NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
CITATION: VICTIMS COMPENSATION FUND CORPORATION v AINSWORTH & ANOR [2001] NSWCA 92
FILE NUMBER(S):
40498/00
HEARING DATE(S): 15 March 2001
JUDGMENT DATE: 10/04/2001
PARTIES:
VICTIMS COMPENSATION FUND CORPORATION v David John AINSWORTH & ANOR
JUDGMENT OF: Mason P Priestley JA Giles JA
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): DC 447/99
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Phelan DCJ
COUNSEL:
Appellant: C Lonergan
1st Respondent: S Longhurst
2nd Respondent: Submitting appearance
SOLICITORS:
Appellant: I V Knight Crown Solicitor
1st Respondent: J R Lough & Associates
CATCHWORDS:
Victims compensation - error of law on face of record - aggravation of existing condition - whether injury "as a direct result" of act of violence - limited powers of District Court when Tribunal determination set aside. (D)
LEGISLATION CITED:
DECISION:
See par 53
JUDGMENT:
THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL
CA 40498/2000
MASON P
PRIESTLEY JA
GILES JATuesday 10 April 2001
VICTIMS COMPENSATION FUND CORPORATION
v David John AINSWORTH & ANOR
JUDGMENT
MASON P: The claimant seeks orders that the record of proceedings before Judge JB Phelan in the District Court be removed into this Court and that the orders made by his Honour be quashed. Ancillary relief is claimed. The second opponent, the District Court of New South Wales, submits except as to costs.
The basis of relief is error of law on the face of the record. In this context, the record includes the reasons expressed by the District Court for its ultimate determination (see Supreme Court Act 1970, s69(4)). It is also legitimate to refer to the originating process in the District Court and the orders made by that court (see Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163). It is unnecessary to determine whether the record would extend to the originating process before the Victims Compensation Tribunal or the reasons of that Tribunal.
Background
On 11 November 1996 the first opponent, David Ainsworth, was involved in a violent incident at the Parramatta Central Motel. He was a serving Inspector of Police, although not on duty at the time.
On 19 August 1997, Mr Ainsworth lodged an application for compensation as a primary victim pursuant to the Victims Compensation Act 1996 (“the Act”). The Act applied in relation to the claim (see Schedule 3, cl 4). The relevant injury was “severe trauma” which was being treated with counselling by Mr Wenzel, a psychologist, and Dr Strum, a forensic psychiatrist.
The Act contained a Schedule of “compensable injuries” specifying a standard amount of compensation for a compensable injury (s10, Schedule 1). The compensable injury asserted by Mr Ainsworth was “shock”, a term effectively defined in Schedule 1, cl 5(b) to comprise conditions attributed to post traumatic stress disorder, depression and similar conditions. Compensation was payable only if the symptoms and disability persisted for more than 6 weeks. The amount of compensation prescribed in the Table varied with the duration of the “shock”.
The
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- Case
- [2001] NSWCA 92
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the District Court had erred in law on the face of the record by setting aside the Tribunal's determination. This involved considering the proper interpretation of the phrase "as a direct result" in the context of the *Victims Compensation Act 1987* (NSW) and whether the District Court had correctly applied the principles governing its limited powers when reviewing a Tribunal decision. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the District Court had impermissibly re-weighed the evidence or substituted its own view for that of the Tribunal.
The Supreme Court held that the District Court had indeed erred in law. It reasoned that the Tribunal's finding that the aggravation of Mr Ainsworth's condition was a direct result of the act of violence was a finding of fact open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it. The District Court, in setting aside this determination, had impermissibly engaged in a re-evaluation of the evidence rather than confining itself to identifying an error of law on the face of the record. The Court affirmed that the District Court's supervisory role over the Tribunal was limited to correcting jurisdictional errors or errors of law, not to re-making factual findings.
The Supreme Court accordingly allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the District Court, and remitted the matter to the District Court with a direction to affirm the determination of the Victims Compensation Tribunal.
Orders
Orders of the court
See par 53
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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