Glencore Coal Assets Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Glencore Coal Assets Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal [2020] FCAFC 145

Review of: Application by Port of Newcastle Operations Pty Ltd [2019] ACompT 1
File numbers: NSD 1986 of 2019
VID 1285 of 2019
Judges: ALLSOP CJ, BEACH AND COLVIN JJ
Date of judgment: 24 August 2020
Catchwords:

COMPETITION – applications for review of decision of the Australian Competition Tribunal (Tribunal) reviewing decision of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) – where ACCC made an arbitration determination pursuant to s 44S of Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) – where Tribunal conducted a “re-arbitration” pursuant to s 44ZP of the CCA – where declared service is the right to access and use monopoly infrastructure assets at Port of Newcastle – where access dispute concerns quantum of charges levied for access and use of declared service and proper scope of application of such charges – whether Tribunal erred in determining how declared service is to be interpreted and appropriate scope of application of arbitration determination – whether scope can be justified by reference to the underlying State legislation being the Ports and Maritime Administration Act 1995 (NSW) – where parties agreed to use building block model and depreciated optimised replacement cost methodology to calculate regulated asset base – whether Tribunal erred in deciding that contributions of service users should not be deducted when calculating regulated asset base – meaning of “extensions” in s 44X(1)(e) of the CCA – application of pricing principles in s 44ZZCA and criteria in s 44X(1) of the CCA – whether assessment is forward-looking – appropriate relief – whether matter should be remitted to Tribunal pursuant to s 44ZR(4) of the CCA

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for judicial review of decision of Australian Competition Tribunal (Tribunal) by Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) – where ACCC made arbitration determination pursuant to s 44S of Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) – where Tribunal conducted a “re-arbitration” pursuant to s 44ZP of the CCA – where ACCC sought declaration that Tribunal erred – whether ACCC can seek review pursuant to s 163A(3) of the CCA

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) ss 44AA, 44CA, 44F, 44G, 44H, 44K, 44PC, 44S, 44V, 44W, 44X, 44Y, 44Z, 44ZD, 44ZF, 44ZN, 44ZNB, 44ZO, 44ZP, 44ZQ, 44ZR, 44ZZCA, 87CA, 163A, Part IIIA

Competition and Consumer Amendment (Competition Policy Review) Act 2017 (Cth)

Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Ports and Maritime Administration Act 1995 (NSW) ss 3, 47, 48, 52, 58, 59, 60, 61, 66A, 66B, 66C, 67, Part 5, Divisions 2–6A

Trade Practices Amendment (National Access Regime) Act 2006 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (Northern Territory) [2009] HCA 41; 239 CLR 27

Application by Glencore Coal Pty Ltd [2016] ACompT 6

ASP Ship Management Pty…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 145
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Glencore Coal Assets Australia Pty Ltd challenged a decision of the Australian Competition Tribunal (Tribunal) which had reviewed a determination made by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The dispute centred around the interpretation of a declared service, specifically the right to access and use monopoly infrastructure assets at Port of Newcastle. The access dispute involved the quantum of charges levied for access and the proper scope of application of such charges. The primary legal issues were whether the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of the declared service and the appropriate scope of application of the arbitration determination. Additionally, the court considered whether the scope of the charges could be justified by reference to the underlying State legislation, the Ports and Maritime Administration Act 1995 (NSW). The case also examined the methodology used to calculate the regulated asset base and whether contributions from service users should be deducted. The ACCC sought to intervene in the proceedings, arguing it had a public interest in ensuring the proper interpretation of the legislation.

The Federal Court held that the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation of the declared service and the scope of the charges. The court found that the Tribunal failed to consider user contributions, which were relevant to determining the appropriate level of efficient costs. The court also determined that the pricing principles in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) required a focus on economic efficiency and investment incentives. The court dismissed the ACCC's application to intervene, finding that the ACCC's primary relief sought a direct benefit to Glencore, which was a party to the original arbitration. The court found that the ACCC's standing to intervene was not established under the statutory provisions cited.

The court allowed Glencore's application, dismissed the ACCC's application, and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for further determination on the identified issues. The court ordered that the reasons for judgment not be disclosed to anyone other than the parties, their legal representatives, and the Tribunal, to allow for any applications to redact or suppress parts of the reasons before publication.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. Within 7 days, each party file a minute of its proposed orders as to costs.

3. Within 14 days, each party file submissions of no more than 3 pages addressing its proposed orders as to costs, with the question to be dealt with on the papers unless the Court orders otherwise.

4. In order to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the reasons for judgment herein not be disclosed to anyone other than the parties and their legal representatives and the Tribunal in order that any party may make an application to redact or suppress any part of the reasons, any such application to be filed and served on or before 4pm Wednesday 26 August 2020. If no application be made by that time, the Court will publish its reasons without qualification. If any application be made within that time, the Court will determine the question of publication with or without any qualification in the resolution of that application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow we would allow the application by Glencore as to both issues raised by its application, dismiss the application by the ACCC and remit the matter to the Tribunal for further determination as to the matters identified in these reasons.Background and an introductory explanation of the issues The Hunter Valley coal industry, including its associated supply chain, is one of the largest coal export operations in the world. It includes coal miners as producers who export their coal, rail haulage and rail track providers, coal export terminals (including by Port Waratah Coal Services (PWCS)), and associated port facilities. In May 2014, PNO took over the operation of the Port by commercial arrangements with the State of New South Wales as part of the privatisation of State assets. The Port is not limited to the loading and movement of coal, but that is a significant part of the business of the Port. Newcastle is the largest coal exporting port in the world. The Port is the only commercially viable means of exporting coal from the Hunter Valley. The shipping channels are a natural “bottleneck” monopoly. Access to and use of the Port and its shipping channels are thus necessary for the export of coal from the Hunter Valley. These matters are expressed at an appropriate degree of generality conformable with understanding the place of the Port and its shipping channels as an essential feature of the relevant economic activity and markets associated with the mining and export of coal. This is how a differently constituted Tribunal discussed the matter in Application by Glencore Coal Pty Ltd [2016] ACompT 6. That decision concerned the declaration of the Service under s 44K of the Act. It is the terms and conditions for access to this Service that were the subject of the disagreement between Glencore and PNO, and that were the subject of the arbitration by the ACCC and of the re-arbitration by the Tribunal (in respect of which re-arbitration determination the two present applications are brought). In that earlier decision, the Tribunal set aside the decision of the Acting Federal Treasurer made on 8 January 2016 not to declare the Service. The Tribunal’s decision was affirmed by this Court in Port of Newcastle Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal [2017] FCAFC 124; 253 FCR 115. The expression of the Service in the decision of the Acting Federal Treasurer and by the earlier Tribunal in its determination was in the terms applied for by Glencore in its application, made on 13 May 2015 under s 44F of the Act, to the National Competition Council (NCC) for a recommendation by the NCC to the designated Minister. On 2 November 2015, the NCC had recommended that the Service not be declared, and on 8 January 2016 the Acting Federal Treasurer had made his decision not to declare the Service.The first issue: the scope of the determination The terms of the expression of the Service loom large in these applications, especially in the application brought by Glencore. Looking at the matter at the level of generality with which the matter has been expressed above, the commercial and competitive considerations might appear to be tolerably straightforward in the following respects: coal miners and exporters need to have access to and use the Port and the Service (being the shipping channels) for the export of their coal. There may be competition between coal-loading facilities (there being three), but there are only the monopolistically controlled (by PNO) shipping channels (including berths next to wharves as part of the channels) available to be used to load and to carry coal out of the Port to foreign ports of discharge. Looking at the matter thus, the relevant access or use of the Service was of those who wished to export coal.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In short, our conclusions about legal error extend to include the final alternative conclusion by the Tribunal at [365].Conclusion as to issue 2 With respect to the Tribunal, it has been demonstrated that there was an error of law by the Tribunal in failing to have regard to the user contributions on the basis that such contributions could not be relevant to the determination of an appropriate level of efficient costs. Various provisions in s 44X(l) required the Tribunal to consider whether there were user contributions of a character that should be brought to account in determining the price and terms of access.Issue 3: the application by the ACCC As we have noted, Glencore and the ACCC each brought separate applications challenging the Tribunal’s decision. Glencore’s application relied upon the statutory right to appeal by way of review expressed in s 44ZR(1) of the Act. It raised both the scope and user contribution issues. The application by the ACCC sought to invoke three separate aspects of the Court’s jurisdiction. First, the ACCC claimed to be a “person aggrieved” by the decision of the Tribunal for the purposes of s 5 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). Second, it also claimed to be a person with a “special interest” who had standing to allege jurisdictional error and invoke the jurisdiction conferred by s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Third, it relied upon s 163A(3) of the Act which provides that the ACCC may institute a proceeding in the Court seeking the making of a declaration. The ACCC submitted that there is a public interest in seeing an important aspect of Part IIIA properly interpreted. It said that it has a statutorily recognised public interest function in bringing proceedings to clarify the operation of the legislation. So much can be accepted. However, the proceedings that it commenced alleged that the contextual application of the legal principles for which it contends in the adjudication of the private dispute between Glencore and PNO should lead to a variation of the Tribunal’s determination in a manner that would reinstate the ACCC’s determination of the appropriate charge. In short, the primary relief it sought was an adjustment to the price that Glencore would pay. It also sought a declaration that the Tribunal erred by holding that the NSC should be based on the value of the assets used to provide the Service, without any adjustment for those assets not paid for by the service provider. Relief of that kind provided a direct and peculiar benefit to Glencore as the outcome of a statutory arbitral process; and in circumstances where Glencore was advancing that position for itself, in its own interests. Division 3 of Part IIIA provides for the resolution of a dispute between the provider of a declared service and a third party who wants access to the service. The arbitration is to be conducted by the ACCC. It has powers to terminate the arbitration in certain circumstances, including where the dispute was vexatious or its subject matter was trivial, misconceived or lacked substance: s 44Y. The ACCC is to be constituted by two or more members for the purposes of conducting the arbitration: s 44Z. The arbitration must be conducted in private, unless the parties agree to a public hearing: s 44ZD. The parties may be charged by the ACCC for its costs of conducting the arbitration: s 44ZN.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the result, examination of the context shows that s 44X(l)(e) appears to have its origins in language adopted in the Competition Principles Agreement concerning matters to which there must be regard in any independent process for the determination of the terms and conditions of access. To the extent that a comparison between that language and the language as enacted assists, it appears to indicate that the reference to the value of extensions was not to be confined to extensions made in particular circumstances (whether by agreement between the access seeker and the access provider or by reason of the terms of an access determination). Further, the pricing principles in s 44ZZCA were introduced to ensure that there was a focus upon the matters stated in the objects clause added as s 44AA, namely economic efficiency and investment incentives, when determining the price on which access was to be provided.The text and structure of the Part IIIA provisions concerning declaration of a service In Sydney Airport 155 FCR at 132–136 [23]–[32], the Full Court discussed the text and structure of important parts of Part IIIA in the form in which it stood in 2006. Importantly since then, the terms of s 44G and s 44H have been amended by the removal of the criteria for the decisions of the NCC and the designated Minister in s 44G(2) and s 44H(4), respectively and the introduction in 2017 (by Act number 114 of 2017 with effect from 6 November 2017) of s 44CA containing the “declaration criteria”. Relevant to the position of the parties here, though not relevant to these applications, was the placement into the declaration criterion in s 44CA(l)(a) of the words “on reasonable terms and conditions, as a result of a declaration of the service” being words that did not previously appear in s 44G(2)(a) or s 44H(4)(a). The introduction of those words was directed to the decision in Sydney Airport 155 FCR at 146–148 [76]–[89] that s 44H(4)(a) (and so necessarily s 44G(2)(a)) required a comparison of the future state of competition with the right or ability to access the service with that future state of competition without any such right or ability or with restricted right or ability. It did not require a comparison of the current factual position with a future position. Thus, whilst the effect of the declaration itself on competition (as it factually existed) might be relevant to consider, it was not mandated by the Act. As can be seen from s 44CA(l)(a) the effect of the declaration is now a mandatory consideration. The importance of the operation of this change to the parties (but not to these applications) is that the declaration of the Service made by the Tribunal in 2016 was revoked in September 2018, by operation of s 44J(7) of the Act, after the Minister received a recommendation from the NCC that the declaration be revoked. The importance of the construction of the previous terms of s 44G(2)(a) and s 44H(4)(a) by the Full Court in Sydney Airport to the declaration of the Service by the Tribunal in 2016 can be seen in the Tribunal’s reasons: Application by Glencore Coal Pty Ltd [2016] ACompT 6 at [57]–[102].The terms and nature of the Service