HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
KIEFEL CJ,
BELL, KEANE, NETTLE AND GORDON JJPAUL OLAF GRAJEWSKI APPELLANT
AND
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (NSW) RESPONDENT
Grajewski v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)
[2019] HCA 8
13 March 2019
S141/2018
ORDER
1.Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales dated 24 October 2017 and in lieu thereof order that the questions submitted to the Court of Criminal Appeal by Judge Bright be answered as follows:
Can these facts support a finding of guilt for an offence contrary to section 195(1)(a), Crimes Act, 1900?
No.
In particular, was the evidence capable of proving beyond reasonable doubt that Ship Loader 2 had been damaged by the conduct of Paul Olaf GRAJEWSKI?
Unnecessary to answer.
3.Quash the conviction and sentence of the District Court at Newcastle on 29 May 2017 on the appeal to the District Court.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales
Representation
T A Game SC with A T S Dawson SC and N D Funnell for the appellant (instructed by O'Brien Criminal & Civil Solicitors)
D T Kell SC with E Jones for the respondent (instructed by Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW))
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
Criminal law – Appeal against conviction – Question of law referred to Court of Criminal Appeal – Case stated – Destroying or damaging property – Physical element of offence – Where appellant harnessed himself to ship loader – Where ship loader shut down due to safety concerns – Where ship loader inoperable until appellant removed – Where no alteration to physical integrity of ship loader – Whether property damaged.
Words and phrases – "destroys or damages", "impairment of value", "physical derangement", "temporary functional derangement".
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 195(1).
KIEFEL CJ, BELL, KEANE AND GORDON JJ. A person who intentionally or recklessly destroys or damages property belonging to another (or to that person and another) commits an offence contrary to s 195(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). This appeal is concerned with the physical element of the offence. In issue is whether a person can be said to destroy or damage a thing if the person's conduct does not occasion any alteration to the physical integrity of the thing.
Mr Grajewski, a protestor, harnessed himself to a ship loader at a coal terminal. Mr Grajewski was at risk of serious harm while he remained in this position. The ship loader was shut down as Mr Grajewski commenced to climb the machine and remained shut down until he was removed. Mr Grajewski was charged with an offence against s 195(1)(a), particularised as doing "damage [to] property causing the temporary impairment of the working machinery" of Ship Loader 2. He was convicted of this offence in the Newcastle Local Court, and fined a sum of $1,000.
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- Case
- [2019] HCA 8
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the High Court was whether the appellant's conduct, which temporarily prevented the ship loader from operating as designed without causing any physical alteration to its structure, amounted to "damaging" the property within the meaning of s 195(1)(a) of the Crimes Act. This required the Court to interpret the meaning of "damages" in the context of property law and criminal offences, specifically considering whether a temporary functional derangement, without physical alteration, could satisfy the physical element of the offence.
The High Court, in allowing the appeal, determined that the appellant's actions did not constitute damage to the ship loader under s 195(1)(a) of the Crimes Act. The Court reasoned that the offence of damaging property requires a physical impairment of the property's value or utility. While acknowledging that damage can include temporary functional derangement, it held that this must involve some physical interference with the property itself, such as an alteration to its mechanism or physical attachment that affects its functionality. In this case, the appellant's attachment, while rendering the machine inoperable, did not physically alter or damage the ship loader in a manner contemplated by the legislation. The Court concluded that the evidence was not capable of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the ship loader had been damaged. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were quashed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales dated 24 October 2017 and in lieu thereof order that the questions submitted to the Court of Criminal Appeal by Judge Bright be answered as follows:
Can these facts support a finding of guilt for an offence contrary to section 195(1)(a), Crimes Act, 1900?
No.
In particular, was the evidence capable of proving beyond reasonable doubt that Ship Loader 2 had been damaged by the conduct of Paul Olaf GRAJEWSKI?
Unnecessary to answer.
3. Quash the conviction and sentence of the District Court at Newcastle on 29 May 2017 on the appeal to the District Court.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: KIEFEL CJ, BELL, KEANE AND GORDON JJ, NETTLE J
The central issue in this case was whether the appellant's conduct in locking himself to the coal loading machine constituted damaging property within s 195(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The Court of Criminal Appeal had found that the appellant's actions amounted to damaging property, but the High Court found otherwise. The High Court held that the appellant's physical attachment to the ship loader, which rendered it incapable of being operated safely, constituted damaging property within the meaning of s 195(1)(a). The Court found that damage in the relevant sense includes physical interference with property which, by bearing on its mechanism, prevents it being operated as it was designed to do. The Court further found that there is no apparent reason in principle to suppose a legislative intention to exclude physical interference with property which, although it does not bear on the mechanism, does by its physical attachment to the machine render the property incapable of operating as it was designed to do.
The Court of Criminal Appeal had interpreted the term "damages" under s 195(1)(a) of the Crimes Act to mean "impairment of value", which the High Court found to be incorrect. The High Court held that the term "damages" should be interpreted in its ordinary and natural meaning, which includes physical interference with property that affects its functionality. The High Court found that the Parliament intended to criminalise physical interference with property that affects its functionality, whether or not the effect on functionality is the result of physical impact.
The High Court also found that the appellant's actions in physically attaching himself to the ship loader constituted a form of physical interference that affected its functionality. The Court found that the temporary functional derangement of the ship loader by the appellant's actions fell within the definition of damaging property under s 195(1)(a) of the Crimes Act. The Court held that the Parliament did not intend to exclude cases of physical interference with property that affects its functionality but do not result from physical impact.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the term "damages" under s 195(1)(a) of the Crimes Act should be interpreted in its ordinary and natural meaning, which includes physical interference with property that affects its functionality. The Parliament intended to criminalise physical interference with property that affects its functionality, whether or not the effect on functionality is the result of physical impact. The Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation of "damages" under s 195(1)(a) of the Crimes Act was found to be incorrect. The High Court's decision in this case provides clarity on the meaning of the term "damages" under s 195(1)(a) of the Crimes Act and the Parliament's intention in criminalising physical interference with property that affects its functionality.