ASP Ship Management Pty Limited v Administrative Appeals Tribunal

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ASP Ship Management Pty Limited v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2006] FCAFC 23

SHIPPING AND NAVIGATION – who is the operator of a ship – proper approach to apply the phrase “operated by” in s 10 of Navigation Act 1912

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – incorrect question addressed in application of s 10 of the Navigation Act 1912

WORKERS COMPENSATION – proper approach to the application of the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) by reference to the application of Part 2 of the Navigation Act through s 10 thereof.

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (UK)

Navigation Act 1912 (Cth)

Navigation Amendment Act 1979 (Cth)

Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth)

Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Cth)

Australasian United Steamship Navigation Co Ltd v Shipping Control Board (1945) 71 CLR 508 applied

Baumwoll Manufactur Von Scheibler v Christopher Furness [1893] AC 8 applied

Behnke v Bede Shipping Co Ltd [1927] 1 KB 649 referred to

Braverus Maritime Inc v Port Kembla Coal Terminal [2005] FCAFC 246 referred

CMA CGM SA v Classica Shipping Co Ltd [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 50 referred to
CMA CGM v Classica [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 460 referred to

Colvin v Newberry (1832) 1 Cl & F 283; 6 ER 923 applied

Director General of Social Security v Chaney (1980) 47 FLR 80 referred to

Frost v Warner (2002) 209 CLR 509 cited

McDermid v Nash Dredging Ltd  [1986] 1 QB 965 referred to

McLellan v Gumm (1866-67) LR 2 Ch App 290 referred to

Sandeman v Scurr (1866) LR 2 QB 86 applied

The ‘Berge Tasta’ [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 422 referred to

The ‘Gregos’ [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 335; [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 followed

The ‘Guiseppe Vittorio’ [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 136 applied

The ‘Hill Harmony’ [2001] 1 AC 638 referred to

The ‘Peonia’ [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 100 referred to

United States v Cornell Steamboat Co 267 US 281 (1925) applied

United States v Shea 152 US 178 (1894) applied

1924 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels
1957 International Convention relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Seagoing Ships
1976 Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Convention

Brodie’s Dictionary of Shipping Terms (4th Ed)

ISM Code:  A Practical Guide to the Legal and Insurance Implications (London, Lloyd’s 1998)

Sullivan’s Marine Encyclopaedic Dictionary (6th Ed)

Sullivan’s Marine Encyclopaedic Dictionary (2nd Ed)

ASP SHIP MANAGEMENT PTY LIMITED v ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

NSD 997 OF 2005

MERMAID LABOUR & MANAGEMENT LIMITED v ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL & ANOR

NSD 998 OF 2005

ASP SHIP MANAGEMENT PTY LIMITED v GERT BERGVALL

NSD 706 OF 2005

MERMAID LABOUR & MANAGEMENT LIMITED v SHANE ANTHONY KELK

NSD 708 OF 2005

BLACK CJ, EMMETT & ALLSOP JJ
10 MARCH 2006
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD997 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

ASP SHIP MANAGEMENT PTY LIMITED
APPLICANT

AND:

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCAFC 23
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court was between ASP Ship Management Pty Limited and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). ASP, a ship management company, sought a review of decisions made by the AAT in relation to compensation claims under the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992. The disputes centred around whether the AAT had jurisdiction to review the compensation claims, specifically if the ships involved were deemed to be "operated" by ASP, which would then make them liable for the compensation claims under the Act.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the AAT had the jurisdiction to review the compensation claims, which depended on whether the ships in question were being operated by ASP. The court had to interpret the term "operated by" in section 10 of the Navigation Act to determine if ASP was the operator of the ships, thereby making them liable for the claims. This interpretation was crucial as it would define the scope of ASP's responsibilities and liabilities under the Act.

The court examined the meaning of "operated by" by considering the various definitions provided in the Oxford English Dictionary Online and how the term has been used in maritime contexts and related legislation. It noted that the term could either refer to the physical operation of the ship or the operation of the enterprise in which the ship is engaged. The court also considered the historical context and the intent of the 1979 Amendment Act, which included provisions to ensure that the operator of a ship, not just the owner, could be held liable for maritime claims. The court concluded that the AAT had jurisdiction to review the claims if the ships were being operated by ASP.

The court found in favour of ASP, determining that the AAT had the jurisdiction to review the compensation claims. It issued orders prohibiting the AAT from considering the merits of the claims unless it found that the ships were being operated by ASP at the time of the injuries. The court also directed that the proceedings stand over for argument on costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. There be an order, in the nature of prohibition, that the first respondent not enter upon a consideration of the merits of the application by the second respondent under the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) unless and until it finds, according to law, that M T Flinders was being operated by the applicant at the time of the injury to the second respondent.

2. The proceeding stand over to a date to be fixed for argument as to costs.

1. There be an order, in the nature of prohibition, that the first respondent not enter upon a consideration of the merits of the application by the second respondent under the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) unless and until it finds, according to law, that M V Lorelay was being operated by the applicant at the time of the injury to the second respondent.

2. The proceeding stand over to a date to be fixed for argument as to costs.

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The proceeding stand over to a date to be fixed for argument as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

By clause 8a of the Memorandum of Understanding, it was agreed that Allseas Construction would provide a permanent master for the duration of the project who would be the ‘person in command’ and would have responsibility for the management and supervision of Lorelay’s operations and safety. By clause 8b, it was agreed that, in addition to the permanent master, an Australian master would be employed as ‘deputy’ to the permanent master and would have responsibility for the management and safety of Lorelay in his role as deputy. THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISIONS The Tribunal determined to decide, as a preliminary question before embarking on any consideration of the merits of the claims for compensation, whether or not there was a reviewable decision in each proceeding. Each of ASP and Mermaid (together ‘the Employers’) asserted before the Tribunal that there had not been a reviewable decision under the Compensation Act such as to confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal. Each contended that s 88 of the Compensation Act had no application. ASP asserted that Mr Bergvall was not a seafarer because Flinders was not a ship to which Part II of the Navigation Act applied and Mermaid asserted that Mr Kelk was not a seafarer because Lorelay was not a ship to which Part II of the Navigation Act applied. The Employers were the only relevant Australian entities for the purposes of s 10 and each asserted that the respective ship was not operated by it. On the other hand, Mr Bergvall asserted that Flinders was operated by ASP, whether or not in association with another entity, and Mr Kelk asserted that Lorelay was operated by Mermaid, whether or not in association with another entity. The Tribunal described the problem as a novel one, although recognising that the use of a procurer of labour for shipboard service was not a new practice. What was seen as novel was that the procurer of the labour was to remain the employer of the persons who became the crew, whilst another party directed the ship. The Tribunal decided that each proceeding involved a reviewable decision and that, accordingly, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the deemed disallowances of the claims for compensation. The Tribunal directed itself to s 10 of the Navigation Act. The phrase ‘operated by’ was said to be illuminated by the seventh and eighth meanings (of 11 meanings) given by the Oxford English Dictionary Online, as follows:‘7.trans. Orig. U.S. to cause or direct the functioning of; to control the working of (a machine, boat, etc.).8.trans. Orig. U.S. to manage, to direct the operation of (a business, enterprise, etc.); to carry out or through, apply (a principle, a tradition, etc).’The Tribunal used those meanings to ‘highlight the competing possible meanings’, as follows:Does the phrase refer to the physical operation of the ship or does it refer to the operation of the enterprise in which the ship is engaged? The Tribunal examined how the verb ‘operate’ and the noun ‘operator’ have been used in maritime contexts, in particular in the development of the law (domestic and international) concerning limitation of liability for maritime claims. It was noted that the classes of persons entitled to limit had grown from owners to include charterers (not merely by demise), persons interested in the ship, persons in possession of the ship and the manager or operator of the ship.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister’s speech on the second reading of the Bill for the 1979 Amendment Act included the following:One important amendment extends the references in the Act to the owner of a ship to include a reference to the operator, except in a few special circumstances. This is to ensure that where a duty or liability is imposed by the Act on the owner, responsibility for ensuring that that duty or liability is discharged is imposed on the person who is directly concerned with the relevant operations, for example, a bareboat charterer, as well as on the owner. Conversely, a benefit conferred on the owner will also, in appropriate cases, be available to the operator. Other amendments empower the Minister to make orders in relation to detailed technical requirements to be applied under the Act, so that such requirements can be quickly implemented, or varied without delay; in the light of ship casualties, equipment failure investigations, or technical developments. There are a number of amendments relating to the engagement and discharge of seamen and certain of the conditions of their employment, mainly to cater for modern developments in the industry. (Australia, House of Representatives, Debates, vol HR116, p 2179)[Emphasis added.] The Explanatory Notes on the Bill for the 1979 Amendment Act, circulated by the Minister for Transport, pointed out that the Bill consisted of a series of amendments for a number of different purposes. Two of the main subjects of the amendments were said to be: Manning; and·Qualifications of seafarers. The general comments in the Explanatory Notes included the following in relation to those subjects:ManningThe Bill contains new manning provisions in place of the existing provisions which were designed for the shipping industry of half a century ago. These provisions will come into force in two stages. Initially, action will be taken to remove the outdated schedules and other inflexible provisions of the Act. This will pave the way for the second stage which is to enable the Minister to specify detailed requirements as to the minimum numbers and qualifications of officers and seamen to be carried to the extent that it appears necessary in the interests of safety or protection of the marine environment. These provisions call for the laying down in the regulations of parameters on which the minimum manning will be based and will not come into force before these have been fully developed and included in the regulations.Qualifications of SeafarersHere too the Bill repeals outmoded provisions and in their place provides broad enabling powers under which necessary standards of competence will be specified by regulation or order. Training, examination and certificates of competency are covered. There will be a new structure for such certificates which has been developed in conjunction with the industry and which is designed to meet present-day needs. Section 4 of the 1979 Amendment Act inserted various new and amended definitions, including s 6(4), to which reference has already been made. The Explanatory Notes contain the following in relation to that provision:The effect of this sub-section is that, where a ship or vessel is being operated by a person other than the owner, provisions in the Act that refer to the owner (except those where a contrary intention appears, e.g. collision loss and damage liability in Division 11 of Part IV, wreck removal in section 329 and salvage matters in Divisions 3 and 4 of Part VII), will apply equally to the operator. In many cases it is more appropriate that the operator rather than the owner should be responsible. It will materially assist in prosecutions in certain circumstances for the company directly responsible for the operating of the ship to be made liable for breaches of the Act, e.g. where the actual owner is not within jurisdiction.[Emphasis added.]