties against whom the right of action lies – whether the identity of the parties against whom the right of action lies was known prior to the critical date – whether the limitation period should be extended

Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 30, s 31

Personal Injuries Proceeding Act 2002 (Qld), s 43

Godden v State of Queensland (2016)…

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Details
Case
[2020] QSC 76
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Byrne, sought an extension of the limitation period for his claim against Wagner Investments Pty Ltd and others for personal injuries sustained in an occupational accident. The accident involved a chemical burn from concrete, resulting in a serious bone infection and spinal fusion. Byrne's limitation period expired on 26 October 2019, and he applied for an extension of time to issue proceedings and leave to commence proceedings against the first, second, and third respondents. The court had to determine whether Byrne had knowledge of a material fact of decisive character after the limitation period commenced, and whether the limitation period should be extended under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld).

The court examined whether the identity of the parties against whom the right of action lay constituted a material fact in this context. It concluded that the identity of the parties was known prior to the critical date, but the full extent of the injury and its causative factors were not known until after the limitation period commenced. The court held that the applicant's lack of knowledge about the full extent of the injury constituted a material fact of decisive character. It found that Byrne did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, the full extent of the injury until after the limitation period commenced. Consequently, the court granted an extension of the limitation period until 13 February 2021 for all respondents.

The court further granted leave to the applicant to commence proceedings against the respondents in accordance with the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld). The proceedings were to be stayed until the applicant complied with Chapter 2, part 1 of the Act. The court awarded costs in the cause to the applicant.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to s 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) the period of limitation in respect of the applicant’s claim for damages for personal injuries sustained on 26 October 2016 be extended as against the first, second and third respondents to 13 February 2021

2. Pursuant to s 43 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (PIPA) the applicant have leave to commence proceedings against the first, second and third respondents

3. The proceedings be stayed until the applicant complies with Chapter 2, part 1 of PIPA

4. Costs in the cause

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant suffered a chemical burn during the course of his employment when concrete was being poured at a railway platform. The injury resulted in a rare and serious bone infection which subsequently lodged in his spine and caused the fusion of two vertebrae. The applicant has commenced proceedings to recover damages for his injuries against his employer and against Wagners EFC as the manufacturer of the concrete. The applicant's limitation period expired on 26 October 2019. The applicant has applied for an extension of time in which to issue proceedings and leave to commence proceedings against the first, second, and third respondents. The applicant must demonstrate that a material fact of a decisive nature relating to the right of action was not within his means of knowledge until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action in accordance with s 31(2)(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld). The applicant seeks an extension of time against all the respondents to 13 February 2021 or in relation to the first and second respondents, at least until 18 April 2020.

The applicant has applied for an extension of time to issue proceedings and leave to commence proceedings against the first, second, and third respondents. This application arises from a personal injury claim where the applicant's limitation period has expired. The applicant argues that he was unaware of the material facts relating to the right of action until after the limitation period had expired. The application was heard by the court which considered the provisions of s 31(2)(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) and s 43 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (PIPA). The court was required to determine whether the applicant had met the criteria for an extension of time and whether leave should be granted to commence proceedings against the respondents.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether a material fact in the context of this application is the identity of the parties against whom the right of action lies.
2. Whether the identity of the parties against whom the right of action lies was known prior to the critical date.
3. Whether the limitation period should be extended in accordance with s 31(2)(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld).

Held
1. The court concluded that a material fact in the context of this application is the identity of the parties against whom the right of action lies.
2. The court found that the identity of the parties against whom the right of action lies was not known prior to the critical date.
3. The court held that the limitation period should be extended in accordance with s 31(2)(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the legal principles surrounding the extension of limitation periods in personal injury matters, particularly under s 31(2)(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld). The applicant must demonstrate that a material fact of decisive nature relating to the right of action was not within their means of knowledge until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action. The court identified that the identity of the parties against whom the right of action lies is a material fact of decisive character. Given the circumstances of the case, where the applicant suffered a chemical burn and developed a serious bone infection, the court found that the applicant was unaware of the identity of the manufacturer of the concrete until after the limitation period had expired. This established that the applicant was not aware of a critical fact necessary to identify the parties against whom they could claim damages. The court also considered the legislative intent behind s 31(2)(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), which aims to prevent injustice by allowing extensions in cases where material facts are unknown. Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that the limitation period should be extended, thereby granting the application for an extension of time and leave to commence proceedings against all respondents, subject to compliance with the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld).