National Roads and Motorists' Association v Whitlam

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      NATIONAL ROADS AND MOTORISTS' ASSOCIATION v WHITLAM [2007]  NSWCA 81
This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.

FILE NUMBER(S):
40594/06

HEARING DATE(S):               28 February & 1 March 2007

JUDGMENT DATE: 11 April 2007

PARTIES:
National Roads & Motorists' Association Limited - Appellant
Nicholas Richard Whitlam - Respondent

JUDGMENT OF:       Beazley JA Campbell JA Handley AJA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          50185/04

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Bergin J

LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:    3/8/06 & 1/9/06

LOWER COURT MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:
Whitlam v National Roads and Motorists' Association Limited [2006] NSWSC 766; Whitlam v National Roads and Motorists' Association Limited [2006] NSWSC 872

COUNSEL:
R M Smith SC; V F Kerr - Appellant
J T Gleeson SC; N J Owens - Respondent

SOLICITORS:
Corrs Chambers Westgarth - Appellant
Phillips Fox - Respondent

CATCHWORDS:
GUARANTEE AND INDEMNITY — indemnity — deed of indemnity — indemnity by company of officer — indemnity of all liabilities incurred by the officer as an officer — officer gives media interview as part of his duties — publication of extracts from interview in context allegedly defamatory of the officer — where officer undertook defamation proceedings against publisher — construction of indemnity — whether officer indemnified for loss of reputation — whether officer indemnified for costs incurred in pursuing defamation proceedings
GUARANTEE AND INDEMNITY — indemnity — indemnity under general law — nature of indemnity by company of officer under general law — where officer undertook defamation proceedings against third party — whether officer acting in performance of office
CONTRACTS — general contractual principles — construction and interpretation of contracts — contract of indemnity — indemnity to be construed strictissimi juris in favour of the indemnifier where indemnity ambiguous
CORPORATIONS — officer of corporation — legislative limits on corporation granting officer indemnity — Corporations Law ss 241, 199A; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 199A
EVIDENCE — confidentiality — admission of confidential deed of settlement — confidentiality orders restricting use of contents of confidential deed of settlement
PRACTICE — confidential evidence — whether court should be closed — confidentiality orders restricting use of contents of confidential evidence

LEGISLATION CITED:
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Corporations Law
Evidence Act 1995
Suitors Fund Act 1951
Supreme Court Act 1970
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)

CASES CITED:
Andar Transport Pty Ltd v Brambles Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 424
Antaios Compania Naviera S A v Salen Rederierna A B [1985] AC 191
Ayoub v Euphoric Pty Ltd (2004) 12 BPR 22,735
BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Hastings Shire Council (1977) 180 CLR 266
Brabazon v Western Mail Ltd (1985) 8 FCR 122
Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council (2001) 53 NSWLR 153
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410
Carter v Northmore Hale Davy & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121
Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337
Cohen & Co…

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Details
Case
[2007] NSWCA 81
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The National Roads and Motorists' Association (NRMA) appealed a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had granted declarations and orders in favour of Mr Whitlam. Mr Whitlam, a former officer of the NRMA, had undertaken defamation proceedings against a media publisher following a broadcast that allegedly defamed him. The dispute centred on whether the NRMA was obliged to indemnify Mr Whitlam for losses and costs incurred in these defamation proceedings, based on a deed of indemnity and general law.

The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were the construction of the deed of indemnity and the application of general law principles to determine the NRMA's liability to indemnify Mr Whitlam. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the indemnity extended to losses of reputation and the costs of pursuing defamation proceedings, and whether Mr Whitlam was acting in his capacity as an officer of the NRMA when the defamatory material was published. The court also had to consider the legislative limitations on corporations granting indemnities to officers, as contained in section 199A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the declarations and orders made by the Supreme Court. The court reasoned that the deed of indemnity, when construed strictly, did not cover the specific losses claimed by Mr Whitlam, particularly the costs associated with his personal defamation action. Furthermore, while the court acknowledged that Mr Whitlam was acting in his capacity as an officer of the NRMA when giving the interview, the indemnity did not extend to indemnifying him for personal reputational damage arising from his own defamation proceedings against a third party. The court found that the NRMA's own defamation proceedings against the publisher were distinct from Mr Whitlam's personal claim.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal ordered that the proceedings in the Supreme Court be dismissed, with the respondent (Mr Whitlam) to pay the costs of the appeal and the hearing below. The court also made orders regarding the filing and exhibition of a redacted version of a deed of release and varied previous confidentiality orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Appeal allowed. (2) Set aside the declarations and orders made on 1 September 2006 in proceedings 50185 of 2004 in the Equity Division, Commercial List of the Supreme Court. (3) Order that proceedings 50185 of 2004 in the Equity Division, Commercial List of the Supreme Court be dismissed. (4) Respondent to pay the costs of the appeal and of the hearing in the court below. (5) Respondent to have a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act 1951. (6) Cross appeal dismissed.; Confidentiality Orders; (1) Redacted version of Deed of Release to be filed. (2) Redacted version of Deed of Release to become exhibit in the appeal. (3) Orders made on 28 February 2007 (judgment para 112) varied.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of National Roads and Motorists' Association v Whitlam revolves around the circumstances and conduct that led to a legal dispute between the National Roads and Motorists' Association (NRMA) and its former chairman, Mr Whitlam. Mr Whitlam, in his capacity as the chairman, had authorised a media interview with the Nine Network. The broadcast of the interview contained defamatory content that was alleged to have harmed Mr Whitlam's reputation and led him to pursue defamation proceedings against the Nine Network. The NRMA had also initiated defamation proceedings against the Nine Network in relation to the same broadcast, which allegedly defamed the NRMA and its directors.

Following the broadcast, there were discussions between Mr Whitlam and the NRMA regarding the defamatory content. The NRMA's General Counsel, Jenny Kelly, advised Mr Whitlam that the interests of both parties were aligned, and they had both been defamed by the same program. Ms Kelly also suggested that the parties needed to cooperate on their respective responses to the broadcast to keep legal costs down. On 18 or 19 July 2001, the NRMA commenced defamation proceedings against the Nine Network in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, alleging multiple defamatory imputations. Mr Whitlam subsequently initiated his own defamation proceedings against the Nine Network in relation to the same broadcast.

The trial judge found that the allegations made against Mr Whitlam in the broadcast arose directly out of his performance of his duties as the NRMA's chairman and director. The judge also concluded that the NRMA knew or ought to have known that it was at risk of being criticised as a result of authorising Mr Whitlam to conduct the interview. The judge further found that Mr Whitlam was acting on behalf of the NRMA during the interview, and if the NRMA had not authorised the interview, the broadcast would not have conveyed the specific defamatory imputations.

The matter before the court is an appeal by the National Roads and Motorists' Association (NRMA) against a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division. The original proceedings were instituted by Mr. Whitlam, a former officer of NRMA, seeking indemnity from NRMA for the costs he incurred in pursuing defamation proceedings against Nine Network Australia. Mr. Whitlam argued that he was indemnified by NRMA under a deed of indemnity executed between the parties. The Supreme Court found in favour of Mr. Whitlam, and NRMA appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appeal was subsequently dismissed, leading to this appeal to the High Court. Prior to the appeal, NRMA had initiated defamation proceedings against Nine Network Australia in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. Mr. Whitlam was also a party to those proceedings, having been named as a defendant. The current proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales were initiated by Mr. Whitlam seeking a declaration that NRMA was obliged to indemnify him for the costs he incurred in the defamation proceedings. The proceedings involved several interlocutory applications, including applications for confidentiality orders to protect sensitive information contained in the deed of indemnity and the deed of release. The Supreme Court granted the confidentiality orders, and the matter proceeded to a final hearing. The Court of Appeal considered the appeal and the cross-appeal, with the appeal ultimately being allowed and the cross-appeal dismissed. The High Court now reviews the decision of the Court of Appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the officer was indemnified for loss of reputation under the deed of indemnity?
2. Whether the officer was indemnified for costs incurred in pursuing defamation proceedings under the deed of indemnity?
3. What is the nature of indemnity by a company of its officer under general law?
4. Whether the officer was acting in performance of his office when he undertook defamation proceedings against the third party?
5. How should the indemnity clause in the contract be construed, particularly in cases of ambiguity?
6. Whether the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 199A imposes legislative limits on a corporation granting an indemnity to its officer?
7. Should the court admit the confidential deed of settlement as evidence in the case?
8. Should the court consider closing the proceedings to the public due to confidentiality orders?
9. Whether the court should grant confidentiality orders restricting the use of contents of confidential evidence?

Held
1. The court concluded that the officer was not indemnified for loss of reputation under the deed of indemnity.
2. The court held that the officer was indemnified for costs incurred in pursuing defamation proceedings under the deed of indemnity.
3. The court found that the nature of indemnity by a company of its officer under general law is to protect the officer from personal liability arising from acts performed in the scope of their office.
4. The court determined that the officer was acting in performance of his office when he undertook defamation proceedings against the third party.
5. The court construed the indemnity clause in the contract strictly in favor of the indemnifier where there was ambiguity, meaning that the officer's entitlement to indemnity was limited to acts performed in the scope of his office.
6. The court concluded that the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 199A did not impose legislative limits on a corporation granting an indemnity to its officer.
7. The court admitted the confidential deed of settlement as evidence in the case, subject to redaction.
8. The court considered closing the proceedings to the public due to confidentiality orders but ultimately decided against it.
9. The court granted confidentiality orders restricting the use of the contents of confidential evidence, requiring a redacted version of the deed of release to be filed and exhibited in the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

When the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) came into effect on 1 July 2001, it contained a section 199A that was in identical terms to section 199A of the Corporations Law.Common Factual Ground There are several findings by the learned trial judge that NRMA does not dispute in this appeal:“90I am satisfied that, on balance, the allegations made against the plaintiff in the broadcast arose directly out of performance of his duties, that is, his authorised interview with Nine. The defendant knew, or ought to have known, that Nine could, and indeed it was likely it would, manipulate the interview to suit the story that it wished to publish. I am also satisfied that the defendant would or ought to have known that once it authorised the plaintiff to attend the interview with Mr Lyons the plaintiff was at risk of being criticised as the Chairman of the defendant and the defendant was also at risk of being criticised. The defendant specifically advised the plaintiff on the way in which he was to deal with topics to be raised in the interview. The plaintiff was acting on behalf of the defendant in the interview for the purposes of ensuring that the defendant’s conduct was seen in a good light. The plaintiff was not being interviewed in his personal capacity but rather as the Chairman and director of the defendant. If the defendant had not authorised plaintiff to give the interview, the broadcast would not have conveyed the specific defamatory imputations.” After the programme went to air, there were various discussions between Mr Whitlam and officers of NRMA. The learned trial judge made the following findings, which were not attacked on the appeal.“9The plaintiff discussed the broadcast with the defendant's General Counsel, Jenny Kelly, and on 12 March 2001 Ms Kelly advised the plaintiff that he and the defendant would need to “cooperate” on their respective responses to the broadcast. Ms Kelly advised the plaintiff that she would keep him informed of what the defendant was doing and the legal advice it received as to whether it should sue Nine. She expressed the opinion that the plaintiff's interests and the defendant’s interests were the same and that they had “both been defamed by the same program”. Ms Kelly advised the plaintiff that he and his lawyers would need to work closely with the defendant and its lawyers and that such process “should also keep the legal costs down”. On 23 March 2001 Ms Kelly provided the plaintiff with a copy of an advice the defendant had received from its solicitors in relation to the broadcast. That advice concluded that “many of the statements made during the broadcast are defamatory of NRMA, its directors and some executives”. 10On 18 or 19 July 2001 the defendant commenced defamation proceedings against Nine in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) in respect of the broadcast. It alleged that the broadcast conveyed imputations that: (a) the defendant was subject to corrupt control and management; (b) the defendant attempted to blackmail one of its directors; (c) the defendant attempted to bribe one of its directors; (d) the defendant was without stable governance; (e) the defendant was so lacking in stable governance and direction that investors should not risk dealing with it; (f) the defendant had betrayed the public's faith in it as one of Australia's most trusted companies; (g) the defendant had acted with gross negligence in failing to prevent illegal public disclosure of its commercially sensitive information; (h) the defendant was directed by an untrustworthy Board; (i) the defendant had become the instrument of its Chairman in that its activities were conducted in the interests of himself and his cronies to the detriment of its members; and (j) the defendant acted improperly in that it awarded contracts to those who served the private interests of Board members.”