K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

K-GENERATION PTY LTD & ANOR v LIQUOR LICENSING COURT & ANOR

[2007] SASC 319

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Duggan, The Honourable Justice Gray and The Honourable Justice Vanstone)

30 August 2007

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - GROUNDS OF REVIEW - PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS - EXCLUSION OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - THE NON-JUDICIAL ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT - THE LEGISLATURE - LEGISLATION AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS - EXAMINATION OF VALIDITY OF LEGISLATION BY COURTS

HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT - THE FEDERAL JUDICATURE - NATURE AND EXTENT OF JUDICIAL POWER

Application for judicial review of a decision of the Licensing Court, which affirmed a decision of the Liquor and Gambling Commissioner - section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (SA) provides that material that is classified by the Commissioner of Police as "criminal intelligence" and provided to the Liquor and Gambling Commissioner and Licensing Court must be taken into account by the Commissioner and Court, cannot be disclosed to applicants for, or holders of, licences, and that the Commissioner and Court need not give reasons for its decision - plaintiffs sought a liquor licence from the Commissioner - application refused on the basis of "criminal intelligence" - decision affirmed by Licensing Court, having considered the "criminal intelligence" without disclosing it to the plaintiffs - whether the plaintiffs were denied natural justice - whether the Liquor Licensing Act excludes an aspect of the common law natural justice hearing rule and so authorises the denial of natural justice - if it does not, whether the plaintiffs waived their right to natural justice by not requesting the "criminal intelligence" at the hearing before the Licensing Court - whether a breach of procedural fairness by an inferior court is reviewable by a superior court - whether section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act is constitutionally valid.

Held: (per Gray J, Duggan and Vanstone JJ concurring) - section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act excludes an aspect of the common law natural justice hearing rule and so an aspect of the plaintiffs' right to natural justice was extinguished - there was no denial of natural justice as the Act did not afford the plaintiffs the right to receive adverse evidence and reasons for the decision - although not necessary to decide, the plaintiffs did not waive any right to natural justice, and a breach of procedural fairness by an inferior court is reviewable by a superior court.

Held: (per Duggan and Vanstone JJ, Gray J in dissent) - section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act is constitutionally valid.

(per Gray J in dissent) - section 28A of Liquor Licensing Act breaches Chapter III of the Australian Constitution - procedural fairness is an essential element of the judicial power - a District Court Judge cannot be required to act in a way that is antithetical to Federal judicial power.

Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (SA) ss 3, 4, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22,…

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Details
Case
[2007] SASC 319
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court concerns a challenge to the constitutional validity of section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (SA) and the legality of decisions made by the Liquor Commissioner and affirmed by the Licensing Court. The plaintiffs, K-Generation, applied for a liquor licence but were refused on the basis of "criminal intelligence" provided to the Liquor and Gambling Commissioner and Licensing Court. The plaintiffs sought judicial review on the grounds that they were denied procedural fairness and that section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act was constitutionally invalid.

The central legal issues in the case were whether section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act excludes an aspect of the common law natural justice hearing rule and thereby authorises the denial of natural justice, whether the plaintiffs had waived their right to natural justice, and whether a breach of procedural fairness by an inferior court is reviewable by a superior court. Additionally, the court had to determine the constitutional validity of section 28A.

The court held that section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act excludes an aspect of the common law natural justice hearing rule, thus extinguishing an aspect of the plaintiffs' right to natural justice. The court found that the plaintiffs were not denied natural justice as the Act did not afford them the right to receive adverse evidence and reasons for the decision. Although it was not necessary to decide, the court noted that the plaintiffs did not waive any right to natural justice, and a breach of procedural fairness by an inferior court is reviewable by a superior court. The court concluded that section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act is constitutionally invalid as it forces the Licensing Court to act in a manner that offends Chapter III of the Constitution by denying procedural fairness to one party. This involvement of the judiciary in determinations that deny natural justice brings the court into disrepute and undermines its appearance of legitimacy and impartiality.

The court found that section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act infringed Chapter III of the Constitution and should be severed from the Act. The plaintiffs’ application for judicial review was successful in part, and the decision of the Licensing Court was quashed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The Liquor Licensing Act, in section 4, defines “criminal intelligence” as:[I]nformation relating to actual or suspected criminal activity (whether in this State or elsewhere) the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to prejudice criminal investigations, or to enable the discovery of the existence or identity of a confidential source of information relevant to law enforcement.Background In October 2005, K-Generation applied for an entertainment venue licence pursuant to section 31(2)(d) of the Liquor Licensing Act. That section relevantly provides:(1)A licence authorises the licensee to sell and supply liquor in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence.(2)Licences are to be of the following classes:…(d)entertainment venue licence; The Commissioner of Police intervened before the Liquor Commissioner and before the Licensing Court, pursuant to section 75A of the Liquor Licensing Act. The Commissioner of Police produced evidence that had been classified as criminal intelligence under section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act. The plaintiffs were not provided with any of the criminal intelligence. The plaintiffs’ application was heard by the Liquor Commissioner on 20 December 2006. The decision not to grant the application was made on 17 January 2007. The plaintiffs sought a review of the Liquor Commissioner’s decision by the Licensing Court. The review was in the nature of a rehearing, pursuant to section 22(4) of the Liquor Licensing Act. Section 22 provides:(1)A party to proceedings before the [Liquor] Commissioner who is dissatisfied with a decision made by the [Liquor] Commissioner in the proceedings may apply to the [Licensing] Court for a review of the [Liquor] Commissioner’s decision....(4)A review is in the nature of a rehearing.(5)On a review, the [Licensing] Court may exercise any one or more of the following powers:(a)affirm, vary or quash the decision subject to the review;(b) make any decision that should, in the opinion of the [Licensing] Court, have been made in the first instance;(c) refer a matter back to the [Liquor] Commissioner for rehearing or reconsideration;(d)make any incidental or ancillary order.The hearing by the Licensing Court occurred on 8 and 12 February 2007. The plaintiffs were not provided with any of the criminal intelligence. On 12 February 2007 the Licensing Court affirmed the decision of the Liquor Commissioner. The Proceedings As earlier observed the plaintiffs have now sought judicial review of the Licensing Court’s decision, contending that they were denied procedural fairness, that the Liquor Licensing Act did not allow this denial, and in the alternative that section 28A is constitutionally invalid insofar as it does allow a breach of procedural fairness. The plaintiffs claimed the following relief: A declaration that the provisions of section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (SA) are invalid in so far as they impermissibly interfere with the exercise by the [Licensing Court] of the judicial power of the Commonwealth.A declaration that [Licensing Court], in affirming the decision of the [Liquor Commissioner] dated 17 January 2007, failed to observe the requirements of procedural fairness.A declaration that the decision of the [Licensing Court] made on 12 February 2007 affirming the decision of the [Liquor Commissioner] made on 17 January 2007 refusing the application of [K-Generation] for an entertainment venue licence on the ground that to grant the application would be contrary to the public interest is void and of no effect.An order for judicial review in the nature of certiorari quashing the decision of the [Licensing Court] made on 12 February 2007 affirming the decision of the [Liquor Commissioner] made on 17 January 2007 refusing the application of the [K-Generation] for an entertainment venue licence on the ground that to grant the application would be contrary to the public interest.An order for judicial review in the nature of mandamus compelling the [Licensing Court] to consider [K-Generation’s] appeal from the decision of the [Liquor Commissioner] made on 17 January 2007 according to law.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DUGGAN J GRAY J
In the present case the Licensing Court has been reduced to a servant of the executive. The fact that it is a District Court judge who holds the position as the Licensing Court, and that the Full Court of the Supreme Court has no option under the legislation but to uphold the Licensing Court’s breach of natural justice, results in section 28A being constitutionally invalid.Conclusion The Liquor Licensing Act compelled the Licensing Court to breach what would ordinarily be a fundamental aspect of the natural justice hearing rule. The plaintiffs had no right to receive the criminal intelligence, by virtue of section 28A, and so were denied the opportunity to know the case against them. That does not give rise to a remedy in itself, however, because the plaintiffs, by virtue of section 28A, did not have any right to know the case against them when the allegations were criminal intelligence. I have reached the conclusion that section 28A is constitutionally invalid by the operation of Chapter III of the Constitution. It must be emphasised that the question that has been considered in this case is not whether the legislature can specify that applications for liquor licences be refused, and liquor licences varied or removed, on the basis of secret material. Parliament clearly has the power to legislate for this. These acts, though, should be carried out by the executive. What is impermissible is the involvement of the independent judiciary in the process of denying natural justice. By involving the judiciary in such determinations, the legislature obtains the advantage of giving the determinations the appearance of legitimacy and impartiality. But if the court is required to act in a way that denies procedural fairness to one party, then the appearance of legitimacy and impartiality is lost. It brings the court itself into disrepute. The court is forced to act as an arm of the executive. If the legislature wishes these decisions to be made by the judiciary, it must accept that members of the judiciary cannot exercise power in a manner that offends Chapter III of the Constitution. It must accept that the judiciary’s appearance of legitimacy and impartiality arises in part from the natural justice obligations that it owes to parties who come before it. If the legislature does not want natural justice to be afforded to applicants for, and holders of, liquor licences, then the decisions to refuse applications, and vary or remove licences, should be carried out by the executive. The constitutional validity of section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act cannot depend on how the judges of the Licensing Court or the Full Court of the Supreme Court discharge the duty that the Act imposes upon them. The provision was either valid or invalid when given the Royal Assent. Nothing that a judge of the Licensing Court did after its enactment could change its status as a valid or invalid piece of legislation. At the time of its enactment, ordinary reasonable members of the public might have seen the Liquor Licensing Act as making the Licensing Court and the Full Court of the Supreme Court parties to and responsible for implementing political decisions of the executive government, acting through the Commissioner of Police, without giving persons who are affected by these decisions the benefit of the ordinary processes of law. As McHugh J observed in Kable:[139]Any person who reached that conclusion could justifiably draw the inference that the Supreme Court was an instrument of executive government policy. That being so, public confidence in the impartial administration of the judicial functions of the District Court and the Supreme Court must inevitably be impaired. The courts no longer exhibit all of the “defining characteristics which mark a court apart from other decision making bodies”.[140] Section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act infringes Chapter III of the Constitution, is invalid, and should be severed from the Liquor Licensing Act.[139] Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 at 124.[140] Forge & Ors v Australian Securities and Investments Commission & Ors [2006] HCA 44.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DUGGAN J, GRAY J

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