NZA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NZA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 140

Citation: NZA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 140
Parties: NZA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: QUD 45 of 2012
Judge: KENNY J
Date of judgment: 28 February 2013
Catchwords:

MIGRATION — cancellation of visa under Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501(2) — whether Tribunal decision affected by jurisdictional error — whether Tribunal failed to exercise its own discretion — whether Tribunal failed to consider applicant’s evidence — whether Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations — whether Tribunal went beyond its jurisdiction — no jurisdictional error shown.

MIGRATION — cancellation of visa under Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501(2) — whether Tribunal decision affected by jurisdictional error — procedural fairness — whether Tribunal failed to afford applicant reasonable opportunity to respond to evidence — where no adjournment requested — where limited time before decision of Minister’s delegate would be affirmed by default — regard to other relevant circumstances — no failure to provide procedural fairness — Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 500(6L).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — States of the Commonwealth — “subject of the Queen” — whether New Zealand is a State or otherwise part of the Commonwealth — New Zealand not part of Commonwealth of Australia — visa requirement for New Zealand citizens valid — Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) 63 & 64 Vict, c 12, s 6 — Commonwealth Constitution s 117 — Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) 63 & 64 Vict, c 12
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Direction 41: Visa Refusal and Cancellation under s 501

Quick J and Garran RR, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (Australian Book Company, 1901)

Cases cited:

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2002) 211 CLR 476
Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 31 ALR 666; [1980] FCA 85
Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 218 CLR 28
Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461
Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1
Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399
Oliver v Minister for Immigrationand Citizenship [2011] FCA 534
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Waterford v The Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54
Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135
WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630; [2003] FCAFC 184
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG (2010) 115 ALD 303
Green v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 100 ALD 346; [2008] FCA 125
Taylor v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural &…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 140
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court involved NZA, an applicant for judicial review, and the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the respondent. The applicant, a New Zealand citizen, sought to challenge the decision of the Minister to cancel his visa on the grounds of character, following his conviction for causing grievous bodily harm with intent. The primary legal issue was whether the Tribunal’s decision to uphold the visa cancellation was legally sound and free from jurisdictional error, as the applicant contended that the Tribunal had failed to consider relevant mitigating factors. The court also had to assess if the Tribunal had appropriately applied the criteria under Direction 41, particularly whether it had correctly balanced the interests of the Australian community against the applicant's personal circumstances.

The court examined the Tribunal's approach to the statutory criteria for visa cancellation and found that the Tribunal had adequately considered the relevant factors, including the seriousness of the offence and the risk of re-offending. The court noted that the Tribunal had given proper weight to the applicant's criminal history and had reasonably doubted the applicant's claims of rehabilitation. Furthermore, the court held that the Tribunal had not erred in its assessment of the impact of the visa cancellation on the applicant’s family, concluding that these factors did not sufficiently mitigate the risk to the Australian community. The Tribunal’s reasoning demonstrated a fair and conscientious consideration of the applicant’s case, and the court found no jurisdictional error in its decision.

In light of the findings, the court dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review, affirming the Tribunal's decision to uphold the visa cancellation. The court concluded that the Tribunal had correctly applied the relevant legal principles and had not overlooked any significant mitigating factors. Consequently, the visa cancellation remained in effect, and the applicant's application for judicial review was rejected.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

A decision of the Tribunal made under s 500(1)(b) is a “privative clause decision”, as defined in s 474 of the Migration Act. The Tribunal’s decision can only be set aside for a jurisdictional error: see Migration Act, s 474(1); Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2002) 211 CLR 476. For the reasons stated below, I would dismiss the applicant’s judicial review application. When the whole of the Tribunal’s reasons are considered, it is clear that the Tribunal considered and determined the applicant’s case fairly and conscientiously. The Tribunal’s decision contained no jurisdictional error.BACKGROUND The applicant was born in New Zealand in 1966 and is a citizen of New Zealand. He first came to Australia on 4 March 2006, when he was 39 years of age. He left Australia on 13 August 2006, returning two days later on a class TY subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa granted on 15 August 2006. On 23 June 2010, the applicant was convicted in the Supreme Court of Queensland of one count of causing grievous bodily harm with intent under s 317 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) and sentenced to five years and six months imprisonment. His conviction arose out of his conduct on 22 February 2009, when shortly after an altercation at a hotel in Southport, Queensland, the applicant drove his car deliberately to collide with another man. The applicant’s appeal against his conviction was dismissed and leave to appeal against his sentence was refused by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland (“the Court of Appeal”). On 23 March 2011, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (“the Department”) sent the applicant a notice of intention to consider cancellation of his visa, on the basis of his criminal record. On 28 September 2011, a delegate of the first respondent (“the delegate”) decided to cancel the applicant’s visa under s 501(2) of the Migration Act (“the visa cancellation decision”). On 6 October 2011, the applicant was notified of the visa cancellation decision. Also on 6 October 2011, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision. At the time the applicant lodged his application for Tribunal review, he was in Woodford Correctional Centre at Woodford, Queensland (“Woodford”). On 16 November 2011, the Southern Queensland Regional Parole Board (“the Parole Board”) decided to grant him his release on parole with effect from 2 December 2011. When the applicant was released from Woodford on 2 December 2011, however, he was immediately taken into immigration detention. He has been detained in the Maribyrnong Immigration Detention Centre in Melbourne since 2 December 2011. It is convenient to note two further circumstances at this stage. The first is that, at the time of his conviction in the Supreme Court of Queensland, the applicant had two previous convictions in New Zealand. In 1991 and 1992, he was convicted as party to offences involving kidnapping and aggravated burglary involving the use of a firearm. The applicant was the driver of a vehicle associated with these offences and was convicted as a party to them on this basis. The longest sentence imposed was for 10 years’ imprisonment, with the applicant serving seven years of that sentence.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The second matter is that, on 4 February 2012, while in immigration detention, the applicant married. His wife was the mother of a fellow inmate at Woodford. The applicant met his wife and formed a relationship with her while he was serving his sentence. The applicant and his wife were engaged at the time of the Tribunal’s decision.THE TRIBUNAL DECISION In his application to the Tribunal for review of the visa cancellation decision, the applicant described his reasons for seeking the review as follows:● Family (engaged …) + Children … 12, … 16, … 17● Immediate Family Brother● Firm offers on employment on release ● Whilst incarcerated engaged in programmes educational and rehabilitation ● Prison employment schemes as overseer● Fully rehabilitated and will contribute to Aust Community● Welfare and medical issue in regard to spouse and children ● Genuine concerns to personal safety if returned to NZ by OMCIt is unnecessary, in these reasons, to name the applicant’s fiancée (and, subsequently, wife) and the children to whom he referred. In the above quotation, “…” indicates that a name has been omitted. In the Tribunal proceeding, the applicant was self-represented and the Minister was represented by his solicitor. The Tribunal conducted a substantive hearing in Brisbane on 13 December 2011 and gave its decision on 22 December 2011. The Tribunal held that, by virtue of his conviction in the Supreme Court of Queensland, the applicant had a “substantial criminal record” within the meaning of s 501(6) of the Migration Act and that the Minister’s discretion to cancel the applicant’s visa on character grounds under s 501(2) was therefore enlivened: see Tribunal’s reasons, [2011] AATA 928 at [3]. The Tribunal stated that the applicant was “wrong” in arguing that the Minister had no power to deport him because New Zealand was an Australian state. Having noted that the delegate and, on review, the Tribunal, were required to have regard to Direction 41: Visa Refusal and Cancellation under s 501 (“Direction 41”), being a direction issued by the Minister under s 499 of the Migration Act, the Tribunal set out its assessment of the four primary considerations that, according to Direction 41, must be addressed.Protection of the Australian community Quoting Direction 41 at [5.1(2)] and [10.1(2)], the Tribunal stated that the first primary consideration was the need to protect the Australian community from “unacceptable risks of harm as a result of criminal activity or other serious conduct by non-citizens” and that this required the Tribunal to consider “the seriousness and nature of the relevant conduct” and “the risk that the conduct may be repeated”: see [2011] AATA 928 at [8]. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s offence was “very serious”: [2011] AATA 928 at [12]. With respect to the risk of re-offending, the Tribunal noted that he had a serious criminal record in New Zealand: [2011] AATA 928 at [14]. The Tribunal observed (at [15]–[16]) that:At the hearing in this matter, the applicant sought to downplay his involvement in those crimes. He said he committed those offences after he had fallen into bad company. He invited me to conclude the sentences were exceptional given the more lenient approach to sentencing that apparently prevailed at the time. The remarks of the Court of Appeal suggest otherwise. The applicant’s evidence at the hearing did not suggest clear insight into his offending in New Zealand, or genuine remorse for what he did.The applicant exhibited a similar reluctance to take responsibility for the offence he committed in Australia. He was asked repeatedly during the course of the hearing whether he accepted he was responsible for what he had done. He refused to answer the questions directly. When asked about the circumstances of the offences [sic], he acknowledged there was evidence that suggested he was guilty but claimed he did not remember what occurred. Yet he gave statements to the police about the incident and also told his new partner … about the offence in some detail according to her testimony. It was unclear whether he accepted responsibility for what he had done, and he did not offer a clear expression of remorse for any of his behaviour. … The verdict of the jury and the evidence referred to by the sentencing judge and the Court of Appeal raises serious doubts over whether the applicant has come to terms with what he did — which raises serious doubts over whether he might engage in that sort of conduct again.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal also considered the rights of his fiancée’s children. In this regard the Tribunal said (at [28]):Several of the children have health problems of various kinds, as does [his fiancée]. While the applicant might conceivably contribute to their care and support if he were permitted to remain, it is unclear how Australia’s international obligations would be compromised if he were required to leave. While the children have apparently taken to referring to him as “Dad”, he cannot properly be regarded as their parent (and cannot therefore have parental obligations) at this early point in their relationship. He has had limited contact with [his fiancée’s] children: they have only physically met him on a few occasions. One of them does not even reside with [his fiancée], and the others are teenagers or older. While the children speak of having formed an intense bond with the applicant, and they might experience disappointment if they do not have the opportunity to get to know him better, it is unclear how their best interests will be compromised if the applicant is required to leave. Their relationship with the applicant has simply not reached the point where Australia’s international obligations make a difference to my decision. I do not think this primary consideration counts in the applicant’s favour.Other considerations Having concluded that, taken together, the primary considerations indicated that the applicant’s visa should be cancelled, the Tribunal also considered a number of other matters, including his ties to Australia. These ties centred on his family. The Tribunal found (at [32]) that the applicant was relatively close to his brother and his brother’s family, but that this relationship would not be disrupted if the applicant were removed from Australia. The Tribunal said (at [32]–[33]):I understand the applicant spends a great deal of time talking to his various family members on the phone from prison. Indeed, all of the witnesses he called at the hearing spoke of the comfort and support they derived from the many lengthy telephone discussions they had with the applicant.It is unclear how the applicant’s removal from this country will disrupt the relationships he has with his brother’s family. While I accept they may be looking forward to the applicant taking his place in the family if he is allowed to stay here. He has not been a fixed feature of their lives in the past. I accept they will be disappointed if he cannot stay, but that is not the same thing as being disruptive. The Tribunal also stated that the applicant’s relationship with his fiancée “could not yet be described as a de facto marriage” and that the relationship with her children was “not a parental one”: see [2011] AATA 928 at [34]. The Tribunal concluded (at [35] and [39]) that:While I accept there will be some disruption to familial ties if the applicant’s visa is cancelled, I do not think this consideration counts heavily against cancellation. …I accept [the applicant’s fiancée] and her family will be very disappointed if they are denied the opportunity to welcome the applicant into their lives. That is not the same thing as experiencing hardship, of course. The fact that [the applicant’s fiancée] and her children and perhaps other family members will be deprived of the emotional or other support may qualify as hardship. I accept there will be some hardship in that sense.