Hananeia v Secretary, Attorney-General's Department

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hananeia v Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department [2016] FCAFC 36

Appeal from: Richard Hananeia v Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department [2015] AATA 319
File number: WAD 274 of 2015
Judges: GILMOUR, BARKER & BROMBERG JJ
Date of judgment: 11 March 2016
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – application for Australian Victim of Terrorism Overseas Payment – whether applicant was “in the place where the terrorist act occurred” for the purposes of s 1601PAA(2)(a) of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) – whether applicant suffered harm “as a direct result of” the terrorist act for the purposes of s 1601PAA(2)(b) of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth)
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44(1), s 44(7)

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 21B(1)(d)

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 4(1)

Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1972 (Vic) s 3(1)

Motor Vehicle (Third Party Insurance) Act 1943 (WA)

Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), s 3, 5(2)(db), s 85B

Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) s 35B, s 35B(1), s 1061PAA(1), s 1061PAA(2), s 1061PAA(2)(a), s 1061PAA(2)(b), s 1061PAD, s 1061PAF, Part 2.24AA

Social Security (Declared Overseas Terrorist Act) Declaration 2013 (Cth) s 35B(1)

Social Security Amendment (Supporting Australian Victims of Terrorism Overseas) Act 2012 (Cth)

Social Security (Australian Victim of Terrorism Overseas Payment) Principle 2013 (Cth) ss 14, 15

Explanatory Memorandum, Social Security Amendment (Supporting Australian Victims of Terrorism Overseas) Bill 2011 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Adams v Xypolitos [2015] VSC 747

Allianz Australia Insurance Limited v GSF Australia Pty Limited (2005) 221 CLR 568

Berichon v the Queen (2013) 40 VR 490

Best v the Queen [2015] VSCA 151

Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232

Environment Agency v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd [1999] 2 AC 22

Fagan v The Crimes Compensation Tribunal (1982) 150 CLR 666

Haber v Walker [1963] VR 339

In re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co [1921] 3 KB 560

Insurance Commission of Western Australia v Container Handlers Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 89

Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549

Kaplan v Lee-Archer (2007) 15 VR 405

Lasermax Engineering Pty Limited v QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited [2005] NSWCA 66

Liang v Chalmers [2010] VSC 241

March v E & M.H. Stramare Pty Limited (1991) 171 CLR 506

Martin v Comcare [2015] FCAFC 169

May v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2015) 322 ALR 330

Medlin v The State Government Insurance Commission (1995) 182 CLR 1

O’Loughlin v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1000

Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound) [1961] AC 388

R v Foster [2008] QCA 90
R v Foster [2009] 1 Qd R 53

RK v Mirik (2009) 21 VR 623

SD v the Queen (2013) 39 VR 487

Stephens v Giovenco [2011] NSWCA 53

Tanner v Smart [2010] VSC 463

Travel Compensation Fund v Tambree (2005) 224 CLR 627

Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Ainsworth (2001) 51 NSWLR 466

WBM v Chief Commissioner of Police [2012] VSCA 159

Date of hearing:
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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 36
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Hananeia v Secretary, Attorney-General's Department involved an appeal against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which rejected the applicant's claim for an Australian Victim of Terrorism Overseas Payment (AVTOP). The applicant was arguing that he was entitled to the payment following harm suffered during the Sari Club bombings in Bali on 12 October 2002. The AAT found that the applicant did not meet the criteria for a primary victim, specifically that he was not in the place where the terrorist act occurred and did not suffer harm as a direct result of the act. The applicant appealed the AAT's decision, challenging whether the AAT had correctly interpreted the relevant provisions of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth).

The court was required to determine whether the AAT misconstrued the Act in its interpretation of the terms "in the place where the terrorist act occurred" and "harm as a direct result of the terrorist act". Specifically, the court examined whether the AAT erred in concluding that the Prime Minister's declaration determined the location of the terrorist act and whether the AAT correctly interpreted the scope of the declared act to include the immediate aftermath of the bombings.

The court found that the AAT erred in concluding that the Prime Minister's declaration determined the location of the terrorist act. The court clarified that the declaration merely identifies the act, its location, and the date, but does not dictate the interpretation of the statutory terms. The expression "in the place where the terrorist act occurred" must be construed according to its own terms and the objectives of the Act, rather than solely by reference to the declaration. The court also noted that the term "close proximity" is open to factual determination and depends on the circumstances of each case. Regarding the harm suffered by the applicant, the court did not find it necessary to address this issue as the primary error in the AAT's decision concerned the interpretation of the location of the terrorist act.

The appeal was dismissed, and the parties were directed to file submissions on costs within seven days. The Court would decide the costs on the papers unless the parties agreed otherwise and filed a minute of consent orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed

2. The parties file submissions on costs within seven (7) days and the Court to decide costs on the papers, unless the parties otherwise agree the question of costs and file a minute of consent orders.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is only the Sari Club bombings on 12 October 2002 that are relevant to this application.The AAT decision The AAT concluded that the applicant was not a “primary victim”, as defined in s 1061PAA(2) of the Act, and therefore did not qualify for an AVTOP. A person is a primary victim of a declared overseas terrorist act if the person was in the place where the terrorist act occurred and was harmed as a direct result of the terrorist act: s 1061PAA(2) of the Act. The two requirements are conjunctional. The AAT concluded that the applicant was not in the place where the terrorist act occurred, or its close proximity: AAT reasons at [40]-[41]. It further concluded that the harm he suffered was not as a direct result of the terrorist act: AAT Reasons at [44]. As to the finding of fact concerning “place”, it held that s 35B(1) of the Act necessarily authorises the Prime Minister to specify not only the “action or threat of action” which is declared to be a “declared overseas terrorist act” but also “the place or location where the relevant “terrorist act” occurred and the date on which it occurred: at [38]. Thus, it found that the declaration relevantly declared “the act”, which was the bombings; the “place”, being the Sari Club, Kuta; and the “date”, being 12 October 2002. It followed, the AAT concluded, that, as the applicant was at the Adi Dharma Hotel, which was 600 metres in a straight line and 1.9 kilometres by the most direct route from the Sari Club, when the bombings occurred, he was not, for the purposes of s 1061PAA(2) of the Act, “at the Sari Club, Kuta”, which was the “place where the terrorist act occurred”: at [39]-[41]. As to the applicant’s harm not being “as a direct result of the terrorist act” the AAT observed that it was unnecessary to consider this question but nonetheless went on to conclude that the harm was not a direct result of the terrorist act. This was so, it reasoned, first, because he was not in the place where the terrorist act occurred and second, that he had voluntarily and unnecessarily attended the place, the Sari Club, after the terrorist act had occurred. It was his own actions in doing so which, in effect, intervened, so as to deprive the harm he suffered as being the direct result of the terrorist act: at [44]. The appeal The appeal concerns whether the AAT misconstrued ss 23(1) and 1061PAA of the Act and thereby asked itself the wrong question causing it to fail to exercise, or properly exercise, its jurisdiction. The question of law There are two grounds, namely:(a)did the AAT misconstrue the Act by finding that the declaration by the Prime Minister determined the place where the terrorist act occurred (ground 1)?(b)did the AAT misconstrue the Act by finding that a declared terrorist act that was described as bombings did not include the immediate aftermath of the bombing (ground 2)? I will deal with both grounds in a composite manner. The AAT’s conclusion at [38], that s 35B of the Act necessarily authorises the Prime Minister to specify not only the act or threat of action but also the place or location of where the terrorist act occurred and the date on which it occurred is an error of law. The conclusion misstates the effect of the provision that empowers the Prime Minister, by legislative instrument, “to declare that a terrorist act that occurs outside Australia is a declared overseas terrorist act”. The AAT used the verb “to specify”, in context, meaning, it seems “to declare” within the power conferred by s 35B. The declaration is directed to the “terrorist act”. The terrorist act, in this case, involved the explosions of two bombs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Gilmour J has set out the statutory framework under which a person is qualified for an AVTOP, the Prime Minister’s Social Security (Declared Overseas Terrorist Act) Declaration 2013 declaring the bombings at the Sari Club to be a “declared overseas terrorist act” for the purposes of s 35B(1) of the Act, and the terms of the AAT decision now under appeal. His Honour has also provided factual background to the circumstances in which the applicant came to suffer harm. I do not need to repeat these matters. In essence, the appeal involves two issues:(1)whether the AAT misconstrued the Act in finding that the applicant was not “in the place where the terrorist act occurred”; and, if so,(2)whether the AAT also erred in finding (if, indeed, it did make such a finding) that the applicant did not suffer harm as a direct result of the terrorist act. In the event that the AAT is held to have erred in both of these respects, a third issue arises as to whether this Court should decide the factual question of whether the applicant did suffer harm as a direct result of the terrorist act, or refer that question back to the AAT for determination.WAS THE APPLICANT “IN THE PLACE WHERE THE TERRORIST ACT OCCURRED”?” Generally, for the reasons given by Gilmour J at [25]‑[36] of his Honour’s reasons for judgment, I agree that the AAT erred in its determination of the question of whether the applicant was in the place where the terrorist act occurred. As Gilmour J points out, at [25]‑[33], ultimately the question is one of fact, and is not to be determined by construction of the Declaration. The Declaration identifies the terrorist act in question, including by reference to its time and location, but is not determinative of “the place where the terrorist act occurred” for the purposes of para (a) of s 1061PAA(2) of the Act. That expression must be construed according to its own terms, in the context of the Act and its objectives, and any relevant extraneous materials, and not simply by reference to the terms of the Declaration. This conclusion is supported by the terms of the Revised Explanatory Memorandum to the Social Security Amendment (Supporting Australian Victims of Terrorism Overseas) Bill 2011 (Cth) that inserted Pt 2.24AA and related sections into the Act, which sought to explain what the expression in proposed para (a) meant:Paragraph (2)(a) provides that the person must be in the place where the terrorist act occurred. The intention of paragraph (2)(a) is to disqualify persons who have watched or heard of the event through any form of public media from making a claim. Although they may be distressed by observing or hearing of the event, this is not enough to qualify for benefits.The person must be physically ‘in a place’ where the overseas terrorist act occurs. This could be in the hotel foyer, an adjacent carpark or across the road. However there must be close proximity to the overseas terrorist act. Thus it may be seen that the expression has, and is intended to have, its own operation independent of the Declaration, and that the parliamentary intent was for the benefit available under the Act to be available not only to those physically “in a place” where a terrorist act occurs, but also those in “close proximity” to that act. Just what “close proximity” means is itself open to debate and construction but no doubt involves questions of fact and degree. Despite the examples provided in the Revised Explanatory Memorandum, the ambit of that expression must depend on the facts and circumstances of each terrorist act declared under the Act.