NEW SOUTH WALES. Action - Tort - Contract - Assault - Intentional injury - Negligence - Duty of
employer to employee-Threat by employer to "shoot someone "-Shot fired- Shock and illness suffered by employee.
The plaintiff, who was employed by the defendant, observed him handling a loaded revolver and later overheard him in his office inform one of her fellow employees that he was going to shoot himself or someone. The defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Shortly afterwards his state- ment was repeated to the plaintiff by the employee to whom it was made and the plaintiff became nervous. The defendant left his office and the plaintiff heard a shot fired, but shortly afterwards the defendant returned unharmed. Later on the same day the defendant tore up pound notes in the plaintiff's presence and said that he would not be there in the morning to mend them and that a death would be heard of. The plaintiff made a case supported by medical evidence that the defendant's conduct shocked her and caused her to
become ill. She sued the defendant for damages for negligence, breach of con- tract, and assault, and for wilfully causing her harm.
Held by Latham C.J., Rich, Dixon and McTiernan JJ. (Evatt J. dissenting), that the facts were not sufficient to constitute any of the causes of action. The injury of which the plaintiff complained was not such as might reasonably have been expected by the defendant to result from his conduct.
Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Full Court): Bunyan V. Jordan, (1936) 36 S.R. (N.S.W.) 350; 53 W.N. (N.S.W.) 130, affirmed.
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
An action was brought in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in which the plaintiff, Lucy Bunyan, claimed from the defendant, Arthur E. Jordan, the sum of £1,000 as damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by her as a result of his conduct. In the declaration it was alleged that in the presence, sight and hearing of the plaintiff, the defendant produced and aimed a revolver, and said " I am going to shoot someone"; and that this caused her such a mental shock that she became ill, and suffered consequential damage. These facts were, in separate counts, alleged to constitute alternatively causes of action in (a) negligence (b) breach of an implied promise that the shop in which the plaintiff was employed by the defendant would be and would continue to be a fit and proper place for her to work in and would not be rendered a dangerous or unfit place for such purpose by any wilful act of the defendant's and (c) assault. In the fourth count the plaintiff alleged a malicious production of a revolver in her presence, sight and hearing and the speaking of the words mentioned above, and the putting…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Continue reading Bunyan v Jordan
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
AGLC
Bunyan v Jordan [1937] HCA 5
Case
[1937] HCA 5
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The plaintiff, an employee of the defendant, sued for damages after suffering shock and illness allegedly caused by the defendant's conduct. The dispute arose when the plaintiff observed the defendant, who was under the influence of alcohol, handling a loaded revolver and heard him state he intended to shoot someone. Later, the plaintiff heard a shot fired and subsequently witnessed the defendant tear up banknotes, making ominous remarks. The plaintiff claimed negligence, breach of contract, assault, and wilful harm.
The High Court was required to determine whether the facts presented were sufficient to establish any of the causes of action pleaded by the plaintiff. Specifically, the court considered whether the defendant's actions were such that injury to the plaintiff could reasonably have been foreseen, and whether a legal duty was owed by the defendant to the plaintiff to avoid causing such harm. The court also examined whether the defendant's conduct amounted to a wilful act calculated to cause injury, even if not directed at the plaintiff personally.
The majority of the High Court, comprising Latham C.J., Rich, Dixon, and McTiernan JJ., held that the facts were insufficient to constitute any of the pleaded causes of action. Their reasoning centred on the principle that a defendant is generally only liable for consequences that a reasonable person might have anticipated. The court found no evidence that the defendant's conduct was likely to cause serious illness to a person in the plaintiff's position, nor that the defendant was aware of any particular susceptibility of the plaintiff to nervous shock. The actions, while potentially alarming, were not considered to be of a nature that would reasonably lead to the severe illness suffered by the plaintiff. Evatt J. dissented, finding that the evidence could support a jury's conclusion that the defendant wilfully alarmed the plaintiff through his unlawful act, causing her injury.
The appeal was dismissed, affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. There was no order as to costs.