HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY AND HAYNE JJ
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS APPELLANT
AND
B RESPONDENT
Director of Public Prosecutions v B (A51-1997) [1998] HCA 45
23 July 1998
ORDER
Appeal allowed.
Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia answering the questions reserved by Mohr J under s 350 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) and in lieu thereof order that it is inappropriate to answer either of the questions reserved.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of South Australia
Representation:
B M Selway QC (Solicitor-General for the State of South Australia) with R F Gray for the appellant (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions, South Australia)
M L Abbott QC with J A English for the respondent (instructed by Legal
Services Commission of South Australia)
2.
Intervener:
J R McKechnie QC with R M Mitchell intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Western Australia (instructed by Crown Solicitor for Western Australia)
Notice: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
CATCHWORDS
Director of Public Prosecutions v B
Criminal law – Practice and procedure – Prosecution attempted to enter nolle prosequi – Whether court has power to refuse to accept entry of nolle prosequi – Jurisdiction of Full Court of Supreme Court to answer questions reserved – Whether questions arose "at the trial" – Time at which criminal trial upon an information begins – No power to issue advisory opinion.
Words and phrases – "at the trial".
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), ss 285A, 350.
GAUDRON, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ. On 28 November 1994, the respondent was arraigned before Judge Lowrie in the District Court of South Australia on an information alleging six counts of sexual offences against a young girl. He pleaded not guilty and his trial was adjourned to be heard at a date to be fixed. In July 1995 he applied for leave to elect for trial by judge alone but that application was adjourned for hearing by the trial judge at the commencement of the trial which was fixed for 11 July 1995. On 6 July 1995, the matter was transferred to the Supreme Court pursuant to s 110 of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA).
On 10 July 1995, the day before the trial was fixed to begin, the matter was called on before the judge assigned to hear the trial (Mohr J). The application for leave to elect for trial by judge alone was not pursued. The proceeding was adjourned to 11 July 1995.
On that day, before the accused was arraigned, counsel for the prosecution told the judge there had been a problem contacting the complainant; neither the complainant nor her mother were present at court. The Crown, therefore, sought to have the matter taken from the trial list. This the judge refused. Counsel for the prosecution took instructions and then told the…
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- Case
- [1998] HCA 45
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court were whether the trial judge had the jurisdiction to reserve the questions of law for the Full Court, and if so, whether a court has the power to refuse to accept a nolle prosequi entered by the DPP, and if such a power exists, what limitations apply to its exercise. The central question was whether the questions reserved by Mohr J arose "at the trial" as required by the relevant legislation.
The High Court determined that the trial judge did not have the jurisdiction to reserve the questions of law for the Full Court because no trial had commenced at the time the nolle prosequi was rejected. In South Australia, a criminal trial begins upon arraignment of the accused. The DPP conceded that the respondent had not been arraigned when Mohr J purported to reject the nolle prosequi. Therefore, the questions reserved did not arise "at the trial".
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia. In lieu of the Full Court's answers, the High Court ordered that it was inappropriate to answer either of the questions reserved.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
Appeal allowed.
2.
Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia answering the questions reserved by Mohr J under s 350 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) and in lieu thereof order that it is inappropriate to answer either of the questions reserved.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GAUDRON, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ, HUGH J,
Mohr J then invited B's counsel to apply for a trial by judge alone. The application was made and granted. B was arraigned before Mohr J and pleaded not guilty to all the counts on the information. At his Honour's suggestion, the prosecution tendered no evidence. His Honour found B not guilty on all of the counts. On the DPP's application under s 350(1a) of the Act, his Honour reserved for the consideration of the Full Court the following two questions of law:(i) Do I have the power to refuse to accept a nolle prosequi entered by the Director of Public Prosecutions?; and(ii) If the answer to the first question is yes, are there any limitations on the exercise of that power?The Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of South Australia (Debelle, Mullighan and Nyland JJ) answered the two questions: "Yes" and "Yes"[36]. Their Honours do not appear to have considered the question whether the trial judge had jurisdiction to reserve the two questions of law for consideration by the Full Court.The trial judge did not have jurisdiction to reserve the two questions of law for consideration by the Full Court[36]Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 3 of 1995) (1996) 66 SASR 450. At all material times, s 350(1a) of the Act provided[37]:"Where a person is tried on information and acquitted, the court shall, on the application of the Attorney-General or the Director of Public Prosecutions, reserve any question of law arising at the trial for the consideration and determination of the Full Court."Section 351(1) provided:"In any of the cases referred to in section 350, the presiding judge shall state a case setting forth the question reserved, with the circumstances on which it has arisen, and shall sign the case and transmit it within a reasonable time to the Full Court."[37]Section 348 defined "Full Court" as meaning "the Supreme Court constituted of an uneven number of judges, not being less than three". In the present case, Mohr J had jurisdiction to reserve the two questions of law only if they were questions "arising at the trial". However, no "trial" had begun when Mohr J purported to reject the entry of the nolle prosequi. At that time, the respondent had not been arraigned before Mohr J. In South Australia, the trial of an accused does not commence before the accused is arraigned before the judge who will hear or preside at the trial of the indictment. As King CJ (with whom Millhouse J agreed) said in Attorney-General's Reference No 1 of 1988[38]:"In this State … the trial commences when the accused having been arraigned before the judge who is to try him, that judge embarks upon the hearing and determination of any preliminary questions or upon the empanelling of the jury."[38](1988) 49 SASR 1 at 5-6. The reasoning of King CJ applies to the facts of this case and shows that there was no trial in progress when Mohr J decided to refuse to accept the entry of the nolle prosequi. Indeed, the DPP concedes that the trial had not commenced when Mohr J purported to reject the nolle prosequi. Notwithstanding this concession, the DPP contends that the question of whether the trial judge had power to reject the nolle prosequi was "a question which arose at the trial" because counsel could have maintained an objection to the rejection of the nolle prosequi after the trial had properly commenced. This argument must be rejected.