Negligence—Duty of care—Nervous shock—Motor accident—Serious injury caused by negligence of driver—Nervous shock suffered by wife after seeing husband in hospital and being told of the seriousness of his injuries—Whether duty of care owed by negligent driver to wife—Foreseeability of injury—Whether sole determinant of duty—Proximity.
Decisions
GIBBS C.J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my brother Deane. I agree with his conclusion and, in general, with his reasons. I can therefore express my own views quite shortly.
2. The respondent developed a psychiatric illness, characterised by anxiety and depression, because of what she saw and heard at the hospital to which her husband was admitted with serious injuries caused by the negligent driving of the appellant. Before the law had reached its present stage of development, the respondent would have had no right to recover damages from the appellant. She was not herself physically injured in the collision, and was not within the area of potential danger arising as a result of the appellant's negligence. She did not see or hear the accident, or its aftermath at the scene of the collision. The shock and fear (apparently well founded) that her husband might die, which caused her psychiatric illness, were caused partly by what she saw, and partly by what she was told, at the hospital on the night of the accident and on the following day. As the law relating to damages for what is somewhat crudely called "nervous shock" has limped on with cautious steps, to use the metaphor suggested by Windeyer J. in Mount Isa Mines Ltd. v. Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383, at pp 395, 403, the old and irrational limitations on the right to recover damages for an injury of this kind have one by one been removed. Finally, in McLoughlin v. O'Brian (1983) 1 AC 410, the House of Lords, taking one short step onward from Benson v. Lee (1972) VR 879 (and see Gannon v. Gray (1973) QdR 411) has held that a plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for nervous shock from a defendant whose negligent driving had caused a road accident in which the plaintiff's daughter was killed and her husband and other children were injured, notwithstanding that the plaintiff had been two miles from the scene of the accident when it occurred and did not hear of the accident until about two hours later, and did not see its consequences until she then went to the hospital. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that we should not follow this decision. With all respect, however, the decision is part of the logical progression of the development of the law already evidenced in the earlier authorities and was correct in principle.
3. The first question for decision in cases such as McLoughlin v. O'Brian and the present…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Jaensch v Coffey [1984] HCA 52
Case
[1984] HCA 52
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of South Australia in a matter involving the appellant, Jaensch, and the respondent, Coffey. The dispute arose from a motor vehicle accident in which the respondent's husband was killed. The respondent, as the widow of the deceased, brought an action against the appellant, alleging that the appellant's negligent driving caused the accident and her husband's death. The respondent also claimed damages for nervous shock suffered as a consequence of witnessing the aftermath of the accident.
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the respondent had established a duty of care owed to her by the appellant, and if so, whether the appellant's negligence had caused the respondent's psychiatric injury. Specifically, the Court had to determine the scope of the duty of care owed by a driver to persons who might suffer psychiatric harm as a result of witnessing the aftermath of an accident caused by that driver's negligence, and the principles governing the recovery of damages for nervous shock in such circumstances.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, affirmed the principles established in *Dillon v Balfour* and *Rowe v McCartney*, holding that a duty of care may be owed to a plaintiff who suffers psychiatric injury as a result of witnessing the aftermath of an accident, even if they were not present at the scene of the accident itself. The Court reasoned that foreseeability of harm to a person of normal fortitude in the plaintiff's position was a key element. The Court found that the appellant's negligence was a cause of the respondent's psychiatric injury, and that the respondent's proximity to the event, both in time and space, and her relationship to the victim were sufficient to establish a duty of care. The Court also considered the nature of the psychiatric injury, finding it to be a recognised psychiatric illness.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia.