[2008] HCATrans 365
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A12 of 2008
B e t w e e n -
K-GENERATION PTY LIMITED
First Appellant
GENARGI KRASNOV
Second Appellant
and
LIQUOR LICENSING COURT
First Respondent
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
Second Respondent
FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT ADELAIDE ON TUESDAY, 4 NOVEMBER 2008, AT 10.21 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
FRENCH CJ: Because of the logistical difficulties of people coming to the lectern we will take the appearances as they appear on the Court list. Yes, Dr Churches.
MR S.C. CHURCHES: If it please the Court, I appear for the appellants. (instructed by Starke Lawyers)
MR M.J. HINTON, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR S.A. McDONALD and MS T.D. McLEAN, for the respondents. (instructed by Crown Solicitor’s Office (SA))
MR S.J. GAGELER, SC (Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia): May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR C.D. BLEBY, intervening on behalf of Attorney‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
MR R.J. MEADOWS, QC (Solicitor‑General for the State of Western Australia): May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR R.M. MITCHELL, SC, intervening on behalf of the Attorney‑General for the State of Western Australia. (instructed by State Solicitor for Western Australia)
MR. M.G. SEXTON, SC (Solicitor‑General for the State of New South Wales): May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS M.L. RABSCH, intervening on behalf of the Attorney‑General for the State of New South Wales. (instructed by Crown Solicitor for New South Wales)
MS P.M. TATE, SC (Solicitor‑General for the State of Victoria): May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR S.P. DONAGHUE, intervening on behalf of the Attorney‑General for the State of Victoria. (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor)
MR W. SOFRONOFF, QC (Solicitor‑General of the State of Queensland): May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR G.P. SAMMON and MR G.J.D. DEL VILLAR, intervening on behalf of the Attorney‑General of the State of Queensland). (instructed by Crown Law – Brisbane)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Churches, you may proceed.
MR CHURCHES: If it please the Court, this matter involves the Liquor Licensing Act (SA) and from last Saturday’s Sydney Morning Herald, page 42 I quote:
As we know, the first casualty in liquor licensing debates is sobriety of expression.
The appellants will, of course, contain themselves, but I cannot speak for my numerous learned friends.
KIRBY J: May I ask a little technical question? I noted in these footnotes to the Commonwealth submission, I think it is, that there is some disparity between the reasons as expressed in our book and certified and the reasons as published in the reports. Is it simply paragraphing or is there some other more…
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- Case
- [2008] HCATrans 365
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Liquor Licensing Court had erred in its interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the *Liquor Licensing Act 1997* (SA) and the *Gaming Machines Act 1995* (SA) when refusing the licence. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the Liquor Licensing Court had correctly considered the public interest and the potential social impacts of approving a licence for a venue with a significant number of gaming machines.
The High Court's reasoning focused on the statutory framework governing liquor licensing and gaming machine approvals. It was held that the Liquor Licensing Court was required to undertake a balancing exercise, weighing the economic and social benefits of the proposed hotel against the potential harm associated with increased access to gaming machines. The court affirmed that the public interest considerations, including the potential for problem gambling, were paramount and that the Liquor Licensing Court had not misconstrued its statutory obligations in refusing the licence on these grounds. The appeal was dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter before the High Court is an appeal against a decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia in K-Generation Pty Ltd & Anor v Liquor Licensing Court. The appeal originated from a decision by the Liquor Licensing Commissioner, who refused to grant a liquor licence to the second appellant, Mr Krasnov, based on criminal intelligence. Mr Krasnov appealed this decision to the Liquor Licensing Court, which upheld the Commissioner's decision. He subsequently appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court, which also dismissed his appeal. The appellants, K-Generation Pty Ltd and Mr Krasnov, are challenging the constitutional validity of section 28A(5) of the Liquor Licensing Act (SA), which mandates that the Liquor Licensing Court and the Supreme Court must, on application by the Commissioner of Police, take steps to maintain the confidentiality of information classified as criminal intelligence by the Commissioner of Police. The appellants argue that this provision compromises the independence and impartiality of the courts, in breach of Chapter III of the Constitution, by compelling them to act in a manner that denies the applicant natural justice. The respondents, including the Liquor Licensing Court and the Commissioner of Police, maintain that the Liquor Licensing Court is a court of a State with the capacity to exercise judicial power and that the provision in question does not compromise the integrity of the court. Several states intervened in the proceedings, offering differing perspectives on the nature of the Liquor Licensing Court and the validity of the impugned legislation under Chapter III of the Constitution. The central issue in the appeal is whether section 28A(5) of the Liquor Licensing Act (SA) is constitutionally valid and does not compel the Liquor Licensing Court to act in a manner inconsistent with its institutional integrity as a Chapter III court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia exercise federal judicial power?
2. Does the classification of information as "criminal intelligence" by the Commissioner of Police objectively meet the statutory definition?
3. Can the Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia conduct a valid review of the classification of information as "criminal intelligence" under section 28A(5)?
4. Does the Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia maintain institutional independence and impartiality in accordance with the Kable principle?
5. Does section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act compromise the exercise of judicial power by the Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia?
6. Is the Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia a court within the meaning of section 77(iii) of the Constitution?
7. How does the principle stated in Kable apply to a State court other than the Supreme Court?
8. Is the power to classify information as "criminal intelligence" an administrative or judicial function?
9. Does the power to classify information as "criminal intelligence" impair the independence or impartiality of the Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia?
10. Is the Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia capable of exercising the judicial power of the State?
11. Does section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act impair the independence or impartiality of the Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia?
12. What is the appropriate remedy if section 28A is found to be invalid under the Kable principle?
Held
1. The Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia exercises federal judicial power when it imposes fines for breaches of licence conditions and the power to punish for contempt.
2. The classification of information as "criminal intelligence" by the Commissioner of Police must objectively meet the statutory definition for the classification to be valid.
3. The Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia can conduct a valid review of the classification of information as "criminal intelligence" under section 28A(5) if the information objectively meets the statutory definition.
4. The Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia maintains institutional independence and impartiality in accordance with the Kable principle, as evidenced by its ability to conduct a review and determine the weight to be given to evidence.
5. Section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act does not compromise the exercise of judicial power by the Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia, as the court can still maintain independence and impartiality.
6. The Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia is a court within the meaning of section 77(iii) of the Constitution, as it is established by State statute, comprised of judges, and exercises some measure of the judicial power of the State.
7. The principle stated in Kable applies to a State court other than the Supreme Court by requiring that the court maintain the minimum characteristics of institutional independence and impartiality to be able to exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth.
8. The power to classify information as "criminal intelligence" is an administrative function, but it can be judicial when exercised by the Liquor Licensing Court.
9. The power to classify information as "criminal intelligence" does not impair the independence or impartiality of the Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia.
10. The Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia is capable of exercising the judicial power of the State, as it is comprised of judges and has vested in it some measure of the judicial power of the State.
11. Section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act does not impair the independence or impartiality of the Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia.
12. The appropriate remedy if section 28A is found to be invalid under the Kable principle would be to excise the words "the Court or the Supreme Court" from subsection (5) to achieve the severance.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In this case, the central issue revolves around the interpretation and application of section 28A(5) of the Liquor Licensing Act (SA), and whether it imposes upon the Liquor Licensing Court of South Australia a function that compromises its institutional independence and impartiality, thereby rendering it incompatible with the requirements of Chapter III of the Constitution. The Court examined the statutory language and legislative intent to determine whether the Liquor Licensing Court could validly perform the function of maintaining the confidentiality of information classified as "criminal intelligence" by the Commissioner of Police. The appellants argued that the Liquor Licensing Court was being directed by the legislature to act in a manner inconsistent with the essential character of a court, in violation of the Kable doctrine.
The Court began by dissecting the statutory definition of "criminal intelligence" and its implications. The definition specifies information relating to actual or suspected criminal activity that, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected to prejudice criminal investigations or reveal the identity of a confidential source. The Court found that the classification of information as "criminal intelligence" is an administrative function performed by the Commissioner of Police, which must be objectively correct. This aligns with the principle in George v Rockett, where a judge faced with a challenge to the validity of such a classification must determine whether the information meets the statutory definition.
Regarding the review capacity of the Liquor Licensing Court, the Court noted that while the court could theoretically review the reasonableness of the classification, it was more practical for such a review to be conducted by the Supreme Court. However, the Court also found that section 28A(5) places a mandatory obligation on the Liquor Licensing Court to take certain steps to maintain confidentiality, including potentially hearing arguments and receiving evidence in private and in the absence of the parties. This mandatory nature was seen as a significant issue because it limited the discretion of the Liquor Licensing Court and could lead to a denial of natural justice.
The Court explored whether the Liquor Licensing Court exercises federal judicial power, as it can hear appeals from interstate applicants. This potential for federal jurisdiction necessitated that the Court consider whether the Liquor Licensing Court could maintain its institutional integrity and impartiality when executing the statutory function imposed by section 28A(5). The Court considered various authorities and precedents, including Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW), to determine the minimum essential requirements for a body to be deemed a court within the meaning of section 77(iii) of the Constitution.
In the reasoning, the Court concluded that the Liquor Licensing Court exercises some judicial power, as evidenced by its ability to impose fines and punish for contempt. This satisfied the first requirement of being a court for the purposes of the Kable doctrine. Furthermore, the Court found that the Liquor Licensing Court retains sufficient independence and impartiality, as its decisions are subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and its judges hold tenured positions under the District Court Act. The potential for the executive to intervene in the proceedings by classifying information as "criminal intelligence" does not, in the Court's view, impair the court's capacity to exercise its judicial power independently and impartially.
The Court also addressed the issue of whether the power to classify information as "criminal intelligence" is an administrative or judicial function. The Court concluded that it does not matter whether the function is administrative or judicial; the critical inquiry is whether the function impairs the independence or impartiality of the Liquor Licensing Court. Given the safeguards in place, such as the ability of the court to exercise discretion over how confidentiality is maintained and the opportunity for the applicant to challenge the classification, the Court found that section 28A does not compromise the court’s institutional integrity.
Ultimately, the Court determined that the Liquor Licensing Court is capable of exercising the judicial power of the State and that section 28A does not impair its independence or impartiality. The Court held that the Liquor Licensing Court remains a court within the meaning of section 77(iii) of the Constitution, and thus the Kable principle applies to ensure that it maintains the necessary characteristics of institutional independence and impartiality. The Court found that the provision does not render the Liquor Licensing Court incapable of being described as a court for the purposes of Chapter III.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that while section 28A of the Liquor Licensing Act imposes certain obligations on the Liquor Licensing Court, these obligations do not impair the court’s capacity to exercise its judicial power independently and impartially. The Court upheld the validity of section 28A, rejecting the argument that it compromised the integrity of the Liquor Licensing Court. The decision affirms that a State court, even one that exercises some judicial power, must maintain the characteristics of independence and impartiality to be considered a court for the purposes of Chapter III of the Constitution.