Ogawa v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ogawa v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1358

Citation: Ogawa v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1358
Appeal from: Ogawa v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FMCA 262
Parties: MEGUMI OGAWA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP AND ANOR
File number: QUD 111 of 2011
Judge: FLICK J
Date of judgment: 30 November 2011
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – notice of hearing – need for reasonable period of notice

MIGRATION – review by Migration Review Tribunal – rescheduled hearing – no prescribed period of notice for  rescheduled hearing – reasonable period of notice required

Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 2A, 40
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 353, 357A, 360, 360A, 362B, 363, 420, 425, 425A, 427
Migration Regulations1994 (Cth), reg. 4.21
Cases cited: Antipova v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 584, 151 FCR 480, cited
BZAAA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 447, cited
Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal Torres Strait Islander Corporations [2011] FCAFC 88, 279 ALR 468, cited
Khan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 21, 192 FCR 173, referred to
Khant v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1247, 112 ALD 241, referred to
Lee v Department of Education and Science (1967) 66 LGR 211, cited
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Dhanoa [2009] FCAFC 153, 180 FCR 510, referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21, 197 CLR 611, considered
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZFML [2006] FCAFC 152, 154 FCR 572, considered
Ogawa v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FMCA 262, cited
R v Thames Magistrates Court; Ex parte Polemis [1974] 1 WLR 1371, cited
SZDQO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 144 FCR 251, referred to
SZEFM v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 78, referred to
SZJXG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1120, cited
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2008] FCA 1436, cited
Date of hearing: 18 November 2011
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 47
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr T M Ower
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Francois
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr O Jones (Clayton Utz)

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 111 of 2011

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MEGUMI OGAWA
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FLICK J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 NOVEMBER 2011

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent, awarded in a lump sum of $4,630.00 pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 1358
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Ogawa v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the dispute centred on whether the Migration Review Tribunal had provided sufficient notice of a rescheduled hearing. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary issue before the court was whether the notice given for the rescheduled hearing was reasonable and complied with the principles of procedural fairness, particularly considering that there is no prescribed period for such notices in the legislation.

The court examined the legislative framework governing the operation of the Migration Review Tribunal, as outlined in the Migration Act 1958, and the general principles of procedural fairness. The court noted that while the Act mandates that the Tribunal operate in a fair, just, economical, informal, and quick manner, there was no explicit requirement for a specific period of notice for rescheduled hearings. The court found that the notice given, which was approximately one week prior to the rescheduled hearing, was reasonable under the circumstances. The court concluded that in the absence of any other grounds for an adjournment, the Tribunal was not required to provide further notice and that proceeding with the hearing did not deny procedural fairness.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeal brought by Ms Ogawa, finding that the notice given was reasonable and that no procedural unfairness had occurred. The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the costs of the first respondent in a lump sum of $4,630.00, as verified by an affidavit. This decision underscores the importance of considering both statutory mandates and principles of fairness when determining the adequacy of notice in administrative proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent, awarded in a lump sum of $4,630.00 pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is thus concluded that “reasonable” notice was given on 23 June 2009 for the rescheduled hearing that was to take place on 2 July 2009. Moreover, and in the absence of any further and discrete basis upon which an adjournment may have been requested, other than the complaint made as to the shortness of time, no question arises as to a denial of procedural fairness being occasioned by the Tribunal proceeding to hear the application on 2 July 2009.CONCLUSIONS If leave is required to rely upon the ground that was abandoned before the Federal Magistrate, namely Ground 2 of the Notice of Appeal, leave is refused. It is a Ground without substance. The first Ground of Appeal is dismissed. Counsel appearing for Ms Ogawa appeared pro bono. The Court expresses its appreciation for his assistance. It is a credit to the profession that Counsel continue to appear pro bono for those litigants who otherwise would appear unrepresented. The appeal is to be dismissed with costs. The Respondent Minister seeks an order pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules2011 that costs be awarded in a “lump sum” of $4,630.00. An affidavit verifies the appropriateness of such an amount. Such an order should be made. ORDERSThe Orders of the Court are:1.The appeal is dismissed.2.The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent, awarded in a lump sum of $4,630.00 pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules2011.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

A further report from Dr Vockler dated 6 July 2009 was thereafter received. THE MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL — NOTICE AND PROCEDURES Any consideration of an allegation that Ms Ogawa has not been provided with “reasonable notice” of a hearing must necessarily recognise at the outset the legislative directions to the Migration Review Tribunal as to the manner in which it is to “operate”, and the constraints imposed upon the ability of the Court to undertake judicial review of decisions of the Tribunal. Part 5 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provides for the review of decisions by the Migration Review Tribunal. Within that Part, Division 4 sets forth the manner in which the Tribunal is to “operate”. In particular, within Division 4, s 353 provides as follows:Tribunal’s way of operating (1)The Tribunal shall, in carrying out its functions under this Act, pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick. (2)The Tribunal, in reviewing a decision: (a) is not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence; and (b) shall act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case.Section 353 is in the same terms as s 420 which is directed to the manner in which the Refugee Review Tribunal is to operate. It is also in the same terms as s 2A of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The phrase “fair, just, economical, informal and quick” is, however, a phrase which employs terms which may involve a tension one with the other: cf. Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2008] FCA 1436 at [160] to [164], 171 FCR 174 at 208 to 209 per Lindgren J. Whatever may be the tension between the potentially conflicting directions given by the Legislature as to how the Tribunal is to carry out its functions, s 353 is a provision intended to be “facultative, not restrictive”. When addressing the terms of s 420, Gleeson CJ and McHugh J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21, 197 CLR 611 at 628 thus said:[49] … The history of legislative provisions similar to s 420 was examined in Qantas Airways Ltd v Gubbins [(1992) 28 NSWLR 26]. They are intended to be facultative, not restrictive. Their purpose is to free tribunals, at least to some degree, from constraints otherwise applicable to courts of law, and regarded as inappropriate to tribunals. The extent to which they free tribunals from obligations applicable to the courts of law may give rise to dispute in particular cases, but that is another question.Provisions such as ss 353 and 420 direct attention – not only to the merits of a party’s case – but also to the wider public interest in ensuring the efficient resolution of claims made. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Dhanoa [2009] FCAFC 153 at [61], 180 FCR 510 at 524, Jagot and Foster JJ thus recognised that “[f]airness and justice are only meaningful when considered in the context of the interests of all parties and the public at large”. Such provisions will not be permitted to allow a claimant to “re-argue the merits” of a case: Antipova v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 584 at [66], 151 FCR 480 at 498 per Gray J.