Rapson v WorkCover Corporation

Case [2007] SASC 172

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court: Case Stated)

RAPSON v WORKCOVER CORPORATION

[2007] SASC 172

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Duggan, The Honourable Justice White and The Honourable Justice Kelly)

17 May 2007

WORKERS' COMPENSATION - PROCEEDINGS TO OBTAIN COMPENSATION - DETERMINATION OF CLAIMS - APPEALS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STATED CASES - STATED CASE

Decision on questions of law referred for the opinion of the Full Court by the Workers Compensation Tribunal - Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA), s 86A - questions referred in the course of an appeal from a judicial determination of a claim for compensation - whether questions appropriate for referral to the Full Court - discussion of principles.

Held:  questions inappropriate for referral to the Full Court - Court declines to answer any of the questions.

Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA), s 30, s 53, s 86A, s 91, Part 6B, referred to.
Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) v B (1998) 194 CLR 566; Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334; Re Alcoota Land Claim No 146 (1998) 82 FCR 391; Pearce v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1978) 20 ALR 354; TransAdelaide v Karanicos  (Unreported, Supreme Court of SA, Full Court, Judgment No 5536, 3 April 1996); State of South Australia v Brophy (1997) 68 SASR 97, applied.
Rapson v WorkCover Corporation [2005] SAWCT 105; Rapson v WorkCover Corporation [2006] SAWCT 48, discussed.
R v Gee (2003) 212 CLR 230; Mack v The Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) (1920) 28 CLR 373; Dickson v The Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1925) 36 CLR 489; R v Rigby (1956) 100 CLR 146; Australian National Railways Commission v Beesley (1999) 73 SASR 414; Corporation Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319, considered.

RAPSON v WORKCOVER CORPORATION
[2007] SASC 172

Full Court:  Duggan, White and Kelly JJ

  1. DUGGAN J:         I would decline to answer the questions referred to this Court by the Tribunal.

  2. I agree with the reasons of White J.

  3. WHITE J:             This is a decision on questions of law referred by the Full Bench of the Workers Compensation Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) on 15 January 2007 for the opinion of this Court.[1]

    [1]    Pursuant to the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) s 86A.

  4. In my opinion, it is inappropriate for this Court to answer any of the four questions which were referred. My reasons for that conclusion follow.

    Background Circumstances

  5. The questions were referred by the Tribunal in the course of its consideration of an appeal from the judicial determination of a claim for compensation by the widow of a deceased worker. They are contained in a document entitled “Case Stated” and it is convenient to continue to refer to the referral in that manner.

  6. The statement of facts in the Case Stated is brief, namely:

    Kevin Rapson was killed in a motor vehicle accident on the evening of 30 September 2003, during…

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Rapson v WorkCover Corporation [2007] SASC 172
Case
[2007] SASC 172
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Rapson v WorkCover Corporation, the Workers Compensation Tribunal referred questions of law to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia for its opinion. The underlying dispute involves a claim for workers' compensation by the widow of Kevin Rapson, who was killed in a motor vehicle accident while traveling home from a worksite. The central legal issue revolves around whether the accident falls within the compensable scope of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA). Specifically, the Tribunal sought clarification on whether the journey Mr Rapson was undertaking at the time of the accident met the criteria set out in section 30(5) of the Act.

The questions posed by the Tribunal required the Full Court to determine whether the accident was compensable under the Act. The Tribunal's referral highlighted uncertainties in interpreting section 30(5) of the Act, particularly regarding the distinction between a journey being "in the course of employment" and "carrying out duties of employment." The Tribunal wanted to ensure that the factual findings adequately addressed these criteria before proceeding further. The Full Court's analysis focused on whether the questions were appropriate for referral and if they could be answered by the Court without making additional factual findings.

The Full Court concluded that it was inappropriate to answer the questions referred by the Tribunal. The Court reasoned that the questions required factual findings that were not adequately addressed in the initial determination by the Tribunal. Instead, the Full Court recommended that the matter should be remitted to the single member for further findings of fact. This decision underscores the importance of ensuring that all relevant facts are established before a court can properly address questions of law. The Full Court's decision also highlighted the need for the Tribunal to consider its options, including whether the inadequacy in the factual findings warranted a judicial review under section 86(1) of the WRCA.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

In my opinion, it is inappropriate for this Court to answer any of the four questions which were referred. My reasons for that conclusion follow.Background Circumstances The questions were referred by the Tribunal in the course of its consideration of an appeal from the judicial determination of a claim for compensation by the widow of a deceased worker. They are contained in a document entitled “Case Stated” and it is convenient to continue to refer to the referral in that manner. The statement of facts in the Case Stated is brief, namely:Kevin Rapson was killed in a motor vehicle accident on the evening of 30 September 2003, during the course of the journey from a farming property at which he had been working for F Westphal Nominees Pty Ltd and his residence.Mr Rapson was driving the motor vehicle, which was owned by Westphal.At the time of the accident Mr Rapson was accompanied by a co-employee Mr Cother, who had left his vehicle at Mr Rapson’s residence. This vehicle was also owned by Westphal. Hence Mr Rapson’s journey to his residence was not only for the purpose of returning home but was also for the purpose of transporting Mr Cother to the place at which his vehicle had been parked. Further background circumstances can be found in the reasons of the single member of the Tribunal[2] and in a document entitled “Preliminary Views” published by the Full Bench.[3] From those documents, it can be seen that Mr Rapson resided in the town of Frances, close to the South Australian-Victorian border in the South-East of this State. Mr Cother resided in Victoria near Minimay, approximately 25 kilometres from Frances. The employer owned several farm properties in western Victoria as well as in the South-East. On 30 September 2003 Mr Rapson and Mr Cother were carrying out work on a property at Wolseley in South Australia, approximately 50 kilometres north of Frances. Both Mr Cother and Mr Rapson had employer‑supplied work utilities. Each could have driven separately to the Wolseley property. However the employer had instructed them that they should travel together. It seems that in accordance with this instruction, Mr Cother drove his vehicle from Minimay to Frances and left it (presumably by arrangement) at Mr Rapson’s home. It seems that he then accompanied Mr Rapson to the Wolseley property and, at the completion of the work, was accompanying him back to Frances for the purposes of retrieving his own vehicle. The accident causing the fatal injuries to Mr Rapson occurred in the course of that journey.[2] Rapson v WorkCover Corporation [2005] SAWCT 105.[3] Rapson v WorkCover Corporation [2006] SAWCT 48. Following its statement of the facts, the Case Stated continued under the heading “The Issue”:Section 30 of the Act sets out the general conditions under which a disability is compensable for the purposes of the Act. It relevantly provides as follows:-“30.(1) Subject to this Act, a disability is compensable if it arises from employment.(2) Subject to this section, a disability arises from employment if-(a)In the case of a disability that is not a secondary disability or a disease – it arises out of or in the course of employment;…(5)A disability that arises out of, or in the course of, a journey arises from employment only if –(a)the journey is undertaken in the course of carrying out duties of employment; or(b)the journey is between –(i)the worker’s place of residence and place of employment; or(ii)the worker’s place of residence or place of employment and –(A)an education institution the worker attends under the terms of an apprenticeship or other legal obligation, or at the employer’s request or with the employer’s approval; or(B)a place the worker attends to receive a medical service, to obtain a medical report or certificate (or to be examined for that purpose), to participate in a rehabilitation program, or to apply for, or receive, compensation for a compensable disability,and there is a real and substantial connection between the employment and the accident out of which the disability arises.(6)However, the fact that the worker has an accident in the course of a journey to or from work does not in itself establish a connection between the accident and the employment for the purposes of subsection (5)(b). …”The issue that divides the parties is whether the circumstances of Mr Rapson’s accident are compensable for the purposes of the Act.The approach of the learned Senior Judge in the decision under appeal seems to reflect an understanding that:-(i)the accident occurred in the course of a journey that was a journey for the purposes of s 30(5)(ii)s 30(5) is an exclusive code that applies to such journeys(iii)as such it was not sufficient that at the time of the accident Mr Rapson might have been in the course of his employment – what mattered was whether at the time he was carrying out the duties of his employment(iv)the concept of “duties of employment” is a narrower one than “in the course of employment”.The decisions of the Full Supreme Court in TransAdelaide v Karanicos (unreported Supreme Court of SA Doyle CJ, Millhouse and Williams JJ, S5536 of 1996, delivered 3 April 1996) and State of South Australia v Brophy (1997) 58 SASR 97 have left open a number of questions about the proper interpretation of s30(5) of the Act.Accordingly in consultation with the parties, we have resolved to exercise the powers conferred upon us by s86(A) of the Act to seek the guidance of the Full Court of the Supreme Court and to seek its answers to the following questions;

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

It will be a matter for the Full Bench of the Tribunal to consider whether or not it has power to remit the matter back to the single member for further findings of fact. If it is not satisfied that such a power exists, it may then have to consider other alternatives, including the question of whether an inadequacy in the factual findings at first instance raises a question of law for the purposes of s 86(1) of the WRCA.Conclusion For the reasons given above, I would decline to answer any of the questions referred by the Tribunal for the opinion of this Court. KELLY J: I agree with the orders proposed by White J for the reasons he has given.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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