FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ogawa v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1358
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 111 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: MEGUMI OGAWA
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FLICK J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 NOVEMBER 2011
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent, awarded in a lump sum of $4,630.00 pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the
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- Case
- [2011] FCA 1358
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the legislative framework governing the operation of the Migration Review Tribunal, as outlined in the Migration Act 1958, and the general principles of procedural fairness. The court noted that while the Act mandates that the Tribunal operate in a fair, just, economical, informal, and quick manner, there was no explicit requirement for a specific period of notice for rescheduled hearings. The court found that the notice given, which was approximately one week prior to the rescheduled hearing, was reasonable under the circumstances. The court concluded that in the absence of any other grounds for an adjournment, the Tribunal was not required to provide further notice and that proceeding with the hearing did not deny procedural fairness.
Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeal brought by Ms Ogawa, finding that the notice given was reasonable and that no procedural unfairness had occurred. The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the costs of the first respondent in a lump sum of $4,630.00, as verified by an affidavit. This decision underscores the importance of considering both statutory mandates and principles of fairness when determining the adequacy of notice in administrative proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent, awarded in a lump sum of $4,630.00 pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
A further report from Dr Vockler dated 6 July 2009 was thereafter received. THE MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL — NOTICE AND PROCEDURES Any consideration of an allegation that Ms Ogawa has not been provided with “reasonable notice” of a hearing must necessarily recognise at the outset the legislative directions to the Migration Review Tribunal as to the manner in which it is to “operate”, and the constraints imposed upon the ability of the Court to undertake judicial review of decisions of the Tribunal. Part 5 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provides for the review of decisions by the Migration Review Tribunal. Within that Part, Division 4 sets forth the manner in which the Tribunal is to “operate”. In particular, within Division 4, s 353 provides as follows:Tribunal’s way of operating (1)The Tribunal shall, in carrying out its functions under this Act, pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick. (2)The Tribunal, in reviewing a decision: (a) is not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence; and (b) shall act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case.Section 353 is in the same terms as s 420 which is directed to the manner in which the Refugee Review Tribunal is to operate. It is also in the same terms as s 2A of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The phrase “fair, just, economical, informal and quick” is, however, a phrase which employs terms which may involve a tension one with the other: cf. Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2008] FCA 1436 at [160] to [164], 171 FCR 174 at 208 to 209 per Lindgren J. Whatever may be the tension between the potentially conflicting directions given by the Legislature as to how the Tribunal is to carry out its functions, s 353 is a provision intended to be “facultative, not restrictive”. When addressing the terms of s 420, Gleeson CJ and McHugh J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21, 197 CLR 611 at 628 thus said:[49] … The history of legislative provisions similar to s 420 was examined in Qantas Airways Ltd v Gubbins [(1992) 28 NSWLR 26]. They are intended to be facultative, not restrictive. Their purpose is to free tribunals, at least to some degree, from constraints otherwise applicable to courts of law, and regarded as inappropriate to tribunals. The extent to which they free tribunals from obligations applicable to the courts of law may give rise to dispute in particular cases, but that is another question.Provisions such as ss 353 and 420 direct attention – not only to the merits of a party’s case – but also to the wider public interest in ensuring the efficient resolution of claims made. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Dhanoa [2009] FCAFC 153 at [61], 180 FCR 510 at 524, Jagot and Foster JJ thus recognised that “[f]airness and justice are only meaningful when considered in the context of the interests of all parties and the public at large”. Such provisions will not be permitted to allow a claimant to “re-argue the merits” of a case: Antipova v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 584 at [66], 151 FCR 480 at 498 per Gray J.