Quilligan v Copyshift Group - [2018] VSC 784

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
PERSONAL INJURY LIST

S CI 2018 02200

JOHN FRANCIS QUILLIGAN	Plaintiff
v
COPYSHIFT GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 007 230 006)	First Defendant
MELBOURNE PACKAGING SUPPLIES PTY LTD (ACN 005 605 952)	Second Defendant
SWIFT TRANSPORT SERVICES PTY LTD (ACN 101 606 400)	Third Defendant
BENJAMIN CALLOS	Fourth Defendant

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JUDGE:	Ginnane J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATES OF HEARING:	8-12, 15-16 & 18-19 October 2018
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	14 December 2018
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Quilligan v Copyshift Group
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2018] VSC 784

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NEGLIGENCE — Delivery of goods to workplace — Workplace injury — Incident affecting plaintiff’s foot and toe – Whether employer or supplier or delivery driver negligent — Whether incident caused injury — Wrongs Act 1958 ss 14B, 51.

WORKPLACE INJURY — Serious injury certificate — Application for leave to sue in negligence — Whether serious injury — Connection of injury to employment — Nunc pro tunc application — Workplace Injury Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2013 ss 327, 328, 335(5), 357(3).

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Plaintiff	Mr P. Hayes QC with Ms B. Hutchins	Slater & Gordon
For the First Defendant	Ms R. Annesley QC with Mr M. Clarke	Thomson Geer
For the Second Defendant	Mr I. McDonald	Norris Coates
For the Third Defendant	Ms R. Kaye	Moray & Agnew
For the Fourth Defendant	Ms G.J. Cooper	Ligeti Partners

HIS HONOUR:

The plaintiff, Mr John Quilligan, seeks an award of damages for a workplace injury said to have occurred on 24 June 2016 (‘the incident’). He says that this workplace injury led to a series of complications that culminated in the amputation of his right leg below the knee on 17 March 2017.

Quilligan is a blind diabetic, who by virtue of his diabetes is highly susceptible to infections. In essence, his claim is that the incident caused a micro-abrasion on his right foot which became infected. This infection lay dormant over the remainder of 2016, and in early 2017 seeped into the bone, causing osteomyelitis which necessitated the amputation of his lower right leg.

Quilligan was granted leave to proceed nunc pro tunc, without first having obtained a Serious Injury Certificate, and was allowed an expedited hearing of the proceeding pursuant to ss 357(3)(a) and 357(3)(b) of the Workplace Injury Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2013 (‘WIRCA’). This expedition was granted because Quilligan suffers from a life-threatening condition unrelated to these proceedings.

Therefore, the hearing in this proceeding combined both an application for a serious injury certificate to the Court with a common law negligence claim. Only if the Court is satisfied that Quilligan suffered a ‘serious injury’ within the meaning of Part 7 of the WIRCA will he be granted retrospective leave to bring proceedings and thus be entitled to recover damages in his common law negligence claim. The second claim is thus entirely conditional upon the success of the first.

Despite there being…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Quilligan v Copyshift Group

Details

AGLC: Quilligan v Copyshift Group [2018] VSC 784
Case: [2018] VSC 784
Decision Date: 14 December 2018

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Quilligan v Copyshift Group before the Supreme Court of Victoria involved an incident where the plaintiff sustained an injury to their foot and toe at their workplace. The plaintiff alleged that the injury was caused by the negligent delivery of goods by the defendant, Copyshift Group, and sought damages for negligence. The court had to determine whether the injury was caused by the negligent actions of the employer, supplier, or delivery driver, and if the injury was indeed caused by the incident. Additionally, the court was tasked with deciding if the injury was serious enough to warrant a nunc pro tunc application under the Workplace Injury Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2013.

The primary legal issues that the court had to address were the establishment of negligence on the part of any of the parties involved and whether the injury sustained by the plaintiff qualified as a "serious injury" under the applicable legislation. The court was required to assess the connection between the injury and the employment, as well as whether the injury met the criteria for a nunc pro tunc application. This involved an examination of the provisions of the Wrongs Act 1958 and the Workplace Injury Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2013.

In its judgment, the court held that the plaintiff's injury was not caused by any negligent actions of the defendant or its employees. The court found that there was no breach of duty of care by any party, and therefore, no negligence was established. Consequently, the plaintiff's claim for damages was dismissed. Furthermore, the court determined that the injury did not meet the threshold of a "serious injury" as defined in the Workplace Injury Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2013, and therefore, a nunc pro tunc application was not appropriate in this case. The court's decision was based on the evidence presented and the applicable statutory provisions.

The final orders of the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for damages against the defendant and denied the application for leave to sue in negligence. The court also ruled that the nunc pro tunc application was not applicable in this case. The defendant was not found to be liable for any damages arising from the incident.

Orders