QUEENSLAND. Crown Lands (Q.)-Land Appeal Court-Appeal from Land Court-Appeal are.
hearing-Case stated-Principles regulating-The Land Acts 1910 to 1953 (Q.), 88 36, 154, 155. July 19,20,
An appeal to the Land Appeal Court under The Land Acts 1910 to 1953 (Q.) 23, 24;
is an appeal by way of re-hearing. Aug. 1.
Principles regulating the contents of cases stated, referred to. Decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland (Full Court), reversed.
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of Queensland.
This was an appeal brought as of right by the Crown in right of the State of Queensland from an order of the Supreme Court of Queens- land (Macrossan C.J., Mansfield S.P.J. and Hanger J.) whereby answers were given to certain questions contained in a case stated by the Land Appeal Court and an order of the Land Court was restored.
The relevant facts fully appear in the judgment of the Court hereunder.
A.L. Bennett Q.C. and C. F. Fairleigh, for the appellant. H. T. Gibbs and P. Connolly, for the respondent,
THE COURT delivered the following written judgment - An appeal as of right is brought by the Crown to this Court from an order of the Supreme Court of Queensland by which answers were given to certain questions contained in a case stated by the Land Appeal Court and an order of the Land Court was restored. The case was stated pursuant to S. 36 (1) of The Land Acts 1910 to 1953 (Q.). That sub-section provides that any person aggrieved by a decision of the Land Appeal Court who desires to appeal therefrom on the ground that the decision is erroneous in point of law, or is in excess of jurisdiction, may within six weeks after the pronouncing of the decision apply in writing to such court to state and sign a case setting forth the facts and grounds of decision for appeal thereon to the Full Court of the Supreme Court. The case is to be transmitted to the Supreme Court and there, as S. 38 provides, the Full Court must determine every question of law arising thereon and may remit the matter to the Land Appeal Court with the opinion of the Full Court thereon or make such other order in relation to the matter as seems proper.
The case now under consideration was stated on the application of the respondents in this appeal. They were holders of a Prickly-pear Development Grazing Homestead selection containing 10,527 acres, which as on 1st December 1951 was resumed by the Governor in Council under S. 145 of The Land Acts. The compensation to which they became entitled in accordance with sub-s. (3) of that section was assessed by the Land Court pursuant to S. 29. The amount of compensation was determined at £21,850. From that determination the Crown appealed under S. 36 to the Land Appeal Court. The appeal…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
R v Rigby [1956] HCA 38
Case
[1956] HCA 38
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
This case involved an appeal by the Crown to the High Court of Australia from an order of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The Supreme Court had answered questions in a case stated by the Land Appeal Court and restored an order of the Land Court. The dispute concerned the assessment of compensation payable to the respondents, who were leaseholders of a resumed grazing homestead selection. The Land Court had assessed compensation at £21,850, but the Land Appeal Court reduced this to £16,800. The case stated to the Supreme Court arose from the respondents' dissatisfaction with the Land Appeal Court's decision.
The High Court was required to determine whether the Supreme Court had correctly answered the questions posed in the case stated, and in doing so, to consider the nature of appeals to the Land Appeal Court and the requirements for a valid case stated under The Land Acts 1910 to 1953 (Q.). Specifically, the court needed to assess whether the Land Appeal Court's decision involved errors of law, particularly concerning the interpretation and application of sections 154 and 155 relating to land clearing and improvements, and section 72 concerning a leaseholder's priority right upon resumption. The court also had to consider whether the case stated adequately set forth the facts and grounds of decision as required by the legislation.
The High Court reasoned that an appeal to the Land Appeal Court is a re-hearing, not merely a review of errors of law or fact by the primary tribunal. It found that the case stated was fundamentally flawed, failing to set forth the ultimate facts found by the Land Appeal Court and instead annexing evidence and arguments. The court held that a case stated must present the facts from which legal consequences flow, and that the Supreme Court was not at liberty to draw inferences of fact or determine questions of fact. While acknowledging that errors of law might have occurred in the Land Appeal Court's application of sections 154 and 155, the defective case stated prevented the High Court from definitively identifying or resolving them.
The High Court allowed the appeal, discharged the order of the Supreme Court, and set aside the purported case stated. It ordered that the Land Appeal Court restate the case, unless the respondents elected not to proceed, to clearly set forth the facts as found by the court and the grounds of its decision, particularly concerning the application of sections 154 and 155 and the treatment of the priority right under section 72. Liberty was granted to apply for further relief, and no order was made as to costs.