Hancock v Nominal Defendant

Case [2001] QCA 227


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: Hancock v Nominal Defendant [2001] QCA 227
PARTIES: DAVID JOHN HANCOCK
(plaintiff/respondent)
v
PAUL HARRISON WALLACE
(first defendant)
THE NOMINAL DEFENDANT
(second defendant/appellant)
FILE NO/S: Appeal No 2634 of 2000
DC No 1170 of 1998
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON: 8 June 2001
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 8 November 2000
JUDGES: McMurdo P, Davies JA and Byrne J
Separate reasons of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made.
ORDER: Appeal dismissed with costs.
CATCHWORDS:

TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – ESSENTIALS OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE – WHERE NERVOUS SHOCK OR MENTAL DISORDER – COMMON LAW – where respondent’s son was killed by the negligent driving of the first defendant – where respondent was informed of the accident the following morning – where initial uncertainty due to impossibility of visual identification as to whether it was the driver or passenger that had been killed – where respondent’s relationship to his son was very close – where effect on the respondent of the receipt of the news was immediate and serious – whether a person who negligently causes injury or death to another owes a duty of care to a third person not present at the scene of the incident or its aftermath not to cause psychiatric injury to that person in consequence of hearing about it – consideration of reasonable foreseeability and proximity elements – whether policy considerations compel the imposition of the requirement of direct perception of the relevant incident or its immediate aftermath – consideration of elements involved in "sudden sensory perception"

DAMAGES – MEASURE AND REMOTENESS OF DAMAGES IN ACTIONS FOR TORT – MENTAL AND NERVOUS SHOCK – COMMON LAW – where respondent awarded damages for psychiatric injury formerly called nervous shock – whether allowance should have been made for the grief which the respondent would ordinarily have suffered and for its consequences

Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310, considered
Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2000) WAR 35, considered
Donaghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, referred to
Coates v GIO of New South Wales (1995) 36 NSWLR 1, considered
Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549, considered
Barnard v Santam BPK (1999) (1) SA 202 (SCA), considered
McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410, followed
Morgan v Tame (2000) 49 NSWLR 21, considered
Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383, referred to
Petrie v Dowling [1992] 1 QdR 661, considered
Pham v Lawson (1997) 68 SASR 357, considered
Reeve v Brisbane City Council [1995] 2 QdR 661, considered

White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455, considered

COUNSEL: R J Douglas SC, with K N Wilson for appellant
J W Lee for respondent
SOLICITORS: O'Shea Corser & Wadley for appellant
Goodfellow & Scott for respondent
  1. McMURDO P:  I agree with the reasons for judgment…

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Hancock v Nominal Defendant [2001] QCA 227
Case
[2001] QCA 227
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Hancock v Nominal Defendant, the court was presented with a case involving a claim for damages due to psychiatric injury caused by the negligent actions of another. The respondent, who was not physically present at the scene of the accident, alleged that he suffered severe mental distress upon learning the following morning that his son had been killed by the negligent driving of the first defendant. The immediate and serious impact of this news resulted in the respondent seeking compensation for the psychiatric injury he sustained. The court was tasked with determining whether a person who negligently causes injury or death to another owes a duty of care to a third party not present at the scene, to prevent causing psychiatric injury through hearing about the incident. The court also needed to consider the principles of reasonable foreseeability and proximity, and whether these principles necessitate a requirement of direct perception of the incident or its immediate aftermath. Additionally, the court had to assess the appropriate measure and remoteness of damages in actions for tort, specifically considering whether the respondent should be compensated for the grief he would ordinarily have suffered and its consequences.

The court examined the established legal principles surrounding claims for psychiatric injury in tort law, focusing on the elements of reasonable foreseeability and proximity. It considered whether the respondent's claim was sufficiently proximate to the defendant's negligent act to establish a duty of care. The court deliberated on whether policy considerations, such as the need to prevent an indeterminate extent of liability, required a stricter requirement of direct perception of the incident or its immediate aftermath. Furthermore, the court evaluated the appropriate measure of damages, deliberating whether to include compensation for the ordinary grief the respondent would have experienced, in addition to the psychiatric injury caused by the shock of learning about the accident. The court concluded that the respondent's psychiatric injury was foreseeable and that the relationship between the parties and the immediacy of the shock were sufficient to establish a duty of care. The court determined that the respondent was entitled to compensation for his psychiatric injury, but not for the ordinary grief associated with his son's death.

The court dismissed the appeal with costs, affirming the lower court's decision that the respondent was entitled to compensation for his psychiatric injury. The court held that the elements of reasonable foreseeability and proximity were satisfied, and that policy considerations did not necessitate a requirement for direct perception of the incident or its immediate aftermath. Consequently, the respondent was awarded damages for his psychiatric injury, reflecting the serious impact of learning about his son's death. The court did not, however, allow for compensation for the ordinary grief the respondent would have experienced, as this was deemed separate from the psychiatric injury caused by the shock of the news. The court's decision underscored the importance of distinguishing between different types of emotional responses in determining the appropriate measure of damages in claims for psychiatric injury.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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