Spano v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SPANO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 2049
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – considerations regarding what is a “spousal relationship” under Migration Act – parties legally married under Australian domestic law – significant age difference between the parties – Tribunal did not identify what constituted a “meaningful discussion” by the parties about having children – Tribunal did not take into account the inherent unlikelihood of a 50 year old woman conceiving a child – legal unreasonableness established – writs issued.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.5F, 198(2)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.1.15A(3), Schedule 2 cls.309.211, 309.221

Cases cited:

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109

BZD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 94

FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 310 ALR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Angkawijaya (2016) 236 FCR 303

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 253 FCR 475

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

Applicant: MIRELLA SPANO
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: CAG  54 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Neville
Hearing date: 15 February 2018
Date of Last Submission: 15 February 2018
Delivered at: Canberra
Delivered on: 3 August 2018

REPRESENTATION

Solicitor for the Applicant: Sean Kikkert
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Quayle
Solicitors for the Respondents: Clayton Utz, Canberra

ON A FINAL BASIS, THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal is to be brought into this Court, and a writ of certiorari is to issue to quash the decision.

  2. A writ of mandamus shall issue and the matter is to be re-determined according to law.

  3. The First Respondent is to pay the Applicant’s costs in accordance with Schedule 1 Part 3 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT CANBERRA

CAG 54 of 2017

MIRELLA SPANO

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. At the commencement of their joint judgment in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Angkawijaya, Kenny and Griffiths JJ refer to and quote the lyrics of a 1955 song by Frank Sinatra “Love and marriage” and how such things “go together like a horse and carriage.”[1]  Their Honours go on to point out how such things were at the heart of the matters before them, particularly in their finding of “ambivalence” between the parties.

    [1] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Angkawijaya (“Angkawijaya “) (2016) 236 FCR 303 at [5].

  2. Such things are similarly relevant…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 2049
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal by the Minister for Immigration against a decision of the Federal Court. The dispute centred on whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) had committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider crucial evidence when assessing the applicant's claims. The case was heard by Neville J in the Federal Court of Australia.

The legal issues before the Court were whether the AAT's failure to consider a Punjab University transcript constituted jurisdictional error, and if so, whether this error affected the Tribunal's exercise of its power. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the transcript was substantial and consequential evidence, and if its omission led the Tribunal to ask itself a wrong question or ignore relevant material in a way that invalidated its decision.

Neville J applied principles established in High Court decisions, particularly *Craig v South Australia* and *Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf*. His Honour reiterated that jurisdictional error occurs when an administrative tribunal, through an error of law, identifies a wrong issue, asks a wrong question, ignores relevant material, or relies on irrelevant material, thereby affecting its exercise of power. The Court distinguished between errors that affect the tribunal's authority and errors of fact within its purview. Neville J emphasised that the importance of the material to the Tribunal's function and the seriousness of any error are key factors. In this case, the Tribunal's failure to consider the transcript, which underpinned its rejection of the applicant's claims based on untruthfulness, was found to be significant. The transcript's omission meant the Tribunal did not engage with the applicant's claims in a way that resolved potential ambiguities or explored alternative explanations, thus impacting the material elements required for a proper assessment.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Next, at [97], Robertson J said (emphasis added):[97] In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323, the passage cited by McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ, with whom Gleeson CJ agreed, from Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 shows that the High Court was concerned with the results or consequences of an error of law:If such an administrative tribunal falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the tribunal which reflects it.Thus merely to ignore “relevant material” does not establish jurisdictional error. This is consistent with proper limits on judicial review so that fact-finding is a matter for the tribunal of fact while the Court is concerned with whether the tribunal has acted so as to warrant the conclusion that it was not performing the task conferred on it by the legislation. At [111] and [112], his Honour further noted:In my opinion there is no clear distinction in each case between claims and evidence: see SHKB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 545 at [24], set out at [69] above. The fundamental question must be the importance of the material to the exercise of the Tribunal’s function and thus the seriousness of any error. In my opinion the distinction between claims and evidence provides a tool of analysis but is not the discrimen itself. Further, it is important not to reason that because a failure to deal with some (insubstantial or inconsequential) evidence will, in some circumstances, not establish jurisdictional error, then a failure to deal with any (substantial and consequential) evidence will also not establish jurisdictional error.As the Full Court said in VAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117 at [77] whether the Tribunal is obliged to consider a document or documents will depend on the circumstances of the case and the nature of the document. In my opinion, the relevant factors in relation to (corroborative) evidence include first, the cogency of the evidentiary material and, second, the place of that material in the assessment of the applicant’s claims… And finally, at [119] – [121], Robertson J observed (emphasis added):[119] The key features of the present case therefore are, first, that the Tribunal did not consider the Punjab University transcript and, second, the matter to which that transcript went founded the Tribunal’s rejection of the applicant’s claims, on the basis that he had been untruthful. This was not a case where the Tribunal took a nuanced approach to questions of credit by considering whether its disbelief of the applicant in one respect nevertheless did not mean that it disbelieved him generally: rather, the Tribunal’s approach was to disbelieve the applicant generally. In the former case it may more readily be seen that such a finding on credit goes only to a matter of fact and thus is quintessentially the province of the Tribunal.[120] The Court is not involved in traversing findings of fact about the corroborative evidence because the Tribunal did not deal with it. The unexplored possibilities include that the transcript was false, that the applicant had studied the Persian language but was a bad student or had a bad memory, and that there was an ambiguity in what studying Persian meant, whether it was language or culture and history. It is for the Tribunal to deal with the material before it and to resolve any conflicts in it.[121] To adopt the language of Buchanan J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZCOQ [2007] FCAFC 9 at [61], relied on by the Minister, these considerations bear upon the material elements which must be satisfied, or rejected, when dealing with an applicant’s claims.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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